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OF
SRĪNIVĀSA

(COMMENTARIES ON THE BRAHMA-SŪTRAS)
(DOCTRINES OF NIMBĀRKA AND HIS FOLLOWERS)

EXPOUNDED BY
ROMA BOSE, M.A., D.Phil. (Oxon)

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PREFACE.

The Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal accepted Dr. Roma Bose's (Choudhury) doctoral dissertation on Vedānta-Pārijāta-Saurabha of Nimbārka and Vedānta-Kaustubha of Śrinivāsa for publication in the Bibliotheca Indica Series and the printing of the first volume was completed early in 1940. When the second volume was printed off in 1941, the two volumes together came to 884 pages, Royal Svo. Dr. B. S. Guha, the then General Secretary hoped to publish Indexes for both the volumes at the end of Vol. II, but the Indexes were not ready and as the third volume would give a general survey of the life and thoughts of Nimbārka, we found it convenient to print the Indexes of all the three volumes together at the end of Vol. III.


The learned author has given a lucid and comprehensive exposition of the doctrinal as well as the historical problems of the Nimbārka school in its entirety. Opening with a brief survey of the life of Nimbārka, the author discusses briefly the date as well as the specific works of the great philosopher. The rest of the book is devoted to a detailed analysis of the doctrines of Nimbārka and his followers (pp. 18-279). Incidentally the author institutes comparison of the doctrine of Nimbarka with some other Bhedābheda (unity in plurality) doctrines as coming from Rāmānuja, Bhāskara, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva. A résumé of the various doctrines was then given, bringing out the inherent similarities and dissimilarities. The various rituals of the Nimbārka sect were finally described and an evaluation of Nimbārka's system was made in the concluding section of the book. An exhaustive bibliography has been added and the Index to all the three volumes will facilitate, let us hope, further studies along the line chalked out by the author whom we congratulate on the completion of her monumental work. *Brahmavādinī* was a well-known and well-merited title held by several *femmes savantes* of the later Vedic age and the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, the pioneer institution in the revival of ancient Indian culture, may take legitimate pride in the fact of setting its seal on the merits of the exposition of Brahmavāda by a brilliant woman scholar of modern India.

KALIDAS NAG,

General Secretary,

Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal.

21st October, 1943.



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LIFE OF NIMBĀRKA

Nothing much is known for certain about the life of Nimbārka. He was believed to be an incarnation of the Sudarśana-cakra (disc) of Lord Viṣṇu, born on earth for suppressing the heretical doctrines, then prevalent, and for preaching the holy Vaiṣṇava religion.¹ He was a Tailaṅga Brāhmaṇa born in Teliṅga,² in the Sudarśana-āśrama, situated on the bank of Devanadī.³ According to a different account,

¹ V.K., p. 1, Kāśī ed.; V.R.M., p. 1; S.J., p. 1; S.S., p. 1; A.S., quoted in Ā.C., p. 35, cf. also S.R., pp. 124-125; G.M., p. 1; V.M., p. 1; L.M., p. 1; Preface to V.P.S., p. 3, C.S.S. ed.; Preface to Ś.K., p. 4; Ś.M.M., p. 2; Ś.M., pp. 1-2; Bh.P., quoted in the Preface to V.P.S., p. 2, Kāśī ed.

The account given in Ā.C., pp. 42-48, is as follows:—

Once all the sages were assailed with doubt as to whether the pravṛtti-mārga was better or the nivṛtti-mārga, and they approached Brahmā with this question. Brahmā took them to Lord Aniruddha on the bank of the Kṣīra-sāgara and requested him to point out the right path to the sages. Thereupon, an unseen voice declared from heaven that to the Lord and to His devotees the nivṛtti-mārga was preferable, and that He should teach the nivṛtti-mārga to the world. Being satisfied, the sages went away. Then the Lord summoned His own Sudarśana-cakra—a part of Himself—and commanded him to descend on earth to revive and teach the Bhāgavata-dharma, which was waning and which he could learn from Nārada, and spread it all around. Accordingly the Sudarśana-cakra was born as the son of Aruṇa and Jayantī.

The account given in Bh.P. is much the same, omitting only the first portion, viz., the going of the sages to Brahmā, etc.

The account given in Naimiṣa-khaṇḍa, as quoted in Ā.C., pp. 34-35, is as follows:—

At the end of the Tretā-yuga, the Brāhmaṇas, being afraid of the Asuras, prayed to the Lord Hari. They also prayed to Brahmā, who himself prayed to Lord Hari again. Thereupon Lord Hari gave him His own Sudarśana-cakra for the protection of the Brāhmaṇas. Sudarśana descended on earth as a sage, called Havirdhāna or Niyamānanda.

² V.R.M., p. 1.

Teliṅga is the country along the coast south of Orissa as far as Madras.

According to one account, Nimbārka was born in a village called Muṅgi-pātana in Tailaṅga; Ś.N., p. 2, and p. 2 footnote; cf. also Ś.N.M., p. 2.

³ Bh.P., quoted in the Preface to V.P.S., p. 2, Kāśī ed. Devanadī is identified with the river Godāvarī in Southern India (vide G.M., p. 47).

In A.S. it is said that Nimbārka was born in a village called Nimbagrāma near Govardhana. Govardhana is a celebrated hill in Vṛndāvana or the country about Mathurā.



however, he was born in Vṛndāvana, on the bank of Sūryaputrī or Yamunā.¹

According to one account he was born in the month of Kārtika in the evening of the full-moon night,² while according to another, he was born in the month of Vaiśākha on the third day of the bright half of the moon.³

His father's name was Aruṇa, and his mother's Jayantī.⁴ According to a different account, however, his father's name was Jagannātha, and his mother's Sarasvatī.⁵

¹ Ā.C., p. 48.

Note that Puruṣottama, who was the fourth in succession from Nimbārka, states in the introductory part of his V.R.M. that Nimbārka was born in Teliṅga (Southern India), but Puruṣottama, the author of Ā.C., holds that Nimbārka was born in Vṛndāvana (Northern India).

British Museum Catalogue (Supplementary catalogue of Sanskrit, Pali and Prakrit books, 1928) makes Puruṣottama, the author of V.R.M., identical with Puruṣottama, the author of Ā.C. (vide p. 819). But this is not really the case, as will be clear from the following evidence:—

The Ā.C. begins thus:—

Once several highly learned men like Svabhūdeva and the like approached the great sage *Harivyāsadeva* in the Dhruvakṣetra in Mathurā, and wanted to hear the biography of Nimbārka, the founder of their sect. Thereupon, Harivyāsadeva first made obeisance to his guru *Śrībhaṭṭa* and began to tell them about the life and doings of Nimbārka, etc. (Ā.C., pp. 1-4).

This shows that Puruṣottama, the author of Ā.C., must have flourished *subsequent to* Śrībhaṭṭa, Harivyāsadeva, and Svabhūdeva. But Śrībhaṭṭa was the thirty-first in succession from Nimbārka, Harivyāsadeva, the thirty-second and Svabhūdeva, the thirty-third, while Puruṣottama, the author of V.R.M., was only the fourth (vide pp. 105-106 of the thesis, Part 1). This proves conclusively that Puruṣottama, the author of Ā.C., was other than Puruṣottama, the author of V.R.M.

² Ā.C., p. 48; Bh.P., quoted in the Preface to the V.P.S., p. 2, Kāśī ed.; Ś.N.M., p. 2.

³ Ś.K., p. 3; A.S., quoted in Ā.C., p. 35, etc. Vaiśākha is the April-May month.

⁴ Ā.C., p. 48; A.S., quoted in Ā.C., p. 35, also given in S.R., pp. 124-125; Preface to Ś.K., p. 4; Preface to V.P.S., p. 3, C.S.S. ed.; Bh.P., quoted in the Preface to V.P.S., p. 2, Kāśī ed. (according to it, Aruṇa belonged to the Bhṛgu clan); Ś.N.M., p. 2; Ś.N., p. 2.

⁵ Ś.K., p. 3.

It is interesting to note that the account given by Harivyāsadeva in his Ś.K. tallies with that given by Audumbara Ṛṣi in A.S. regarding the time of Nimbārka's birth (viz. the month of Vaiśākha) and his father's name (viz. Jagannātha), but differs from it regarding his mother's name, which the latter gives as "Vaijayantī".

Eggeling's identification of Nimbārka with Bhāskarācārya is wrong.¹ His disciples never refer to him as Bhāskara, but always as Niyamānanda or Nimbārka.² It will be shown later on that Bhāskara and Nimbārka were two different persons representing two different schools of thought altogether.

According to tradition, Nimbārka had some other names as well, viz. Āruṇi, because he was the son of Āruṇa³; "Jayanteya", because he was the son of Jayantī⁴; "Haripriya", because he was very dear to the Lord, being His incarnation⁵; "Havirdhāna", because he was a supporter and a nourisher of the haviṣ, or sacrificial *ghee*⁶; and "Sudarśana", because he was an incarnation of the Sudarśana-cakra of the Lord.⁷

His most well-known names are, however, the first two, viz. Niyamānanda and Nimbārka. Various etymological explanations of the first name have been given by his disciples,⁸ and several legends are connected with the second.

We do not know, and have no means of knowing, whether the parents of Nimbārka each bore two names: Āruṇa and Jagannātha, Jayantī and Sarasvatī.

¹ I.O.C. of Sanskrit MSS., Part IV, 1894, p. 802.

² Śrīnivāsa, V.K., pp. 1-2—Nimbabhāskara and Niyamānanda; Puruṣottama, V.R.M., p. 1—Niyamānanda; Devācārya, S.J., pp. 2, 6—Niyamānanda; Sundarabhāṭṭa, S.S., p. 1—Niyamānanda; Keśavakāśmīribhāṭṭa, T.P., p. 1—Nimbārka; Harivyāsadeva, Ś.K., p. 3—Nimbāditya and Nimbārka; Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava I, Ś.K., pp. 1, 148—Niyamānanda; Anantarāma, V.M., p. 1—Niyamānanda.

Cf. also Gopāla Śāstrī, Preface to Ś.K., p. 4—Niyamānanda; Vindhyaśvarī-prasāda Dvivedin, Preface to V.P.S., K.S.S., p. 3—Nimbārka; Kiśorī Dāsa, Ś.N.M., p. 2 and Ś.N., pp. 1, 2, etc.

³ Ā.C., p. 56. This name, it is said, was given to Nimbārka by Brahmā. See footnote 1, p. 6 of the thesis, Part 1.

⁴ *Op. cit.*

⁵ Ā.C., p. 61. This name, it is said, was given to Nimbārka by Nārada.

Keśavakāśmīrin, at the end of his T.P., p. 380, refers to Nimbārka as "Haripriya", but the word seems to be used as an adjective rather than as a pronoun.

⁶ Naimiṣa-khaṇḍa, quoted in Ā.C., p. 35; Sanmohanatantra, quoted in Ā.C., p. 37. Kṛṣṇa-upaniṣad, quoted in Ā.C., p. 39.

⁷ Naimiṣa-khaṇḍa, quoted in Ā.C., p. 34; Kāñcī-khaṇḍa, quoted in Ā.C., p. 37.

⁸ L.S., p. 1. He was called "Niyamānanda" because (cf. the commentary on L.S., p. 3) he brought all people under his control, or because he devoted (controlled) himself to supreme bhakti of the Lord.

Vide G.M. also, p. 2, on L.S.; various explanations given, such as, He was niyama, because he controlled (niyamayati) those who deviated from the path of

According to one account, when the boy was about five years old, Father Brahmā went to the hermitage of the sage Aruṇa, in the guise of an ascetic. The sage was not at home at that time, and Jayantī, as the hostess, respectfully offered some refreshment to the guest. But as it was past sunset, the ascetic refused to comply with her request. Thereupon, the boy approached the ascetic and said: "Reverend Sir, do be pleased to accept our hospitality, for look, the sun is still lingering over the yonder Nimba-tree", and showed him the sun, shining as bright as ever over the said tree. But when the ascetic finished his meal, he was astonished to find that it was really past midnight. Thereupon Brahmā, being pleased, gave the boy the name "Nimbārka" because he had shown him the sun (arka) over the Nimba-tree long after sunset.¹

According to a different account, once a great and learned Daṇḍin (or a Jaina ascetic, according to another account) visited our sage, and the two were engaged in controversial discussions till sunset. Then the sage offered some refreshment to the visitor, but as the sun was already setting, the mendicant was obliged to decline. Thereupon the great sage arrested the further descent of the sun, and ordered it to stay over a yonder Nimba-tree till the guest had taken

religion, and he was ānanda because he gladdened (ānandayati) the heart of his devotees; and so on.

Ā.C., p. 56. He was called "Niyamānanda" because he expounded the Law, i.e. the Veda.

S.P. p. 2 and S.S., p. 4. He was called "Niyamānanda" because the Bliss (ānanda, i.e. Brahman) taught by him universally (niyamena) manifests the world; i.e. because he was the teacher of the highest truth, viz. Brahman.

Keśavakāśmīrin, in the Maṅgala-pāṭha of his T.P., p. 1, gives an etymological explanation of the word "Nimbārka", viz. he was like a medicinal fruit (nimba) in curing people from the disease of the world, and he was like the sun (arka) in removing the darkness of the heart.

¹ Ā.C., pp. 52-56. According to this account, Brahmā not only gave him the name "Nimbārka", but also some other names, viz. Āruṇi, Jāyanteya, and Niyamānanda.

A slightly different account is given in Ś.N.M., pp. 2-3. Once Brahmā (or Nārada, according to another account) went to the hermitage of Aruṇa and asked for alms. But the sage was out, and nothing was available at home. Then seeing the guest turn back, disappointed, Niyamānanda placed his own Sudarśana-tejas (which looked just like the sun) on a Nimba-tree, and fetched, in the meantime, fruits, etc. for the ascetic, from the forest.

Cf. also the similar account given in Bh.P., quoted in the Preface to V.P.S., pp. 2-3, Kāśī ed.

his meal. The sun did so, and from that time the sage came to be known as "Nimbārka" or "Nimbāditya" or the Sun of the Nimba-tree.¹

Nimbārka is said to be the immediate disciple of Nārada.² He himself refers to Nārada as his guru in his commentary on the Brahma-sūtras.³ The tradition is that Brahmā, out of pity for the world, merged as it was in the darkness of ignorance, produced four Kumāras, viz. Sanaka, Sananda, Sanātana, and Sanatkumāra, out of his mind (mānasa-putra). These Kumāras requested their Father to teach them the highest reality. Brahmā, being himself unable to teach them, prayed to Lord Viṣṇu. Thereupon, the Lord, for the good of the world, manifested Himself as a swan (Hamsāvatāra) and taught the supreme truth to the Kumāras, who taught it to Nārada,⁴ and Nārada in his turn handed down this knowledge to Nimbārka.⁵

It is evident that no historical importance can be attached to this alleged fact of Nimbārka's being the immediate disciple of Nārada, who is, after all, a mere traditional figure, like the swan-incarnation and the four Kumāras. It is true that Nimbārka himself refers to him as his preceptor,⁶ but that by no means guarantees us in con-

¹ B.M.G., p. 171.

Cf. the similar account given in Ś.N., p. 3.

² Ā.C., pp. 57ff.; Ś.N., p. 4; Ś.N.M., pp. 7, 8.

³ V.P.S., 1.3.8, p. 80, Kāśī ed.

⁴ Cf. also the Chānd., 7th chap., the dialogue between Nārada and Sanatkumāra. Here Sanatkumāra is represented as teaching the supreme truth to Nārada. See V.K., 1.3.8

Nimbārka also represents Nārada as learning the truth from Sanatkumāra in his V.P.S., 1.3.8.

⁵ Ā.C., pp. 7-21, 57-64. Nārada went to the hermitage of Nimbārka, initiated him properly, gave him the name "Haridāsa Haripriya" and taught him five-fold knowledge, viz. the Gāyatrīmantra, the Viṣṇu-bhakti-rahasya-mantra, the Upaniṣads, the Vedas, and the Śrī-gopāla-mantra of eighteen syllables. He taught him, further, the Vedānta doctrine, viz. that there are three realities, viz. God, Soul and World, and that the relation between them is a relation of difference-non-difference.

Cf. also Maṅgala-pāṭha, V.K., verse 1, p. 1, Kāśī ed., where Śrīnivāsa makes obeisance to the Lord Swan, Sanaka, and the rest, and Nimbārka.

Maṅgala-pāṭha, T.P., verse 4, p. 380, where Keśavakāśmīrin makes obeisance to the Lord who assumed the form of a swan for teaching the truth to Sanaka and the rest; P.R., p. 8, where Baladeva quotes from Padma-purāṇa to the effect that Śrī, Brahmā, Rudra, and the four Kumāras, respectively chose Rāmānuja, Madhva, Viṣṇusvāmin, and Nimbārka as the founders of their respective sects; Ś.N.M., p. 8; Ś.N., p. 5.

⁶ See footnote 3, above.

cluding that he actually learnt the Vedānta-doctrine from Nārada, as alleged. Nimbārka might have very well called Nārada his preceptor simply for showing the antiquity of his own doctrine, as well as for glorifying it and making it more acceptable to the people, for quite naturally people would fall in with his doctrine far more easily if they were to learn that it was not invented by Nimbārka, a man, but was handed down to him by Nārada, a divine sage, who, again, learnt it from the Kumāras, sons of Brahmā, who, finally, learnt it from the Lord Himself. Another reason why Nimbārka chose to refer to Nārada as his preceptor was perhaps that Nārada was supposed to be well acquainted with the glory of Rādhā-Kṛṣṇa, the central point of Nimbārka's doctrine.¹

Of course, Nimbārka does not seem to have been the first to hold the Bhedābheda doctrine. In the Brahma-sūtras, for example, we find a reference to the view of Āśmarathya² who seems to have held a sort of Bhedābheda doctrine. Nimbārka might, however, have been its first systematic propounder.

Nimbārka was a Naiṣṭhika-brahmacārin, i.e. led the life of a perpetual religious student, observing the vow of chastity through his life, and never became a householder.³ He is said to have practised a severe penance under a Nimba-tree, living on the juice of its fruits only.⁴ Afterwards, it is said, he visited all the holy places and travelled all around preaching the holy Vaiṣṇava religion wherever he went. He visited the Setu-bandha in the South,⁵ Gurjara,⁶ and Nārāyaṇa-sarovara. Finding the world plunged in ignorance, he deputed the sage Audumbara to compose a Saṃhitā in his (i.e. Audumbara's) name, preaching the path of devotion.⁷ Next he went to the Naimiṣāranya and stayed there for a few years with prominent

Cf. also M.R.Ś., verse 1, p. 1, where Nimbārka makes obeisance to the Swan, the Kumāras, and Nārada.

Nimbārka refers to Sanaka and others as well as to Nārada in his D.Ś., Śloka 6, also.

¹ The Nārada-pañca-rātra brings out this fully.

² Vide Br. Sū., 1.4.20.

³ Ā.C., p. 64.

⁴ Ā.C., p. 72.

⁵ The ridge of rocks extending from Rāmeśvara on the south-eastern coast of India to Ceylon, and supposed to have been formed by Hanumat for the passage of Rāma's army.

⁶ Modern Gujrat.

⁷ Audumbara-saṃhitā, quoted in Ā.C., p. 35, also S.R., pp. 124-125.

sages. Afterwards, he visited the Bādārī-āśrama.¹ After that he returned to his own place and engaged himself in a great penance.² It is clear from the above account that our knowledge of the life of Nimbārka is at present meagre and not satisfactory. The available accounts about Nimbārka's life are mostly traditional which may, however, contain some elements of truth.

¹ The place near the source of the Ganges.

² A.C., pp. 64ff.

WORKS OF NIMBĀRKA

Nimbārka wrote a short commentary on the Brahma-sūtras called "Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha".¹ It is said that he dedicated it to his immediate disciple Śrīnivāsa.²

This commentary is very condensed, and its peculiarity is that unlike most of the commentaries, it contains no attempt at refuting rival schools of thought,³ or at expounding at length the theory of the author himself. In it there are very few⁴ discussions and argumentations, and the author is content with stating his case in as few words as possible in course of explaining the word-meaning of the sūtras without ever entering into details of any sort. His language, too, is very simple, and just to the point. He quotes from the Upaniṣads, etc., the Bhagavad-gītā, the Mahā-bhārata, Manu-smṛti, the Purāṇas, etc. in support of his case.

Nimbārka composed also a small work containing ten stanzas, called "Daśa-śloki" or "Siddhānta-ratna". It is said that he composed this also for his immediate disciple Śrīnivāsa.⁵ This book is a succinct statement of his views regarding the nature of the three realities (tattvas), viz. Kṛṣṇa,⁶ the cit,⁷ and the acit.⁸ Here Nimbārka emphasises the fact that Brahman, i.e. Kṛṣṇa, is to be meditated on at all times,⁹ supreme devotion being the highest sādhana.¹⁰ And the object of meditation is not Kṛṣṇa alone, but Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa con-

¹ "The Odour of the Heavenly Flower of the Vedānta." Traditionally, he is supposed to have composed it during his stay in the Badarikāśrama with Vyāsa.

The colophons to V.P.S. call it "Śārīrakamīmāṃsā-vākya-rtha", and not a Bhāṣya, as they do Śrīnivāsa's V.K., vide e.g. the Kāśī ed. of V.P.S., pp. 46, 47, etc. etc.

² Ā.C., p. 87, and p. 120.

³ Nimbārka, of course, criticises like other commentators, the theories of the Sāṃkhya, Yoga, etc. (vide V.P.S. 2.2), but he makes no attempt at criticising other schools of the Vedānta. His criticisms of the Sāṃkhya, Yoga, etc., too, are very brief.

⁴ Cf. e.g. V.P.S., 1.1.4.

⁵ D.Ś., śloka, 4.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, śloka 3.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, śloka 9.

⁵ Ś.K., p. 3; Ā.C., p. 120.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, śloka 1-2.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, śloka 6, 8.

jointly.¹ This is a new point brought out, not found in the "Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha", there being not a single mention of Rādhā or Kṣṇa in it.² Nimbārka ends this treatise by pointing out the five truths to be known by the wise, all of which, however, he himself does not propound in it.³

It is interesting to note that in this treatise Nimbārka insists, specially and separately, on the reality of all cognitions of objects, and on the trinity of reals (tri-rūpa).⁴ By nature a very concise writer, he would not have devoted an entire verse (out of ten only) to this topic, unless there were prevalent at that time some views insisting on the falsity of our ordinary perceptions of the things of the world of plurality, and on the sole unity and reality of the Self. This seems to suggest that Nimbārka flourished in an age when Advaita-vāda was already in vogue.⁵ In no other work of Nimbārka we find any such special and separate emphasis on this point.⁶ The reality of the world is taken for granted everywhere, as if self-evident and outside the sphere of all dispute.

The "Daśa-ślokī" being so very concise itself needs commentation and interpretation in order to be understood properly. Several

¹ D.Ś., śloka 5.

² Footnote 1, p. 18.

³ D.Ś., śloka 10. The five truths or arthas are as follows: (1) the nature of the Upāśya (i.e. Brahman), (2) the nature of the Upāsaka (i.e. the jīva), (3) the fruit of the Lord's grace, (4) the Bhaktirasa, and (5) the obstructions to the attainment of the Lord. In D.Ś. Nimbārka propounds the first two only, and incidentally mentions the fourth, but says nothing about the fifth and the third, whatever he may mean by the latter. (According to most commentators, he means "mokṣa" here; vide e.g. V.R.M., p. 132. According to Harivyāsadeva however, the word means self-surrender (prapatti) and the giving up of all actions except the service of the Lord which results in self-surrender. Vide Ś.K., p. 38.)

⁴ D.Ś., śloka 7. Vide also V.R.M., p. 84.

⁵ Cf. discourses regarding the date of Nimbārka; vide *infra*.

⁶ In V.P.S., 3.3.39, Nimbārka says simply that the text "Neha nānāsti kiñcana" (Brh., 4.4.29, Kaṭha, 4.11) means that everything is brahmātmaka, but says nothing more, p. 334, Kāśī ed.

In his Ś.N.K.S., too, as we shall see, while insisting on the sagunatva of Brahman (as against Nirguṇavāda), on the reality of the "I" (as against the view that the ahaṃ-padārtha is something unreal as composed of the Ajaḍa cit and the jaḍa ahaṃkāra), and on the view that Brahman is never the substrate and object of ajñāna, he does not specially insist on the reality of the world as against Māyā-vāda.

commentaries have been written on it by different disciples of Nimbārka.¹

The style of the "Daśa-śloki" is very simple and charming, specially suited to a devotee who does not want to be bothered with abstract logical theories and hair-splitting wranglings, but wants to have the truth immediately in a nut-shell.² Hence it has been appropriately termed "Vedānta-kāma-dhenu Daśa-śloki".³

Nimbārka composed also a hymn of twenty-five verses in praise of Lord Kṛṣṇa, called "Saviśeṣa-nirviśeṣa-Śrī-Kṛṣṇa-stava-rāja". The tradition is that when Nimbārka went to see Kṛṣṇa in Vṛndāvana, he eulogized the Lord by these twenty-five verses.⁴

The Lord is belauded here as Hari, Kṛṣṇa, Keśava,⁵ the abode of all power,⁶ and all beauty,⁷ the source of everything,⁸ the greatest of all,⁹ all-pervading,¹⁰ yet abiding within all,¹¹ and essentially fond of His devotees.¹² The Lord is always an object of adoration and worship,¹³ and can be attained through devotion alone.¹⁴

This book contains undeniable attempts at criticising Nirguṇa-vāda,¹⁵ the doctrine that the Aham-artha or the "I" is not the essence

¹ See Appendix.

² Vide Ś.K., p. 3, where it is said that the mastering of many śāstras being very difficult, Nimbārka, with a view to favouring his disciples, taught the kernel of truth in ten verses.

³ V.R.M., p. 2.

⁵ Ś.N.K.S., śloka 7.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, ślokas 1, 3, 4, 10.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, śloka 3, 11.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, śloka 7. The Lord is both apu and mahān.

¹² *Op. cit.*, ślokas 11, 12.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, śloka 18.

⁴ Ś.N., p. 2.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, śloka 8, 12.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, śloka 1, 9.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, śloka 1, 7.

¹³ *Op. cit.*, śloka 3, 7, 15, 16.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, śloka 2, 6, 10. In śloka 2 it is said that the Upaniṣadic texts which declare the Lord to be devoid of attributes simply mean that He is absolutely free from all āvidyaka viśeṣaṇas only, which fact does not prevent the Lord from being an abode of an infinite number of auspicious qualities.

In śloka 6, the same thing is affirmed once more, viz. that the text "Not so, not so" (Bṛh., 2.3.6) denies only certain (i.e. unworthy and inauspicious) qualities to the Lord, and not any and every (i.e. worthy and auspicious) quality.

The same thing is affirmed in śloka 10:—The Lord is said to be 'nirviśeṣa-cit' (in the sense of being free from all imperfections), and 'maṅgalālaya' (in the sense of being an abode of all auspicious qualities). These repeated attempts at explaining the nirguṇa-texts cannot but aim at refuting the theory based on them.

of the self,¹ *Drṣṭi-srṣṭi-vāda*² and the doctrine that Brahman is the āśraya and viśaya of *ajñāna*.³

The style of the “*Saviśeṣa-nirviśeṣa-Śrī-Kṛṣṇa-stava-rāja*” is rather heavy, and not so simple and to the point as those of the two books mentioned above. This book is also more controversial than them, for even the “*Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha*” contains no sectarian controversy, as we have seen. Several commentaries have been written on this work.⁴

Nimbārka is alleged to have written also a book called “*Rahasya-mīmāṃsā*”.⁵ We know only of two sections of it, viz. “*Mantra-rahasya-ṣoḍaśī*” and “*Prapanna-kalpa-vallī*”.⁶

Both these sections deal with the *sādhana* called *gurūpasatti*, i.e. the complete self-surrender to a preceptor as a means of being led to God. The latter speaks of both *gurūpasatti* and *prapatti* with its six parts, but recommends the former as the essential pre-requisite of every *sādhana*.

These two *sādhana*s, viz. *prapatti* and *gurūpasatti*, are not mentioned in the “*Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha*”, and though referred to incidentally in the “*Daśa-śloki*”⁷ and the “*Saviśeṣa-nirviśeṣa-Śrī-Kṛṣṇa-stava-rāja*”,⁸ are not set forth in details therein. The above two sections of the “*Rahasya-mīmāṃsā*” indicate to us the detailed method of procedure of approaching God through an intermediary—viz. a guru, the god on earth.

Besides the above-mentioned works, we know of a few hymns and verses composed by Nimbārka—viz. the “*Prātaḥ-smaraṇa-stotra*”, or ten stotras in praise of Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa, to be recited

¹ Ś.N.K.S., śloka 21. It is said here that the *Aham-artha* or the “I”, the object of introspection (*aham-pratīti*) (viz. “I know”, etc.) is not a combination of two things (*dvyaṃśa*) (viz. the *cit* and the *acit*). This seems to refer to the Advaita view that the “I” is not the essence of the self, but is ultimately unreal, because it is due simply to the unwarrantable commingling of two diametrically opposed things—the *ajāda cit* and the *jaḍa aham-kāra*.

² *Op. cit.*, śloka 22. It is said here explicitly that the ‘*Drṣṭi-srṣṭi-vāda*’ is an untenable doctrine.

³ *Op. cit.*, śloka 23. Here it is explicitly said that the Lord is neither the āśraya nor the viśaya of *ajñāna*.

⁴ Vide Appendix.

⁵ P.S.M., p. 1.

⁶ Vide Ś.R., where these two chapters have been collected (*Rahasya-ṣoḍaśī*, pp. 86-87; *Prapanna-kalpa-vallī*, pp. 103-111). *Mantra-rahasya-ṣoḍaśī* has been published separately with commentary. See Appendix.

⁷ D.Ś., śloka 8.

⁸ Ś.N.K.S., ślokas 3, 7, etc.

daily in the morning by the devotee,¹ the "Rādhāṣṭaka" or eight verses in praise of Rādhā² and the "Kṛṣṇāṣṭaka" or eight verses in praise of Kṛṣṇa.³

These stotras are merely hymns in praise of the upāśya-devatā of Nimbārka, and are as such of no philosophic value.

The "Sva-dharmādhva-bodha", attributed to him, is preserved in manuscript form only⁴ and mainly deals with ritualistic problems.

Other works by him, also preserved in manuscript forms, are "Madhva-mukha-mardana",⁵ "Aitihya-tattva-rāddhānta",⁶ "Pañca-saṃskāra-pramāṇa-vidhi",⁷ and "Vedānta-tattva-bodha".⁸

These are all the works of Nimbārka actually known. Besides these, he composed some other treatises as well, which have not been found as yet. That he wrote a book called "Sadācāra-prakāśa", dealing with the Karma-yoga, is known from the works of some of his disciples.⁹ It is evident from the same source that he wrote another book called "Prapatti-cintāmaṇi"¹⁰ and a commentary on the Bhagavad-gītā.¹¹

¹ As given in Ś.R., pp. 71-72; also in L.S.V., pp. 21-23.

² Quoted in Ā.C., pp. 122-125; given in L.S.V., pp. 32-34.

³ Quoted in Ā.C., pp. 130-133.

According to tradition, Nimbārka commanded his immediate disciple Śrīnivāsa to go to Śrī-Rādhā-kuṇḍa and recite the eight verses in praise of Rādhā and as a result he would be able to have a direct vision of Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa. But Śrīnivāsa, not being satisfied, said to his guru that he had taught him that the highest form of worship was the conjoint worship of Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa, but so far he had been taught the Rādhāṣṭaka only, and asked him to teach him the Kṛṣṇāṣṭaka as well. Thereupon, Nimbārka taught him eight verses in praise of Kṛṣṇa. Then Śrīnivāsa went to Govardhana, did as he was told by his guru, and was able to have a direct vision of the Lord Kṛṣṇa accompanied by Rādhā. Vide Ā.C., pp. 128-129.

⁴ I.O.C. of MSS., Part IV, 1894, MS. No. 2486.

⁵ Cat. Cat., p. 428, Part 1; N.W.P., Part 1, 1874, pp. 274-275.

⁶ Cat. Cat., pp. 14, 64, Part 2; Rep. Bh., 1894, p. 56.

⁷ Cat. Cat., p. 63, Part 3; Rep. Kath., p. 29.

⁸ Cat. Cat., p. 297, Part 1; Oudh MSS., 1898, p. 42.

⁹ V.R.M., p. 97; Ś.K., p. 128; G.M., p. 34.

It is claimed that a few torn leaves of this treatise have been found in a place called "Aruṇa-ghāṭa" in Bengal. Vide Preface to V.P.S., p. 6; Kāśī ed.; Ś.N.M., p. 9.

¹⁰ V.R.M., p. 140; vide also Preface to V.P.S., p. 3, Kāśī ed.

We do not know whether this treatise is identical with the "Rahasya-mīmāṃsā". The subjects of the two,—judging the first by its name and the second by its two known sections,—seem to be identical. Even if this be the case, still we have no sure ground for inferring that the two are identical.

¹¹ T.P., p. 380.

Finally, it has been claimed that Nimbārka wrote a commentary on the Veda,¹ too, but this view has no more than a traditional value, until we come across some definite evidence. The Vedānta-siddhānta-pradīpa, attributed to Nimbārka in the Notices of Sanskrit MSS. (No. 2826), and the Guru-paramparā noticed in the Catalogue of MSS. in the Private Libraries of N.W.P., Parts I-X, as a work of Nimbārka are not actually his works. The former is a work on the Advaita Vedānta school of Śaṅkara and the latter is a list of the successive teachers of the school.

¹ Ā.C., p. 56.

DATE OF NIMBĀRKA

So far as the date of Nimbārka is concerned, we do not unfortunately get any help from the writings of his disciples, for most of them are silent about it,¹ and the few who mention it, unfortunately, contribute nothing to the problem, their accounts being mostly based on tradition and more or less exaggerated.

This latter class of followers attempts to assign Nimbārka to a very ancient date. Thus some of them make him a contemporary of Vyāsa, the author of the Brahma-sūtras,² and other ancient mythical figures.³ Others,⁴ again, identify the names Haripriya, Āruṇi and Sudarśana—the first mentioned in the Brahma-vaivarta-purāṇa and the last two in the Bhāgavata-purāṇa—with Nimbārka, and argue therefrom that Nimbārka must have flourished in an ancient date.

It is evident at once that the above arguments are based on pure tradition, and not on historical truth; and may be rejected as such without further ado. Further, Haripriya and the rest are very common names, and may belong to anybody, and there is no evidence to show that they really refer to Nimbārka.

It has been claimed further that Nimbārka was the oldest of the commentators of the Brahma-sūtras, because his commentary contains no refutation of the views of any other commentator. As such, it is said, Nimbārka must have flourished earlier than Śaṅkara.⁵ It is alleged⁶ also that in the Gauḍapāda-kārikā there is a reference to the Dvaitādvaita-vāda of Nimbārka in the italicised portion of the passage:—

“Advaitam paramārtho hi dvaitam tad-bheda ucyate.
Teṣāṃ ubhayathā dvaitam tenāyaṃ na virudhyate.”⁷

¹ E.g., Śrīnivāsa, Puruṣottama, Devācārya, Sundarabhaṭṭa, Keśavakāśmīrin, and Harivyāsadeva, the well-known disciples say nothing about his date.

² Ā.C., p. 87; Ś.N.M., p. 7; Ś.N., pp. 18ff.; Preface to V.P. 3, p. 3, Kāśī ed.

³ Ā.C., pp. 47, 57ff., e.g. Kṛṣṇa and Nārada.

⁴ Ś.N.M., pp. 4ff.; Ś.N., pp. 18ff.; Preface to V.P.S., pp. 3-4, Kāśī ed.

⁵ Ś.N., p. 20; Intro. to V.P.S., p. 6, Kāśī ed.

⁶ Preface to V.P.S., pp. 4-5, Kāśī ed.

⁷ G.K., 3.18, p. 216.

Now, as we have seen, it is a fact that in his Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, Nimbārka makes no attempt at all to criticise Śaṅkara. But we find that in his Saviśeṣa-nirviśeṣa-Śrī-Kṛṣṇa-stava-rāja there are references to Nirguṇa-vāda, the doctrine that the 'aham-artha' is not the essence of the self, Drṣṭi-srṣṭi-vāda and the doctrine that Brahman is the āśraya-viśaya of ajñāna.

In Gauḍapāda we do not find any exposition of the Nirguṇa-vāda. He, of course, repeatedly emphasises the point that there is absolutely no difference (bheda) in the Ātman,¹ that the Ātman is unborn, immortal, changeless,² etc., but he says nowhere explicitly that it is nirguṇa, or free from attributes, as Śaṅkara repeatedly does.

Again, Gauḍapāda never once says that the Ātman is the substratum (āśraya) and object (viśaya) of ajñāna.

Hence when Nimbārka refers to these doctrines he cannot but refer to Śaṅkara and his school. Gauḍapāda was the first systematic exponent of the monistic school, and hence it cannot be said also that Nimbārka is referring to some earlier teacher, in whose doctrine these tenets are found, though not in Gauḍapāda's.

We also find that Śrīnivāsa, the immediate disciple of Nimbārka, explicitly refers to the Pratibimba-vāda.³

Now Gauḍapāda makes no reference to this doctrine also. He illustrates his theory by three sets of examples. First, he brings in the famous rope-snake illustration, and points out that just as in darkness a rope is imagined to be a snake, so the Ātman, too, is imagined to be what it is not.⁴ Next he refers, at length, to the no less famous ether-pot illustration, pointing out that the individual soul is really nothing but the Ātman, just as the ether within the pot is nothing but the universal ether, etc.⁵ Finally, he gives the illustration of a burning stick, and points out that just as a stick burning at one end, when waved round quickly, produces the illusion of a circle of fire (alāta-cakra), so is the world of plurality nothing but an illusion.⁶ But he does not say for a single time that the world of plurality is a reflection of the Ātman on avidyā, like the reflection of the sun on water, as Śaṅkara often does.

Hence, there is no doubt that Śrīnivāsa could not have flourished before Śaṅkara. And this serves as a further evidence that Nimbārka,

¹ Vide G.K., Advaita-prakaraṇam.

² *Op. cit.*

³ "Pratibimba-vādi-vadaś ca pāpīyān apramāṇataḥ", V.K.V., 1st taraṅga, verse 5, p. 5.

⁴ G.K., 2.17-18.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 3.3-9.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 4.47-50.

who was a contemporary of Śrīnivāsa, being his preceptor, cannot be a predecessor of Śaṅkara. In the passage, alleged to contain a reference to Nimbārka's Bhedābheda-vāda, there is really nothing of the kind.

The phrase "Teṣām ubhayathā dvaitam" does not at all refer to Bhedābheda-vāda, but it simply means: 'For them (i.e. for the Dvaitavādins) duality (is the truth) in both ways (i.e. from both pāramārthika and apāramārthika points of view).¹ This is the explanation given by Śaṅkara. He explains the whole verse thus: Non-duality is real, duality is its work (tad-bheda = tat-kāryya), i.e. is simply due to the working of the mind and ceases when the mind ceases to work, as in the states of deep sleep, swoon, etc. This is our view. But they, the Dualists, hold that duality is the ultimate truth, either from the real or from the non-real points of view. But our view is not contradicted by their view, because for an Advaitin there can be no opponent, since he thinks every one, even his opponent, as his own self.

Thus there is a reference to the Dualistic view alone; and if there were really a reference to the Bhedābheda view, we see no reason why Śaṅkara would not have interpreted as such.

Even if the phrase does refer to the Bhedābheda view, that does not prove in any way that Nimbārka's view is referred to here. Gauḍapāda explicitly refers to the Dvaita view,² but will any one take Madhva to be prior to Gauḍapāda for simply that reason? Just as absurd will be to take Nimbārka to be prior to Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara, simply on the ground of their referring to a kind of Bhedābheda doctrine.

There is a manuscript called "Madhva-mukha-mardana", a criticism of Madhva's religion, attributed to Nimbārka.³ This places Nimbārka after Madhva, provided the work is really by Nimbārka. The fact that the manuscript is not lent to anybody by the followers of Madhva,⁴ perhaps prevented us as well from having it, no reply even being given to our enquiries. It seems Nimbārka undertook the work because it was Madhva's immediate influence upon the people which he had to fight against for making his own campaign successful.

¹ "Dvaitinām tu teṣām paramārthataḥ aparamārthataś ca ubhayathāpi dvaitam eva." Vide Śaṅkara-bhāṣya on G.P., 3.18, p. 121.

² "Sva-siddhānta-vyavasthāsu dvaitino nīcitā dṛḍham", etc., G.P., 3.17.

³ Cat. Cat., p. 428, Part I; N.W.P., Part I, 1874, pp. 274-275.

⁴ N.W.P., Part I, 1874, p. 275.

Thus, from internal evidences from well-known works by Nimbārka, we can definitely assert that Nimbārka could not have flourished before Śaṅkara, whereas we are led to think, on the evidence of the manuscript mentioned above, that he did not flourish also before Madhva; i.e. not before the 13th century A.D.¹

¹ Madhva's date is about 13th century A.D. According to Sir R. G. Bhandarkar (Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism and minor religious systems *in loco*), Nimbārka flourished shortly after Rāmānuja. According to Dr. R. L. Mitra (Notices), he, however, flourished after Rāmānuja, Madhva and Vallabha.

DOCTRINE OF NIMBĀRKA

I. Brahman.

The Highest Reality, according to Nimbārka, is Brahman, Kṛṣṇa or Hari,¹ a Personal God. There is nothing that is equal to Him, nothing that is superior. He is the Lord of all, and the Controller of all. He is called 'Brahman' because of the unsurpassed greatness of His nature and qualities, because He is beyond any limit of any kind of space, time or thing.²

Brahman is the sole cause of the creation, maintenance and destruction of the universe. All beings arise from Him, are preserved by Him and return to Him. The Lord alone is the First Cause, the manifestor of all names and forms, and none else.³

Brahman is thus both the material and efficient cause (upādāna and nimitta Kāraṇa) of the universe.⁴ In ordinary cases we find

¹ Nimbārka does not use the terms "Kṛṣṇa" and "Hari" in V.P.S. There he speaks of the Highest Reality throughout as "Paramātman" (V.P.S., 1.1.13-15; 1.1.21-22, etc. etc.) also as "Brahman" (V.P.S., 1.2.3-4, etc.), "Para" (V.P.S., 1.2.3, etc.) and "Puruṣottama" (V.P.S., 1.1.1, 1.1.19, 1.2.9, 1.2.13, 1.3.8, 1.3.11, 1.3.24, etc.). Once he refers to Him as "Rāmākānta Puruṣottama" (V.P.S., 1.1.1).

In D.Ś., śloka 4, he uses all these three terms, viz. Brahman, Kṛṣṇa and Hari, simultaneously, and in śloka 8 he speaks of Kṛṣṇa.

In Ś.N.K.S. also he uses all these three terms; e.g. in verse 1, he speaks of Hari, in verse 7 of Kṛṣṇa, Hari and Keśava, in verse 8 of Brahman and in verse 16 of Hari. He refers to the Highest Reality also as "Keśava" (verse 7), "Vibhu" (verses 16, 19) and "Mādhava" (verse 24).

² V.P.S., 3.2.32. Cf. also V.P.S., 3.2.31-36, where a pūrva-pakṣa is raised that there is something superior to Brahman and refuted. D.Ś., śloka 1; Ś.N.K.S., śloka 3, 7.

Ś.N.K.S., śloka 3. V.P.S., 1.1.12, etc. D.Ś., śloka 8. Ś.N.K.S., śloka 5. V.P.S., 1.1.1, "Svābhāvika-svarūpa-guṇa-śaktyādirbhiḥ br̥hat-tamaḥ". Ś.N.K.S., śloka 11. Thus, Nimbārka identifies Brahman, Viṣṇu and Kṛṣṇa; Rāmā and Rādhā. For him "Rāmā-kānta Puruṣottama" or (Viṣṇu) is none but "Rādhā-vallabha Kṛṣṇa". This is a distinct difference between Rāmānuja and Nimbārka.

³ V.P.S., 1.1.3, 1.4.14-15. Ś.N.K.S., śloka 1. Ś.N.K.S., śloka 9. V.P.S., 1.3.42. *Op. cit.*, 1.1.19.

⁴ V.P.S., 1.4.23-27.

that the clay, the material cause of a pot, and the potter, its efficient cause, are different. But in the case of the Universe, the two are identical, because Brahman, wishing to be many, transformed (and therefore He is the *nimitta*) Himself (and therefore He is the *upādāna*) into the form of the world.¹ The Universe is thus a transformation (*pariṇāma*) of Brahman.

Brahman is, thus, both transcendent and immanent. He is not an external creator, but pulsates within the entire universe. He is the inner soul, the inner controller and constant sustainer of His own creation.²

Several objections have been raised against this doctrine of the Causality of Brahman. The most formidable one is: Why should Brahman create this universe? All philosophies and religions have to answer this important and very natural question at the outset. Acts of intelligent beings are never motiveless. So the acts of the Supreme Intelligence must, too, have some definite motives or ends in view. We, as imperfect beings, act for attaining some goal. But how can we attribute any unfulfilled desire, any unattained goal to the Perfect Being in whom there is no incompleteness or insufficiency? What possible motive can He have in creating the world? It can be of no good to Him, for He lacks nothing; it can be of no good to the individual souls, for worldly life is full of sorrows and sufferings, and, salvation, admittedly, consists in getting rid of the *Samsāra*, of the eternal cycle of births and rebirths.

This leads to the second difficulty, no less formidable. Why should the merciful Lord deliberately plunge souls in grief? If He cannot prevent pains and evils on earth, He is not all-powerful; if He can, but does not, He is not all-merciful. What is the way out of this eternal dilemma? Again, people undergo different lots, without any apparent reason, the honest and the good suffer; in spite of contrary reasons, the wicked prosper. Hence if God be the creator of this world, He must, of necessity, be charged with cruelty and partiality.

¹ V.P.S., 1.4.26.

Nimbārka does not explain in what sense precisely Brahman is the material cause of the universe. That He is the efficient cause of the universe is evident enough, but how He can be its material cause as well in view of the fact that all things are said to arise from *prakṛti*, the primeval Matter-eternal and real—is not explained. This is explained clearly by his disciple *Puruṣottama*, vide V.R.M., p. 65.

² V.P.S., 2.1.35; 1.2.5-6; 1.2.19.

These fundamental questions can by no means be easily solved. Some doubt the very capacity of human mind to grasp the motives of the Divine Mind. Reason must halt here, and make room for intuition or revelation. The sacred texts, learned prophets, ancient and modern, assure us that God alone is the cause, the creator of the world, whatever be His motive in creating it; that God is constantly working for our good, in spite of apparent injustice, wrongs and sufferings. And, we must accept these on trust.

Hindu philosophers, in spite of their deep trust in revelation or scripture, attempt also to find rational explanations, as far as possible, of these problems. In trying to solve the first problem, Nimbārka and other Vedānta philosophers bring in the conception of sport or *līlā*.¹ The creation of the world implies no want, no imperfection on the part of Brahman, for it is but a mere sport to Him. As a supreme monarch indulges in sports, not because he is in need of something, but because, on the contrary, he, as a King, has all his desires fulfilled and can indulge in pastimes at will, so Brahman creates the world not because He needs something, but, on the contrary, out of the fulness of His nature, out of the abundance of His joy.

But, the creation of the world may be a spontaneous sport, and not a necessity, on the part of Brahman, but to the poor souls, it is not so. How can that God be called merciful who only for the sake of sport, not even for any essential necessity, condemns souls to eternal grief? Hence it is pointed out that Brahman's indulgence in this cosmic sport, though not serving His own purpose, is not entirely motiveless, but is essentially guided by the demands of morality. This explanation tries to exonerate Brahman from the charges of cruelty and partiality.² Though creation is a sport, it is not a senseless or arbitrary sport. It is the eternal and inexorable law of Karma that determines the nature of every new creation and the fates of different individuals. "As you sow, so you reap"—this is the universal rule. So Brahman cannot be made responsible for the sufferings and varying lots of individuals,—it is the individuals themselves who are really responsible through their own Karmas.³ These Karmas are without beginning and are, as such, existent before the individual souls come

¹ V.P.S., 2.1.32.

² *Op. cit.*, 2.1.33.

³ Brahman may be here compared to the cloud. The cloud, as rain, is the common cause of the growth of all sorts of plants, good or bad, but the differences among those plants themselves are not due to the rain, which pours down upon all of them equally, but to the differences lying inherent in their respective

into existence, and Brahman takes these Karmas into account when creating the world.

But can we really say that this creation of the world serves no purpose of Brahman, is of no use whatsoever to Him? Even if we suppose that creation is but a sport, can we say that this sport is of no use to Brahman? Sports, too, have their own uses. The fact is that, as admitted by Nimbārka himself, Brahman and the universe are correlatives, one always implying the other. Hence, the evolution of the universe is a logical necessity on the part of Brahman. If the universe is impossible without Brahman, Brahman is no less incomplete without the universe.

Can we, again, say that Brahman is never responsible for the Karmas of souls, and hence for their consequent sufferings and unjust lots? If Brahman be the inner controller, how can He disclaim all responsibilities for the actions of the souls in whom He inheres?

Good and evil are necessary correlatives. One is possible only in contrast to the other. Moral life requires freedom of will, and freedom is meaningless unless there be two things to choose between. Hence, He who creates souls as free moral agents, must of necessity create both good and evil. The existence of evils in a world created by the Supreme Good may, thus, be justified. But the problem as to why virtue and happiness should not always go hand in hand, why should the sins of fathers be visited upon their children, requires a better and a more convincing explanation.

We may consider here one or two other objections against this doctrine that Brahman is the creator of the world. It has been urged, for example, that the material cause and its effect are of the very same kind.¹ From a lump of clay, we can get clay-pots alone, and not gold ones; from a piece of gold we can get gold rings alone, not clay ones. So, from the sentient Brahman a sentient world alone can arise. But who can assert that the world is sentient?

But, Nimbārka points out,² there is no rule that the cause and the effect must always be absolutely similar. So it cannot be said

seeds. In the very same manner, the differences among men are due to the anādi karma-bījas of the men themselves, and not to the Lord.

Cf. Ś.B., 2.1.34.

Cf., also, V.K., p. 175, Kāśī ed.; V.R.M., pp. 13-14.

¹ V.P.S., 2.4-5.

² *Op. cit.*, 2.1.6-7. Here he cites the examples of nail, hair, etc. arising from living beings; and dung-beetles from the dung.

that the world, being different from Brahman in nature, cannot arise from Him.

The real point, however, is that Brahman is immanent in the world, animates and sustains its every part,—so the world is by no means absolutely separate, absolutely different from Brahman.

It has also been urged that the universe not only does not arise from Brahman, but cannot return to Him as well at the time of universal dissolution,¹ for then it is sure to defile Him with its own impurities.

But when the universe returns to Brahman, it inheres in Him as His power (śakti) and ceases to be imperfect.

Further, it has been objected² that as Brahman is a component whole, without separable parts (niravayava), He must be transformed into the world in his entirety; or, else, He must be held to be possessed of such parts (sāvayava) which will make Him something divisible, and hence mutable.

In reply, Nimbārka points out that³ the universe is not a part, actually cut off from Brahman, but always inheres in Him during creation, as during dissolution. Before creation, it remains as a subtle power of Brahman, during creation this subtle power comes to be manifested. Creation, thus, means the full manifestation of the powers of Brahman (svaśakti-vikṣepa). So there is no question of Brahman's divisibility and mutability here.⁴

There remains one more objection to be considered. If Brahman be the material cause of the universe, He Himself becomes individual souls (jīvas), and as such, must of necessity undergo all worldly pleasures and pains.⁵ But why should Brahman be so foolish as to do what is not beneficial to His own self and create a world that causes nothing but intense and infinite suffering to Him? ⁶ Again, if Brahman dwells within the hearts of jīvas, that also implies that He must share

¹ V.P.S., 2.1.8.

² *Op. cit.*, 2.1.25.

³ *Op. cit.*, 2.1.26, 27. Vide also V.P.S., 1.4.26. Cf. Bṛh., 5.1.1. "From the whole arises the whole, . . . still the whole remains."

⁴ Nimbārka refutes a few other objections against Brahma-kāraṇa-vāda that are not of any philosophical importance, such as: (1) a creator must have external implements. A potter, e.g., needs clay, wheels, etc. But Brahman has no such implements. (V.P.S., 2.1.23.) Hence, He cannot be the creator of the world. (2) Brahman cannot be a creator, for He has no sense-organs (*op. cit.*, 2.1.30), etc.

⁵ V.P.S., 2.1.13.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 2.1.20.

all the experiences (bhogas) of the jīvas and be contaminated by their defects and blemishes.¹

The fact, however, is, Nimbārka points out, that the individual souls are both different and non-different from Brahman.² The former only are subject to Karmas and the consequent bhogas, not the latter. Again, though Brahman is the in-dwelling spirit, He is untouched by human defects and sins, for the pristine purity of Brahman can never be sullied by anything.³ God is God, Pure and Perfect *in spite of* all impurities and imperfections, and not *excluding* them. He pervades and contains everything, yet transcends everything.

So, Nimbārka concludes, Brahman is the cause of the universe, and its soul.

Thus, on the one hand, Brahman is eternal and great, the Greatest of the great, the Highest of the high,—the Creator, etc. of the universe, high above the individual soul, of which He is the Lord and the Ruler. But this is but one aspect of Brahman.

He has another aspect, equally real. He is also an abode of infinite beauty, bliss and tenderness, and in intimate connection with the soul. He is an abode of supreme peace, supreme grace,⁴ the ocean of all sweetness and charms.⁵

Bliss is His very essence like existence and knowledge, since He is one indivisible mass of bliss.⁶ His bliss is unlimited, unlike human bliss.⁷ He is called Blissful also because He is the cause of the bliss of the soul.⁸ He brings forth and maintains the universe through bliss.⁹

¹ V.P.S., 1.2.8.

² *Op. cit.*, 2.1.13. This point will be discussed fully later on. Cf. V.P.S., 2.1.21-22.

³ *Op. cit.*, 2.1.9; 3.2.11; 3.2.30.

Nimbārka refutes some other objections against the doctrine that Brahman is the Antaryāmin, Inner controller. These are philosophically unimportant, e.g. it has been objected that Brahman, the all-pervading Being, cannot abide within the atomic soul, etc. V.P.S., 1.2.7, etc.

⁴ Ś.N.K.S., śloka 1. Śānti, Kānti.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, śloka 3. Sudhā-nidhi.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, śloka 4.

⁷ V.P.S., 1.3.9.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.15.

⁹ Vidē Tait., 3.6. Cf., also, Tait., Brahmanandavalli.

Finally, Brahman is essentially gracious to His devotees¹ (bhakta-vatsala). He strikes terror in the heart of the wicked, but to his devotees He is tender and solicitous as ever. Out of pity for them, He enables them to have a direct vision of Himself,² and is thereby the giver of salvation.³ He is, in fact, not only the giver of salvation, but the giver of all fruits whatsoever in accordance with the karmas of individual souls.⁴ Further, He manifests Himself in various forms with a view to pleasing His devotees,⁵ and descends on earth in the forms of various vyūhas (and avatāras) for the good of the world.⁶

We see, thus, that the Lord is, on the one hand, all-powerful, on the other, all-merciful; He is transcendent, yet immanent; all-pervading, yet abiding within the heart of man; Ruler, yet Helper. His supreme might and majesty constitute no truer aspect of His nature than His boundless love and kindness.⁷

It is clear from the above that Brahman is essentially possessed of attributes.⁸ On the one hand, He possesses an infinite number of auspicious qualities (which again, as we have seen, are of two broad kinds, viz. omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, etc. on one side, beauty, bliss, tenderness, on the other), and on the other hand, He is absolutely devoid of all that is inauspicious, unworthy and defective.⁹ In this sense, the Lord is possessed of a double set of characteristics,¹⁰ one positive, the other negative. And it is this negative aspect of the Lord, i.e. His freedom from all unworthy qualities, which sometimes leads to the description of Him as

¹ Ś.N.K.S., śloka 12. Bhakta-vatsala. The Lord is called "Ātma-supriya" (śloka 4) and "Ātma-vallabha" (śloka 14), which means, according to commentators, that He is bhakta-vatsala. Vide Ś.K., pp. 19 and 46.

² V.P.S., 3.2.24; Ś.N.K.S., śloka 11.

³ V.P.S., 3.2.5; Ś.N.K.S., śloka 1.

⁴ V.P.S., 1.1.4; 3.2.39-41.

⁵ D.Ś., śloka 8. Cf. Arjuna's Viśvarūpa-darśana, Gītā 11.

⁶ D.Ś., śloka 4. Cf. V.R.M., pp. 47-48. See also pp. 121ff. of the thesis, Part I. Nimbārka does not himself say what these vyūhas are.

⁷ It is to be noted that Nimbārka makes no reference to the softer aspect of the Lord—to His beauty, loveliness, tenderness, etc., in V.P.S., where the Lord is depicted in His sterner aspect of a creator, controller, and judge. The softer aspect of the Lord has been developed at length by the disciples of Nimbārka. Vide e.g., V.R.M., pp. 45, 49, 113, 119, etc.

⁸ V.P.S., 1.1.1-2, etc.; Ś.N.K.S., śloka 1.

⁹ D.Ś., śloka 4; Ś.N.K.S., śloka 10.

¹⁰ V.P.S., 3.2.11; 3.2.15, 17, 18. Ubhaya-līṅga.

attributeless.¹ He is thus attributeless in the sense of being free from all ordinary material and inauspicious qualities, and He is possessed of attributes in the sense of being possessed of all celestial and auspicious ones.²

The conclusion is, therefore, that the Lord Kṛṣṇa is an abode of an infinite number of auspicious qualities, absolutely undefiled by any blemish, pure, complete and independent. He is one and self-sufficient, yet out of His own free will and without any want on His part, creates the world of plurality out of Himself, to fulfil the demands of morality, and He, out of His boundless kindness, again, leads the individual soul from the trammels of mundane existence.³

The Lord is accompanied, on His left, by Rādhā, the giver of all fruits, and of equal auspiciousness like Himself⁴ and who is to be worshipped conjointly with him.⁵

The general nature and characteristics of the Lord being thus determined, the next question is: What is the proof of the existence of such a Being as Brahman? What is the source of our knowledge regarding Him? The reply is that Scripture alone is our source of knowing Brahman,⁶—from Scripture alone we come to know that there is a Being possessed of the above marks. The entire Scripture, in fact, is concerned with establishing Brahman as its sole supreme object.⁷ Scripture may apparently seem to depict a variety of things, but really it depicts only one thing, viz. Brahman, for in Him alone all the diverse scriptural passages find their complete reconciliation.

Thus, some texts seem to enjoin the worship of the Person within the sun and the eye.⁸ Here a doubt may be felt as to whether this

¹ Ś.N.K.S., śloka 6. Nirguṇa.

² *Op. cit.*, śloka 2. Cf. also V.P.S., 3.3.39.

³ Saṃsāra.

⁴ D.Ś., śloka 5. Vide also "Nanda-grha-candanam". Ś.N.K.S., śloka 1. Nimbārka identifies Ramā or Lakṣmī with Rādhā. Vide above, p. 28, Part I. Ś.N.K.S., śloka 5.

⁵ D.Ś., śloka 5. Cf. also Rādhāṣṭaka, Kṛṣṇāṣṭaka, and Prātaḥ-smaraṇa-stotra.

⁶ V.P.S., 1.1.3.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.4. For the objection to this view and its refutation, see V.P.S., 1.1.4.

⁸ Chānd., 1.6.6-8.

Person is identical with Brahman or some other Being. In the latter case, of course, it cannot be held that the entire Scripture teaches Brahman alone as the sole object to be known and worshipped. But the fact is that this Person is none but Brahman, for the Person is said to be free from all sins, to be the soul of all, etc., and these qualities can belong to the Lord alone.¹

Similarly, all scriptural passages, Nimbārka points out, which seem to deal with objects other than Brahman really refer to Brahman and Brahman alone.²

Thus, the conclusion is that the Lord Kṛṣṇa is known from Scripture alone, and is the sole object and purport of all scriptural passages.

It may pertinently be asked: Why should we resort to Scripture alone for having any knowledge of Brahman? Is not our own reasoning faculty a safe and sure guide here? Nimbārka frankly admits the limited capacity of *ordinary* human reason. Ordinary individuals like us can reason or infer about mundane, empirical objects alone,—but what is extra-mundane, transcendental, lies beyond the scope of reasoning. And, here and here alone Scripture is our sole guide.

But what, after all, is Scripture? It is nothing but the product of the mature reflection and sustained thinking of inspired prophets and sages. To them, to those extraordinary minds, minds that are wiser and purer than our own, nothing is a sealed book, and even transcendental truths are known directly through the help of super-developed reasoning faculty.

Hence, it would be manifestly wrong to accuse Nimbārka, and for the matter of that, other Indian philosophers, of dogmatism, of a blind, unwarranted reliance on authority and revelation alone. In the first place, they are only frank and practical enough to admit the distinction between grades of human reason—its undeveloped and super-developed forms. In the second place, even in the stage of this lack of full development, they admit, rather insist on, the need of manana or reflection after śravaṇa or acquisition of philosophical truths from Scripture.

¹ V.P.S., 1.2.9; 1.2.26-28; 1.3.14-15.

² V.P.S., 1.1.21-22; Chānd., 1.9.1; V.P.S., 1.1.23; Chānd., 1.11.15; V.P.S., 1.1.24; Kauṣ., 3.2; V.P.S., 1.1.29-32; Chānd., 3.13.17; V.P.S., 1.1.25; Chānd., 3.14.1; V.P.S., 1.2.1-5; Kaṭha., 2.25.

II. The cit : the jīva.

1. Nature, size, number and kind of the jīva.

First and foremost, the jīva or the individual soul is essentially of the nature of intelligence.¹ It is different from the body, the sense-organs, the vital-breath, the mind and buddhi, which are all material and inanimate. It manifests all these, but does not need to be manifested by them,² being manifested by the all-manifesting Lord alone. In fact, the sense-organs (eleven in number),³ the vital-breath (with its five modes),⁴ and the mind (with its four modes),⁵ are but implements of the soul;⁶ they serve different purposes of the soul,⁷ such as perception, enjoyment and action—and are under its complete control.⁸ As such, the jīva is not identical with any one of them, but is a different and a superior intelligent principle.⁹

The individual soul is not only knowledge (jñāna), but a knower (jñātā) as well.¹⁰ That is, it is not a mere phenomenon of knowledge, but an intelligent substance having knowledge for its essential attribute.¹¹ To say that the individual soul is knowledge and has knowledge for its attributes is not contradictory by any means—for in spite of the fact that the individual soul, the substratum, and knowledge, the attribute, are equally knowledge, there is a distinction between them,¹² as declared by Scripture itself,¹³ so that the relation of substratum and attribute is possible between them.¹⁴

¹ V.P.S., 2.3.26-30; D.Ś., śloka 4. Jñāna-svarūpa.

There is no discussion about the individual soul in Ś.N.K.S., except in śloka 21.

² Cf. V.R.M., p. 3; V.M., śloka 5, p. 2.

³ V.P.S., 3.4.6. For the eleven sense-organs and their functions, vide V.R.M., pp. 26-29. Vide *infra*.

⁴ For the four vṛttis of the mind and their functions saṃśaya, garva and ahaṃkāra, vide *infra*, V.R.M., p. 25.

⁵ For the five vṛttis and their functions, see V.R.M., p. 28; see below.

⁶ V.P.S., 2.4.10-12. Upakaraṇas.

⁷ Vide V.R.M., for details, pp. 26-27.

⁸ V.P.S., 2.4.15-16.

⁹ Vide V.M., śloka 1. A man thus is composed of the ātman or the jīva (soul), deha (body), indriyas (sense-organs), the prāṇa (the vital-breath) and the manas (the mind). The first alone is intelligent or non-material and eternal, the others not.

¹⁰ V.P.S., 2.3.18; D.Ś., śloka 1.

¹¹ V.P.S., 2.3.25-26.

¹² *Op. cit.*, 2.3.27.

¹³ Vide e.g., Kauṣ., 3.6. Cf. V.R.M., pp. 4-5. Also Śrī. B., 1.1.1. See below.

¹⁴ V.P.S., 2.3.27.

Knowledge being the very essence of the individual soul, persists always under every state whatsoever.¹ It is present even in the states of deep sleep and the rest, though during these states it is not fully manifested as it is during the waking state.²

The soul being a knower is essentially a self-conscious Ego or "I" (aham).³ The "aham-artha" does not consist of two factors, one intelligent and the other non-intelligent,⁴ i.e. it is not something which is ultimately unreal, but is the very essence of the soul, and real throughout. As we shall see, the soul continues to be an "I", a distinct individual even when it is freed.⁵

The soul being a self-conscious Ego, is an active agent.⁶ If the individual soul be not an agent, all the spiritual injunctions regarding different means leading to different ends (viz. heaven or salvation) would be simply meaningless⁷; for example, it has been enjoined that one who desires to go to heaven should perform sacrifices,⁸ or that one who desires salvation should meditate on Brahman.⁹ But if the individual soul be not an agent, it cannot possibly carry out these injunctions; and why should Scripture enjoin something which is quite impossible?¹⁰

Further, during the state of dream, the soul is said to move about within the body, controlling the organs as desired.¹¹ This also proves that the soul is an active agent. The sense is that the soul is the guide and the controller of the entire body, regulating the different organs to their different functions and this the soul could not be unless it were an active agent. The fact that the soul sometimes acts in a way which brings about unforeseen and undesired for consequences is no ground for arguing that it is not an agent, for the argument: "Why should one wilfully do what is harmful to one's self?"—has no force here seeing that the individual soul in bondage

¹ V.P.S., 2.3.30.

² *Op. cit.* See V.R.M., pp. 7-8.

³ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.18.

⁴ Ś.N.K.S., śloka 21: "Dvyamśatā'pi na ca bhāti cetane ahampratīti-
viśaye aham-arthake", etc. Cf. the Advaita Vedānta view of Śaṅkara.

⁵ See below.

⁶ V.P.S., 2.3.32-40.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.32.

⁸ Vide e.g., Tait. Sam., 2.5.5.

⁹ Brh., 1.4.7.

¹⁰ Scripture enjoins "Samādhi" also, which is possible on the part of an active agent only. Vide V.P.S., 2.3.38.

¹¹ V.P.S., 2.3.33. Cf. Brh., 2.1.18.

is neither omniscient nor omnipotent, and as such cannot always foresee or prevent the adverse consequences of its own acts.¹

The individual soul is an agent not only during the state of mundane existence, but also in its state of release.²

The individual soul is an enjoyer, too.³ This follows from the above; for an agent, a doer of karmas, good or evil, is also an enjoyer—the reaper of the fruits thereof, good or evil.⁴ Even when the soul is freed from all karmas, and consequently from the trammels of mundane existence, it remains an enjoyer still,⁵ though this enjoyment is not like earthly enjoyment and does not lead to rebirths.

Thus, the individual soul is a self-conscious intelligent principle, a knower, a doer and an enjoyer.

But in spite of this, it is not independent or self-dependent, as might be supposed, but is essentially under the control of the Lord,⁶ and its existence, knowledge, activity, enjoyment—everything in fact—depend on and are guided by the Lord Himself.⁷ Even when it becomes free and comes to attain similarity with Him, it remains under His control.⁸

The individual soul is without beginning and without end—eternal.⁹ This is declared by Scripture itself, which explicitly says that there is no such thing as birth or death of the soul, for the soul does not die when the body is dead and is not born when the body is born.¹⁰ Hence such expressions like “One is born, one is dead” are only figurative, and imply only that the material body is born or dead, but not the soul itself.¹¹

¹ V.P.S., 2.3.36. Cf. V.K., 2.3.36.

² The freed soul, e.g., creates its own body, roams about and sports with the Lord, etc. All these acts, however, incur no more rebirths or earthly existences for the soul. See below.

³ V.P.S., 1.3.7; 3.2.17.

⁴ Of course, an exception is to be made in the case of the Lord, who is a kartā—as creator of the universe—but not a bhoktā of it.

⁵ E.g., the freed soul enjoys all sorts of celestial pleasures with the Lord. See below.

⁶ D.Ś., śloka 1.

⁷ See below. It is pointed out that the fact that the Lord makes some do good deeds, while others bad deeds, does not imply any partiality on His part, for He makes one do this or that act not arbitrarily, but out of regard for one's own karmas. Vide V.P.S., 2.3.33 and 41.

⁸ See below.

¹⁰ Cf. e.g., Kāṭha., 2.18. Also Gītā, 2.20.

⁹ V.P.S., 2.3.16-17. Aja.

¹¹ V.P.S., 2.3.16.

The fact that the individual soul is equally eternal with the Lord does not in any way subtract from Brahman's supreme majesty, for the eternal soul from all eternity exists *in* Brahman and is under His control, so that no question of its being a "second" principle besides Brahman, the One, arises at all.

The souls (and the *pradhāna*) are, in fact, both unborn and have Brahman as their essence or cause without giving rise to any contradiction, for these two designations refer to two *different conditions* of the souls (and the *pradhāna*)—viz. their causal¹ and effected² states. In their causal state, they remain as powers of Brahman, and as Brahman is eternal, His powers must also be so; and it is in this sense that the individual souls, etc. are called unborn and eternal; in their effected states, on the other hand, they emanate from Brahman in some form or other and are said to have Brahman for their cause.³

The soul is a part of Brahman, and as such both different and non-different from Him.⁴ All of them (as pure souls, untainted by *Avidyā*) are really equally pure, all being equally parts of one Lord, yet they are distinguished from one another as *Brāhmaṇa*, *Śūdra*, pure, impure, etc., owing to their connection with different kinds of bodies, just as the same fire is acceptable from the house of a learned *Brāhmaṇa*, but not from a crematory.⁵

Finally, the soul is really possessed of celestial qualities like 'freedom from sins' and the rest,⁶ though through the wish of the Lord, all these qualities remain veiled by *Avidyā*, i.e. Matter and Karma, and consequently non-manifest during its state of bondage.⁷

Next, the size of the soul. It is atomic in dimension.⁸ This is proved from the fact that the soul is said to pass out of the body through such small openings like the eyes, etc.,⁹ and unless it be very minute in size, it cannot possibly do so.¹⁰ This is declared by Scripture as well which designates the soul as the hundredth part of a hair divided a hundred-fold.¹¹

But although the soul is atomic, it can yet experience the pleasures, pains, etc., i.e. sensations, of the entire body, just as a single

¹ *Kāryyāvasthā*.

³ V.P.S., 1.4.10. Cf. also V.K., 1.4.10.

⁵ V.P.S., 2.3.47. Vide also V.P.S., 2.1.22.

⁶ Cf. *Prajāpati-vākya*. Chānd., 8.5.1.

⁸ V.P.S., 2.3.19-22.

¹⁰ V.P.S., 2.3.19, etc.

² *Kāraṇāvasthā*.

⁴ See below.

⁷ V.P.S., 3.2.5-6

⁹ Cf. *Brh.*, 4.4.2.

¹¹ Cf. *Śvet.*, 5.9.

drop of sandal in one part of the body can soothe and delight the entire body.¹

And the atomic soul is capable of experiencing the sensations of the entire body through its attribute of knowledge, which is all-pervasive.² Hence just as the rays of a small lamp in one corner of a room flood the entire room,³ or just as the smell of a tiny flower spreads far and wide,⁴ so the all-pervasive attribute of knowledge of the atomic soul, abiding in the heart only, pervades the entire body and makes it possible for the soul to experience all the various states of the body.

Sometimes, of course, the soul is designated as all-pervasive like Brahman, but such designations are simply due to its all-pervasive⁵ quality of knowledge. That is to say, while Brahman is by nature great and all-pervasive and also possessed of equally great and all-pervasive attributes, the soul is by nature small and atomic, though possessed of the all-pervasive attribute of knowledge, by virtue of which alone it is sometimes called all-pervasive.⁶ And there is nothing contradictory in such a designation of the atomic soul as all-pervasive on the ground of the all-pervasiveness of its attribute of knowledge, seeing that this attribute of knowledge is the very essence of the soul, persisting so long as the soul itself does.⁷

The doctrine of the all-pervasiveness of the soul, Nimbārka points out, is open to many serious objections. On this doctrine there must result either eternal perception or eternal non-perception on the part of the soul,⁸ for, the all-pervasive soul must be eternally in connection with all objects; or, even if somehow this connection be denied, there is no extra third principle outside the all-pervasive soul to bring it about. Further, since on this view, all all-pervasive souls will be in connection with all karmas, there is sure to result a confusion among the karmas of the different souls. The recourse to *adṛṣṭa* is of no avail here, for there is no mark for distinguishing that one particular *adṛṣṭa* belongs to one particular soul. Further, it cannot be said that particular resolves, viz. "I shall do this and not that", etc., on the part of particular individuals lead them to be connected with particular karmas and *adṛṣṭas* (and hence with different lots), for such particular resolves themselves

¹ V.P.S., 2.3.23.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.26.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.29.

² *Op. cit.*

⁵ Cf. e.g., Muṇḍ., 1.1., etc.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.31.

³ *Op. cit.*

⁶ V.P.S., 2.3.28.

are not possible. Finally, it cannot be said that one particular soul is connected with one particular body only, hence there can be no confusion of karmas and enjoyments, for that particular soul being universal, must be in contact with all bodies.¹

Thus, the doctrine of the universality of the soul is fallacious.² It is because the soul is by nature atomic, in spite of being a part of the all-pervasive Lord, and in spite of possessing the all-pervasive attribute of knowledge, that there is no confusion among the karmas, no universal perception or universal non-perception.³ Thus, we conclude that the soul is essentially atomic in size and ever remains so, even in its state of release.⁴

Next, the number of souls. They are infinite in number.⁵

Finally, the kinds of souls. There are broadly two kinds of them, viz. souls in bondage and freed souls.⁶ The souls are, therefore, in a condition to be associated or disassociated with the body,⁷ i.e. the souls in bondage, surrounded by beginningless māyā, i.e. matter and karma, are associated with earthly bodies, while the freed souls, through the knowledge of the Lord, gained through His grace, get rid of all connection with matter and karma, and thereby of their earthly bodies.⁸

Thus, the conclusion reached is that:—

- (1) In nature, the soul is knowledge, yet a knower, a doer, and an enjoyer, under the control of the Lord and a part of the Lord, yet eternal—all these being true of the soul in bondage as well as in release; further, it is possessed of the qualities of 'freedom from sins' and the rest, although not during its state of bondage.
- (2) In size, it is atomic, in bondage as in release.
- (3) In number, it is infinite;
- (4) and it is of two broad kinds—bound and freed.

¹ V.P.S., 2.3.48–52.

² *Op. cit.*, 2.3.49.

³ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.48.

⁴ See below.

⁵ D.Ś., śloka 1. That is, in spite of the fact that more and more jīvas are being freed from the saṃsāra, the saṃsāra still continues and will evidently do so eternally. This proves that the number of jīvas is infinite. Vide V.R.M., p. 19. See below.

⁶ D.Ś., śloka 2. Baddha and mukta. Cf. V.R.M., pp. 22–23, for details and subdivisions. See below.

⁷ D.Ś., śloka 1.

⁸ The freed soul may, of course, possess a celestial body at will. See below.

2. *Different states of the jīva : jāgrat, svapna, suṣupti, mūrchā and maraṇa.*

The soul has five different states: viz. the states of waking (jāgrat), dream (svapna), deep sleep (suṣupti), swoon (mūrchā) and death (maraṇa).¹

The state of waking has been considered above. The waking soul is a self-conscious, knowing subject, an active agent and an enjoyer, experiencing the inevitable fruits of its own karmas and thereby undergoing a variety of conditions.

In the state of dream, too, the soul is a conscious subject,—a knower and an enjoyer.² It enjoys the various dream-objects created by the Lord in accordance with its own karmas. It is held by some that the soul itself, and not the Lord, is responsible for the dream-creation,³ but that is not possible, because the omnipotent and omniscient Lord alone, capable of realising all His wishes at once (without the help of any external implements), can produce the wonderful dream-objects and never the soul.⁴ The latter, of course, is possessed of the equal qualities of realising its wishes at once and the rest, but that fact is of no avail here, for all these qualities of the soul remain veiled, as we have seen, during its state of bondage.

Further, dreams are indicative of the future.⁵ Now, if the soul were indeed the creator of dreams, it would surely have dreamt only lucky dreams indicative of future prosperity to itself. But that, evidently, is not the case.

Next, the state of deep sleep. During this state, too, the soul is a conscious subject—a knower and an enjoyer, though its knowledge, etc. are not fully manifest as they are during its state of waking, but remain unmanifest and latent, as we have seen before.⁶

¹ These are, of course, the states of the baddha-jīva only, not of the mukta-jīva.

² V.P.S., 3.2.1-6.

³ *Op. cit.*, 3.2.21-22.

⁴ The sense is that the soul can make different things out of the materials and implements supplied, but it cannot evidently make anything without the help of these. Now, the dream-objects, unlike the ordinary objects, are not made out of ordinary materials, etc.—there being no such materials, etc. present then. Hence they are outside the limited power of the soul, and can be produced by the Lord alone who can produce anything through a mere wish.

⁵ V.P.S., 3.2.4.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.30. That the soul is a knower and an enjoyer in the state of deep sleep is clear from such memories: "So long I sleep well and do not know anything", etc.—which proves the presence of the conscious subject as

Suṣupti takes place in the Lord.¹ The soul, after entering the vein and the pericardium finally rests in the supreme Lord and rises from Him again.²

It is the very same soul who went to sleep that rises again and not a different one.³ This is proved from three facts—viz. recollection of work, scripture and injunction.⁴ Thus, a soul after rising from deep sleep, remembers the work begun before, but left half-done, and finishes it. This proves that the soul which began the work before falling asleep is identical with the one which finishes it after rising from sleep. Scripture also proves the very same fact,⁵ and finally, injunctions regarding sacrifice, meditation, etc. are meaningless unless the same soul persists throughout.⁶

Next, the state of swoon.⁷ This is a distinct state, not to be included under any one of the other states, though it resembles some of the other states in some points; for example, the state of swoon possesses half the characteristics of death, yet is not identical with it—it is, in fact, midway between sleep and death and not exactly identical with any one of them.⁸

Finally, the state of death. There are two kinds of death—that which leads to rebirth and that which does not. In the first case, the soul leaves the body, goes to heaven, or to hell, and returns to a new body; while in the second case, the soul goes to the world of Brahman, not to return any more. These are considered in detail in the next section.

3. *Different destinies of the jīva: svarga, naraka, and apavarga: heaven, hell, and salvation.*

There are broadly two classes of souls in bondage, viz. doers (or karmin) and knowers (or jñānin). The former are, again, divided

the substrate of the knowledge: "I do not know anything", and of the feeling of happiness: "I am sleeping happily". Cf. V.R.M., pp. 7-8; Ś.K., pp. 101-102; cf. also Śrī. B., 1.1.1.

¹ V.P.S., 3.2.7.

² *Op. cit.*, 3.2.8.

³ *Op. cit.*, 3.2.9.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 3.2.9.

⁵ E.g. Chānd., 6.9.2; 6.10.2.

⁶ The souls go to sleep daily, but if the same souls do not arise, there is evidently no sense in telling them to do this or that—to follow this or that path with a view to attaining this or that goal.

⁷ V.P.S., 3.2.10.

⁸ Cf. V.K., 3.2.10.

into pious workers (*puṇyavān* or *iṣṭakārins*), and sinners (*pāpīns* or *aniṣṭakārins*); and these three kinds of classes of souls, pious workers, sinners and knowers, undergo different destinies, attaining different ends, through different paths.¹

What happens to a pious worker after death is as follows²: His soul, accompanied by the sense-organs³ and surrounded by the subtle elements⁴ such as water, fire, etc., which are the germ for a new body, leaves the body with a view to enjoying the fruits of its own karmas. Thus, first the senses of the pious worker are connected with the mind—first speech and then the rest—next, the mind is connected with the vital breath, the vital breath with the soul, and the soul with the subtle elements. Then the soul comes out of the body through the eyes or any other opening.

After having come out of the body, the soul follows the path of Fathers, which begins with 'smoke'. Thus, it first goes to the smoke, and then successively to night, the dark half of the moon, six months of the sun's southern progress, world of Fathers, and finally to the moon.⁵ There it enjoys the fruits of its karmas, and after that, with a remainder of its karmas still clinging to it,⁶ it returns once more to earth and assumes a new body in accordance with its karmas.⁷ Thus, on its return journey, first it becomes the ether, the air, the smoke, mist, the cloud in succession, and then as rain, it pours down on earth; after that it grows as grains, herbs, and

¹ Here, Nimbārka, like Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and the rest, follows the account given in Chānd., 5.3-5.10, and also in Bṛh., 6.2.

² V.P.S., 3.1.1.

³ This is proved from the scriptural passage: "He going out, the prāṇa goes out; and the prāṇa going out, all the prāṇas go out". (Bṛh., 4.4.2.)

⁴ For objections to this view and refutation thereof, vide V.P.S., 3.1.2.

⁵ Cf. Chānd., 5.10.3-4; also Bṛh., 6.2.16.

⁶ V.P.S., 3.1.8. There are two kinds of karmas—those which produce fruits to be experienced hereafter in heaven or hell as the case may be, and those which produce fruits to be experienced here, in this world. The soul, after leaving the present body, goes to heaven or hell, to experience the first kind of fruits, and then returns to earth to experience the rest here. Cf. V.K.S., 3.1.8.

⁷ Cf. Chānd., 5.10.7.

trees, i.e. as food, then it is eaten by a man and becomes seed, and from this seed is born a new man.¹

Of course, "becoming" the ether, etc. here does not mean actual becoming, but only becoming *similar* to the ether and the rest²; while "growing" as rice, etc. also does not mean actual growing, but only becoming connected with them.³ And the descending soul remains in a state of similarity with the ether and the rest for but a short time, while it has to remain connected with rice, herbs and the rest for a comparatively longer time.⁴

This is the destiny of pious workers, who perform sacrifices, and practise charity and the rest.⁵

But sinners, who act contrary to sacrificial injunctions, i.e. do what is forbidden and omit to do what is enjoined, are not subject to the same destiny.⁶ They follow neither the path of Fathers, nor the path of Gods, and go neither to the world of the moon, nor to

¹ Nimbārka, as pointed out, follows the process of generation as depicted in the "Pañcāgni-vidyā" in the Chānd. and Brh. thus:—

Chānd., 5.3-5.9.

(Five offerings)

Chānd., 5.10.5-6.

(The way of return)

(a) The prāṇas offer śraddhā (i.e. water, vide V.P.S., 3.1.5), i.e. the soul accompanied by the subtle elements—water and the rest, to the *ether*, and it then becomes the moon.

(b) Then the prāṇas offer this body to the *clouds* and then it becomes *rain*.

(c) Then the prāṇas offer the rain to the *earth*, and then it becomes *food*.

(d) Then the prāṇas offer this food to *man* and then it becomes *seed*.

(e) Finally, the prāṇas offer the seed to *woman* and it becomes a *man*.

(a) Ether.

(b) Air.

(c) Smoke.

(d) Mist.

(e) Cloud.

(f) Rain.

(g) Food.

(h) Seed.

(i) Man.

Cf. Brh., 6.2 for a similar account. Cf. V.K., 3.1.1.

² V.P.S., 3.1.22.

³ *Op. cit.*, 3.1.24.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 3.1.23.

⁵ It is to be noted that the performance of sacrifices, etc. may lead to mokṣa, through generating vidyā, if undertaken in a *different spirit*. See below.

⁶ V.P.S., 3.1.12-17.

the world of Brahman, but to a "third place".¹ Thence they return to earth and their method of returning is different from that of pious workers, i.e. they are not born in the usual way.²

Finally, the destiny of the knower is different from that of both pious workers and sinners. What happens to a knower after death is as follows³: After death, the senses of a knower are merged⁴ in the mind—first speech and then the rest—the mind then is connected with the vital breath, the vital breath with the soul, the soul with the subtle elements. Up to this point, as evident, the cases of a pious worker and a knower are exactly alike. But while the soul of a pious worker leaves the body through the eyes, etc., the soul of a knower—thus accompanied by the senses, the mind, the vital breath and the subtle elements, i.e. by the subtle body⁵—leaves the gross body through the vein which passes out of the crown of the head,⁶ in recognising which it has no difficulties, since the Lord Himself, being pleased with a knower, lights up the tip of that particular vein.⁷ The soul then comes out of the body through that vein which is directly connected with the rays of the sun and ascends up, following

¹ V.P.S., 3.1.17.

Nimbārka does not say what precisely this "third place" is, nor does Śrip-ture (Chānd. or Brh.). According to the followers of Nimbārka, this "third place" is hell, the soul of a sinner is led to it by the servants of Yama through a path full of scorching sand, etc. and has to suffer innumerable agonies there. Vide Ś.K., pp. 132, 141-2. See below.

The pūrva-pakṣa, viz. that the soul of a sinner, too, goes to the moon, though not directly like the soul of a pious worker, but after a full retribution of its sins in hell, is rejected on the ground of Scripture. Vide V.P.S., 3.1.12-16.

² V.P.S., 3.1.18.

Nimbārka does not tell us in what forms exactly the souls which go to a "third place" are reborn on earth, nor any one of his followers. Evidently he means that they are born as the most primitive forms of life, in accordance with Brh., 6.2.16—which states that those who do not follow either the path of (punya) karmas, or the path of jñāna are born as worms, gnats, etc.

³ V.P.S., 4.2.1-7.

⁴ Cf. Chānd., 6.15.1-2.

Here "merging" means neither a mere functional absorption (as held by Śaṅkara), nor a complete material absorption, but conjunction (saṃyoga).

⁵ 4.2.9, 11. Cf. also V.P.S., 3.3.30.

It is said here that the subtle body of the knower persists, in spite of the fact that all his karmas come to decay, for unless the soul be accompanied by a substratum, it cannot move through the path of Gods.

⁶ Cf. Chānd., 8.6.5.

⁷ V.P.S., 4.2.16.

the rays of the sun and goes through the path of Gods.¹ The successive stages of the path are as follows: light, day, the bright fortnight, the six months of the northern progress of the sun, the year, the air (otherwise called the "world of Gods"), the moon, the lightning, the world of Varuṇa, the world of Indra, the world of Prajāpati.²

Then it reaches the world of Brahman to return no more.³ This is the destiny of a knower.

It may be supposed that as the soul of a knower is said to follow up the rays of the sun, a knower who dies at night cannot follow the path of Gods and reach Brahman, nor can a knower who dies during the inauspicious period of the sun's southern progress attain Brahman. But this is really not the case, for the main obstruction to the attainment of Brahman, viz. karma, being removed, there is nothing that can hinder such an attainment on the part of a knower—the time-factor plays no part here.⁴

Thus, the conclusion arrived at is:—

(a) Knowers go to the world of Brahman through the path of Gods, not to return any more.⁵

¹ V.P.S., 4.2.17. Devayāna-panthā.

² This order is arrived at by reconciling the different scriptural accounts, viz. Chānd., 4.15.5; 5.10.1-2; Brh., 6.2.15; Kauṣ., 1.3. Vide V.K., 4.3.35.

Thus, when the soul leaves the body through the vein, it goes to light first, following the rays of the sun. Then the presiding deity of light leads it to day; the presiding deity of day leads it to the bright fortnight and so on. Then, when the soul reaches lightning, the presiding deity of lightning, an immortal Person, leads it to the world of Varuṇa; this immortal Person of lightning, assisted by Varuṇa, leads it to the world of Indra; thence the same immortal Person of lightning, assisted by Indra, leads it to the world of Prajāpati. Then, assisted by Prajāpati, the same immortal Person of lightning leads the soul above the sphere of the material world to the river Virajā where the soul discards its subtle body, and enters the world of Brahman, not to return any more.

³ V.P.S., 4.3.4-5.

The sense is that from light up to the moon, the ascending soul is led from one stage to another by presiding deities of each stage, but from lightning to the world of Brahman, it is the immortal Person of lightning who is the chief conductor, while Varuṇa and the rest are only assistants.

⁴ V.P.S., 4.2.18-20. It is pointed out that the rays of the sun persist in the night-time.

A question is raised also whether the soul is led to the effected Brahman or to the Supreme Brahman. Vide V.P.S., 4.3.6-15.

⁵ For the state of knowers in the world of Brahman, see the section on Salvation.

- (b) Pious workers go to the world of the moon through the path of Fathers, to return again in accordance with their karmas.
- (c) Sinners go to the "third place" (i.e. hell) to return to earth again, though not through the ordinary way.

These two famous paths, celebrated in the Upaniṣads—the path of Fathers (Pitr-yāna), followed by the pious workers, and the path of Gods (Deva-yāna), followed by the knowers—may appear meaningless from the philosophical point of view. But they are but figurative ways of indicating the essential difference between the destinies of mere workers (Karmin) and real knowers (Jñānin). The soul of a person,—who spends his time in doing this thing or that in the hope of acquiring merit (puṇya), and not in the acquisition of knowledge that alone can put an end to all karmas and the consequent rounds of birth and rebirth,—has to traverse a *dark* path that gets darker and darker as it proceeds, although it finally leads to the world of Fathers and hence to the moon. But the soul of a person, who has acquired knowledge, goes through a *bright* path that gets brighter and brighter as it proceeds, finally leading to the world of Gods, the moon, higher and higher worlds; and thence to the world of Brahman. The darkness of the one path and the brightness of the other symbolically stand for the ignorance of the karmins and the knowledge of the jñānins respectively.

The return journey of the soul of the karmins is also something very ingenious. The soul of the unborn child must somehow enter the bodies of its future parents and become one with their souls. Hence arises the novel conception of the incoming soul being gradually coming into contact with the food taken by the parents.

III. The acit : the jagat, etc.

The acit is of three different kinds: viz. prākṛta, or what is derived from prakṛti, the primal matter, aprākṛta, or what is not derived from prakṛti, and kāla, or time.¹

Prakṛti, or the primal matter—the stuff of the entire universe is real and eternal like the individual souls, and like them, though eternal and unborn, has yet Brahman for its cause.² It consists of the three guṇas, viz. sattva, rajas and tamas.

¹ D.Ś., śloka 3.

² See below.

Nimbārka distinguishes between the “aupaniṣada-pradhāna” and the “Sāṃkhya-pradhāna”, i.e. matter dependent on and under the control of the Lord, and independent and self-sufficient matter. The former alone is admitted by Scripture and not the latter.¹

The process of the origin of the world is as follows²: First, the ether originates from the Lord, from the ether air, from air fire, from fire water and from water earth, although in every case it is the Lord who is the real creator.³

And the process of dissolution is just the reverse of the process of creation⁴—viz., first the earth is merged in water, water in fire, fire in air, air in the ether and the ether in the Lord.

Like the elements, the vital breath, the mind and the sense-organs all originate from the Lord.⁵

Nimbārka, in fact, accepts the usual Sāṃkhya view of creation.⁶ But to say that the elements and the vital breath, etc. arise from the Lord is not wrong on the acceptance of this view, for the Lord really is the material cause of the universe.⁷ He accepts the doctrine of tri-partition (trivṛt-karāṇa), and points out that everything is a mixture of all the elements, but is called one particular thing because of the preponderance of one particular element in it.⁸

Nimbārka does not tell us what exactly the aprākṛta is, nor does he define kāla more precisely, beyond noticing, as pointed out above, that the aprākṛta and the kāla are species of the acit.⁹

IV. Relation between Brahman, the cit and the acit : Svābhāvika-bhedābheda-vāda.

Thus, we have seen that, according to Nimbārka, there are three equally real and co-eternal realities, viz. Brahman, the cit and the acit. Brahman is the Controller (Niyantṛ), the cit the enjoyer (bhokṛ) and the acit the object enjoyed (bhogya).¹⁰ The next question which confronts us is: What is the exact relation between these three?

In the first place, there is an essential difference of nature (svarūpa-bheda) between Brahman on the one hand, the soul and the world

¹ V.P.S., 1.4.3.

² *Op. cit.*, 2.3.1–13.

³ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.13.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.14.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.15; 2.4.1–4.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.15. V.R.M., pp. 23–29. Vide pp. 144ff. of the thesis, Part I.

⁷ See p. 29 of thesis, Part I.

⁸ V.P.S., 2.4.19–21; 3.1.2.

⁹ Cf. V.R.M., pp. 37–40 for details. See below under *Puruṣottamācārya: Kāla and Aprākṛta*.

¹⁰ V.P.S., 2.1.13; 3.3.36. D.Ś., śloka 7.

on the other. Thus, Brahman is the cause and the soul His effect, and there is evidently a difference between the cause and its effect, as between the sea and its waves, between the sun and its rays.¹ Also, the Brahman is the whole, and the soul His part, and the part and the whole cannot be identical.² Again, Brahman is the object to be worshipped,³ the object to be known,⁴ the object to be attained,⁵ while the soul is the knower, the worshipper and the attainer, and there is always a difference between the worshipper and the worshipped, the knower and the known, the attainer and the attained.⁶

Further, Brahman, as the Inner Controller, dwells within the soul and controls it, and the dweller and the place dwelt in, the controller and the controlled, must be different.⁷

Other essential differences between Brahman and the soul are that while the former is never subject to avidyā,⁸ absolutely and always free from sins, capable of realising all His wishes at once, etc.,⁹ all-pervading,¹⁰ and possessed of the power of creation, maintenance and destruction,¹¹ the latter is not.

Even the freed soul, which is similar to Brahman in other points, differs from Him in the last two points.¹²

Thus, the difference between Brahman and the soul is eternal and natural, and can by no means be denied at any time. Brahman is essentially other than and superior to the soul.¹³

In the very same manner, there is an essential difference between Brahman and the universe. Brahman is the cause, the universe the effect, and as such the two cannot be absolutely identical.¹⁴ Brahman is sentient, non-gross, non-material, ever-pure, the universe is quite the reverse.¹⁵ The former is the ruler, the universe the ruled.¹⁶ Hence the two must be different.

Thus, the difference between Brahman and the universe is equally eternal, natural and undeniable.

¹ V.P.S., 2.1.13. Cf. V.K., 2.1.13, p. 159.

² *Op. cit.*, 2.3.42. Cf. also Ś.N.K.S., śloka 1, where the Lord is said to be "amśin".

³ V.P.S., 1.2.12.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 1.2.12; 1.3.5.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.15, 18, 20.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 1.2.12; 1.3.5; 1.1.18.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 1.2.5-6; 1.3.44.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 1.2.8; 1.3.7; 3.2.13-14.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, 1.2.8. Although the soul possesses all these qualities really, yet it does not do so during its state of bondage. See above.

¹⁰ V.P.S., 2.3.28.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, 4.4.17.

¹² See below.

¹³ V.P.S., 1.4.18; 2.1.21.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, 2.1.16.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, 2.1.4-6; 3.3.33.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, 1.2.19.

But if, on the one hand, difference is true, on the other, non-difference is no less true. The souls and the universe—as effects and parts of Brahman, are distinct from Him, the cause and the whole, but as effects and parts, again, they are also non-distinct from Him.¹ This is proved by the fact that the effect is completely dependent on the cause for its very being and existence—that the effect can exist solely when the cause itself exists and never otherwise.² The fact is that the effect and the cause, the part and the whole are neither absolutely distinct nor absolutely non-distinct, but the relation between them is a relation of both difference and non-difference (bhedaḥbhedā).³ Thus, the relation between Brahman, on the one hand, and the souls and the universe on the other, is a relation of natural difference-non-difference (svābhāvika-bhedaḥbhedā),⁴ just like that between a snake and its coil,⁵ or between the sun and its rays.⁶ Just as the coil is nothing but the snake, yet different from it, just as the ray is nothing but the sun, yet different from it, just as the different kinds of stones, though nothing but earth, are yet different from it,⁷ so the souls and the universe, though nothing but Brahman (brahmātmaka),⁸ are different from Him because of their own peculiar natures and attributes.

The conclusion arrived at, therefore, is that difference (bheda) and non-difference (abheda) are both equally real, natural and eternal, without contradicting each other. Just as it is true that the souls and the universe exist in Brahman from all eternity (as a tree exists in its seed) and do not become separate from or independent of Him, even when actually produced (or rather manifested), as a pot becomes separate from the potter—being ever permeated, supported and controlled by Him, so it is equally true at the same time that they retain their peculiar natures—their own individuality and separateness from Brahman all along.

V. Criticism of other schools of thought.

Nimbārka criticises (though not in details) the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Bauddha, the Jaina, the Śaiva and the Śakti schools of thought.⁹

¹ V.P.S., 1.4.20; 2.1.14-15.

³ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.4; 3.2.27-28.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 3.2.27.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.31; 3.3.39. D.Ś., śloka 7.

⁹ See translation of V.P.S., Vol. I, 2.2.

² *Op. cit.*, 2.1.5.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.42; 3.2.27-28.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 3.2.28.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 2.1.22.

VI. Mokṣa.

Mokṣa or salvation means becoming like the Lord (tad-bhāvā-patti)¹—i.e. attaining similarity (sāmya)² with Him in nature and qualities, and it is due to the grace of the Lord.³

Thus, the process of attaining release is as follows:—

A man, desirous of salvation,⁴ approaches a guru, and follows one or other of the sādhanas as directed by him; this has the effect of pleasing the Lord Who Himself frees him from the shackle of avidyā,⁵ i.e. from all karmas, good or bad, which are the causes of bondage. But the man has to wait till he has completely exhausted the effects of works which have already begun to bear fruit (prārabdha karmas) by retributive experience (or bhoga).⁶ After that, when he is completely freed from them and has no more birth to undergo, his soul leaves the body through the vein which passes out of the crown of the head, follows the path of Gods and attains the world of Brahman.⁷ Then, through the grace of the Lord, it comes to have a direct vision of the Lord,⁸ and attains similarity with Him,⁹ i.e. attains the nature and qualities of the Lord—and this is salvation.

But this, viz. the attainment of the nature of Brahman (Brahma-svarūpa-lābha), is only one element in mokṣa, and not the whole of it. The other and equally important element is the attainment of one's own real and essential nature (ātma-svarūpa-lābha) as well.¹⁰ Mokṣa, thus, means no less a full development of one's own individuality. The difference of the soul from Brahman being natural and eternal persists always—in bondage as well as in release,¹¹ and hence salvation does not imply any identity between the two, or any annihilation of the individuality of the soul. In fact, the word

¹ M.R.Ś., śloka 14. P.K., śloka 22.

² V.P.S., 3.2.26.

³ See below.

⁴ According to the followers of Nimbārka, this very fact that one has an inclination towards salvation (and not towards earthly enjoyment) is due to the grace of the Lord. It is because one particular person has been looked at with favour by the Lord at the time of his birth that he has from the very beginning a natural inclination to higher ends, viz. the attainment of Brahman, and a natural aversion to worldly ends. Vide V.R.M., pp. 133–142; Ś.K., p. 142.

⁵ D.Ś., śloka 6.

⁶ See below.

⁷ See below.

⁸ V.P.S., 3.2.22 (though no mention of grace here). But vide V.P.S., 3.2.5—where it is said that the Lord is the cause of salvation—which means that the Lord Himself leads men to a direct realisation of Himself—which is salvation.

⁹ V.P.S., 3.2.26.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, 4.4.1-2.

¹¹ See above.

“sāmya” used often¹ to describe the state of salvation, means similarity and never identity. The freed soul, therefore, is similar to the Lord without losing its own nature and individuality.

This full development of the real nature or individuality of the soul implies the full manifestation of its real nature as consciousness through and through, untainted by matter, and of real qualities of freedom from sins, from decay and death, from hunger and thirst, etc.² This real nature of the self as pure consciousness remains hidden during its state of bondage through its connection with avidyā, i.e. matter, karma, like the rays of a lamp within a pot.³ Similarly, its real qualities remain veiled through avidyā, which subjects the soul to all sorts of sins and impurities, to decay and death and endless rebirths. But in salvation, this veil of avidyā being completely lifted up, the true self shines forth in all its brilliance and purity.⁴

It is clear from the above that since salvation means the attainment of the nature of Brahman, as well as that of one's own nature,⁵ the freed soul realises itself as non-distinct from Brahman—which non-distinction is not incompatible with a distinction between itself and Brahman.⁶ That is to say, as everywhere else, the relation between the soul and Brahman is one of natural difference-non-difference (svābhāvika-bhedābheda), in salvation, too, there being similarity as well as distinction between the two.

The similarity between the freed soul and Brahman consists in the following facts:—

First, as noted above, the freed soul attains the nature and qualities of the Lord, viz. pure and obstructed consciousness, omniscience, freedom from sins, faults and impurities, decay and death.⁷ It, further, comes to have the power of realising all its wishes at once and can meet its forefathers, etc. through a mere wish.⁸ It comes to possess also the power of moving about everywhere at will and can attain any world without resorting to any means.⁹ It comes to possess, in fact, supreme majesty¹⁰ and becomes a self-ruler, not under the control of any one else¹¹ (excepting the Lord, of course).¹²

¹ Vide e.g., “paramam sāmyam upaiti” (Munḍ., 3.1.3).

² See above.

³ See above.

⁴ Cf. Chānd., 8.3.4, “svena rūpeṇa abhiniṣṭapadyate”.

⁵ Ś.N.K.S., śloka 13.

⁶ V.P.S., 4.4.4. Vibhāgavirodhinā vibhāgena.

⁷ V.P.S., 4.4.7. See above.

⁸ V.P.S., 4.4.8.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.40.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, 4.4.9.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, 4.4.9.

¹² See below.

It shares all the pleasures and enjoyments with Brahman in this world.¹ It may possess a body or not at its own liking² and in the absence of a body created by itself, it enjoys pleasures by means of the body created by the Lord.³ The sense is that the freed soul, being capable of realising all its wishes, can, of course, create its own body, yet sometimes it voluntarily refrains from doing so and prefers to have a body created by the Lord. And even when it creates its own body, it does so in accordance with the Lord's wish. That is, the freed soul, though a self-creator, is ever under the control of the Lord and always follows His will.⁴

On the other hand, the difference between the freed soul and the Lord consists in the following:—

In the first place, the freed soul is atomic in size,⁵ while the Lord is all-pervading.⁶ As pointed out above,⁷ atomicity is the very essence of the soul, hence since salvation does not imply the disappearance of the essence or nature of the soul, the essentially atomic soul cannot become all-pervasive in salvation. But this atomicity of the freed soul does not prevent it from enjoying the pleasures, etc. of several bodies simultaneously,⁸ for just as a small lamp pervades several rooms with its rays extending far and wide, so can the freed soul experience the pleasures of several bodies through its all-pervading quality of knowledge.⁹

In the second place, the freed soul, in spite of possessing supreme powers and majesty, never possesses the power of creating, maintaining and destroying the universe, which power belongs exclusively to the Lord alone.¹⁰

Thus, we find, that the state of salvation is a definite acquisition—a positive state of supreme self-development, knowledge and enjoyment, and not a negative state of unconsciousness and blankness.¹¹ The freed soul abides with a constant intuition of the Lord and is, thereby, free from all fear and full of bliss.¹²

¹ V.P.S., 4.4.21.

² *Op. cit.*, 4.4.14. This body, like that of the Lord, is non-material—*aprākṛta*. Vide V.R.M., pp. 31, 39.

³ V.P.S., 4.4.13.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 4.4.14. See above.

⁵ V.P.S., 4.4.15.

⁶ See above.

⁷ See above.

⁸ Cf. Chānd., 7.26.2, where it is said that the soul becomes one-fold, three-fold, etc.

⁹ V.P.S., 4.4.15.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, 4.4.20.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, 4.4.16.

¹² *Op. cit.*, 4.4.19.

Finally, according to Nimbārka, there is no such thing as jīvan-mukti, or salvation in this life, here and now. When a man is favoured by the Lord (because of following the paths of knowledge, devotion, etc.), he comes, of course, to be freed from any further karmas, i.e. his past karmas are destroyed and the future ones do not accumulate.¹ But those karmas which have already begun to bear fruits remain intact, and hence, as we have seen, he must continue his mundane existence until such karmas are completely destroyed by means of retributive experience,² although any further karmas which he may have to do during that period do not cling to him, as pointed out above, and he attains release, i.e. fellowship with the Lord and a full manifestation of his real self—after exhausting all these karmas that have already begun to fructify and discarding the physical body.

VII. Ethics : the sādhanas.

There are five sādhanas or means to emancipation, viz. karma or work, vidyā or knowledge, upāsanā or meditation, prapatti or self-surrender to the Lord, and gurūpasatti or devotion to a guru.³

(1) *Karma.*

Karmas by themselves do not lead to salvation directly, yet they are not useless, because, if performed conscientiously in a proper spirit, in accordance with one's caste and stage of life, they give rise to vidyā or knowledge which is a means to salvation.⁴ Hence, karmas being indirect means to salvation are to be undertaken as essential duties and not to be avoided or neglected as worthless or as leading away from salvation.

(2) *Vidyā.*

(a) *Nature of vidyā and its relation to karma.*

Brahman, the highest goal of men, can be attained through vidyā.⁵ Vidyā is not a subsidiary factor of karma (karmāṅga),

¹ V.P.S., 4.1.13.

² *Op. cit.*, 3.4.51; 4.1.15.

³ For details, vide V.R.M. See below under Puruṣottamācārya: Sādhana.

⁴ This is considered in details immediately in sub-section (2).

⁵ V.P.S., 3.4.1.

"Vidyā" means not mere "knowledge", but "meditative knowledge", i.e. knowledge ending in meditation. According to Nimbārka, knowledge and meditation are interconnected: knowledge ends in meditation, meditation is based on knowledge. Vide *infra*.

but is an independent means.¹ Far from being a subordinate factor of karma, it, on the contrary, destroys karmas which lead to endless rebirths, thereby hindering the attainment of final emancipation.²

But in spite of this, it is not to be supposed that karmas are absolutely useless, or that they have no relation whatsoever with vidyā. The fact is that karmas help the rise of vidyā and are, as such, elements of vidyā (vidyāṅga).³ The conscientious performance of the religious duties incumbent on particular stages of life (or the āśrama-dharmas), viz. the performance of sacrifices, the practice of charity and the rest,⁴ have the effect of purifying the mind and thereby helping the rise of knowledge.⁵ Of course, the function of karmas ends here, i.e. in giving rise to knowledge, for once knowledge is generated, it does not wait for anything else, but itself leads to salvation.⁶ Thus, karmas produce knowledge, but are, in their turn, destroyed by that very knowledge which they have produced. It is to be noted, however, that karmas do not always give rise to knowledge and thereby lead to salvation—sometimes they give rise only to merit, and thereby lead to heaven only. The fact is that it is the spirit with which one undertakes a work that determines the end attained. A man, who, desirous of salvation, performs sacrifices, etc. in a disinterested spirit with no desire for heaven, attains knowledge as a result and through it, salvation. But a man not desirous of salvation, who performs his duties in a selfish spirit with a view to attaining heaven, and the rest, accumulates merit as a result, goes to heaven, and is born on earth once more.⁷

Not only the external performance of sacrifices and the rest, but the internal control of the senses and so on, too, are incumbent on one desirous of knowledge as a means to salvation. In order that there may be a rise of knowledge in him, he must be calm, self-controlled, indifferent to worldly objects, forbearing and collected.⁸

Further, one wishing to have knowledge of Brahman must have deep learning, childlike simplicity and unostentatiousness and profound

¹ For the pūrva-pakṣa that vidyā is karmāṅga and the refutation thereof, vide V.P.S., 3.4.1-18.

² V.P.S., 3.4.16.

³ *Op. cit.*, 3.4.26.

⁴ Cf. Brh., 4.4.22.

⁵ V.P.S., 3.4.36.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 3.4.27. Cf. V.K., 3.4.27: the analogy of a horse, etc.

⁷ V.P.S., 3.4.32-34.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 3.4.27. Cf. Brh., 4.4.23.

thoughtfulness and the gift of silence. All these help the rise of knowledge.¹

There are, thus, three sets of auxiliaries to knowledge—first, the disinterested performance of one's own duties, such as sacrifices, the practice of charity and penance, etc.; secondly, the possession of self-control, forbearance, etc.; and thirdly, the possession of deep learning, simplicity and thoughtfulness.

Of course, each of these auxiliaries (*sahakārin*) is not universally needed for the rise of knowledge; for example, those who lead a life of chastity are not required to perform sacrifices, etc. for attaining knowledge, but can do so independently of any such things.²

The conclusion is, therefore:—

- (a) *vidyā* is independent of and separate from *karmas*; hence some, viz. the ascetics, who are not required to work or perform sacrifices, etc., can attain knowledge without the help of *karma*; ³
- (b) while others, again, viz. religious students and householders—who are required to work in accordance with their respective castes and stages of life—can attain knowledge only through the proper performance of sacrifices and the rest.

Nimbārka, therefore, does not regard the giving up of the active life of a householder as the essential pre-requisite to attaining Brahman.

Finally, it is recommended that one desirous of knowledge should take particular care regarding the food he takes, for purity of food, guarantees purity of the heart which quickens the rise of knowledge,⁴ and should always avoid wanton conduct.⁵

(b) *Adhikārins of vidyā.*

The proper relation between knowledge and work being thus determined, the next question is: Who are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman?

As seen above, all those who belong to one or other of the stages of life (or the *āśramas*)—both householders and ascetics—are entitled

¹ V.P.S., 3.4.46; 3.4.48-49. Cf. Brh., 3.5.1. Pāṇḍitya; bālya; mauna.

² V.P.S., 3.4.25.

³ They attain *vidyā* through the duties incumbent on their stage of life, viz. *śravaṇa*, *manana*, etc., vide V.K., 3.4.25.

⁴ V.P.S., 3.4.29-30.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 3.4.31.

to knowledge through the proper performance of their duties prescribed for the particular stages of life.¹

Further, even those who do not belong to any particular stage (or the anāśramin), are entitled to knowledge provided that the fact of their not belonging to any particular stage of life is due to mishap and not to actual lapse or wilful negligence on their own parts; for example, a widower, by misfortune, happens to be outside all stages of life—being neither a religious student nor a householder, nor an ascetic. Such men can gain knowledge through the muttering of prayers (or japa) and the rest (there being no particular āśrama-dharmas to be performed by them).¹ It is to be remembered, however, that one should belong to one or other of the stages of life if one can help, for it is far better to do so than to remain outside.² But persons who voluntarily leave or lapse from their stages of life through misbehaviour, are not entitled to knowledge like widowers and the rest. Such a lapse is a very serious offence. A Naiṣṭhika-brahmacārin or a perpetual religious student, observing the vow of chastity, who lapses from his vow is as good as a murderer of his own self and no penance can atone for his sin.³

Generally speaking, one who has studied the Veda with its six parts, and the science of religious duties, who is, as a result, averse to worldly ends and desirous of attaining the Lord, and who accordingly approaches a preceptor and devotes himself to him—is entitled to Brahma-vidyā.⁴

The conclusion, thus, is that the adhikārins of vidyā are:—

- (a) generally speaking, those who have studied the Vedas and the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, have approached a preceptor and have been ceremonially purified;

¹ V.P.S., 3.4.37.

² *Op. cit.*, 3.4.39.

³ *Op. cit.*, 3.4.41.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1.

(a) The sense is: The study of the Vedas generates a doubt regarding the exact nature of karmas and their fruits, since some Vedic passages teach that the fruits of karmas are eternal, while others teach that they are not.

(b) This leads a man to study the Karma-mīmāṃsā.

(c) From his study of the Karma-mīmāṃsā, he comes to see the distinction between the non-eternal karmas and the eternal Brahman.

(d) This generates an aversion in him for the transitory fruits of karmas, i.e. for ordinary objects of enjoyment—here or hereafter in heaven—and a desire for knowledge of Brahman.

(e) This leads him to approach a guru, and learn the Brahma-vidyā from him. Vide V.P.S., 1.1.1.

- (b) all who belong to one or other of the stages of life, through their performance of the duties incumbent thereon, and
 (c) some who do not belong to any stage of life, like widowers, etc., through muttering of prayers and so on.¹

(c) *The rise of vidyā.*

There is no fixed rule when knowledge is going to arise.² It may arise here or hereafter.³ If there be no obstructions, knowledge arises here in this world, otherwise not.

(3) *Upāsana or Dhyāna.*

(a) *The mode of meditation.*

A man who desires for salvation should meditate on his own self—on his real and essential self, freed from all sins and imperfections.⁴ He should meditate on the Lord as his own self.⁵ He should neither meditate on the self as it is during its stage of bondage,⁶ nor on any symbol.⁷ The best kind of meditation, thus, is the meditation on the self as one with the Lord (abhedopāsana).

(b) *Posture of meditation.*

Meditation is to be carried on in a sitting posture, meditation being best possible in that posture alone,⁸ i.e. on the part of one who is motionless.⁹

(c) *Place of meditation.*

There is no particular rule regarding the place of meditation the only requisite being that meditation should be practised in a place which helps the concentration of the mind.¹⁰ -

¹ The Śūdras, on the other hand, are not entitled to the knowledge of Brahman. The rule is that before any man is fit to receive instruction, he must be initiated with the holy thread as a preparatory purifying rite. But since a Śūdra belongs to the fourth caste, he is not entitled to any such purificatory ceremony and as such not entitled to knowledge. V.P.S., 1.3.34-39.

According to Puruṣottama and Sundarabhaṭṭa, the Śūdras are entitled to the study of the Purāṇas, etc., but are not to that of the Veda. Vide V.R.M., p. 74; S.S., p. 8.

² V.P.S., 3.4.50-51.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 4.1.3.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 4.1.7-8.

³ *Op. cit.*, 3.4.38, 50.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.51-52.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, 4.1.9.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.52.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 4.1.4-6.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, 4.1.11.

(d) *Time of meditation.*

Meditation is to be carried on, not off and on, but continuously as long as life lasts.¹

(e) *Fruits of meditation.*

Meditation, like knowledge, brings about the destruction of all karmas and leads to salvation.²

(f) *Kinds of meditation.*

The process of meditation depicted above³ is a somewhat higher intellectual process, presupposing the consciousness of identity between the individual soul and the Highest Soul. Ordinarily, however, this process is not always resorted to.⁴ The Lord is taken simply as a supreme object of worship and worshipped as such in Himself without the above preliminary identification of Him with the individual soul. Kṛṣṇa should be worshipped with steady and wholehearted devotion.⁵ He alone is to be worshipped and no other deity.⁶ Everything depends on His grace; hence those who are averse to the Lord, but given to the worship of other deities or to the pursuit of worldly ends—never attain success in anything⁷—not even in worldly pursuits. On the contrary, they have to face endless miseries at every step.⁸ The fact is that it is only through a complete dedication of one's life to the service and worship of the Lord that human life can have any meaning or worth.⁹

Whenever the Supreme Brahman is meditated on, He must be meditated on as possessed of the essential qualities of truth, knowledge, bliss, being the soul of all, having true desires, non-grossness, non-atomicity and the rest¹⁰—which pertain to His very nature—whether they be specially mentioned or not in connection with various Brahmopāśanās set forth in various schools of the Vedas, while the inessential qualities of having joy for His head and the rest, need not be included in all meditations.¹¹ That is to say, the various

¹ V.P.S., 4.1.12.

² *Op. cit.*, 3.2.5; 4.1.13-14. D.Ś., śloka 6.

³ Under the sub-section (a).

⁴ Cf. D.Ś., and Ś.N.K.S. See below.

⁵ Ś.N.K.S., ślokas 1, 3, 7.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, śloka 5. It is said that those who worship other deities are no better than ignorant beasts (paśu). D.Ś., śloka 6.

⁷ Ś.N.K.S., śloka 16.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, śloka 18.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, śloka 25.

¹⁰ V.P.S., 3.3.11; 3.3.13; 3.3.34.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.12.

Brahmopāsanās, depicted in various schools of Scripture, are really one and the same, since they are all connected with the same object, viz. Brahman. Hence the special features mentioned in connection with one are to be extended to all the rest.¹

But in spite of this fact that the various kinds of meditations designated in various Upaniṣads, viz. the meditation as taught by Śāṇḍilya,² meditation on the Small,³ meditation on the Imperishable,⁴ and the rest, are really one as referring to the same object, viz. Brahman, yet since the method of procedure is different in each case and since different forms are resorted to by different adhikārins,⁵ they are taken to be different in this sense.⁶ But since they all lead to the same result, viz. the attainment of Brahman, it is not necessary to resort to each of them, any one being enough to yield the desired result, viz. the salvation.⁷

The symbolic meditations, on the other hand, do not lead to the attainment of Brahman, but to other limited results only,⁸ and hence they are to be avoided, as noted above.⁹

Finally, the Lord is, sometimes, meditated on as the Inner Controller of the non-sentient.¹⁰

The conclusion is, thus, there are broadly three kinds of meditation¹¹:—

- (a) Meditation on the Lord as one's own self, i.e. meditation on the Lord as the Inner Controller of the sentient.
- (b) Meditation on the Lord as the Inner Controller of the non-sentient.
- (c) Meditation on the Lord Himself, as different from the sentient and the non-sentient.

The various kinds of meditation taught in the Upaniṣads, etc. may be included under one or other of these three headings.

¹ V.P.S., 3.3.1-5.

² See translation, Śāṇḍilya-vidyā, V.K., 3.3.1.

³ *Op. cit.*, Dahara-vidyā.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, Akṣara-vidyā, V.K., 3.3.56.

⁵ The sense is that the followers of different sākhās are evidently entitled only to those forms of meditations recorded in their own particular sākhās respectively, and hence arises the variety of meditations.

⁶ V.P.S., 3.3.56.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 4.3.15. Cf., e.g., Chānd., 7.1.

⁹ See 3(a) above.

¹⁰ V.P.S., 1.1.32.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.57-58.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.32.

(g) *Adhikārins of meditation.*

It is clear that meditation, involving as it does scriptural knowledge, is confined to the upper three classes only.¹ That meditation involves knowledge is clear from the following facts:—

- (a) The first kind of meditation, viz. meditation on the Lord as the self of the individual, is based on the real knowledge of the Lord, of the individual soul, and of the identity between them, which knowledge can be obtained from Scripture alone, barred to the fourth caste.²
- (b) The second kind of meditation, viz. the meditation on the Lord as the Inner Controller of the non-sentient, too, is based on the real knowledge of the Lord and the non-sentient, obtainable from Scripture.
- (c) The third kind of meditation, viz. the meditation on the Lord Himself, too, is based on the knowledge of the essential nature and qualities of the Lord, obtainable from Scripture.³

(h) *Upāsana and Bhakti.*

According to Nimbārka, *bhakti* is not a synonym for *upāsana*, but consists in a special love for the Lord.⁴ Meditation and devotion mutually involve each other.⁵

Devotion is a supreme *sādhana*. It can be obtained through the grace of the Lord alone. The grace of the Lord generates a feeling of utter humility, which in its turn generates devotion.⁶

There are two kinds of devotion, *parā* and *aparā* or *sādhana-rūpikā*.⁷

¹ *Op. cit.*, 1.3.34–41. See above.

² See above.

³ According to V.R.M., pp. 74 and 127, Śūdras are entitled to meditation enjoined in the Purāṇas, but not to those enjoined in the Upaniṣads.

⁴ D.Ś., śloka 9. *Prema-viśeṣa-lakṣaṇā*.

The followers of Nimbārka, however, use the word exactly in the sense of *upāsana*. Vide V.P.M., p. 97; Ś.K., p. 127. See p. 169 of the thesis, Part I.

⁵ See below.

⁶ D.Ś., śloka 9.

⁷ *Op. cit.*

According to the commentators, the distinction between these two kinds of devotion is that the *parā bhakti* is generated through the grace of the Lord, while the *sādhana-rūpikā bhakti* through the performance of the *sādhana*s, i.e. through meritorious works, company of the good and so on. Vide V.R.M., pp. 126–128.

(4) *Prapatti*.(a) *Its general nature and factors.*

Prapatti means a complete resignation or self-surrender to the Lord, and is one of the most effective means to salvation.¹ It consists in depending on the Lord in every respect and at every step,² relinquishing one's narrow individuality as a separate self-dependent and self-sufficient being,³ giving up every other sādhana,⁴ and throwing one's self completely on the mercy of the Lord.⁵ One who wants to attain salvation through this sādhana should, after having received instruction from a preceptor,⁶ take refuge in the Lord with whole mind and body,⁷ looking upon Him as Father, Mother, Friend and Master, as knowledge, wealth, and everything,⁸ serving Him as a son serves his father, a friend his friend, a servant his master.⁹

Self-surrender consists of six factors (or aṅgas):—

- (1) bearing good will to all, (2) absence of ill-will, (3) faith that the Lord will protect, (4) acceptance of Him as the Saviour, (5) feeling of helplessness, and (6) self-surrender to the Lord; the last is the main factor (aṅgin) while others are its elements (aṅgas).¹⁰

The Lord is ever-gracious to one who has thus taken refuge in Him.¹¹ He protects him at all times from all harms and difficulties,¹² regards him as His special ward, as His dear friend and never abandons him,¹³ in spite of his faults and failings. And, finally, He, with His own hands, leads him to salvation, to an attainment of Himself.¹⁴

¹ D.Ś., śloka 8: "There seems to be no way to salvation except the lotus-feet of the Lord". P.K., śloka 22, given in S.R., p. 110.

² *Op. cit.*, śloka 4, p. 108.

³ *Op. cit.*, śloka 19, p. 110.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, śloka 24, p. 110. Cf. Gītā 18.66.

⁵ P.K., śloka 4, 19, pp. 108, 110, S.R.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, śloka 4-5, p. 108.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, śloka 19, p. 110.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, śloka 6-8, p. 109.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, śloka 9, p. 109.

¹⁰ The six factors are: (1) ānukūlyasya saṃkalpaḥ, (2) prātikūlyasya varjanam, (3) rakṣiṣyati iti viśvāsaḥ, (4) goptṛtva-varaṇam, (5) kārpaṇyam, (6) ātma-nikṣepaḥ. P.K., śloka 10-11, p. 109, S.R. The above translation is based on the explanation of these factors (not given by Nimbārka himself) in V.R.M., pp. 100 ff.

¹¹ P.K., śloka 12-14, p. 108, S.R.

¹² *Op. cit.*, śloka 14, p. 108, S.R.

¹³ *Op. cit.*, śloka 15, p. 108, S.R.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, śloka 22-23, p. 110, S.R.

(b) *Adhikārins of Prapatti.*

One who desires for release, who is utterly destitute of any interest other than the Lord, who has no end in view other than the attainment of the Lord, who has recourse to no other sādhanas than the complete self-surrender to the Lord and who is conscious of his own utter helplessness and insignificance is entitled to self-surrender.¹

It is clear that while the other sādhanas like knowledge and meditation are confined to the upper three classes only, self-surrender is open to all—to the high as well as to the low, to the learned as well as to the ignorant, to Brāhmaṇas as well as to Śūdras.

Self-surrender does not imply complete inactivity on the part of the person surrendering himself, because he has to exert himself for doing what is liked by the Lord, and avoid what is not. He must be benevolent, charitable and friendly towards all, striving to help everyone—high and low—and must be free, on the other hand, as we have seen, from violence, anger, malice and haughtiness, refraining from harming any one. Thus, love and devotion to the Lord mean love and service of mankind, and not indifference to fellow beings, just as self-surrender to the Lord means ceaseless effort to follow the right path, and thereby please the Lord, and not mere idleness and apathy.

(5) *Gurūpasatti or Gurv-ājñānuvṛtti.*²(a) *Its general nature.*

Self-surrender is of two kinds: self-surrender to the Lord and self-surrender to a guru or spiritual preceptor. The first has been considered in the previous section, the second is being considered here.

Gurūpasatti, as the name implies, means complete self-surrender to a preceptor and not directly to the Lord Himself. The guru is the intermediary between the individual soul and the Lord, and leads the former to the latter. “Jīva→Guru→Hari”—this is the eternal secret of all truth.³

¹ P.K., ślokaś 24-25, p. 110, S.R.

² Vide Sundarabhaṭṭa's account for details. See pp. 193 ff. of the thesis, Part I.

³ M.R.Ś., ślokaś 1-2, p. 1.

It is this truth which is contained in both the mysterious Āgama-mantra: “Om”, and in the Bija-mantra: “Klīm.” In the first case, the

The soul is, thus, to offer itself to the Lord through the preceptor in the same manner as clarified butter is first poured in a ladle and then offered to the fire;¹ and having thus offered itself, it becomes free from the fetters of the mundane existence and attains similarity with Brahman;² i.e. salvation.

The sense is that one who has surrendered his own self completely to his preceptor, needs do nothing else,—perform no other duties, follow no other sādhanā—except to obey and serve him. The method of taking refuge to and serving him is very similar to that of serving the Lord.³ The devotee should dedicate himself heart and soul to the preceptor,⁴ as well as everything belonging to himself,⁵ his wealth,⁶ his youth,⁷ his works.⁸ He should regard him as his all in all, and serve him as such.⁹ He should give up all sense of egoity and be completely merged in him.¹⁰ He must obey implicitly whatever he commands him and learn the sacred Mantra in the way recommended by him.¹¹ The preceptor, on his part, is to impart the supreme knowledge to him, his disciple alone, and not to any one else.¹²

(6) *Adhikārins of Gurūpasatti.*

One who desires for release, who has no attachment either to his own self (ātman) or to anything belonging to himself (ātmiya), and one who is willing to dedicate himself, body and soul, to his preceptor, is entitled to this sādhanā.¹³

It is clear that like self-surrender to the Lord, self-surrender to the preceptor is open to all, and not only to the upper three classes.

syllable “a” means Hari, the syllable “u” means the preceptor and the syllable “m” means the soul; while in the second case, the syllable “k” means Hari, the syllable “i” means the preceptor and the syllable “m” means the soul.

M.R.Ś., śloka 3, 5, pp. 1, 2 and *op. cit.*, śloka 4, 5, pp. 1, 2.

¹ M.R.Ś., śloka 8. Here the clarified butter stands for the soul, the sacrificial ladle for the preceptor and the fire for the Lord.

For a full working out of the simile, see Sundarabhāṭṭa's M.R. See below.

² M.R.Ś., śloka 9, p. 2.

³ See above.

⁴ M.R.Ś., śloka 15, p. 4.

⁵ P.K., śloka 19, p. 110, S.R.

⁶ M.R.Ś., śloka 12, 15, pp. 3, 4.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, śloka 12, p. 3.

⁸ P.K., śloka 19, p. 110, S.R.

⁹ M.R.Ś., śloka 15-16, p. 4. P.K., śloka 5-6, S.R.

¹⁰ P.K., śloka 18, 20-21, p. 110, S.R. Ātmasāt-kṛta.

¹¹ M.R.Ś., śloka 17, p. 4.

¹² *Op. cit.*, śloka 18, p. 4.

¹³ *Op. cit.*, śloka 13, p. 3.

This means is specially fit for those who cannot perform even the six factors¹ of self-surrender to the Lord independently of their own unaided efforts, but are required to be led by someone else in all respects, their only duty being to obey their preceptor with blind faith as a child obeys his mother.² And, all that is necessary for their attainment of salvation is done by the preceptor himself, just as the mother of a suckling baby herself takes medicine for curing her child's disease.³

Sahakārins to the sādhanas.⁴

There are certain sahakārins or auxiliaries to the above sādhanas, which help the attainment of salvation. These are broadly five in number, viz. śraddhā or reverence, ārjava or straightforwardness, viśvāsa or faith, sat-saṅga or company of the good and virāga or detachment.⁵

Reverence means reverently accepting as true what is taught by Scripture and the spiritual teacher.⁶ That is, one who desires to have salvation should have complete faith in Scripture and the spiritual teacher.

Straightforwardness means perfect harmony between mind, speech and body.⁷ That is, one who desires salvation should be truthful and keep his word; he should speak what he thinks, and do what he says, but should not think one thing, say one, and do another.⁸

Faith means the belief that the Lord is sure to make the devotee His own.⁹ That is, one who desires for salvation should have unshaken faith in the Lord and His protection, otherwise there is no sense in resorting to the sādhanas.

Company of the good means associating with and serving the good.¹⁰ The good are those who are endowed with knowledge, detachment and devotion, who follow the path indicated by the Swan Incarnation (i.e. belong to the sect of Nimbārka) and are devoted

¹ See above.

² Cf. V.R.M., pp. 97, 122.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 122.

⁴ This account is based on V.R.M., V.K.V. with its commentary A.S.T., as is the account (given in the next section) of the obstacles (virodhins) to salvation. Nimbārka himself does not consider these points. But it seems best to include them here for facility of reference.

According to V.R.M., p. 140, the various kinds of virodhins have been set forth in the Prapatti-cintā-maṇi by Nimbārka.

⁵ V.K.V., 5th taraṅga, śloka 1, p. 53.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, śloka 2, *op. cit.*

⁷ *Op. cit.*

⁸ A.S.T., p. 53.

⁹ V.K.V., 5th taraṅga, ślokas 3-4, p. 54.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, ślokas 5-7, p. 55.

to their sect, who are untouched by any vices and passions like greed, malice, and the rest and free from all selfish desires for sons or wealth and so on, who are devoted to the Lord alone and ever accompanied by the Lord as a consequence,¹ i.e. who regard every end other than the Lord as utterly negligible and who implicitly follow the commands of the Lord.² The mere sight of such good men, it is said, is enough to bring about salvation, not to speak of associating with them.³ And, they are to be served more devotedly, so to speak, than even the Lord.⁴

Finally, detachment means absence of both attachment (rāga) and detachment (dveṣa) to objects of senses.⁵ That is, one who desires for emancipation should neither be attracted by beautiful objects, sweet sounds and the rest, nor feel disgusted with non-attractive objects and the rest, but should maintain an attitude of strict indifference.⁶

There are two kinds of detachment⁷: sahetuka and nirhetuka. Detachment that is sahetuka or due to some cause is that which arises through the loss of one's nearest and dearest ones, of health, wealth and power, etc. That is, when a man all of a sudden loses all that he had valued so long, he naturally becomes averse to the world through sheer disappointment. Such a detachment, however, being only temporary, and not based on a proper discrimination between what is eternal and what is not, does not conduce to salvation. The detachment that is nirhetuka or not due to any cause, on the other hand, is that distaste for the world which arises through the grace of the Lord Himself. A man who is looked at with favour by the Lord at the time of his birth, from the beginning, comes to be averse to the world, and inclined to the Lord, and such a detachment, being based on a proper discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal, leads to salvation.

Virodhins to the sādhanas and mokṣa.⁸

There are many virodhins or obstacles which prevent one from attaining salvation. They are broadly of two classes: viśeṣa and sāmānya.⁹

¹ V.K.V., 5th taraṅga, śloka 5-8, pp. 55, 57.

² A.S.T., p. 56.

³ V.K.V., 5th taraṅga, śloka 9, p. 58.

⁴ V.R.M., pp. 141-2.

⁵ V.R.M., p. 134. V.K.V., 6th taraṅga, śloka 1, p. 64.

⁶ V.R.M., p. 129.

⁷ V.R.M., p. 131.

⁸ A.S.T., p. 58.

⁹ See above.

(1) The viśeṣa-virodhins or special obstacles are, again, of four kinds, viz. relating to the knowledge of the self, relating to the knowledge of Brahman, relating to the means and relating to the fruit, viz. salvation.¹

- (a) Thus, the first kind of special obstacles consist in having a wrong notion of one's own self—the individual soul, i.e. in taking the not-self, viz. the body, the sense-organs, the mind, etc. as the self; in thinking one's self self-sufficient and independent of the Lord and the preceptor, or dependent on someone else; in disbelieving that one's self belongs to the Lord, in disregarding the commands of the Lord as laid down in Scripture and Smṛti; in worshipping, praying and bowing down to other deities; and in feeling attracted toward unworthy texts, i.e. doctrines which are opposed to the Upaniṣad doctrine,² etc. Those who have, thus, a wrong notion about their own selves are no better than "stealers of the self" and the greatest sinners.³
- (b) The second kind of special obstacles consists in having a wrong notion of the Supreme Self, i.e. in taking the Lord (Viṣṇu) to be identical with some other deity (Brahmā, Śiva, etc.), and on the other hand, these deities (Brahmā, Śiva, etc.) as the Supreme Deity; in taking the incarnation of the Lord as mere ordinary men, and the copper or earthen images (pratimā) of the Lord and the sacred stone (śālagrāma) as mere ordinary copper, earth, stone, etc., and not as God (which they really are); in taking the sacred formulae relating to the Lord as mere ordinary words and the legends, etc., relating to Him as mere ordinary stories; and finally, in supposing the Lord—who is an abode of infinite auspicious qualities,—as devoid of qualities.⁴
- (c) The third kind of special obstacles consists in having a wrong notion of the means to be followed, i.e. slighting the sādhanas like prapatti or self-surrender and the

¹ V.R.M., pp. 134 ff. V.K.M., 6th taraṅga, śloka 2, p. 64.

² A.S.T., p. 65.

³ V.R.M., p. 134. V.K.V., 6th taraṅga, ślokas 3-5, p. 64.

⁴ V.R.M., pp. 134-135. V.K.V., 6th taraṅga, ślokas 6-8, p. 65.

like, for fear of entrusting one's self—so full of faults—to the Lord; in having no faith in the object (viz. the Lord) to be reached by the sādhanas; in being attached to sādhanas other than the scriptural ones; in adopting other mantras; in hankering after worldly ends other than service, worship, etc. of the Lord; in regarding the religious duties, and the like—which are to be performed as the Lord's commands in an altogether disinterested spirit—as means to furthering one's selfish ends; in taking the preceptor, the incarnation of the Lord on earth, as a mere earthly being, etc.¹

- (d) The fourth kind of special obstacles consist in having a wrong notion about the fruit, viz. salvation, i.e. in taking religious merit, wealth and pleasure as supreme ends and desiring for them (instead of desiring for salvation); in thinking one's self an independent agent (while really one's acts are regulated by the Lord²); in acting wantonly and contrary to Scripture, etc.; in being reluctant to leave the earthly body; in shunning the company of the good and seeking that of the bad, and so on.³

(2) The general obstacles consist in not complying with the commands of the Lord, Scripture and Smṛti, i.e. in giving up the religious duties incumbent on one's own caste and stage of life, while doing what is incumbent on other stages of life; in making a sale of one's own power—which is of two kinds: internal and external, consisting in selling one's knowledge, and so on; in insulting Brāhmaṇas out of pride of knowledge, and defeating them in argumentations, etc.; in partaking of refreshment before worshipping the Lord; in abandoning one's relatives and friends, not because one has become an ascetic (in which case it would not have been blamable), but out of sheer spite; in thinking ill of others; in scheming how to injure them; in being under the sway of passions like greed, anger, pride and the rest, etc.⁴ All these obstacles which hinder the attainment of salva-

¹ V.R.M., pp. 135-136. V.K.V., 6th taraṅga, ślokas 9-12, pp. 66-67.

² Vide A.S.T., p. 68.

³ V.R.M., pp. 136-138. V.K.V., 6th taraṅga, ślokas 13-14, p. 67.

⁴ V.R.M., pp. 138-140. V.K.V., 6th taraṅga, ślokas 13-18, p. 70.

tion are to be avoided by one who desires salvation with the greatest care.¹

Conclusion.

Thus, we see that Nimbārka speaks of five sādhanas or means.

Devotion accompanies each of these. Thus, knowledge generates supreme devotion for the Lord by making us realise His unsurpassed greatness, and infinite kindness, on the one hand, and our own utter worthlessness and helplessness, on the other.

Meditation similarly implies devotion. Constant meditation on the Lord cannot but generate a supreme love for Him, and on the other hand, it is the supreme love for Him that leads us to meditate on Him unceasingly. In this way, meditation and devotion mutually involve each other.

Self-surrender also generates devotion.² The complete self-surrender to the Lord cannot but give rise to a feeling of devout love for Him, and on the other hand, it is supreme devotion for the Lord which leads us to surrender ourselves to Him. Self-surrender and devotion, too, thus mutually involve each other.

Finally, self-surrender to the preceptor, too, involves devotion first for the preceptor, god on earth, and then for the Lord Himself.

It is clear that these sādhanas are not mutually exclusive, but, on the contrary, mutually involve one another. Nimbārka does not tell us definitely which of these sādhanas he considers to be the best and the most effective, but points out simply in course of treating them separately that each of them leads to salvation in its own way.³

¹ V.R.M., p. 141.

² D.Ś., śloka 9.

³ Thus:—

- (a) In V.P.S., 3.4.1, he says that the attainment of Brahman takes place through vidyā.
- (b) In V.P.S., 3.2.24-25, he says that the direct vision of Brahman results from meditation. In D.Ś., śloka 6, he says that the meditation on the Lord removes the darkness of ignorance.
- (c) In D.Ś., śloka 8, he says that there is no other way to salvation except resorting to the lotus-feet of the Lord.
- (d) In M.R.Ś., śloka 9, he says that those who offer themselves to the Lord through a guru are delivered from the saṃsāra and attain similarity with Him, i.e. salvation.
- (e) In V.P.S., 3.2.24, he quotes a text to the effect that one can have a direct vision of the Lord through devotion. In Ś.N.K.S., he points out that those who are not devoted to the Lord can attain no end (śloka 13), and that the Lord is obtained through devotion.

Hence we may conclude that according to him, any one of these ¹ may lead to salvation, either by itself or in conjunction with others, and that they are to be resorted to accordingly by men of different castes, stages of life, inclination, and capacity.² The first three classes may gain salvation through any one of these, while the fourth class through the last two only. And in the former case, those who are confident of reaching their goal, viz. salvation through their own unaided effort, follow the paths of work, knowledge and meditation, while those who are not—those of self-surrender to the Lord and to the preceptor.

It is to be noted that, according to Nimbārka, the approach to a guru is the essential pre-requisite of all sādhanas,³ the difference being that in other cases it is but a preliminary factor, not the only factor involved, while as an independent sādhana it is so.

Nimbārka did not develop the theory of grace at length, though his writings furnish evidence of his belief in it. Thus, it is said that the Lord is the cause of bondage and release.⁴ It is through the wish of the Lord that the real nature and qualities of the souls remain hidden through their state of bondage,⁵ but again it is the Lord Himself who, out of pity for the souls in bondage, manifests Himself before them,⁶ and leads them to salvation. Salvation, thus, is the result of the Lord's grace. The Lord also infuses the spirit of self-surrender (as noted above) in men, which in its turn generates supreme devotion,⁷ and these two lead to the attainment of the Lord. Thus, without the grace of the Lord, even the sādhanas themselves cannot be availed of.

If one is to follow all the sādhanas, one may follow the order as given below:—

- (1) Karma, which purifies the mind, and makes it fit for knowledge and meditation.
- (2) Gurūpasatti, or approach to a sad-guru.

as "rasa", "ānanda" (śloka 17). Cf. also the views of his followers, e.g., V.R.M., p. 94, where five kinds of sādhanas are described.

¹ Excepting karma, of course, which as pointed out many times, is but an indirect means, not a direct one.

² See below for further confirmation of this view.

³ V.P.S., 1.1.1. See above. Cf. also V.R.M., p. 120.

⁴ V.P.S., 3.2.25. Ś.N.K.S., śloka 1.

⁵ Ś.N.K.S., śloka 11.

⁶ V.P.S., 3.2.25.

⁷ D.Ś., 9.

- (3) Jñāna, or attainment of knowledge from him, which by generating bhakti or love, leads to
- (4) Dhyāna, or meditation on the object known, viz. Brahman, which leads to
- (5) Prapatti, which generates
- (6) Bhakti, which induces
- (7) the grace of the Lord—and this brings about
- (8) Sākṣātkāra and saṃyoga—and i.e. mokṣa.

Finally, it is pointed out that the sādhanas are to be repeated constantly, till the end is reached.¹

VIII. Theology.

This has been noticed incidentally in connection with the treatment of other topics. The system of Nimbārka is philosophico-theological. While Nimbārka tries to give philosophical explanations of the ultimate categories and their inter-relations, and so on, he does not overlook the needs of the human heart, its inborn spirit of religion, its sense of living fellowship with another. In this sense, his system may be said to stand midway between the absolutist system of Śaṅkara—in which there is no place for religion, and the theistic system of Baladeva, which frankly gives up the attempt to reconcile philosophical antitheses, and concerns itself with religion mainly.²

The eternal relation between God and men, according to Nimbārka, is a relation between the worshipped and the worshipper. As we have seen, the soul is never equal to the Lord, but is always under His control—always His servant, following His will and command under every circumstance, even in release.

But this relation is not a relation of awe, but a most intimate relation of love and spontaneous devotion. The soul does not serve the Lord out of fear, but out of love. To the devotee, the Lord is not a cold and merciless Being, standing aloof in His supreme majesty far beyond his reach, but is an infinitely tender Being, essentially loving towards His devotees, meeting them half-way down, and lifting them above the endless miseries of the world. And it is because the Lord is such an abode of love and kindness that there is any sense in worshipping Him and praying to Him for mercy. Though the devotee is fully conscious of his own insignificance, yet he turns to God with the simple faith of a child in its mother, because he knows

¹ V.P.S., 4.1.1-2.

² See below for Baladeva's system.

that however puny he may be, God will never scorn or forsake him, but is ready at hand to guide and help him at every step.

It is this sweet, intimate relation between God and man that has made the doctrine of Nimbārka—which makes such a relation possible—so popular, along with other Vaiṣṇava schools, as against the Advaita theory of the identity of man and God, which may satisfy intellect, but not feeling—the head, but not the heart.

The personal God worshipped by Nimbārka, as we have seen, is Gopāla-Kṛṣṇa—the cowherd Kṛṣṇa, brought up in the house of Nandagopa, engaged in playful pastimes with the gopīs, and attended by Rādhā. This conception of Kṛṣṇa brings out clearly the intimate nature of the relation between man and God—a relation of love and bosom friendship, as pointed out above.

The object of worship according to Nimbārka, as we have seen, is Rādhā-Kṛṣṇa conjointly. This Rādhā-Kṛṣṇa cult, to which Nimbārka gives an exclusive prominence, is one of the most popular and influential cults that have ever flourished in India.

FOLLOWERS OF NIMBĀRKA

INTRODUCTION.

The following is the succession list of the high priests of the sect founded by Nimbārka (Ācārya-paramparā)¹:—

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. The Swan Incarnation. | } Mythological. Hence the
sect of Nimbārka is often
known as Hamsa-sampradāya
or Sankādi-sampradāya. |
| 2. The four Kumāras, Sanaka
and the rest. | |
| 3. Nārada. | |
| 4. Nimbārka. | |
| 5. Śrīnivāsācārya. | |
| 6. Viśvācārya. | |
| 7. Puruṣottamācārya. | |
| 8. Vilāsācārya. | |
| 9. Svarūpācārya. | |
| 10. Mādhavācārya. | |
| 11. Balabhadraācārya. | |
| 12. Padmācārya. | |
| 13. Śyāmācārya. | |
| 14. Gopālācārya. | |
| 15. Kṛpācārya. | |
| 16. Devācārya. | |
| 17. Sundarabhaṭṭa. | |
| 18. Padmanābhabhaṭṭa. | |
| 19. Upendrabhaṭṭa. | |
| 20. Rāmacandrabhaṭṭa. | |
| 21. Vāmanabhaṭṭa. | |


¹ Vide "Śrī-guru-nati-vaijayanti" (as given in S.R., pp. 127-136).

"Ācārya-paramparā-stotra" (as given in L.S.V., pp. 9-11).

"Ācārya-praṇāmāvali" (*op. cit.*, pp. 11-13).

These three lists tally exactly. We have a fourth list given in Ś.N., pp. 6-7, which differs from the above three in two points: (1) Bhāskara is placed immediately after Śrīnivāsa. This is, however, not correct, for as we shall see later on Bhāskara represents a different school of thought and cannot be taken to be a disciple of Nimbārka. (2) There is no mention of Keśavabhaṭṭa after Gopī-nāthabhaṭṭa.

22. Kṛṣṇabhṭṭa.
23. Padmākarabhṭṭa.
24. Sravaṇeśabhṭṭa.
25. Bhūribhṭṭa.
26. Mādhavabhṭṭa.
27. Śyāmabhṭṭa.
28. Gopālabhṭṭa.
29. Balābhadrabhṭṭa.
30. Gopīnāthabhṭṭa.
31. Keśavabhṭṭa.
32. Gāṅgalabhṭṭa.
33. Keśavakāśmīribhṭṭa.
34. Śrībhṭṭa.
35. Harivyāsadeva.



Thus after Harivyāsadeva, the school split into two rival groups of teachers.

I. Śrīnivāsācārya.

1. LIFE AND DATE.

Śrīnivāsa was the immediate disciple of Nimbārka. Traditionally, he is supposed to be an incarnation of the Pāñcājanya, the Conch-shell of Viṣṇu (Śaṅkhāvatāra),¹ and to have flourished when Vajra-

¹ Pāñcadhātī-stotram, p. 126, S.R.; V.R.M., p. 3. Puruṣottama here quotes a verse from the above, composed by Viśvācārya, his preceptor, beginning "Śaṅkhāvatāra Puruṣottamasya..." and ending: "Taṃ Śrīnivāsaṃ śaranam prapadye", S.J., p. 89. Devācārya also quotes the above verse. S.S., p. 1; V.K.P., p. 20; Ā.C., p. 152; A.S.T., p. 1; G.M., p. 1.

nāma, the great-grandson of Kṛṣṇa was reigning in Mathurā.¹ The fact is, however, that he can by no means be assigned to a very ancient date. At least, it is absolutely certain from internal evidence that he could not have flourished before Śaṅkara.²

Śrīnivāsa is said to have born in the hermitage of Nimbārka in the month of Māgha³ on the fifth day of the bright half of the moon. His father's name was Ācāryapāda and his mother's Lokamatī. Both of them were highly learned and pious. Tradition is that once Ācāryapāda, out on a mission to conquer the whole world with his scholarship, accepted the hospitality of Nimbārka, but refused to take any refreshment as it was nearly sunset. Thereupon, Nimbārka made the setting sun linger over a Nimba tree, in order to enable his guests to finish their meal. Ācāryapāda was so much struck with this extraordinary feat that he at once became a disciple of Nimbārka and continued to stay in the hermitage.⁴

It is said that Śrīnivāsa was taught all the Scriptures by Nimbārka himself. Nimbārka dedicated his "Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha" to him,⁵ and also composed the Daśa-śloki⁶ for him. Nimbārka, further, taught him eight verses in praise of Rādhā (Rādhāṣṭaka) and eight verses in praise of Kṛṣṇa (Kṛṣṇāṣṭaka)⁷ by reciting which, in accordance with his command, Śrīnivāsa, so the tradition goes, was able to have a direct vision of Rādhā-Kṛṣṇa.

Śrīnivāsa travelled a good deal accompanied by his disciple Viśvācārya, preaching the holy Vaiṣṇava religion and is said to have converted many people.⁸

2. WORKS.

He composed the "Vedānta-kaustubha" in compliance with the request of Nimbārka himself.⁹ He is said to have composed also commentaries on the Bhagavad-gītā and the Upaniṣads.¹⁰ But so far we know only of his Vedānta-kaustubha, which elucidates the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha of Nimbārka.¹¹

¹ Ā.C., p. 114.

³ Māgha corresponds to January-February.

⁴ Ā.C., pp. 96ff.

⁶ See above.

⁸ Ā.C., p. 143.

⁹ V.K., p. 2, Kāśī ed.; Ā.C., p. 143.

¹⁰ Ā.C., p. 143.

² See above.

⁵ See above.

⁷ See above.

¹¹ See Preface.

We know of another work of Śrīnivāsa—which is, however, of no philosophical importance—viz. “Laghu-stavarāja-stotram”,¹ a collection of forty-one verses in praise of Nimbārka.

A third work by Śrīnivāsa is “Vedānta-kārikāvalī”, a metrical exposition made from the teaching of Nimbārka in seven taraṅgas or sections.² From this work, it is evident that Śrīnivāsa could not have flourished prior to Śaṅkara, for here he criticises the Pratibimba-vāda.³

We also find here a strong support of our view that according to Nimbārka, any one of the sādhanas, viz. knowledge, meditation, and the rest—as suited to the capacity of one desirous of salvation, leads to his goal,⁴ for the author explicitly says that the means to salvation are of various kinds in accordance with the capacities of different adhikārins,⁵ and then goes on to elucidate them one by one.⁶

Another work by Śrīnivāsa, preserved in manuscript form, is “Stava-pañcaka-māhātmya”.⁷

He is said to have composed a commentary on the Veda, too,⁸ and a treatise called Nigada.⁹

3. DOCTRINE.

His doctrine is exactly similar to that of Nimbārka, only it is far more elaborate. Like Nimbārka, Śrīnivāsa is content with elucidating simply his own view, without attempting to criticise the doctrine of Śaṅkara or any other rival Vedānta school, except a single hostile reference to the Pratibimba-vāda, as noted above. Like Nimbārka, he

¹ Published by C.S.S., with commentary. See Bibliography. Also given in S.R., pp. 120–124.

² Vide B.M.C., Supplementary Catalogue of Sanskrit, Pali and Prakrit Books, 1928, p. 1003.

³ See above.

⁴ See above.

⁵ V.K.V., 4th taraṅga, śloka 1, p. 40:—

“Upāyāḥ śreyasāḥ proktā adhikāry-anusārataḥ.

Vividhāḥ śrutibhis te vai nirṇīyante svarūpataḥ”.

And the commentary says: “Adhikāri-vaividhyāt sādhanā-vaividhyam” (p. 40).

⁶ V.K.V., 4th taraṅga, śloka 2 ff, pp. 40 ff.

⁷ Rep. Bh., 1894, p. 76.

⁸ Cat. Cat., p. 671, Part 1.

⁹ *Op. cit.*

accepts the trinity of reals, viz. Brahman, the cit and the acit,¹ and a relation of natural difference-non-difference (svābhāvika-bhedābheda) between them—a point upon which he insists again and again.² He takes Brahman to be identical with Kṛṣṇa,³ but makes no mention of Rādhā in his commentary. His elucidation of the doctrine of Nimbārka is admirable and lucid, also very useful in view of the fact that Nimbārka was a very succinct writer.

II. Viśvācārya.

Viśvācārya was the immediate disciple of Śrīnivāsa⁴ and second after Nimbārka. We know nothing about his life and works. We know of only one work by him, viz. "Pañcadhātī-stotram", a collection of seven hymns in praise of his guru Śrīnivāsa,⁵ but this work contains nothing about his philosophical view.

It is interesting to note that in his copious commentary Vedānta-ratna-mañjuṣā, Puruṣottama the immediate disciple of Viśvācārya, makes obeisance to Śrīnivāsa in the beginning and in the end,⁶ and not to his immediate guru Viśvācārya, in accordance with the usual custom. And he sometimes refers us back to Śrīnivāsa,⁷ but makes no reference whatsoever to Viśvācārya, except only once, and there also he only quotes a verse from Viśvācārya in praise of Śrīnivāsa.⁸ This seems to suggest that Viśvācārya was not, after all, a very prominent man and did not have any work of great philosophical worth to his credit, otherwise his immediate disciple at least would have referred to his works.

¹ V.K., 1.1.1, p. 7, K.S.S.

For a summary statement of his view, see V.K., 1.1.1. See translation, vol. I.

² V.K., 1.1.1, p. 11 (page references are to K.S.S. throughout); 1.1.7, p. 25; 1.2.21, p. 66; 1.4.9, p. 124; 1.4.20, p. 139; 1.4.21, p. 140; 2.1.13, p. 159; 2.1.21, p. 165; 2.1.22, p. 166; 2.2.33, p. 205; 2.3.42, p. 236; 3.2.28, p. 291; 4.1.3, p. 386; 4.4.4, p. 425; etc.

³ V.K., 1.1.1, p. 5, etc.

⁴ Vide Ā.C., p. 143.

⁵ S.R., pp. 125-126. Also published separately. See Bibliography.

⁶ V.R.M., pp. 1, 148.

⁷ Vide e.g., V.R.M., pp. 127, 134, etc.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 3.

III. Puruṣottamācārya.

1. LIFE AND DATE.

Puruṣottama was the immediate disciple of Viśvācārya, and the third after Nimbārka.

Nothing definite is known of his life and date. He is said to have been born in Teliṅga,¹ although his exact birth-place is not known, and to have flourished in the fifth century A.D. as a contemporary of Gauḍapāda.² But this latter view is not tenable, for it is absolutely clear from internal evidence that he flourished *at least* after Śaṅkara, as he criticises many full-fledged Advaita doctrines, not found in Gauḍapāda's system.

2. WORKS.

He wrote a copious commentary called "Vedānta-ratna-mañjuṣā" on Nimbārka's "Daśa-sloki". Another work, attributed to him,³ viz. the "Ācārya-caritam" is, however, not really his work, but of a different Puruṣottama, as already shown.⁴ He is claimed to have composed some other treatises, too, such as "Siddhānta-kṣīrārṇava" which, unfortunately are all lost.⁵

3. DOCTRINE.

Puruṣottama gives a very lucid exposition of the general doctrine of Nimbārka, adding many new details. His main originality consists in the fact that he was the first (so far known) of the sect of Nimbārka to undertake a thorough criticism of the Advaita tenets.

He divides his work⁶ into four sections, the first concerned with the padārthas or the categories, viz. Brahman, the cit and the acit; the second with the reconciliation of apparently contradictory texts, viz. the bheda-vākyas or texts designating difference, and the abheda-vākyas or texts designating non-difference, etc.; the third with the sādhanas or the means to emancipation, viz. work, knowledge, devotion, etc.; and the fourth with the fruit, viz. salvation.

¹ Teliṅga is supposed to be the birth-place of Nimbārka also. See above.

² Preface to V.R.M., p. 1.

³ B.M.C., Supplementary Catalogue of Sanskrit, Pali and Prakrit Books, 1926, p. 819.

⁴ See above.

⁵ Preface to V.R.M., p. 1.

⁶ V.R.M.

*Section 1. The Trinity of Reals.**(A) Brahman.**(i) His nature and qualities.*

The Highest Reality is Brahman or Kṛṣṇa.¹ He is called "Brahman" because He is great in nature and qualities,² and He is called "Bhagavān" because He is possessed of supreme excellence.³

On the one hand, the Lord is absolutely free from all defects and faults due to beginningless matter, viz. from the five kinds of kleśas, such as avidyā or tamas (i.e. nescience which veils the real nature of things), asmitā or moha (i.e. confounding the body to be the soul), rāga or mahā-moha (i.e. hankering after enjoyment), dveṣa or tamisrā (i.e. malice), and abhiniveśa or andha-tamisrā (i.e. death); from the six kinds of vikāras, such as janma (birth), astitva (i.e. existence), vṛddhi (growth), parināma (transformation), kṣaya (decay) and maraṇa (death); from the three guṇas of prakṛti, viz. sattva, rajas and tamas; from all the numerous effects of connection with prakṛti. In this sense alone, Brahman is attributed.⁴

On the other hand, He is an abode of infinite auspicious qualities and powers, like jñāna, śakti, bala, aiśvaryya, tejas, vīryya, sauśīlya, vātsalya, ārjava, etc. etc. Thus jñāna means the power of directly intuiting all space, time and objects; śakti means the power of making the impossible possible; bala means the power of supporting the Universe, etc.; aiśvaryya means the power of controlling; tejas means tirelessness or absence of exertion in spite of continued and immense labour; and vīryya means the power of defeating all enemies without being ever defeated by them. These six qualities of the Lord lead Him to undertake the creation, maintenance and destruction, etc. of the Universe. Further, sauśīlya means His willingness to associate even with the lowliest and the most unworthy, in spite of His own greatness; vātsalya means overlooking the faults of His servants; mārḍava means not being able to tolerate the miseries of those who have resorted to Him; ārjava means the coincidence of mind and speech; sauhārdhya means the attempt to protect others; sarva-śaranyatva or saumya means being the one common resort of all; kāruṇya means removing the faults of others; sthīratva means remaining steady in wars; dhairyya means keeping promises; dayā means feeling grieved

¹ V.R.M., p. 40.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 112.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 50.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 43-44.

at the grief of others and the wish to allay it, and mādhyurya means infinite nectar-like sweetness, etc. All these qualities of the Lord lead him to undertake the protection of His devotees.¹

Thus, negatively, the Lord is devoid of all the qualities of the soul in bondage, i.e. of the qualities due to avidyā or matter and karma; and positively, He is possessed of infinite number of greatest and worthiest qualities—which are majestic on the one hand, sweet on the other. Hence just as He is called “Brahman” and “Bhagavat” because of His supreme might and majesty, so He is called “Hari” also, because of His infinite beauty and sweetness which captivates (harati) the heart of His devotees.²

The Lord is called “Hari” also because He removes (harati) all sins of His devotees.³ He is called Kṛṣṇa for the very same reason.⁴ He is, thus, essentially devoted and solicitous to His devotees, and goes out of His way to help and please them. He removes not only the sins, but the merits (puṇya) as well of His devotees, i.e. frees the soul from the bondage of beginningless karmas. In this sense, the Lord is the giver of salvation.⁵

The Lord is deva, because He plays with the Universe, i.e. the creation, etc. of the Universe is but a mere play to Him; conquers the demons, i.e. is the destroyer of the evil and the protector of the good; controls all beings from within; shines eternally; is worshipped by Brahmā and other gods; moves everywhere and finally, because He enjoys.⁶

The Lord is para, superior to both the perishable and the imperishable.⁷ He is the cause of causes, the Lord of lords, the God of gods, the original source of all deities like Brahmā, Śiva and others, and eternally worshipped by them.⁸ These latter deities, though possessed of great power and lordship, are not yet para or the most supreme. Some Purāṇas, it is true, speak of Brahmā, Śiva, etc. as the most supreme deities, but it must be remembered that all Purāṇas are not equally authoritative. There are, in fact, four classes of Purāṇas, viz. sāttvika, rājasika, tāmasika and saṃkīrṇa. The first are concerned with sāttvika objects, the second are concerned with rājasa

¹ V.R.M., pp. 44–47.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 49.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 49.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 52. “Pāpam karṣayati nirmūlayati iti Kṛṣṇa.”

⁵ V.R.M., p. 52.

⁶ Vide B.M.; p. 238, Part 2. “Divu kṛdā-vijigīṣā-vyavahāra-dyuti-stuti-moda-mada-svapna-kānti-gatiṣu.”

⁷ Vide Gītā 4.8.

⁸ V.R.M., pp. 103–113.

objects and had their origin in a *rājasa* time, and so on. The *sāttvika* Purāṇas are concerned with Hari, the *rājasa* ones with Brahmā, the *tāmasa* ones with Śaṅkara and the *saṃkīrṇa* ones with Sarasvatī. The *sāttvika* Purāṇas like the Viṣṇu Purāṇa and the rest are the most authoritative, for they alone lead to salvation, while the other kinds of Purāṇas lead to the mundane existence.¹ Hence the Lord Viṣṇu alone, and none else, is the most Supreme Deity,—“*ekamevādviṭīyam*”, one without a second.

The Lord is the cause of the Universe, both material and efficient cause.²

Several objections may be raised to this view.

Firstly, it may be argued that He cannot be the material as well as the efficient cause, because we do not find ordinarily that the material and the efficient causes are identical, e.g. the clay, the material cause of a pot, is different from the potter, its efficient cause. To this we reply: we do find instances of the material and the efficient causes being identical; e.g. the soul is both the material and the efficient cause of its own knowledge. Hence we may argue thus: Brahman is the one *identical* material and efficient cause of the world,

because He possesses the power of being so
just as the soul is of its own knowledge.³

Secondly, it may be objected that if Brahman be the one material and efficient cause of the world, then the nature of the effect, the world, becomes a riddle indeed. Thus, the world cannot be of one form of collection,⁴ nor something produced or begun, for Scripture declares the Universe to be beginningless; nor, finally, can it be a transformation of Brahman, for no transformation is possible on the part of an all-pervading Being like Brahman who is devoid of parts. Hence we may argue thus: Brahman cannot be subject to transformation, because He is all-pervading (*vibhu*) and devoid of parts (*niravayava*), like the ether. Hence the world is not a real transformation (*pariṇāma*) of Brahman, but an illusory one (*vivarta*).⁵

To this objection, the reply is as follows⁶: Firstly, there is no rule whatsoever that an all-pervading (*vibhu*) object can have

¹ V.R.M., pp. 55-56.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 63.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 63.

⁴ *Samṣati-rūpa*.

⁵ V.R.M., p. 63. For a full criticism of the *vivarta* doctrine, see below.

⁶ V.R.M., pp. 63-64.

no transformation; e.g. the ether, which is all-pervading, is declared by Scripture itself to be transformed into air.¹

Secondly, even what is devoid of parts (*niravayava*) can have transformations, provided it is possessed of such a *power* of having transformations; e.g. in the case of the transformation of milk into curd, it is not the milk really, but the milk-atoms, which are devoid of parts (*niravayava*), that undergo transformation. The fact is that it is the power (*śakti*) inherent in a thing which determines whether a particular thing can be transformed into something else or not, and not the fact of its having parts or not. Hence, water though possessed of parts (*sāvayava*) is never transformed into curd, because it lacks the power of being so transformed, while the milk-atoms, though devoid of parts (*niravayava*), are transformed into curd, because they possess the power of being so transformed.

Thus, the two reasons cited in the above argument, viz. all-pervasiveness and not having parts, are both logically fallacious; and finally, the parallel instance cited, too, viz. the ether, is not correct, because as shown above, the ether can have transformation. Hence, the above argument that Brahman can have no transformation, because He is all-pervading and without parts, is not a valid one. On the contrary, we may argue as follows:—

Brahman is capable of having transformation, because He is all-pervading, like the ether.

Thirdly, it may be objected that either the entire Brahman must be transformed into the world, or Brahman must have parts, both of which are impossible. *Puruṣottama* refutes this objection just like *Nimbārka*.²

Thus, we conclude that the world is a transformation of Brahman who is its one identical material and efficient cause.

The Lord is the material cause of the Universe in the sense that creation means the manifestation of His subtle powers of the sentient and the non-sentient into gross effects. That is, during dissolution the entire Universe of the sentient and the non-sentient merges in the Lord and exists in Him in a subtle state as His natural powers. Then, in the beginning of a new creation, the Lord manifests these powers of the sentient and the non-sentient, developing them into

¹ *Tait.*, 2.1.1.

² *V.R.M.*, pp. 64-65. See above under *Nimbārka*.

grosser effects and producing, thereby, the Universe of names and forms.¹

And the Lord is the efficient cause of the Universe in the sense that He unites individual souls with their respective karmas, their results, and the instruments for experiencing them, i.e., it regulates the destiny of individuals in accordance with strict justice. During dissolution, the beginningless impressions of past karmas² get dimmed and confused, and at the time of a new creation, the Lord revives these impressions in particular individuals, thereby making each individual undergo the fruits of his past acts.³

(ii) *His forms (vyūha) and manifestations (avatāra).*

Like Nimbārka, Puruṣottama holds that the Lord is possessed of an external and celestial body, the abode of all beauty, grace and auspiciousness.⁴ This body is made of the luminous stuff, aprakṛti.⁵

The Lord has different forms and manifests Himself in different incarnations.⁶

A vyūha is a form which the Lord assumes for the sake of creation, preserving and destroying the Universe, as well as for the sake of being worshipped. There are four kinds of vyūhas, viz. Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha.⁷ Further, there are twelve vyūhas, like Keśava and the rest who, as the mantra devatās of the ceremony of putting the white perpendicular line on the forehead (ūrdhva-pūṇḍra), are to be worshipped as such where enjoined.⁸

An incarnation is the form which the Lord assumes for the sake of establishing religion and destroying sin,⁹ as well as for fulfilling

¹ V.R.M., p. 65.

² Anādi-karma-saṃskāras.

³ V.R.M., p. 63. Cf. V.K., 1.1.2, p. 13, K.S.S. for an exactly similar definition of the upadāntva and nimittatva of the Lord. See Trans., vol. I.

⁴ V.R.M., pp. 39-40.

⁵ See below.

⁶ Hence the Lord is called Anantamūrti, V.R.M., p. 47.

⁷ According to Śaṅkara, Vāsudeva denotes the highest self, Saṃkarṣaṇa the individual soul, Pradyumna the mind, and Aniruddha the principle of egoity. Of these four, Vāsudeva constitutes the ultimate causal essence, the three others are the effects. Vide Ś.B., 2.2.42.

According to Rāmānuja, Vāsudeva is the highest self, while Saṃkarṣaṇa and the rest are beings ruling over the individual souls, the mind and the principle of egoity respectively. Vide Śrī. B., 2.2.42.

⁸ V.R.M., pp. 47-48. See also under "Ritualistic Doctrine of the School of Nimbārka" below.

⁹ Vide Gītā, 4.8.

the desire of His devotees. There are three kinds of incarnation: viz. *guṇāvatāra*, *puruṣāvatāra* and *līlāvatāra*. *Guṇāvatāras* are the creator, etc. of the Universe through regulating the *guṇas* (viz. *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*) of *prakṛti*. Thus the Lord creates the world through *Brahmā*, *Kāla*, *Dakṣa* and others; maintains it through *Kāla*, *Manu* and others; and destroys it through *Rudra*, *Kāla* and others.¹

The *puruṣāvatāras* are of three kinds, in accordance with the difference of limiting adjuncts, viz. first, the Person, lying on the *Kāraṇārṇava* (*Kārṇārṇavaśāyin*), the controller of *prakṛti* from which arises the *mahat*; second, the Person lying on the *Garbhoda* (*Garbhodaśāyin*), the inner controller of the aggregate (*samaṣṭi*); third, the Person lying on the *Kṣīroda* (*Kṣīrodaśāyin*), the inner controller of individuals (*vyāṣṭi*).

The *līlāvatāras* are of two kinds, viz. *āveśāvatāras* and *svarūpāvatāras*. The former, again, are of two kinds—*svāmśa-āveśa* and *śakty-amśa-āveśa*. A *svāmśāveśāvatāra* is a part of the Lord Himself directly embodied in a material form with, however, no distinguishing individuality between him and the Lord, as *Naranārāyaṇa*; while a *śakty-amśāveśāvatāra* is but a part of the power of the Lord, embodied as an individual soul and distinguished from Him as such, and carrying out His mission. There are, again, two kinds of *śakty-amśāveśāvatāras* in accordance with greater or lesser degree of the power manifested, viz. *vibhava* and *prabhava*, *Ṛṣabha*, *Kapila*, the four *Kumāras*, *Nārada*, *Vyāsa*, etc. belonging to the first class, *Dhanvantarī*, *Paraśurāma*, etc. to the second.


The *svarūpāvatāras* are of the form of existence, consciousness and bliss² like the Lord Himself, since they are the manifestations of the Lord's own essential nature or *svarūpa*. They are non-different from the Lord in nature, quality and power, just as one lamp is from another. There are two kinds of *svarūpāvatāras*, viz. *amśa-rūpa* and *pūrṇa-rūpa*. The former, though full manifestations of the Lord, manifest few qualities and powers such as the fish, the tortoise, the boar, the dwarf and the swan incarnations, etc. The latter fully manifest all the qualities and powers such as *Nṛsiṃha*, *Rāma*, *Kṛṣṇa* and the rest.³

¹ V.R.M., p. 48.

² *Sac-cid-ānanda-rūpa*.

³ V.R.M., pp. 47-49.

The following is a chart of the various kinds of avatāras:—



But although the Lord manifests Himself in all these various vyūhas and avatāras, yet the Lord's own nature and powers remain untransformed and undiminished. The Lord remains ever Full, over One, in spite of appearing as many.¹

(iii) *Criticism of rival theories regarding Brahman.*

(a) *Criticism of Nirguṇa-vāda and Nirviśeṣa-vāda.*

If Brahman be devoid of all attributes (guṇas) and specifications (viśeṣas), He will be outside all pramāṇas or sources of knowledge,² and as such be unreal (or tuccha) like the sky-flower, which also is outside all sources of knowledge. Thus, the attributeless Brahman is not, evidently, an object of perception, since He is beyond the sense-organs; nor is He an object of inference, since He is without any mark (liṅga)³; nor is He an object of Scripture even, for what is devoid

¹ V.R.M., p. 47.

² See Epistemology below.

³ That is, in the inference—

All men are mortal.

John is a man.

John is mortal,

John possesses the mark of humanity (the middle term), shared by infinite number of other beings—which alone makes the inference possible. But in the case of Brahman, this is not possible, because Brahman does not possess any marks.

of attributes cannot be expressed by words. Thus, the attributeless and non-specific Brahman cannot be an object of rūḍhavr̥tti,¹ as He is devoid of class, attribute and action, nor an object of yogavr̥tti, as He can have no root-meaning, nor an object of lakṣaṇā, as He is devoid of any connection with anything else, nor lastly, an object of gaṇaavr̥tti, as He is devoid of qualities. Such a Brahman, therefore, incapable of being established by any proof, is but a myth, and not a reality. The real Brahman is essentially possessed of attributes, as shown above.²

(b) *Criticism of Aprameyatva-vāda.*

Brahman is by no means aprameya or unknowable and outside all the pramāṇas, for in that case He would be tuccha or unreal like the sky-flower—as pointed out above. Texts like “He is known by one who does not know Him, but he who knows Him does not know Him. He is not known to the knower and known to the non-knower” (Kena 11), “From Him speech turns back with the mind, not getting Him” (Tait., 2.4.1), etc. do not prove that Brahman is never an object of knowledge, but they only deny any possible limit to the Lord. Thus, the first text means that those really wise men who never know Him in His real nature, i.e. absolutely unlimited, while those who, in pride of their little knowledge, know Him as limited, fail to know Him. The fact is that the nature and qualities of the Lord being infinite, are really outside the sphere of ordinary logical thinking, and the wise recognise this fact instead of thinking that they have grasped the Lord fully. But they know the Lord through intuition. Otherwise, how can we explain such texts: “Knowing Him alone, one surpasses death”? (Śvet., 3.8). Hence, the conclusion is that though Brahman surpasses ordinary comprehension, yet He is known through Scripture and direct intuition.³

(B) *The cit.*

(i) *Its nature, size, number and kind.*

The soul is essentially of the nature of knowledge (jñāna-svarūpa), i.e. different from whatever is non-sentient, viz. the body, etc. The Cārvāka view that the soul is nothing but the body, and the Naiyāyika

¹ For the explanation of this and the following terms, see under Epistemology below.

² V.R.M., pp. 60–63.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 58–59.

view that the intelligence is not the very essence of the self, but only an adventitious quality of the self, generated through its connection with the internal organ—are both wrong.¹

The soul is not only knowledge, but a substratum of knowledge, i.e. a knower.²

An objection may be raised here³: The soul cannot be both knowledge and knower, i.e. possess knowledge as its attribute, for here the substratum itself and what inheres in it, the possessor and the quality possessed—both being equally knowledge—are identical, just as one drop of water has no separate existence from water, but is identical with it. Hence the soul is not a knower, but pure knowledge, and only appears to be a knower.⁴

The answer to this objection is as follows⁵: In many cases, the substratum (dharmin) and the attribute (dharma) are very similar, but that does not mean that they are identical; e.g. a gem and its rays are equally luminous, yet they are different and stand in the relation of substratum and quality. Similarly, though the soul and its quality of knowledge are equally knowledge, yet on account of this very fact that one is the substratum and the other its quality, they belong to different categories (vijātiya) and are hence distinct from each other. The fact is that there does exist a difference between a drop of water and water, for that drop of water, having a distinct form (sāvayava), must be different from other drops of water. We can argue thus: A drop of water is distinct from water, because it has a form just like dust thrown into dust, or sesamum-grain in a heap of sesamum-grains.

To say that the soul is a knower is to say that it is an ego—an “I”, for a knower always feels “I know”, “I see”, etc.⁶

An objection may be raised here⁷: If the “I” were the very essence of the self, it would have always accompanied it. But that is not the case, for in the states of deep sleep, salvation, etc. the “I” no longer exists. Hence the “I” is simply an effect of prakṛti, i.e. non-sentient.

To this, we reply⁸: Even in deep sleep the “I” persists, as is proved from such memory as “So long I slept happily and did not know anything”, which shows that the “I” was present during the

¹ V.R.M., pp. 3-4.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 4.

³ *Op. cit.*

⁴ For criticism of this view, see below.

⁵ V.R.M., p. 5.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁷ *Op. cit.*

⁸ *Op. cit.*, pp. 7-8. Cf. Śrī. B., 1.1.1. The arguments are exactly alike.

state of deep sleep as the substratum of knowledge (viz. "I do not know") and the feeling of happiness (viz. "I am sleeping happily"). Even the memory—"So long I did not know even myself"—does not prove the absence of the "I" during the same state. For here the first "I" (aham) means the self as it is during that state of *susupti*, i.e. the soul, the knower, pure and devoid of all connection with matter, i.e. the body, the sense-organs, etc., while the second "I" (*mām*) means the self as it is during the waking state, in union with matter, i.e. the body, etc. Hence "So long I did not know even myself" means simply that the real, pure "I" persists in deep sleep, what is absent is the "I" as it is during the waking state. Otherwise, on rising from deep sleep, one would have felt to the effect: "So long I did not exist, but now I have come into existence", etc.—but such is never the case.

Hence, the "I" must persist even during states of deep sleep, swoon and the rest. During those states, of course, there is no definite well-defined consciousness, as during the waking state, for there are present no well-defined, special objects then. Nevertheless, such a vague and general consciousness during deep sleep, etc., too, requires a substratum, for consciousness implies one who is conscious, and this substratum is the "I"—the real I.

Moreover, there may be some room for doubt whether the "I" persists during the states of deep sleep, etc., but there can be no doubt that it persists in the state of release—for release is not the destruction of the self, but its full development.

The soul is, further, an active agent or a *kartā*, and continues to be so during its states of deep sleep and release. Of course, during the state of deep sleep its agency is not manifest as during its state of waking. This is due to the fact that the soul in bondage has to work through its sense-organs, i.e. during its state of bondage the *kartṛtva* of the soul has to depend on the function of its sense-organs, and hence, since in the state of deep sleep the sense-organs function no more, the soul does not seem to be an agent at the time. During its state of waking, too, it is not always an agent, but only when its sense-organs function in relation to some or other particular object.¹

The soul is an enjoyer or *bhoktā* and continues to be so during deep sleep and release. During deep sleep, it enjoys happiness (as

¹ V.R.M., p. 11. For objection to the view that the *jīva* is essentially a *kartā* and refutation thereof, see below.

is evident from the memory: "So long I slept happily") and during release it enjoys supreme bliss arising out of its direct vision of Brahman.¹

The soul, though knowledge by nature, knower, doer and enjoyer,² equally like the Lord, is yet never equal to Him, but is essentially under His control. Although the sentient is different from and superior to the non-sentient, yet it, in common with the latter, is dependent on the Lord for its very nature, existence and activity. In one word, the soul is dependent, and not independent like the Lord.³

An objection may be raised here ⁴: If the souls be not responsible for their own acts, but the Lord, then seeing that He induces some to meritorious acts, while others to evil ones, the Lord must be accused of partiality and cruelty. Puruṣottama refutes this objection just in the same way as Nimbārka ⁵ does.

It is not to be argued that since the freed soul has no karmas, it is not under the control of the Lord, for the essential nature of the soul is to be controlled, while the essential nature of Brahman is to control,⁶ and one can never change one's essential nature. Hence the freed souls, too, are dependent on the Lord for its nature, existence and activity.⁷

It is not to be supposed, further, that since it is the Lord alone who leads the souls to this or that course of action, there is no use of the study of Scripture, recommending different courses of action, for the study of Scripture is by no means useless, seeing that it arouses the soul to the consciousness of its real nature. The soul, engrossed in the world of matter, thinks itself to be an independent being, but Scripture reveals to it the great truth that far from being an independent being, its very nature and existence depend on the Lord.⁸

Because of having Brahman for its very essence (*tad-ātmaka*), the soul is dependent on Him. This may be proved from the following positive and negative arguments:—

¹ V.R.M., p. 12.

² Of course, the Lord is not an enjoyer in the sense of experiencing the fruits of work, as the soul in bondage is; He is an enjoyer of celestial pleasures which He shares with the freed.

³ V.R.M., p. 13.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 13.

⁵ See above.

⁶ V.R.M., p. 14: "Niyantṛtva-niyamyatvayos-tat tvam-padārtha-svarūpatvāt".

⁷ *Op. cit.*

⁸ V.R.M., p. 14. Vide V.K., I.1.7.

(Positive). Whatever has something else for its very essence, depends on that for its nature, existence and activity, like pots which have the clay for their essence.

The jīva has Brahman for its essence. The jīva depends on Brahman for its nature, etc.

(Negative). Whatever has not something else for its essence, does not depend on that for its nature, etc., like the sky-flower.

The soul has Brahman for its nature. The soul depends on Brahman for its nature, etc.¹

Thus, in nature, the soul is knowledge by nature, knower, doer, enjoyer and dependent.

Next, the size of the soul. In size, it is atomic, although it is able to pervade the whole body and experience its pleasures, pains, etc. through its all-pervading attribute of knowledge.²

An objection may be raised here³: If the soul be atomic in size, it must be without form, without parts. But in that case, how can the Lord be said to be pervading it and abiding within it? For, to pervade is to pervade something definite with a form of its own, to abide within is to abide within something which occupies space.

The answer to this objection is that,⁴ even if the soul be atomic and without parts, still it can be pervaded by the Lord who pervades everything. The fact is that the relation of the controller and the controlled, the pervader and the pervaded does not depend upon the sāvayavatva or niravayavatva of a thing, but on the power inhering in it. That is, if one thing possesses the power of pervading and controlling something else, it does so, whether that thing is with or without parts, or whether it itself is with or without parts. Conversely, if a thing possesses the power, i.e. fitness to be pervaded, and controlled by something else, it is done so, irrespective of the fact whether it is with or without parts, or whether that which pervades is with or without parts. Hence, the Lord, possessing as He does, the power of pervading and controlling everything, pervades and controls the soul.

Next, the number of souls. The souls are many,⁵ while the Lord is one—herein lies one great difference between the soul and Brahman.

¹ V.R.M., pp. 14-15.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 15-16. For objection to this view and refutation thereof, see below.

³ V.R.M., p. 17.

⁴ *Op. cit.*

⁵ For the objection to this view and refutation thereof, see below.

The souls are, in fact, infinite in number, and hence it is that in spite of the fact that more and more souls are being freed from the world, the course of mundane existence still goes on, and will ever do so.¹

Finally, the kinds of souls. The souls are broadly of two kinds—souls in bondage (baddhas) and those that are free.²

The souls in bondage are connected with various kinds of bodies, through the beginningless impressions of past works, and are possessed of a strong sense of egoity, i.e. falsely regard themselves to be independent of the Lord. They are of two kinds: *mumukṣus* or those who, after having undergone all sorts of pains and miseries in the world, have lost all attachment for it, but wish to get rid of their earthly existence and attain salvation, and *bubhukṣus*, or those who hanker after earthly enjoyment.

Those desirous of salvation, again, are of two kinds, viz. those who desire for salvation which implies attaining the nature of the Lord, and those who desire for salvation which implies attaining their real nature.³ The *bubhukṣus* also are of two kinds, viz. those who hanker after future happiness (i.e. perform sacrifices, etc. for attaining heaven) and those who hanker after ordinary earthly enjoyments only.⁴

The freed souls are of two kinds: *nitya-muktas*, or those who are ever-free, i.e. are never subject to the transmigratory existence and its miseries, are never in contact with matter, but ever abide in supreme bliss, intuiting and worshipping the Lord; and *baddha-muktas* or those who were in bondage previously, but are now freed. The *nitya-muktas* are, again, of two kinds: *ānantaryya*, viz. the crown, the ear-ornaments and the flute of the Lord considered as living beings; and *pārśada*, viz. *Garuḍa*, *Viśvakṣena*, and the rest. The *baddha-muktas*, too, are of two kinds, viz. those who have attained supreme bliss consequent on their attaining the very nature of the Lord, and those who are content with the bliss consequent on their attaining their own real nature.⁵

¹ V.R.M., p. 19.


² *Op. cit.*, p. 22.

³ Of course, salvation always implies the attainment of the nature and qualities of the Lord and the attainment of the real nature of the individual (see above). But some *mumukṣus* desire more for the former, others the latter. Hence the distinction between the two classes of *mumukṣus*.

⁴ V.R.M., p. 22.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 22-23. Vide footnote 3.

The following is a chart of the different kinds of souls:—



Thus the conclusion is:—

In nature, the soul is knowledge by nature, knower, doer, enjoyer and dependent.

In size, it is atomic.

In number, it is endless.

And it is broadly of two kinds with various sub-divisions.

(ii) *Criticism of rival theories regarding the jīva.*

(a) *Criticism of Pratibimba-vāda.*¹

The doctrine that the soul is not really a knower, but it appears to be so through the reflection of consciousness on buddhi, is an absurd one, for a mere reflection cannot behave as if it is really possessed of knowledge—a knower. The reflection of the sun, e.g. can never do what the real sun does, viz. remove darkness and cold. In the very same manner, if the knowing soul were a mere reflection, it could not have acted—as it evidently does—like a real knower. Further, here both the object reflected (the bimba, viz. caitanya) and the limited adjunct (the upādhi, viz. buddhi) are without form and colour, hence no reflection is possible, otherwise we have to admit that there may be reflection of taste on sound, or on time, of time on taste, etc.—which is evidently absurd.

The very same argument applies equally to the doctrine that the soul is but a reflection of Brahman, for here, too, the object reflected (viz. Brahman) and the object on which it is reflected (viz. avidyā) are devoid of form and colour.

¹ V.R.M., pp. 5-6. See below for further criticism under Keśavakāśmīri-bhaṭṭa.

If it be argued that the ether, though without form and colour, is seen to have reflection over rivers, etc.—so why not here? We reply, the ether does possess a form and colour, since it is an intermixture of all the elements (cf. the process of *Pañcīkaraṇa*).

(b) *Criticism of Avaccheda-vāda or Upādhi-vāda*.¹

According to this doctrine, Brahman, as limited by *avidyā* or *antaḥkaraṇa* (internal organ), is called the soul. Just as the ether within a pot (*ghaṭākāśa*) is distinct from the universal ether (*mahākāśa*), but when the pot is broken, it is no longer distinct from the universal ether, so the soul as limited by *avidyā* is distinct from Brahman, but when free from *avidyā* is no longer distinct from Him.

But this view is absolutely untenable. Thus, whether the limited adjunct be *avidyā* or *antaḥkaraṇa*, the question is: how does it exactly limit Brahman? Does it actually cut off Brahman into separate piece, as an axe cuts a log of wood, or does it limit one portion of Brahman (without actually cutting off that portion from Brahman)? The first alternative is not possible, because what is all-pervading and without parts cannot be actually cut off into pieces, and also because in that case, the soul would cease to be eternal and unborn, as Scripture declares it to be.² The second alternative, too, is equally untenable. Here the question arises whether the limiting adjunct is all-pervading or limited. First, it cannot be all-pervading, for then no going out, coming back, etc. of the soul would be possible.³ Also, if the limiting adjunct, too, be all-pervading like Brahman, everything will be veiled, even Brahman, in His entirety. Secondly, it cannot be limited either, for in that case, although the going out, etc. of the soul become possible, some other difficulties arise, viz. just as on the motion of the pot, no motion of the ether within it is possible, the ether being motionless, so, on the motion of the limiting adjunct, no motion is possible on the part of Brahman, the all-pervading, who is motionless like ether. In that case, there will

¹ V.R.M., pp. 6-7.

² The sense is that if the soul be a part of Brahman cut off by *avidyā*, then it is something produced in course of time and not eternal, just as a particular piece of log is something which did not exist before as such, but is brought about by the cutting off the log by an axe.

The Advaitins might reply that the eternal *avidyā* limits Brahman from all eternity, hence the eternity of the soul is not jeopardised.

³ That is, the soul departs from the body at death, and returns to a new body. Now, if the *upādhi* (viz. *antaḥkaraṇa*) be all-pervading—this evidently is not possible.

arise sudden and causeless release and bondage and violation of the law of karman. So the doctrine that the soul is but Brahman, limited by limiting adjunct, does not stand to reason in any way.¹

Further, the doctrine that the soul, which is but Brahman, is not really an active agent, but the limiting adjunct (viz. antaḥkaraṇa) of the soul is the real agent, is also absolutely untenable, for the limiting adjunct, being non-sentient, can never be an agent. If it be said that it is not the limiting adjunct by itself, but the soul in connection with limiting adjunct which is the agent, we point out that the soul (which, according to Advaitins, is not an agent) cannot become so simply through its union with the limiting adjunct, which also is not an agent, otherwise we have to admit that a hermaphrodite can produce children through associating with a woman—which is evidently absurd. Hence the fact is that just though the fire is the substrate of the natural power of burning, yet this power is manifested only in connection with fuel, etc., so though the soul is the substratum of natural power of being an agent, yet this power is manifested through the functioning of the sense-organs only. That is, just as there is nothing contradictory in the fact that the fire does not burn always, though the power of burning is natural (svābhāvika) to it, so exactly, there is nothing contradictory in the fact that the soul is not always active (e.g. in deep sleep, etc.), though the power of being an agent is natural to it.²

(c) *Criticism of Sarva-gatātma-vāda.*³

The doctrine that the soul is really all-pervading (being Brahman itself) but appears to be atomic through its connection with the limiting adjunct (viz. antaḥkaraṇa), is equally absurd. If the soul be all-pervasive, the question arises whether there is a plurality of souls or one soul only. In the first place, there cannot be a plurality of souls, for in that case, whether the mind be all-pervasive or atomic in either case, the souls being all-pervasive, must be in eternal connection with all objects, therefore with all minds, and hence everyone must be aware of the thought of everyone else.⁴ Hence there will be

¹ Cf. Śrī. B., 1.1.4.

² V.R.M., pp. 11-12. For further criticism see below under Keśavakāśmīri-bhaṭṭa.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.

⁴ That is, knowledge arises through the connection of the mind with the soul. Now, suppose there is a plurality of souls A, B, C, etc., all all-pervasive, and a plurality of minds A₁, B₁, C₁, etc. A, being all-pervasive, must be simul-

no special perceptions to the effect "I", "You", "He", etc., all perceptions being universal and identical. And, if every soul were to know everything and every mind, it would become equal to Brahman who is omniscient.

In the second place, to say that there is not a plurality of souls, but one soul only, does not obviate the above difficulty, for the one all-pervasive soul, being connected with all minds, must be omniscient. If not, i.e. if it be said that the soul, though in connection with all minds, feels the pleasures, pains, etc. of only *one* of them (viz. its own), we are inevitably led to the conclusion that the soul is non-sentient.¹ And if the soul be non-sentient, it cannot, evidently, be the knower and hence we have to say that the limiting adjunct of the soul (viz. antahkaraṇa) must be the knower. Now, if the limiting adjunct be atomic, there can be no simultaneous experience of pain, etc. in different parts of the body (which, however, is an undeniable fact), for the limiting adjunct which is atomic cannot be simultaneously connected with different parts of the body. If, again, the limiting adjunct be of the size of the body,² the soul, limited by the upādhi, must also be so, which will go against the view of the Advaitins themselves.

(d) *Criticism of Eka-jīva-vāda.*³

The doctrine that there is only one soul does not stand to reason. If there were only one soul, when one sleeps, faints or dies, everyone else would have been found to be sleeping, fainting and dying simultaneously—but this is never found. So this doctrine is absurd, and there is really a plurality of souls.

(C) *The acit.*

There are three kinds of acit, viz. prākṛta or what is derived from prakṛti; kāla or time; and aprākṛta or what is not derived from prakṛti.⁴

taneously connected with all the minds of A₁, B₁, C₁, etc.; similarly, B, too, being all-pervasive, must be equally connected with all the minds A₁, B₁, C₁, etc. simultaneously, and so on; and hence the knowledge of A, B, C, etc. must all be identical.

¹ That is, a jaḍa or non-sentient object is one which though *in connection* with something, does not *feel* it. Hence, if to avoid the conclusion that the soul is omniscient (which evidently it is not, seeing that it knows its own states and feelings only, and not those of others) it be said that the soul, though *connected with* all minds (which it must be, since it is alleged to be all-pervading), yet does not *feel*, i.e. know the states and feeling of all of them, the soul must be non-sentient or jaḍa.

² Madhyama-parimāṇa.

³ V.R.M., p. 19.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 23.

(i) *The prakṛta*.¹

Prākṛta or primal matter is also called “māyā”, “pradhāna”, “tamas”, “avyakta”, etc. It is the substratum of three guṇas, viz. sattva, rajas and tamas. The sattva is the cause of knowledge, etc. As such it is the best means to salvation, and also because it, surpassing the rajas and the tamas, gives rise to self-control, etc. which lead to emancipation. The rajas is the cause of avarice and the rest. As such it is the cause of the soul's deviation from the path of truth. The tamas is the cause of delusion, etc. As such it is the main cause of the veiling of its own nature, as well as that of others. Prakṛti is a state of equilibrium of these three guṇas.² Then, when through the wish of the Lord—who is all along guided by the beginningless karmas of the soul—this equilibrium of the guṇas is disturbed, and they enter into a natural relation of subordination and co-ordination, prakṛti begins to produce various effects.

The successive stages in the process of creation is as follows:—

The first product of prakṛti is the mahat. The mahat is the cause of perseverance, and is of three kinds, viz. sāttvika, rājasika and tāmasika. From the mahat arises ahaṁkāra, which is the general cause of the sense of egoity in the body of individual souls. The ahaṁkāra, too, is of three kinds, viz. sāttvika, etc., and is called then vaikārika, taijasa and bhūtādi respectively. From the vaikārika ahaṁkāra arise the presiding deities of the sense-organs and also of the mind or the internal organ—which has four vṛttis or mode, viz. manas, buddhi, citta and ahaṁkāra. The manas is the cause of thought (manana). It is the cause of bondage when it is connected with, i.e. engrossed in the ordinary worldly objects, such as sound and the rest, but is a cause of salvation when, discarding worldly objects, it devotes itself wholly to the thought of the Lord. There are two kinds of manas, viz. impure and pure; the former full of worldly desires, the latter devoid of them. The buddhi is the instrument of discerning or understanding (bodhana). The ahaṁkāra is the cause of the sense of egoity in the body, etc., and citta is the cause of reflection (cintanam). The presiding deities of these four modes are respectively Candra, Brahmā, Rudra and Kṣetrajña. According to one description, their presiding deities are the four vyūhas, viz. Vāsudeva, Saṁkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha,

¹ V.R.M., pp. 23–37.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 24ff. Cf. the Sāṁkhya doctrine of creation.


respectively. But these two different descriptions do not come into conflict by any means, because Candra and the rest are responsible for their functioning, while the four vyūha deities are to be worshipped as their inner controller. The location of the manas is in the throat; of buddhi, the mouth; of ahaṁkāra, the heart; and of citta, the navel.

From taijasa ahaṁkāra arise the ten external sense-organs. These are divided into two classes, viz. the organs of knowledge, which are the general causes of the perceptions of sound and the rest, and the organs of action, which are the general causes of actions like speech, etc. There are five organs of knowledge, viz. the ear which can hear sound only, the skin which can feel only, the eyes which can perceive colour, form, etc. only, the tongue which can taste only, and the nose which can smell only. The presiding deities of these five organs of knowledge are respectively Dik, Vāyu, Āditya, Varuṇa, and Aśvinī, and their objects are sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. Similarly, there are five organs of action, viz. the organ of speech, which is the organ for uttering sound, and is situated in the throat; the hands which are the general instruments for taking, holding, etc. (in the case of elephants, etc., however, these functions are performed by the tip of the nose), the feet which are the general instruments for moving about (in the case of snakes, birds, etc., however, these functions are performed by the breast, the wings, etc., respectively), the organ of elimination and the organ of generation. The presiding deities of these five organs of sense are respectively Vahni, Indra, Upendra, Mrtyu and Prajāpati, and their objects are speech, receiving, moving about, elimination and enjoyment.

From the tāmasa ahaṁkāra or bhūtādi arise the five tan-mātras, viz. the śabda-tan-mātra and the rest, and the five great elements like the ether and the rest. The tan-mātras are the subtle elements or essences which are called the elements or bhūtas in their grosser forms. Thus from the tāmasa ahaṁkāra or bhūtādi arise the śabda-tan-mātra and from that the ether; from that the sparśa-tan-mātra and from that the air; from that the rūpa-tan-mātra and from that the fire; from that the rasa-tan-mātra and from that water; from that the gandha-tan-mātra and from that the earth. The qualities of the earth are five, viz. śabda (sound), sparśa (touch), rūpa (colour), rasa (taste) and gandha (smell); those of water are four, viz. the first four; those of fire, three, viz. the first three; those of air, two, viz. the first two; and that of the ether, only one, viz. the first.

The *prāṇa* or the vital-breath is a special kind of air, which upholds the body.¹ It has five different modes, viz. *prāṇa* or that which goes up through the nose, *apāṇa* or that which goes down through the organ of elimination, *vyāṇa* or that which moves about everywhere throughout the body, *udāṇa* or that which is the cause of eructation, and *samāṇa* or that which is the cause of digestion. According to some, there are five kinds of air, viz. *Nāga* or that which is the cause of eructation, *Kūrma* or that which is the cause of the opening of the eyes, *Kṛkala* or that which is the cause of appetite, *Devadatta* or that which is the cause of yawning, and *Dhanañjaya* or that which is the cause of nourishment. But these are really included under the five modes mentioned above, and are not independent ones.

Thus, there are altogether twenty-four principles. Cf. the following chart:—



Prakṛti, *mahat* and the five gross elements are the constituting material of the gross body of the soul; while the five subtle elements,

¹ Vide Br. Sū., 2.4.9-12. (N.B.).

and the mind, the ten sense-organs, and the vital-breath are the constituting material of its subtle body. The body is controlled by the soul, and is the instrument of the soul's enjoyment; it is the substrate of the soul, and non-separate from it. There are two kinds of body, permanent and non-permanent. The Lord and the ever-free souls have permanent bodies.¹ There are two kinds of non-permanent bodies, viz. those due to karma and those not due to karmas. Thus, the forms assumed by the Lord, viz. the forms of Virāj and the rest, as well as the forms assumed by the ever-free souls, are non-permanent, but not due to karmas. And, the forms which are both non-permanent and due to karma are of various kinds, viz. the sthāvaras or the immovable, such as mountains, trees, etc., and the jaṅgama or the movable, viz. gods, men, etc. These latter, again, are born from womb, or from eggs, etc.

Thus, beginning from the mahat down to the body, everything is an effect of prakṛti, and as such, non-different from it; for the cause and the effect are always non-different. The distinctions of names, forms, number, use, etc. are due to the distinctions of states only of prakṛti.²

The entire prakṛti, together with its effects, constitutes the object of enjoyment, the implement of enjoyment and the place of enjoyment of the soul. Thus, the objects of enjoyment are testes, sounds, colours and the rest, as well as the objects having taste, sound, colour, etc., viz. food, etc. The implements of enjoyment are the body, the sense-organs, the mind, the buddhi, etc. The places of enjoyment are the fourteen worlds included within the Brahmāṇḍa. And the entire prakṛti, together with its effects, constitutes the object of sport, the instrument of sport and the place of sport of the Lord. That is, while prakṛti is an object of enjoyment to the soul, it is but an object of sport to the Lord.³

The first two, viz. the objects of enjoyment, sound and the rest, and the instruments of enjoyment, the body and the rest, have already been explained above. Now, only the place of enjoyment, viz. the Brahmāṇḍa, remains to be explained.⁴ The Brahmāṇḍa is of the shape of a kapittha fruit, formed out of the great elements, through the process of Pañcikarāṇa,⁵ and contains fourteen worlds.

¹ See below under "Aprākṛta".

² V.R.M., p. 31.

³ *Op. cit.*

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 32ff. Here the author follows the description given in Viṣṇu-purāṇa, 2.4.

⁵ See below.

It is thus a product of matter, and as such, negligible by one who desires for final release.

The fourteen worlds are Bhūr-loka and the rest, viz.:—

1. Bhūr-loka is this world, the abode of men and the rest. It is of the shape of a lotus and occupies a space of fifty koti¹ yojanas². It consists of seven islands, surrounded by seven oceans. The seven islands are Jambu, Plakṣa, Śālma, Kuśa, Krauñca, Śāka and Puṣkara. And the seven oceans are Kṣārodakārṇava or the ocean of salt-water; Ikṣurasārṇava or the ocean of sugar-cane juice; Surārṇava or the ocean of wine; Ghṛtārṇava or the ocean of clarified butter; Kṣīrārṇava or the ocean of milk; Madhura-jalārṇava or the ocean of fresh water.

Each island is surrounded by an ocean as large as itself, which in its turn is surrounded by another island twice as large and consisting of seven varṣas or lands, except the last, viz. Puṣkara, which consists of two only. Thus, the Jambu-dvīpa occupies a space of lakṣa³ yojana. In its centre there is a mountain called Meru, of the shape of a karṇikā or the seed vessel of a lotus. It is surrounded by nine varṣas or lands, viz. Bhārata and two others in the south, Rāmyaka and two others in the north, Bhadrēśvara in the east, Ketu-mālā in the west, and Ilāvṛta in the middle. This Jambu-dvīpa is surrounded by the Kṣārodakārṇava or the ocean of salt-water, as large as itself.

That ocean is surrounded by the Plakṣa-dvīpa, twice as large and consisting of seven varṣas or lands. This Plakṣa-dvīpa is surrounded by the Ikṣurasārṇava or the ocean of sugar-cane juice, as large as itself. And so on.

2. Above the Bhūr-loka there is the Bhuvar-loka or the space extending from the earth up to the orb of the sun, occupying a lakṣa yojana, and inhabited by perfected souls, sages and the rest.

3. Above the Bhuvar-loka there are the orbs of the Candra (the moon), Nakṣatra (the constellation through which the moon passes), Budha (the planet Mercury), Śukra (the planet Venus), Bhauma (the planet Mars), Bṛhaspati (the planet Jupiter) and Saptarṣi (the seven stars in the constellation of the Ursa Major), and above these, there is the Dhruva-cakra (the Polar Star). The Svar-loka, the region of Indra, extends from the orb of the sun up to the Dhruva, i.e. it is

¹ One koti = ten millions.

² A yojana = 4 krośas or about 9 miles.

³ One lakṣa = one hundred thousand.

the space between the sun and the Polar Star, occupying fourteen lakṣa yojanas.

4. Above the Svar-loka there is the Mahar-loka, occupying a koṭi yojanas, inhabited by Bhrgu and other saints.

5. Above Mahar-loka there is the Jana-loka, twice as large, the abode of Brahman's sons, Sanatkumāra and the rest.

6. Above the Jana-loka there is the Tapo-loka, four times as large, the abode of deified vairāgins.

7. Above the Tapo-loka there is the Satya-loka or Brahma-loka, occupying twelve koṭi yojanas, the abode of Brahmā.

These are the seven worlds from the earth upwards. There are seven more worlds from the earth downwards. Thus: The Bhūr-loka (with its seven islands and seven seas) is surrounded by the Kāñcana-bhūmi, twice as large, and not inhabited by any animals; that, again, is surrounded by the Lokā-loka mountain; that, again, by the Andha-tamaḥ (deep darkness); that, again, by the Garbhodaka (the ocean of the womb, i.e. the fluid in the mundane egg, viz. Brahmāṇḍa); and that, again, by the Aṇḍa-kaṭāha (the shell of the mundane egg, viz. the Brahmāṇḍa). Below that, there are seven worlds, one below the other and ten times as large, viz. Atala, Pātala, Vitala, Sūtaḥ, Talātala, Rasātala and Mahā-tala.

In between these seven worlds, the Atala and the rest, there are twenty-one narakas or hells, viz. Raurava and the rest, the abode of sinners. Below that there is the Andha-tamas, below that the Garbhodaka, and below that the Aṇḍa-kaṭāha.

Such is the constitution of one Brahmāṇḍa. There is an infinite number of such Brahmāṇḍas floating like bubbles in the ocean of pradhāna—which is of the essence of the Lord's power. Hence the Brahmāṇḍa is endless.

The process of Pañcikarāṇa, referred to above, consists in the following¹: The Lord, first, created the five great elements, earth, water, fire, air and ether. Then He divided each element into two parts. Of these two halves, He kept one half apart, and then divided the other half into four parts, mixed each of these parts with each of the other four elements, taking just as equal portion in return from each of these four elements and mixing them in return with the element with which He has begun. Thus earth, e.g. $\frac{1}{2}$ earth + $\frac{1}{8}$ water + $\frac{1}{8}$ fire + $\frac{1}{8}$ air + $\frac{1}{8}$ ether. Similar is the case with every other element. The

¹ V.R.M., p. 36.

earth is called *earth* (and not any other element), because of the preponderance in it of the element of earth. Similar is the case with every other element.

So far is the process of creation.

Next, the process of dissolution (*pralaya-krama*)¹: The order of dissolution is that each effect is merged into its respective cause and not vice versa, i.e. the cause into its effect; for the effect can have no existence at all apart from its cause. Thus, the successive order of dissolution is as follows: the earth, through the *gandha-tan-mātra*, merges in water; water through the *rasa-tan-mātra* into fire; fire through the *rūpa-tan-mātra* into the air; the air through the *sparśa-tan-mātra* into the ether; the ether through the *śabda-tan-mātra* into *Bhūtādi* or the *tāmasa ahaṁkāra*. The sense-organs on their parts merge into the *rājasa ahaṁkāra*, and the mind and its presiding deities in the *vaikārika* or the *sāttvika ahaṁkāra*. Then these three kinds of *ahaṁkāra* disappear into the *mahat*, and the *mahat* into *prakṛti*, the *prakṛti* into the Imperishable, the Imperishable into Darkness, and the Darkness into the supreme Lord.

(ii) *Kāla*.²

The second kind of the *acit* is *kāla* or time—which is different from the *prākṛta* and the *aprākṛta*. It is eternal, and all-pervasive, and persists even before creation and during dissolution. It is the cause of such conventional distinctions like the past, present and future, the simultaneous, the eternal, the quick,³ etc. It is, further, instrumental in the creation and destruction of the universe, which, evidently, involve time, and the specific instrument of such measurements like *paramāṇu*,⁴ etc., up to *parārdha*.⁵ Thus, time is the basic principle of the entire cosmic existence. But though the regulator and controller of everything, it, itself is entirely under the control of the Lord. Though time is indivisible and ever continuous and ever present in its own nature, yet it is non-permanent in the form of

¹ V.R.M., p. 37.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 37-38.

³ That is, in practical life, we constantly use such expressions like "This is", "That will be", "These are simultaneous", "That is eternal", etc., and all these expressions involve time.

⁴ A *paramāṇu* is the time taken by the sun to traverse an atomic sphere. All these measures are evidently based on time alone.

⁵ Vide V.K., I.1.1., p. 19, K.S.S.

its effects which are due to the limiting adjunct being the sun's revolution.¹

(iii) *The aprākṛta*.²

Aprākṛta is a kind of the non-sentient different from prakṛti and kāla. It is termed variously as nitya-vibhūti, paramātma-loka, parama-vyoma, viṣṇu-pada, parama-pada, etc. It is illuminous or refulgent by nature, i.e. does not veil itself or anything else, absolutely unlimited and eternal. It is called "bliss", because it manifests bliss. It is the stuff of the Lord's nitya-vibhūti or celestial manifestation, e.g. the manifestation of the viśvarūpa by the Lord Kṛṣṇa to Arjuna.³ It is also the stuff of the region and forms of the Lord and of the ever-free souls. It constitutes, in short, the objects of enjoyment such as the forms (vigraha), etc., the implements of enjoyment—such as ornaments, weapons, carriages, seats, flower, leaves, fruits, etc.—and the places of enjoyment—such as gateways, courtyards, ramparts, crystal palaces, forests, glens, lakes, etc.—of the Lord and the ever-free souls, just as prakṛti (as shown above)⁴ constitute the objects, implements and places of enjoyment of the souls.

The body of the Lord and the bodies of the ever-free souls are due to the Lord's own eternal wish, and are, as such, eternal and natural. The freed souls, too, when they are released from their earthly bodies, i.e. from all connection with prakṛti, are endowed with such eternal and celestial bodies, which are subject to no change or decay. Just as during a festival, the king gives clothes, ornaments, etc. to his servants. So when the freed souls are freed from matter, the Lord endows them with eternal bodies as instruments of His own service.⁵

The body of the Lord, like His own nature, is the substratum of infinite auspicious qualities, such as beauty, grace, sweetness and the

¹ That is, time as a whole is eternal, while particular portions of time are non-eternal, e.g. a minute passes away, so does a day, or a month or a year. And these particular portions are not real divisions of time—which is really indivisible—but only divisions to the limiting adjunct in the sense that time is divided by us for practical convenience only, in accordance with the revolution of the sun. Thus, the sun's revolution on its own axis once constitutes a day for us, its revolution round the sun once constitutes a year for us, and so on.

² V.R.M., pp. 39-40. Vide V.K., 1.1.1, p. 10, K.S.S.

³ That is, just as the soul enjoys its body, so the Lord, too, enjoys His.

⁴ See above, p. 91.

⁵ That is, the mukta worship and serve the Lord through their celestial bodies.

rest very one of them immeasurable and infinite. But though the Lord possesses a body, He is not in need of the sense-organs for seeing, etc.—as He can do so without the help of sense-organs. Similar is the case with the freed souls, too, who are similar to the Lord. And, they are all beyond influence of time.

(iv) *Criticism of rival theories regarding the jagat.*

(a) *Criticism of Vivarta-vāda.*¹

The doctrine that the world is simply a vivarta (illusory, and not real, transformation) of Brahman is absolutely untenable. The Lord is, undoubtedly, one and without a second, but that does not imply by any means the falsity of any and everything besides the Lord. It implies that the Lord is without an equal or a superior. How can the world be falsely superimposed upon Brahman, seeing that there can be no superimposition of what is unreal? The rule is that a thing existing in one place is superimposed upon another, but a sky-flower is never superimposed on anything.

If it be said that the only requisite for making the superimposition of one thing upon another possible is that the thing superimposed must be *perceived* and not necessarily that it must be real, we reply, that the very perception of what is *asat* is not possible.

If it be said that just as there is the perception of a snake in place of a rope, so the perception of the world, too, is a false perception, due to *doṣas* (avidyā, etc.) and not a real perception, we reply, the unreal world can never be the *cause* of the perception of the world, its effect. The fact is that an unreal object can never be the *cause* of anything, for the cause must be possessed of certain powers of producing the particular effect. The unreal snake is not the cause of fear, trembling, etc., but the real *knowledge* of the snake. And the unreal snake is not also the cause of this knowledge of the snake, but the real *doṣas*—such as distance, absence of proper light, defective eyesight, etc., are the cause of that knowledge. Similarly, the knowledge of past rain is not produced by the non-existing rain, but by the existing effects of the rain, such as muddy road, wet grass, etc., and the knowledge of future rain, too, is produced by the real science of Astronomy. So, nowhere the *asat* is a cause. Hence the superimposition of the *asat* being impossible, the vivarta theory is absolutely untenable.

¹ V.R.M., pp. 65–69.

If it be said¹ that the following process of inference proves the falsity of the world, viz. the world is false, because it is perceivable, like the nacre-silver, we reply that in that case, Brahman, too, being perceivable (by the knowers), must be false, on the ground of the inference: Brahman is false, because He is perceivable, like the world. That Brahman is perceivable by knowers is proved from many scriptural passages.²

The famous passage "Vācārambhāṇa-vikāra" (Chānd., 6.1.5) by no means proves the vivarta theory. The use of the term "vikāra" (transformation) leaves no room for doubt that the effects are real transformations of the cause, otherwise the term "bhrānti" (error) would have been used. Moreover, the vivarta illustrations, viz. snake-rope, etc., do not fit in with the above text which professedly teaches the doctrine that through the knowledge of one (viz. the cause) there is the knowledge of all (viz. its effects). Now, this fits in very well with the Pariṇāma doctrine, e.g. through the knowledge of clay, there is the knowledge of all the effects of clay; but how can it be said that through the knowledge of rope, there is knowledge of snake? ³

Hence the vivarta-vāda is supported by neither reason, nor Scripture.⁴

(v) *Epistemology.*

There are three sources of valid knowledge (pramāṇa), viz. perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna) and authority (śabda). Perception is the knowledge arising from the connection of sense-organs with objects, e.g. "I see my teacher," etc.; inference is the knowledge arising from the knowledge of vyāpti, e.g. the mountain is on fire, because it smokes, and whether smoke is on fire, as the oven; and authority is the word or testimony of the wise (āpta-vākya). A wise person is one who is free from the four causes of error, viz. weakness of intellect, etc., and speaks the truth.

There are three kinds of the wise—the wisest (Āptatama) is the Veda, and the Vedic texts are the most authoritative. A little less wise are the Smṛtis, like the Manu Smṛti and the rest, and the Smṛti texts are a little less authoritative, while the commentators

¹ V.R.M., pp. 68-69.

² Vide, e.g., Brh., 2.4.5, etc.

³ V.R.M., p. 67.

⁴ See for further criticisms under Keśavakāśmīribhaṭṭa.

and expounders of Śruti and Smṛti are one degree less wise, since they have to depend on both Śruti and Smṛti and their words are one degree less authoritative.

Now, among these three sources of knowledge, perception and inference are liable to error, e.g. on seeing a magic head, one may take it to be a real head, or again, simply on seeing smoke issuing from a hill, one may infer that the hill is on fire, although the fire may have been long before extinguished by rain. But śabda is more authoritative and trustworthy than these two.

Upamāna and the rest are not to be taken as independent pramāṇas, since they really fall under one or other of the above three.¹

There are two kinds of śabda-vṛttis, viz. mukhya and gaṇa.² The former is of the form of śakti or the inherent power of a word to express its meaning. It is of three kinds, viz. rūḍhi, yoga and yoga-rūḍhi. The first implies the samudāya śakti of a word, as Hari, Nārada, etc. It, again, is of two kinds, viz. paryyāya (synonyms or having one sense), e.g. hasta (hand), etc., and anekārtha (having many senses), e.g. hari (which means a variety of things like horse, lion, the sun, etc.). The second implies the avayava śakti of a word, e.g. Mādhava, Ramākānta, etc. The third is a combination of the first two, e.g. soma, pañkaja, etc.

The second kind of śabda-vṛtti also is of two kinds, viz. lakṣaṇā and gaṇī. The first implies something connected with the actual object (śakya) implied by the word (and not the actual object itself). It is of three kinds, viz. jahat, e.g. "The village situated on the Ganges", does not mean that the village is situated on the river Ganges, but that it is situated on the coast of the Ganges (which is connected with the Ganges); ajahat, e.g. "Protect the curd from crows" does not mean that the curd is to be protected from crows alone, but that other pests as well, as dogs, etc., and jahadajahat, e.g. "Thou art that"—here the peculiar attributes of the soul and Brahman are overlooked, while both are regarded in their common features alone.


The second implies connection with the qualities of the actual object (and not the actual object itself) implied by the word, e.g. "Devadatta is a lion". Here, evidently, it is not meant that Deva-

¹ Vide the Advaita view which regards these as independent pramāṇas. Cf. Vedānta-paribhāṣā, chs. 1-6.

² Vide Vedānta-paribhāṣā, ch. 4.

datta is actually a lion, but simply that he possesses some qualities of the lion—great strength, fearlessness, etc.

This is a chart of the sources of knowledge acknowledged by Puruṣottama:—



Section 2. Reconciliation of Abheda and Bheda Vākyas.

(i) Relation between Brahman, the cit and the acit.

On the one hand, the cit and the acit are non-different from Brahman, on the following three grounds:—

- because they have Brahman for their essence (Brahmāt-maka), and whatever has something else for its essence is non-different from it, as e.g. a gold ear-ring from gold;
- because they have their existence and activity under the control of Brahman (tad-āyatta-sthiti-pravṛtti) and whatever is under the control of something else for its existence and activity is non-different from it, e.g. the sense-organs are non-different from the prāṇa;
- because they are pervaded by Brahman (tad-vyāpya), and whatever is pervaded by something is non-different from it.¹

On the other hand, the cit and the acit are different from Brahman, for there is an essential difference between the nature of these three: Brahman is the controller (niyantr), the cit the enjoyer (bhoktr) and the acit the enjoyed (bhogyā).²

¹ V.R.M., pp. 88-89.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 85.

Hence the truth of things is a natural difference-non-difference (svābhāvika-bhedābheda).

In this way alone can the bheda and abheda texts be reconciled. There are two kinds of existence, *sva-tantra* (or independent), *para-tantra* (or dependent). An independent being has his own existence and activity under his own control—the Supreme Brahman alone is such an independent Being. A dependent being has his existence and activity under the control of someone else, the soul and the *pradhāna* are such dependent beings. The soul is *kūṭastha* and *nitya*, i.e. unchangeable and eternal, the *pradhāna* is *pariṇāmi* and *nitya*, i.e. changeable, yet eternal. Now, the abheda-texts, designating abheda and denying bheda, refer to the *sva-tantra-sattvā*, the Lord. The Lord is self-subsistent and needs nothing besides Himself—hence there can be nothing outside Him, nothing other than Him—and it is in this sense alone that there is Unity—the One, without a second, and no plurality outside, and independent of Him. Hence if we look from the point of view of Brahman, there is abheda. The bheda-texts, affirming bheda between Brahman and the universe, refer to the *para-tantra-sattvā*, the *cit* and the *acit*. The sentient and the non-sentient are not self-subsisting, but point beyond themselves to something else. Hence if we look from the point of view of the universe there is bheda,—i.e. at least two realities—the universe, the dependent, and Brahman, the substratum. Thus, bheda and abheda are equally true—only due to different view-points.¹

(ii) *Interpretation of the text "Tattvamasi"*.

In the light of the above discussion alone, can the great text "Tat tvam asi" (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.) be properly interpreted. Here the term "tat" refers to the Lord, "tvam" to the soul, and "asi" the relation between them; and this relation is that the soul is non-different from the Lord, which *non-difference is compatible with a difference between them*.²

Section 3. *The Sādhana*s.

(i) *The five sādhana*s.

There is a variety of *sādhana*s—viz. Karma, Jñāna, Bhakti, Prapatti and Gurv-ājñānuvṛtti.³

¹ V.R.M., pp. 89-90.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 91.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 94.

1. *Karma-yoga*.¹ There are three kinds of *karmas*—viz.: *Nitya*, *Naimittika* and *Kāmya*. The *nitya karmas* are those which are to be performed always, such as, evening-prayer, ablution, muttering of sacred formulae, etc. Of these, the performance of sacrifices, the practice of charity, and Vedic study are obligatory to the upper three classes, while conducting and assisting sacrifices, receiving gifts and teaching the Vedas are special duties of the *Brāhmaṇas* alone. Thus, the *Brāhmaṇas* have six obligatory duties,² while the *Kṣatriyas* and the *Vaiśyas* only three. And, sense-control, visiting holy places, fasting, fruit-diet, distribution of food, etc. are obligatory to everyone equally. As to the different results achieved through these duties performed in different spirits, *Purṣottama* holds the same view as *Nimbārka*.³

The *naimittika karmas* are those which are to be performed on special occasions only such as the ceremony in honour of the dead.⁴

The *kāmya-karmas* are those which are undertaken with worldly ends in view, e.g. the performance of sacrifices with a view to attaining heaven, etc. Such *karmas* lead one to endless births and rebirths, and are, hence, to be avoided by one who desires for final release. But the other two classes of *karmas*—viz. the *nitya* and the *naimittika*, are to be performed by those as entitled in accordance with their respective castes and stages of life. The upper three classes are to perform those which are enjoined in the Vedas, while the *Śūdras* are to satiate gods and deceased persons by libations of water, distribution of food,⁵ etc. as laid down in the *Purāṇas*.

2. *Jñāna-yoga*. *Jñāna* is a special kind of direct intuition (*anubhava-viśeṣa*) regarding the nature, attributes, power and majesty, etc. of the Lord. It is generated through the repeated and continuous practice of the *sādhana*s, *śravaṇa*, etc. (hearing of Vedic texts, etc.) by one desirous of salvation, who, having his mind purified by the disinterested performance of the daily and occasional duties, as befitting his caste and stage of life, has come to be entitled to the study of Scripture.⁶

Thus, having ascertained the fact that the *Vedānta*-texts are concerned with establishing the nature and attributes of the Lord, one desiring for salvation approaches a preceptor, and hears and learns the real meaning of the *Vedānta*-texts from him. This is *Śravaṇa*.

¹ V.R.M., pp. 94–96.

² *Nitya-karmas*.

³ See above.

⁴ *Śrāddha*.

⁵ *Tarpaṇa*; *anna-dāna*.

⁶ V.R.M., p. 97.

Next, wishing to realise and see for himself the truth of what he has heard, i.e. been taught by the preceptor, he reflects on it, discusses and tests it by means of ratiocinative argumentations, etc., in accordance with Scripture. This is *manana*. Finally, being himself convinced that what he has been taught is the true doctrine, and wishing to have a direct vision of the Lord,—the object of *śravaṇa* and *manana*,—he devotes himself to a continuous meditation on the Lord. This is *nididhyāsana*.¹

3. *Bhakti-yoga*. *Bhakti* is a special kind of direct intuition (*anubhūti-viśeṣa*) consisting in an unceasing meditation on the Lord, continuous and uninterrupted like the flow of a river, increasing day by day so long as life lasts.²

The Lord is to be worshipped by men of all castes alike, the only distinction being that the higher three classes are entitled to the meditations recommended in the Vedas, while the fourth class to the *upāsana*s laid down in the *Purāṇas* only.³

There are two kinds of *bhakti*, viz.: *sādhana-rūpikā* and *phala-rūpā*. The *sādhana-rūpikā bhakti* is so called because it is generated through the continuous performance of *sādhana*s, i.e. through the accumulated mass of *pūnyas* or meritorious deeds, like penance, charity, self-control, etc.

Sādhana-rūpikā bhakti is, again, of two kinds—*Vaidika* and *Paurāṇika*. The former consists in practising the meditations laid down in the *Upaniṣads*—e.g. the *Madhu-Vidyā*⁴ and the rest, and only the first three classes are entitled to them. The latter consists in worshipping the Lord as laid down in the *Purāṇas*. *Sādhana-rūpikā bhakti* is so called also because it is conducive to *phala-rūpā bhakti*, considered below.⁵

Phala-rūpā bhakti is that which is generated through the grace of the Lord Himself. A man who conscientiously performs his duties as best as he can, pleases the Lord, and gains thereby a true knowledge of his own self, and then, through the grace of the Lord, again, this knowledge of his self—by convincing him of the utter worthlessness of his own self and of the absolute greatness of the Lord, naturally generates a supreme *bhakti* for the Lord. *Phala-rūpā bhakti* is also

¹ V.R.M., p. 43.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 97. Note that the author uses the term “*bhakti*” in the sense of “*upāsana*” exactly after Rāmānuja. Contrast Nimbārka’s interpretation of the word.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 74.

⁴ *Chānd.*, 3.1 ff.

⁵ V.R.M., p. 127

called "parā bhakti", "prema-lakṣaṇā bhakti", "dhruvā smṛti", etc. It is a kind of mental mode continuous and lasting so long as the self does—regarding the nature and attributes of the Lord, just like the modes of sense-organs regarding particular objects, lasting so long as those objects do. It leads to a direct intuition of the Lord. The attainment of this kind of bhakti is facilitated by keeping company with the good and hence those who wish to attain it, must always seek the company of the good,—or those whose sole end of life is the realisation of the Lord and who have consequently given up all worldly pursuits, and who never act contrary to the Lord's command.¹

4. Prapatti-yoga or Śaraṇāgati. Prapatti is the complete entrusting of one's own self to the infinitely merciful Lord through the means recommended by the good, when one is convinced of one's incapacity for resorting to other sādhanas like knowledge and the rest.² It has six parts:—

- (a) The resolve to treat everyone with good-will and friendliness, being convinced of the great truth that everyone and everything, down to a tuft of grass, is the body of the Lord and as such deserves respect.
- (b) Discarding what is contrary to the above solemn determination, i.e. refraining from all violence, malice, back-biting, falsehood, etc.
- (c) Strong faith in the protection of the Lord.
- (d) Praying to the Lord for protection, being aware of the fact that the Lord, though all-merciful, does not release any one who does not pray to Him, but is, on the contrary averse to Him (otherwise there would have resulted universal release).
- (e) Discarding all false pride and sense of egoity, i.e. assuming an attitude of utter humility.
- (f) Complete entrusting of one's own self and whatever belongs to one's self to the Lord, being convinced that such a complete resignation of the "I" and the "mine" to the Lord alone induce the mercy and grace of the Lord.³

As to the qualifications of a person entitled to the prapatti-yoga, Puruṣottama holds the same view as Nimbārka.⁴

¹ V.R.M., p. 127. See under Nimbārka 'Sahakārins to the Sādhanas'.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 97. Nimbārka simply mentions these factors but does not, as is natural with him, explain them.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 100-102.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 102. See under Nimbārka.

The object of prapatti, i.e. He to whom a man is to surrender himself is the Lord Kṛṣṇa alone, and not any other deity like Brahmā, Śiva and the rest, who are all subordinate to the Lord.¹

It is not to be apprehended that the soul, poor and puny as it is, can have no access to the Supreme Lord, the abode of infinite might and majesty, and worshipped by great deities like Brahmā and the rest, for the Supreme Lord is not only all-powerful, but all-merciful as well and essentially devoted to His bhaktas.² Hence although the Supreme Lord is not easily attainable even by great deities like Brahmā and the rest, He is, nevertheless, easily attainable by those who have had recourse to Him.³ And no reason can be assigned why the Lord, in spite of His unsurpassed greatness, should stoop low to please His devotees, for the motives and doings of the Lord are beyond all explanation and are not to be judged by ordinary standards.⁴

The peculiar efficacy or virtue of prapatti consists in the following: Through the grace of the Lord all the sins of the devotee are washed off at once. He immediately attains the fruits of all meritorious deeds, as if he has practised every penance immediately, performed every sacrifice, visited every holy place and practised every charity. What others attain through one or other of the sādhanas, after a long period of continuous effort, he attains at once without any direct effort on his own part. He becomes entirely free from all fears and all embarrassment, and is ever protected by the Lord Himself. Through the grace of the Lord he obtains the supreme sphere, whence there is no return. In this way, prapatti leads to salvation.⁵

5. Gurūpasatti or Gurv-ājñānuvṛtti. As to the nature and adhikārin of this means, Puruṣottama holds the same view as Nimbārka.⁶

He points out that every one is not to be a preceptor or a disciple. Both must be endowed with certain qualities.⁷

He, who has resorted to a guru, has everything looked after by the guru, who helps him in all matters, relation to this world or to the next.⁸ This will be made clear from the following analogy of a mother and her child⁹:

¹ V.R.M., pp. 102-103.

² See above, under Puruṣottamācārya.

³ V.R.M., pp. 113-115.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 115.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 117.

⁶ For details, see the account given by Sundarabhaṭṭa.

⁷ V.R.M., pp. 121-122. For details, see Sundarabhaṭṭa's account.

⁸ V.R.M., p. 123.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 122.

(a) A child does not know what is good or what is bad for himself. (b) Hence he follows his mother in all respects and does what she tells, being convinced, whether by instinct or by knowledge, that whatever she does and orders is always for his own good. (c) His mother, on her side, protects him from all danger and (d) ensures safety, peace and happiness for him; also (e) she herself takes medicine, etc. for curing her (suckling) child's disease.

In the very same manner, (a) one who desires salvation, finding himself incapable of following any of the sādhanas by his unaided effort, gives up thinking for himself of what is good and what is bad for him, but (b) resorts to a guru following him in all respects and obeying his commands. (c) The guru, in his turn, protects him and (d) leads him to salvation, and (e) does whatever is necessary for his emancipation.

(ii) *The theory of grace.*

It remains to consider the part played by grace of the Lord as a means to release. It is emphasized again and again that it is the grace of the Lord which is the ultimate and the most immediate cause of salvation in every case without distinction. Whatever path a man may follow—knowledge, meditation, or self-surrender, etc., *in every case*, he must somehow or other invoke the grace of the Lord, otherwise all his efforts will be in vain, all his time and energy wasted. Salvation means attaining one's own real nature as well as attaining similarity with the Lord, and unless the Lord is pleased to free the soul from the fetters of beginningless karmas, thereby enabling it to realise its real nature fully and to have a direct vision of Himself, no amount of unaided effort on its own part, however great and earnest, will be of any avail in bringing about the desired end.

The successive stages in the attainment of salvation (mokṣa-prāpti-karma) are as follows¹: A man who is looked at with favour by the Lord at the time of his birth becomes sāttvika from the very beginning,² i.e. has a tendency to a life of purity and knowledge. This inborn sāttvika tendency in him leads him to give up all worldly pursuits and hanker after mukti alone. This leads him to devote

¹ V.R.M., p. 133.

² It is said that if a man is looked at by Madhusūdāna at the time of his birth, he becomes sāttvika, if by Brahmā, rājasika, and if by Rudra, tāmasika. V.R.M., p. 133.

himself whole-heartedly to the sādhanas, which has the effect of pleasing the Lord, who manifests Himself before him, and thereby he becomes free.

It is clear from the above that right from the very beginning, down to the very end, a man has to depend upon the Lord at every single step. It is the grace of the Lord which makes him desire for salvation¹ in the beginning, it is the grace of the Lord which makes him a successful pursuer of the means in the intervening period, and it is the grace of the Lord which makes him free in the end. Thus, the grace of the Lord is the most essential pre-requisite to salvation.

An objection may be raised here²: The grace of the Lord must be either limited or all-pervasive. But it cannot be limited, because then it must be dependent on some initiating cause (as the favour shown by a soul)³ and not of much worth as such. Neither can it be all-pervasive, because then there will result universal emancipation and the scriptural injunctions regarding the sādhanas will become useless simply.⁴

To this objection, we reply⁵: The Lord's favour is undoubtedly all-pervading, yet it is manifested not to any and every one indiscriminately, but only to those who having approached a preceptor have had recourse to the sādhanas. A thing may be universal, yet its actual manifestations may depend on certain conditions, e.g. according to the Nyāya view the universal (sāmānya) "gotva" (cowness) is all-pervading (all universals are all-pervading according to this view), yet all things are not found to be pervaded by it (a pot, e.g. has no "gotva" in it, nor a horse), but only a certain species of animals having dew-lap, etc. (i.e. cows which alone possess "gotva"). Again, according to the Advaita view, Brahman is all-pervading, yet

¹ Vide Ś.B., I.1.1, Mumukṣutva is taken to be one of the four sādhanas which entitle one to Brahma-jijñāsā.

² V.R.M., p. 18.

³ That is, a man favours his fellowmen sometimes, and sometimes not, such favour being dependent on some reason or other; e.g. he favours them whom he likes and not others, etc. Now, if the Lord's favour too be limited like the jīva's favours, it too, like that of the jīva, must be dependent on and conditioned by alien and external factors, and cannot, therefore, like human favour amount to much.

⁴ That is, if the Lord favours any and every one at all times, evidently the sādhanas, which are for this very purpose of invoking His favour, become useless.

⁵ V.R.M., p. 18.

any and every one cannot perceive it, but only those who are fit for knowing it. Such is the case with the universal grace of the Lord.

Another objection may be raised ¹: If it be said that the grace of the Lord, though all-pervading, depends on certain conditions—(viz. the sādhanas) the view that the Lord's grace is the chief cause of salvation can no longer be held. There will arise also the logical fallacy of mutual dependence: grace depends on the sādhanas, the latter on the former.

To this we reply ²: The Lord is without an equal or a superior, thence the grace of the Lord does not *really* depend on any other condition besides Himself, but in order that He may not be accused of wantonness,—of partiality, cruelty, etc. in His bestowal of favour and also in order that Scripture, dealing with the sādhanas, may not be useless,—the Lord depends on those sādhanas *apparently* only in His bestowal of favours, and this dependence being but a mere semblance (and not a reality), in no way disproves His absolute independence.

Section 4. Mokṣa.³

Here Puruṣottama brings forward no new points, except that he gives a detailed account of the obstacles which prevent the attainment of salvation—which have already been noticed above.⁴ The attainment mokṣa implies, thus, the performance of the sādhanas on the one hand, and the rejection of the virodhins on the other:

IV. Devācārya.

(1) LIFE AND DATE.

Devācārya was twelfth after Nimbārka. Of the previous teachers who flourished between Puruṣottama and Devācārya, we know nothing. Devācārya was supposed to be an incarnation of the lotus of Viṣṇu (padmāvatāra) ⁵ and to have flourished in Tailaṅga in the Vaikrama Yuga-rudrendu 1112,⁶ i.e. 1112 Samvat or 1056-57 A.D. But this view is untenable, since it is clear from internal evidences that he could not have flourished prior *at least* to Rāmānuja and Madhva,

¹ V.R.M., p. 21.

² *Op. cit.*

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 132ff.

⁴ See under Nimbārka: 'Virodhins to the Sādhanas'.

⁵ S.S., p. 2, Intro. to S.J., p. 2.

⁶ Intro. to S.J., p. 2.

i.e. not prior to the thirteenth century A.D., as he criticises the views of these latter philosophers.¹

(2) WORKS.

Devācārya composed a commentary on the Brahma-sūtras, styled "Siddhānta-jāhnavī". Unfortunately, the whole of this commentary has not yet been found, but it has been published only up to the first pāda of the first chapter (sūtras 1.1.1-1.1.31).

(3) DOCTRINE.

He accepts the usual doctrines of the sect—viz. the trinity of reals; Brahman, the cit and the acit, and a relation of svābhāvika-bhedābheda between them. His arguments are in many places exactly similar to those of Puruṣottama, whom he often cites as authority.²

(a) Brahman.

Brahman is Puruṣottama, the husband of Rāmā (or Lakṣmī), possessed of infinite auspicious qualities and free from material qualities.³

Brahman is the creator of the Universe, both its material and efficient causes.⁴ He alone can be the universal cause, (1) neither the soul, since in that case, the souls being infinite in number, there will be an infinite number of creators; (2) nor the four-faced Brahmā or Hiraṇyagarbha, since he, not being eternal, but a created being, did not exist prior to creation; (3) nor Śiva, since he too is a temporal being and not eternal; (4) nor time itself, since this view is set aside by Scripture as false; (5) nor accident (svabhāva), since on this view an effect has no fixed cause, but arises somehow by itself and hence how can it be said that accident is the cause of the effect (viz. the world) without contradiction? Thus, this view leads to the horns of a dilemma: If the effect *has a cause*, it cannot be said that it is

¹ Vide S.J., 1.1.1, pp. 43-44, No. 94. Here he criticises the Viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda of Rāmānuja. And vide S.J., 1.1.1, pp. 36-37, 42, No. 94, where he criticises the Atyanta-bheda-vāda of Madhva. Vide also S.S., p. 34, "Anye Mādhvāḥ prāhuḥ".

² Vide e.g., S.J., 1.1.1, pp. 51, 56; 1.1.2, p. 121, etc. (No. 94).

³ S.J., 1.1.1, pp. 27-28 (No. 94). Also vide 1.1.1, p. 54 (No. 94).

⁴ S.J., 1.1.2, p. 121, No. 94. In defining the *upādānatva* and the *nimittatva* of Brahman, the author quotes verbatim from V.R.M., p. 65. See above under Puruṣottama for explanation.

accidental, but if it *has not a cause*, it cannot be said that it has accident as its *cause*; (6) nor, finally, non-existence (*abhāva*), since non-existence can never give rise to existence, the sky-flower to scent.¹

Like Nimbārka, he points out that the Universe of souls and matter is a *pariṇāma* or actual transformation of Brahman—who in spite of being without parts and all-pervading can have transformation,² and in spite of having transformation remains Himself untransformed.³

Brahman is *satya* or ever-true or eternal, *jñāna* or knowledge and *ananta* or infinite. It is the last characteristic which distinguishes Him from the non-sentient—which is eternal and devoid of knowledge and from the sentient—which is eternal.⁴

Brahman is *sāstra-yoni*, i.e. can be known through Scripture alone, and not through any other source. Thus, He cannot be known through perception, since in spite of the fact that the all-pervading Brahman pervades the sense-organs, these latter fail to grasp and manifest Him, as the tongue fails to see colour, the fire-fly to manifest the sun. Secondly, Brahman cannot be known through inference also, since inference is not an independent source of knowledge, but is based on perception.⁵ It cannot be said that the following inference establishes Brahman:—

Whatever is an effect has a cause, like pots, etc., and whatever is not an effect has not a cause, like time, etc. The great elements like the earth and the rest are effects. Therefore they have a cause (*viz.* Brahman),⁶

since, by this process of inference we can arrive at best only at a particular kind of soul, like potters, etc. Further, the ether is not admitted to be an entity by the logicians and hence it cannot be an effect, and hence the reason cited here “Whatever is an effect” does not apply to the case in hand. Thirdly, Brahman cannot be known through comparison or similarity (*upamāna*), for there is nothing similar to Brahman on the analogy of which He can be known,

¹ S.J., 1.1.2, pp. 95-98, No. 94.

² *Op. cit.*, 1.1.2, pp. 109-110, 116, No. 99. The author repeats the arguments given in V.R.M., pp. 63-64. See above.

³ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.2, p. 116, No. 99. This is a point accepted by all others, Nimbārka and the rest. See above.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.2, p. 122, No. 99.

⁵ That is, we infer that a hill is on fire, when we first see smoke issuing from it, etc.

⁶ Cf. V.K., 1.1.3, pp. 25-26, K.S.S.

possessed as He is of omniscience, omnipotence, etc. If it be urged that not only similarity, but dissimilarity too is a source of knowledge, e.g. we say "The elephant is dissimilar to the camel", etc.—and hence although there may be nothing similar to Brahman, yet we can know Him from His dissimilarity to the sentient and the non-sentient thus: "Brahman is one who is dissimilar to the sentient and the non-sentient"—, then we reply: the knowledge of dissimilarity between objects is based on the knowledge of the dissimilar objects themselves, e.g. we cannot know that an elephant is dissimilar to a camel, unless we first know what an elephant is, and a camel is. Similarly, we cannot know that Brahman is dissimilar to the sentient and the non-sentient, unless we first know what Brahman Himself is,—to do which we must first resort to Scripture. Fourthly, Brahman cannot be known through postulation (*arthāpatti*), since it is but a mode of inference which has already been disposed of. Finally, Brahman cannot be known through non-perception (*anupalabdhī*), since it is included under perception, which has already been disposed of. Hence the conclusion is that Brahman can be known through Scripture alone.¹

(b) *The cit.*

Devācārya points out, exactly like other followers of the sect, that the soul is of the nature of knowledge, etc. He does not elucidate these points, but refers us back to Puruṣottama's "*Vedānta-ratna-māñjūṣā*".²

(c) *The acit.*

Like others, he holds that there are three kinds of the acit : *prākṛta*, *apākṛta* and *kāla*,³ and describes them exactly after Puruṣottama.⁴

(d) *Relation between Brahman, the cit and the acit.*

Devācārya criticises four different schools—viz. *Aupādhika-bhedābheda-vāda*, *Advaita-vāda*,⁵ *Dvaita-vāda* and *Viśiṣṭādvaita*—

¹ S.J., 1.1.3, pp. 126ff., No. 99.

² *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, p. 56, No. 94. See above.

³ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, p. 77, No. 94.

⁴ Except that he does not speak of them in such great detail. Vide S.J., 1.1.1, pp. 77-78, No. 94, for the *prākṛta*; *op. cit.*, p. 84, for the *apākṛta*; and *op. cit.*, pp. 86-87, for *kāla*. Vide *supra*.

⁵ The point of distinction between the *Aupādhika-bhedābheda-vāda* and Pure *Advaita-vāda* is not clear, for both seem to represent the identical doctrine. Of course, Devācārya himself does not use these terms, *Aupādhika-bhedābheda*—

vāda, and establishes the doctrine of Svābhāvika-bhedābheda-vāda.¹

1. According to the first doctrine, Brahman is by nature One,—a pure identity, while the differences are due to beginningless adjuncts, which cease on the rise of the knowledge of identity through texts like “Thou art that”, etc. (Chānd., 6.8.7, etc.). But this view is untenable, for each of the following five possible alternatives leads to absurdities. Thus:—

- (a) It cannot be said that the soul is a portion of Brahman actually cut off from Him by the limiting adjunct, since first, Brahman cannot be cut off thus, and secondly, the soul becomes non-eternal on this view.²
- (b) It cannot be said that the soul is a part of Brahman (not actually cut off from Him but) connected with the atomic upādhi,³ since first, in that case all the faults of the upādhi will pertain to Brahman, and secondly, motion of Brahman being not possible on the motion of the upādhi, there will arise sudden bondage and release on the part of the souls.⁴
- (c) It cannot be said that the soul is Brahman Himself, connected with the limiting adjunct,⁵ for if Brahman becomes the soul in His own nature, there will remain no transcendent Brahman, unconnected with upādhis.
- (d) It cannot be said that the soul, a conscious being and connected with upādhis, is different from and other than Brahman (who is a conscious being, but not connected with upādhis), for if a second reality besides

vāda, etc., but he evidently makes a distinction between the first view (called Aupādhika-bhedābheda-vāda by Sundarabhaṭṭa in S.S., p. 30) and the second view (called Māyā-vāda in S.S., p. 30), while no distinction is discernible between them. Sundarabhaṭṭa (S.S., p. 30) makes Bhāskara the representative of the first view, but it does not represent the doctrine of Bhāskara, but rather the ordinary Advaita theory.

¹ S.J., pp. 30ff., No. 94.

² Cf. V.R.M.,—exactly similar. See above.

³ “Aṇurūpādhisamyukta-Brahma-pradeśa-viśeṣaḥ.” S.J., 1.1.1, p. 31, No. 94.

⁴ Cf. V.R.M.,—exactly similar. See p. 140 of the thesis, *op. cit.*

⁵ “Upādhi-samyuktaṁ Brahma-svarūpaṁ eva jivaḥ.” S.J., 1.1.1, p. 31, No. 94.

Brahman be admitted, the view that all difference is due to upādhis only (and is not real) falls to the ground.

- (e) Finally, it cannot be said that the limiting adjunct itself is the soul, for that will lead to the Cārvāka view which identifies the soul with the body.

2. According to the second doctrine Brahman is pure consciousness, free from all specifications and all differences, *sajātiya*, *vijātiya* or *svagata*,¹ and absolutely non-different from the entire universe of soul and matter. But this view is not tenable, because there are hundreds of scriptural texts which teach the difference between Brahman and the universe.

3. According to the third view, the opposite extreme, there is an absolute difference between Brahman and the universe. According to this view, the so-called *abheda*-texts cannot refer to Brahman, for according to the *abheda*-view, Brahman is absolutely devoid of specifications and qualities and as such cannot be designated by words which indicate always objects possessing particular qualities. Hence the *abheda*-texts designate only the similarity between Brahman and the soul, but the real fact is that Brahman is absolutely different from the sentient and the non-sentient as depicted by *bheda*-texts. But this view too is equally untenable, for the *abheda*-texts cannot be set aside summarily in this fashion.

4. According to the fourth view, the sentient and the non-sentient are the attributes or adjectives of Brahman, and Brahman, thus qualified by the sentient and the non-sentient, is a unity, omniscient and omnipotent. But though the sentient and the non-sentient are attributes of Brahman, they are different from Him, and do not corrupt Him with their own faults and defects. But this view is not tenable for the following reason. The very task of an attribute or an adjective is to differentiate the particular object which possesses that particular attribute from other objects which do not possess it,² e.g. the red colour of a red ball differentiates it from a blue ball and the rest. Now, in the very same manner, if the sentient and the non-sentient be attributes of Brahman, the question at once arises: from whom or

¹ *Sajātiya*-bheda is the difference of a tree from other trees, *vijātiya*-bheda is the difference of a tree from a stone or an animal, while *svagata*-bheda is internal difference, viz. difference of fruits, leaves, branches, etc. in the same tree. Vide *Pañcadaśī*, 2.14, p. 67.

² "Vyavartakatvaṃ tāvad-viśeṣaṇatvam iti sarva-pakṣa-sāmānyam." S.J., 1.1.1, p. 43, No. 94.

from what object do they differentiate Brahman? It cannot be said that they differentiate Brahman from themselves (i.e. the sentient and the non-sentient), for that which differentiates can never be itself the object from which the original object (i.e. the object of which it is an attribute) is differentiated, e.g. it is absurd to say that the red colour of a red ball differentiates the ball from red colour. But nor can it be said that the sentient and the non-sentient differentiate Brahman from any other object, because there are no other objects or realities besides these three: Brahman, the sentient and the non-sentient. Hence the sentient and the non-sentient cannot be attributes of Brahman. Moreover, the Viśiṣṭādvaita view also admits of a svābhāvika bheda between Brahman on the one hand and the sentient and the non-sentient on the other, and between the sentient and the non-sentient themselves. Hence instead of admitting difference-non-difference in this round-about fashion, it is far better and reasonable to admit svābhāvika-bhedābheda all at once.

This criticism of Viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda is an original contribution by Devācārya, not made by any of the previous teachers of the sect (so far known), and brings out the subtle point of distinction between the Viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda and the Svābhāvika-bhedābheda-vāda, which are so very alike in most other points.

Hence, Devācārya continues, the right conclusion is that the sentient and the non-sentient are both different and non-different from Brahman.¹

(e) *Mokṣa*.

Salvation implies attaining the Lord, consequent on being free from Matter. "Attaining" means giving up the sense of puny and selfish egoity—the ideals of "I" and "mine" (sva-mamatva-bhāvanā) and abiding in pure unceasing intuition of the Lord.² Therefore, salvation does not imply the destruction of the real individuality of the soul, but only of its narrow egoity.

The freed soul, too, is under the control of the Lord, like the soul in bondage, but the great difference between the two is that while the soul in bondage is subject to fear, the freed soul is not, for fear arises only from one's separation from the Lord and the freed soul being ever in the presence of the Lord, has no cause to fear anything.³

¹ S.J., 1.1.1, pp. 44-45, No. 94. Here the author follows V.R.M. See above.

² S.J., 1.1.1, pp. 164-165, No. 99.

³ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.21, p. 22, No. 358.

The freed soul is possessed of a non-material body, by means of which it enjoys all sorts of pleasures and worships the Lord.¹

Like others, he holds that there is no such thing as jīvanmukti. The soul is finally released only when it is freed from the body.²

(f) *The sādhanas.*

Dhyāna or meditation is the most direct and immediate (anta-raṅga) cause of salvation. Mere knowledge of scriptural texts is of no avail here. Just as the mere knowledge of a medicine does not cure a patient unless he actually takes it, so the mere dry textual knowledge of Brahman does not free a man from the fetters of the world, unless he actually feels or realises Brahman by meditation. Hence Śravaṇa (or hearing of texts) must lead to manana (or pondering over them), and manana must lead to nididhyāsana (or meditation).³

If it be objected here that meditation is a kind of mental activity, and if salvation be something brought about through it, salvation becomes something produced—an effect and as such non-eternal—then, we reply: Salvation is not something generated by meditation, but the task of meditation is simply that it removes the veil which so long hid the Lord from the soul and enables it to have a direct vision of Him.⁴

Both the substratum and the object of salvation are eternal, being free from four kinds of operation,—viz. origination, modification, attainment and purification. Thus, the substratum of salvation, viz. the soul, has no origin like pots and the rest, no modification like curd and the like, is not something to be obtained, since its own nature is ever-obtained and is not something to be purified, being eternal knowledge. And, that the object, viz. Brahman is beyond all these four kinds of operation, needs no elucidation. Hence salvation too is eternal.⁵

The fact is that when the eternal knowledge of the soul becomes contracted through its connection with the beginningless ajñāna, i.e. matter and karma, it is called “bound”, but when through the grace of the Lord, its connection with matter and karma ceases, and its original knowledge becomes manifest, it is called “freed”. Hence

¹ S.J., 1.1.4, p. 189, No. 99.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 195.

³ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.4, p. 175.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.4, pp. 177-178, No. 99.

⁵ Utpatti, vikāra, prāpti and samskṛti.

S.J., 1.1.4, pp. 181-182, No. 99.

bondage does not imply the destruction of the essential purity of the soul, but only a temporary contraction of its attribute of knowledge.¹

Thus, Devācārya too admits the grace of the Lord to be an essential prerequisite of salvation.²

He also holds that approach to a guru (gurūpasatti) and devotion to him (guru-bhakti) are essential prerequisites of it.

Thus: Gurūpasatti → Śravaṇa → Manana → Nididhyāsana → Bhagavat-prasāda → Sāksātkāra or Mokṣa.

V. Sundarabhaṭṭa.

(1) LIFE AND DATE.

He was the immediate disciple of Devācārya and thirteenth after Nimbārka. We know nothing (so far) of his life and date. But from internal evidence, it can be asserted that he flourished after Bhāskara, Rāmānuja and Madhva.³

(2) WORKS.

He wrote a super-commentary, styled "Dvaitādvaita-siddhānta-setukā", on his guru Devācārya's commentary on the Brahma-sūtras. He also wrote an extensive commentary, styled "Mantrārtharahasya", on "Mantra-rahasya-ṣoḍaśī" of Nimbārka. The first work, viz. Siddhānta-setukā, has not yet been found as a whole, but only up to the Catuḥ-sūtrī.

(3) DOCTRINE.

His doctrine is exactly similar to that of Puruṣottama and Devācārya. In many places, specially while criticising the Advaita view, he quotes Puruṣottama verbatim.⁴

¹ S.J., 1.1.4, pp. 182-183, No. 99.

² *Op. cit.* Vide also S.J., p. 3, No. 94.

³ Vide S.S., pp. 30, 34 and 42, No. 94. See above.

⁴ Vide S.S., 1.1.1, pp. 3ff., No. 94. Thus the following are some of the examples where he quotes from V.R.M. verbatim:—

- (a) The distinction between the two kinds of virāgas, sahetuka and nirhetuka, p. 21, V.R.M., pp. 141-42. See above.
- (b) The distinction between the different kinds of duḥkhas, p. 23, V.R.M., p. 144.
- (c) The distinction between svatantra and paratantra sattvās, p. 48, V.R.M., pp. 89-90. See above.

(4) THE SĀDHANA "GURŪPASATTI".

In his "Mantrārtha-rahasya", Sundarabhaṭṭa gives a most elaborate and detailed account of the method and procedure involved in the sādhanā "Gurūpasatti"—which is really an original contribution to the sect, furnishing a guide to those who want to resort to this means.

(i) *Mokṣa or the end.*

Mokṣa involves two factors, viz.: (1) freedom from the fetters of the world and (2) attaining the nature of Brahman.¹

(1) The first means freedom from the beginningless avidyā (or karma), which is due to the connection of the soul with prakṛti or matter and consists in a narrow sense of "I" and "mine".²

(2) The second means abiding in a constant intuition of the Lord, consequent on a direct vision of the Lord, due to his grace.³

Thus: Freedom from egoity→direct vision of the Lord→abiding in eternal intuition of the Lord.

(ii) *Gurūpasatti or the means.*A. *Its general nature.*

Gurūpasatti—which is a direct means to salvation—means renouncing or offering one's own self (ātma-nyāsa), i.e. of one's narrow

(d) Arguments how the soul can be both knowledge and the substratum of knowledge, pp. 60-61. V.R.M., pp. 4-5. See above.

(e) Criticism of Pratibimba-vāda, pp. 61-62. V.R.M., pp. 5-6. See above.

(f) Criticism of Avaccheda-vāda, pp. 62-63. V.R.M., pp. 6-7. See above.

(g) Criticism of the view that the "I" does not pertain to the essence of the self, but is something unreal, pp. 63-64. V.R.M., pp. 7-8. See above.

(h) Arguments that the soul is a kartā, pp. 66-67. V.R.M., pp. 11-12. See above.

(i) Arguments that the soul is Aṇu, pp. 69-72. V.R.M., pp. 16-17. See above.

(j) Criticism of Adhyāsa-vāda, pp. 78-80. V.R.M., pp. 66-67. See above.

¹ M.R., p. 28.

² *Op. cit.* Vide also p. 18 where it is said that the two syllables "mine" (mama) mean death and bondage, while the three syllables "not mine" (na mama) mean eternity and salvation.

³ M.R., pp. 30-31.

individuality, together with whatever belongs to one's self (*ātmiya*) to the Lord, *through the guru*.¹ This may be made clear by the following two examples:—

Just as in a sacrifice, clarified butter (*haviṣ*) is poured into the fire (*agni*) by means of a ladle (*sruva*), so the soul is to throw itself into the Lord through the preceptor. Here the clarified butter stands for the soul, the fire for the Lord, and the preceptor for the ladle. Just as the clarified butter, when poured into the fire, is burnt off completely, so the narrow egoity (or *karmas*) of the soul disappear completely when it gives itself up to the Lord. Secondly, just as the clarified butter cannot be poured into the fire all at once, but has to be poured into the ladle first and *then* into the fire, so the soul is to dedicate itself first to the preceptor, and *through him* to the Lord. Thirdly, just as the fire alone can consume the clarified butter, and nothing else, so the Lord alone can burn off the *karmas* of the soul and none else.²

Or, to take another illustration: Just as a fond father at first ignores the faults of his son and lets him keep the object which he has stolen from him, but after a time sends an intermediary, a mutual friend, to his son to bring him (son) back, so the Lord at first overlooks the faults of the soul which has stolen itself (*ātman*), His property, from Him, and lets it enjoy the world, but after a time sends a preceptor to it to bring it back to Him. And just as in exchange for the few stolen objects, the son becomes heir to the whole property of his father, so exactly the soul in exchange for its narrow and puny egoity comes to attain the nature and qualities of the Lord.³

This essential truth that the soul is to offer itself to Brahman through the guru is contained in the *praṇava*-mantra "Om" and the *bija*-mantra "*klīm*".⁴

Gurūpasatti is the best of all the *sādhana*s, involving, as it does, every other means,—work, knowledge and devotion. Thus, obeying the commands of the preceptor is following the path of action (*karma*-

¹ M.R., pp. 14-15.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 14-17.

Here: *Haviṣ*→*Sruva*→*Agni*.

Jīva→*Guru*→*Bhagavat*.

³ M.R., pp. 18-25.

Here: *Putra*→*Madhyastha*→*Pitr*.

Jīva→*Guru*→*Bhagavat*.

⁴ M.R., pp. 9-10. See above.

yoga); knowing one's self as having the guru for his essence (tad-ātmaka) is following the path of knowledge (jñāna-yoga); and being devoted to the guru is following the path of devotion (bhakti-yoga).¹

Gurūpasatti, further, involves the eight-fold yogas (aṣṭāṅga-yoga) which are regarded as means to a direct vision of the Lord, viz.: yama, or forbearance, niyama or religious observance, āsana or posture, prāṇāyāma or regulation of breath, pratyāhāra or restraint of the senses, dhyāna or contemplation, dhāraṇā or steadying of the mind and samādhi or profound meditation. Thus:—

- (a) The soul's distaste for its narrow individuality (ātman) and what belongs to itself (ātmiya) is yama.
- (b) Intense love for the Lord and the preceptor is niyama.
- (c) The steadfast idea that all things, sentient or non-sentient, belong to the Lord, accompanied by a complete indifference to them is āsana.
- (d) Assigning the different modes of the vital-breath (prāṇa, apāna, etc.) to the Lord, is prāṇāyāma.
- (e) Directing the mind to the Lord alone is pratyāhāra.
- (f) The uninterrupted intuition, viz. "Brahman is my self or essence" is dhyāna.
- (g) The steadfastness of the above belief is dhāraṇā.
- (h) The continuous and uninterrupted meditation of the Lord is samādhi.²

Thus, as every sādhana is included under this sādhana, the latter does not wait for any other sādhana, but by itself leads to salvation straight. Here Sundarabhaṭṭa holds the same view as Puruṣottama.³

B. Qualifications of the guru and the śiṣya.

It is evident that any and every one is not fit to be a guru or preceptor, since the preceptor is entrusted with a great task—that of leading the erring and strayed off soul back to its proper resort, viz. the Lord. The preceptor thus must belong to one or other of the upper three classes; be versed in the Vedas; devoted to the Lord; devoted to the Sacred Mantra; devoted to his guru; engaged in the proper performances of the nitya and the naimittika karmas, as well

¹ M.R., p. 26.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 26-27.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 27-28. See above.

as in the constant worship of the Lord; impartial, pure and free from malice; and an abode of kindness, parental love, forgiveness, honesty, tenderness, etc.

A man who wants salvation should resort to a preceptor who is endowed with the above qualifications, and not to any one else, for just as one cannot cross the ocean and reach the shore in a holed boat, so one cannot cross the ocean of life and attain salvation through a preceptor who is not worthy and learned.¹

On the other hand any and every one cannot be a śiṣya or disciple. First and foremost, the disciple must be devoted to his preceptor heart and soul. He must regard his very self and everything he possesses,—his body and mind, wealth and youth, merit and demerits, relatives and friends, as but instruments for serving his preceptor. He must regard the preceptor as his all in all²; be wholly indifferent to his own self and to whatever belongs to his self and renounce them to his preceptor; have complete faith in the words of the preceptor and Scripture; have right discrimination of what is permanent and what is not and what belongs to himself and what not. That is, he must realise that his own self and what belongs to himself really belong to the Lord and must be returned to Him as soon as possible, through the preceptor.³ Further, he must be honest and truthful; must not resort to any other means except self-surrender to the Lord and to the preceptor; be humble and not over-confident, i.e. must not think himself capable of resorting to other sādhanas without the help of the preceptor and so on.⁴

The preceptor should instruct only such a disciple and none else.⁵

C. *Successive stages of Gurūpasatti.*

The sādhana Gurūpasatti involves the following successive stages⁶:—

1. First, a man who desires for salvation approaches a preceptor,—who is endowed with the stated qualities,—with fuel in hand, lies prostrate before him and prays for his emancipation. He chooses him as his only saviour from mundane existence, from three kinds of pain (viz. physical, mental and elemental), six kinds of changes (birth,

¹ M.R., p. 48.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 57-58.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 15.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 49-50.

⁵ The guru must teach the "most intimate" disciple alone. See below.

⁶ M.R., pp. 51ff.

growth, etc.), five kinds of miseries (ignorance, etc.)¹ and the three *gunas* of *prakṛti* (*sattva*, etc.), as his sole master, father, husband and friend, asking him to make his own self and whatever belongs to him as his (i.e. the preceptor's) own.² This is the process of choosing the saviour or preceptor by the disciple.³

2. Prayed thus the preceptor then proceeds to examine the fitness of the candidate, allowing him to stay with him as a probationer for a whole year, or for six months, or two months—or at least for one month, as the case may require.

3. When the preceptor is satisfied of the candidate's fitness, he brings him before him, takes hold of his (the candidate's) hand, places them on his (the guru's) own feet and asks the candidate thrice whether he is really willing to give up the world and become his servant. Each time the candidate answers in the affirmative. Then the preceptor accepts the candidate finally as his servant, son, wife and friend, makes him his own and assures him that he has become his Saviour. This is the process of accepting and making the disciple his (the preceptor's) own.⁴

4. Then, reciting suitable mantras, the preceptor puts the caste-mark or the *tilaka* on the disciple's forehead with his own hands.

5. After that, with the utterance of prescribed formulae, the preceptor stamps the marks of Viṣṇu's conch-shell and disc on the two arms of the disciple.

6. Now the preceptor once more consecrates the body and the soul of the disciple by reciting the name and the holy mantra of the Lord.

7. After that, he puts the disciple's right arm around his (the preceptor's) own neck and teaches him the succession of the spiritual teachers of the sect.⁵ Thenceforward, the disciple is to be known as belonging to that sect of teachers.

8. Next, the preceptor proceeds to inaugurate the disciple to supreme lordship with the words: "You are a king. The lap of your preceptor is your throne, his right hand is your royal umbrella, his left hand is your royal fan, the knowledge that you gain through worshipping him is your army, association with the Lord is your capital, attaining the Lord is your victory, the destruction of desires

¹ *Tāpa*, *vikāra*, *kleśa*.

² *Gopīrtva-varaṇa-vidhi*.

³ *Guru-paramparā*.

⁴ *Ātmasātkaraṇa*.

⁵ *Ātmasāt-karaṇa-vidhi*.

and the connection with matter is your universal conquest". Then the preceptor blesses the disciple, assuring him that he will teach him the knowledge of Brahman. This is the process of inaugurating to the kingdom of the Lord.¹

9. Next, the preceptor, after uttering auspicious mantras, whispers the Sacred Mantra of the sect in the right ear of the disciple and recites the "Mantra-rahasya-ṣoḍaśī" (composed by Nimbārka) to him.

10. Then the disciple comes down from the lap of the preceptor and makes obeisance to him by lying prostrate before him. The preceptor now places water in the disciple's palms, puts the Sacred Stone (śālagrāma) before him, repeats the disciple's resolution to renounce his own self and what belongs to him, as well as makes the disciple repeat it himself. Then, the preceptor takes the right hand of the disciple in his own hand and prays to the Lord to accept the disciple and make him His own (ātmasāt) through His infinite mercy and grace. Afterwards the preceptor makes the disciple take up the Sacred Stone in his hand and thereby makes the Lord accept the disciple and make him His own. The preceptor next makes the disciple eat some food first tasted by himself (by the preceptor) and drink some water touched by his (the preceptor's) feet,² embraces him and says to him thrice that he (the disciple) is now made his own (ātmasāt-kṛta) entirely, so he must serve his preceptor as a servant, son, wife and friend. Thrice the disciple consents to do so. The preceptor now proceeds to teach the disciple as befits his intelligence, place and time.

11. Next the preceptor worships the Sacred Stone as fitting, places It over the head of the disciple, commanding him to love and serve It as a servant serves his Master, a son his Father and so on; teaches him how to worship It, making him repeat the method lest he should forget and finally delivers the Sacred Stone to him.

12. Lastly, the disciple makes obeisance to the preceptor thrice by lying flat before him, accepts the Sacred Mantra and the Sacred Stone from him as eagerly as a penniless beggar accepts riches and offers remuneration to his preceptor as proper and enjoined.³ Henceforward, the disciple must daily perform a three-fold worship, viz. the worship of the Sacred Mantra, that of the preceptor (who has imparted it to him) and that of the Lord (who is its object) and these

¹ Svārājyābhiṣeka.

² Prasāda and pādodaka.

³ M.R., p. 63.

three kinds of worship are really identical. The worship of the Mantra consists in reciting it, every word distinctly and understanding its meaning, the worship of the preceptor has been already indicated and the worship of the Lord consists in five duties.¹

The Brahma-vidyā or the Sacred Mantra is to be imparted by the preceptor only to his most intimate and trusted disciple, who is the well-beloved of the Lord and to none else. There are four kinds of disciples, viz. an ordinary disciple (śiṣyamātra), an intimate disciple (antarāṅga), a more intimate disciple (antarāṅgatara) and a most intimate disciple (antarāṅgatama). It is only this last one who is entitled to the Sacred Mantra.²

The disciple, on his part, must learn the Mantra from his preceptor *directly* and from no one else, e.g. not from another favoured disciple who has learnt it directly from the preceptor himself.³ If, however, the preceptor is in a far-off country, or dead, one wishing to know should approach a learned person who has been taught the knowledge directly by the preceptor and learn what he desires from him.⁴

VI. Keśavakāśmiribhaṭṭa.

(1) LIFE AND DATE.

Keśavakāśmiribhaṭṭa was the twenty-ninth pontifical head after Nimbārka. He was the immediate disciple of Gāṅgalabhaṭṭa.⁵ In his Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā, however, he makes obeisance, not to Gāṅgalabhaṭṭa, but to Mukunda as his guru.⁶ Perhaps, he had two gurus, or else they were identical. He is supposed to have flourished in the 14th century A.D.⁷ But in conformity with our view that Nimbārka did not flourish before the 13th century A.D., we are led to think that he must have flourished later.⁸

Tradition is that he thrice conquered all learned men of his time. Hence the epithet "dig-vijayī" is often prefixed before his name.⁹

¹ M.R., p. 66. The five duties are: abhigamana, upādāna, ijjā, yoga, svādhyaya. See below under the ritualistic doctrine of Nimbārka.

² M.R., p. 6.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 67-68

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 68-69.

⁵ Maṅgala-pāṭha in T.P., verse 5, pp. 1-2.

⁶ Maṅgala-pāṭha in V.K.P., and colophons therein. See under Mādhava Mukunda below.

⁷ Preface to T.P., p. 1.

⁸ See above.

⁹ Vide, e.g., colophon to V.K.P., p. 73, etc.

He got the epithet "kāśmīrī", so the tradition goes, after he had vanquished the Śaivas of Kāśmīra and lived there for some time.¹

From his works it is evident that he was a great logician, an adept in the art of very subtle and hair-splitting reasoning.

(2) WORKS.

He composed an elaborate commentary on the Brahma-sūtras, styled "Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā", in elucidation of Śrīnivāsa's "Vedānta-kaustubha". He wrote a commentary on the Bhagavad-gītā, too, styled "Tattva-prakāśikā", and further composed an elaborate treatise on ritual styled "Krama-dīpikā". Besides these, we know of certain stotras or hymns by him, viz. "Śrī-govinda-saraṇa-gati-stotram"²—a collection of twelve hymns in praise of the Lord, Whom he describes as Govinda, Gopāla, Gopīnātha, etc., and "Yamunā-stotram",³ a collection of twenty-one stotras or hymns in praise of the river Yamunā, the banks of which were the scene of Kṛṣṇa's sports with the Gopīs.

Other works by him, preserved in manuscript forms, are "Tattva-prakāśikā", a commentary on Veda-stuti, a part of the Bhāgavata-purāṇa, tenth skandha,⁴ "Brahmopaniṣat-ṭīkā",⁵ and "Viṣṇu-sahasra-nāma-ṭīkā".⁶

He composed a commentary on the Taittiriya-upaniṣad, called "Taittiriya-prakāśikā",⁷ not yet found. It is alleged that he wrote

¹ His first conquest consisted in vanquishing Vidyādhara-cārya, the head of the Śaiva sect in Kāśmīra. After vanquishing Vidyādhara-cārya, Keśava deputed him to preach the Vaiṣṇava religion in Kāśmīra. Formerly Keśava was called "Keśavabhāratī", but after his conquest, he lived in Kāśmīra for a time and thenceforward came to be known as "Keśavakāśmīribhaṭṭa". His second conquest consisted in driving away the Yavanas from Mathurā. After his second conquest, Keśavakāśmīrin set out on his third conquest, vanquishing the Śākta sect in Bengal, defeated all learned men in Navadvīpa and himself settled in Kāśmīra.

According to the Caitanya-caritāmṛta of Kṛṣṇadāsa, chap. XVI, 28-108, one Keśava Kāśmīrī was defeated by Nimāi Paṇḍita, later on universally known as Śrīcaitanya. It is, however, not definitely known whether these two Keśava Kāśmīrīs are identical.

² Given in S.R., pp. 70-71.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 73-76.

⁴ Cat. Cat., p. 127, Part 1; Oudh MSS., 1878, p. 42.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 28, Part 3.

⁶ *Op. cit.* Vide also the preface to T.P., pp. 3-4.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 127, Part 1.

commentaries on twelve Upaniṣads as well, and many Bhāgavata-stotras.¹

(3) DOCTRINE.

He accepts the usual doctrines of the sect—the trinity of reals—and a relation of svābhāvika-bhedābheda between them. His chief merit consists in his elaborate and scholarly criticism of the Advaita-vāda. Often he refers to Sundarabhaṭṭa² and to “previous teachers” who have criticised the Advaita view.³ We shall notice below some original and striking ones of such criticisms.

CRITICISM OF THE ADVAITAVĀDA.

(i) *Criticism of the Advaita views of Brahman.*

A. *Criticism of Nirviśeṣa-vāda.*

Brahman cannot be absolutely devoid of all qualities and specifications. In the first place, such a Brahman cannot be an object of enquiry by Scripture. According to the Advaita view three alternatives are possible here—viz. the object of enquiry is either the pure Brahman, or Brahman as limited by māyā, or Īśvara, superimposed through ajñāna. Now, the first alternative is not possible, because according to the Advaitins, the pure Brahman is not an object (aviśaya), otherwise we might argue very well: The pure Brahman is mithyā, because it is an object of enquiry, like pots and the rest. The second alternative, too, is not possible, because in that case we shall attain a knowledge of the māyā-limited Brahman alone and not of the pure and real Brahman, and hence no salvation will follow. The third alternative, too, is not possible, because it is this very adhyāsa (or false superimposition) which, according to the Advaitins, is set aside by Scripture. Hence the Brahman of the Advaitins cannot be an object established by Scripture, i.e. must be wholly unacceptable.⁴

In the second place, the Brahman of the Advaitins cannot be the creator of the world. Here too three alternatives are possible—viz. the creator of the world is pure or śuddha Brahman, i.e. pure con-

¹ Preface to T.P., pp. 3-4.

² Vide, e.g., V.K.P., 1.1.1, p. 29; 2.1.16, p. 430; 4.4.7, p. 1322. That he had a great reverence for Sundarabhaṭṭa is evident from the fact that he makes obeisance to him in the Maṅgala-pāṭha, V.K.P., verse 4, p. 19.

³ Vide, e.g., V.K.P., 1.1.1, p. 30; 2.1.14, p. 405, etc.

⁴ V.K.P., 1.1.1, pp. 22-23.

sciousness; or māyā-limited or upahita Brahman; māyā-superimposed or adhyasta Brahman. Now the first alternative is not possible, because one who is devoid of all distinctions cannot possibly think and resolve to be many, as the creator of the world does in the beginning according to Scripture.¹ In fact, an object, free from all distinction, being beyond every proof, is but a non-entity.² The second alternative, too, is not possible. Here the question is whether the māyā-limited creator is of the form of the object reflected (bimbarūpa) or of the form of the reflection (pratibimbarūpa). Not the first, for in that case just as the face reflected on a mirror is outside the mirror and does not pervade it, so Brahman will be outside the individual soul and non-pervasive of it, and thereby cease to be the inner controller of all. Not the second, because in that case, since the qualities of the upādhi belong to the reflection (e.g. when the mirror—which is the upādhi—is dirty, any reflection on it is also so, and so on)—Brahman must be subject to all the faults, etc. due to avidyā (which is the upādhi here). The third alternative, too, is not possible, because the superimposition of avidyā on Brahman—which is by nature knowledge, is absurd, just as it is absurd to hold there is darkness in the sun.³

The Advaitins themselves describe Brahman as truth, knowledge and bliss. Now, they must either hold that these constitute the nature of Brahman, or the attributes of Brahman. Now if these be the nature of Brahman, then Brahman will have a three-fold nature, which will go against the Advaita view itself, and if these be the qualities of Brahman, that too will go against the Advaita view. Moreover, if it be said that they denote the nature of Brahman, then Brahman becomes an object (viṣaya) of words,—which is against the Advaita view. If it be said Brahman cannot be denoted by words, then Brahman becomes anirvacanīya and as such mithyā in accordance with the inferences: Brahman is mithyā, because it is anirvacanīya, for whatever is anirvacanīya, is mithyā, like māyā. Brahman is mithyā, because it is asat, for whatever is asat is mithyā, like the snake-rope.⁴ Hence Nirguṇa-vāda and nirviśeṣa-vāda are full of self-contradiction and as such absolutely untenable.

¹ Vide Chānd., 6.2.2.

² See above.

³ V.K.P., 1.1.2, p. 48. See below under Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava for further criticisms on this point.

⁴ V.K.P., 1.1.2, pp. 49-50.

(ii) *Criticism of the Advaita view of the jīva.*A. *Criticism of Pratibimba-vāda.*

The individual soul cannot be a reflection of Brahman, because Brahman being formless and colourless, can have no reflection.¹ Further, the connection of the individual soul with the upādhi or the limiting adjunct (viz. avidyā on which Brahman is reflected), can neither be natural or svābhāvika, since that will make salvation impossible—nor be due to upādhi or aupādhi, since that will lead to an infinite regress, for an upādhi will require another upādhi to be connected with the soul, that still another and so on. Further, we find in ordinary experience that the object reflected (bimba) and on which it is reflected (upādhi) belong to the same category. For example, the real sun is reflected on real water only, but never on the mirage. Hence Brahman and avidyā must belong to the same category, i.e. avidyā must be as real as Brahman. Also, an object can be reflected on something else, only when it is outside that something else. For example, an aquatic animal, plunged in a river, can never be reflected on the river. But avidyā is not admitted to be outside Brahman, who is all-pervading and hence there can be no reflection of Brahman on avidyā.²

B. *Criticism of Avaccheda-vāda or Upādhi-vāda.*

It is absurd to say that Brahman, who is by nature eternal and infinite knowledge, an abode of bliss and power, can ever come to be connected with avidyā and upādhi. Now, the upādhi must be either all-pervading, or atomic or of the middle size (i.e. of the size of the body). But it cannot be all-pervasive, because in that case, the entire Brahman will be veiled up. Nor can it be atomic, for then there being no motion of the all-pervading Brahman on the motion of the upādhi, there will result sudden bondage and release.³ Nor can it, finally, be of the middle size, for that will go against the Advaita view that the individual soul is atomic owing to its connection with an atomic upādhi. Moreover, if the upādhi be real, then the doctrine of Non-dualism will fall to the ground—there being at least two

¹ Cf. V.R.M. See above.

² V.K.P., I.I.I, p. 28. See below under Puruṣottamaprasāda for further criticisms.

³ Cf. V.R.M. See above.

realities—Brahman and upādhi, and also no salvation will be possible, since knowledge cannot set at naught what is real. If, on the other hand, the upādhi be unreal, then to say that the upādhi binds the soul would be just as absurd as to say that a dream-fetter binds a man who is awake.¹

C. Criticism of Eka-jīva-vāda.

If there be only one individual soul, then evidently, there will be an unwarrantable intermixture of the respective experiences of different individuals. It cannot be said that though there is no real difference between different individuals, yet there is the difference which is due to upādhis and as such there is no intermixture of experiences,—for, we point out that the difference, which is due to upādhis only, does not guarantee non-intermixture, for in spite of the differences of hands, feet, etc. (which are due to upādhi), the sensations in hands or feet, etc. are alike felt by the soul.²

D. Criticism of Akartṛtva-vāda.

The view that the soul is not really a kartā or an active agent, but only appears to be so through the false superimposition or adhyāsa of the kartṛtva of the antaḥkāraṇa on the soul, just as white crystal appears to be red through the superimposition of the redness of a red flower—is not tenable. In the case of the crystal and red flower, redness is perceived separately in the crystal and in the flower: 'The crystal is red'. 'The flower is red.' But in the case in hand we never have perceptions to the effect 'The mind is a kartā', 'The soul is a kartā' separately, but we always feel 'I am kartā' (and not my mind).³

(iii) *Criticism of the Advaita view of the jagat.*

A. Criticism of Vivarta-vāda.

To say that the world is but an illusory transformation of Brahman and not a real one is absurd. The Advaitins too admit Brahman to be the efficient and the material cause of the world. But if the world be false, then Brahman cannot be its efficient cause, for nobody can be the creator of what is false, e.g. nobody—neither the mistaken person himself nor others—can ever create a nacre-silver. It cannot

¹ V.K.P., 1.2.6, pp. 102-103.

² *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, p. 24.

³ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.32, pp. 675ff.

be said that Brahman is the creator here in the sense as a magician is,—for the latter shows tricks to delude an audience, but there is none whom Brahman can delude by creating a false world.

Again, Brahman, the real, cannot be the material cause of the unreal world, for the cause and the effect must be of the same nature. If it be said that Brahman is the material cause in the sense of being the substratum of error,¹ then we point out that this definition is both too narrow, since clay, etc. which are not substrata of error are still the material causes of pots, etc., and too wide, since the nacre, e.g. which is the substratum of the silver-nacre illusion, is not the material cause of the illusory silver. If it be said that the world is the vivarta or illusory transformation of Brahman and the paripāma or real transformation of ajñāna, and hence not Brahman alone, but Brahman and ajñāna both are the material cause of the world,—then we reply: if a real object assumes the form of an unreal something, then it must have certain specific features which enables it to appear in that unreal form, e.g. any and every object does not appear to be a piece of silver, but only nacre, which possesses certain features (lustre, etc.) which appears in the form of silver to the unwary. But Brahman,—which according to the Advaitins is absolutely devoid of attributes, etc.,—can have no such qualities of appearing as the false world. If it be said that the material cause of an object is that which is not seen to be separate from the object itself, then we point out that in that case, Brahman (which according to the Advaitins is not separate from the individual soul) becomes the material cause of the individual soul and the individual soul as a result becomes real; the milk becomes the material cause of water, because it is never separated from water; and the calf becomes the material cause of “cowness”, because it is never separated from “cowness”. If it be said that māyā is the material cause, Īśvara the instrumental cause, and the pure Brahman the substratum or the adhiṣṭhāna, then we point out that this goes against the view that the material cause and the efficient cause of the universe are identical. The fact is that to say that Brahman is the substratum of the cosmic illusion is to give up practically the doctrine that Brahman is the material cause of the world, as held by the Advaitins themselves,—for the nacre, the substratum of the silver-nacre illusion, is never the material cause of the illusory silver. Thus, the Advaita view is full of self-contradictions, and fails to prove how

¹ Bhramādhiṣṭhāna.

Brahman can be the material and efficient cause of an illusory world, although it holds Brahman to be such.¹

Moreover, as already hinted above, a substratum of an illusion must possess certain qualities. A nacre e.g. must have certain qualities in common with the silver, such as lustre, etc.—which bring about the illusion. And it must also have certain qualities of its own, as distinct from those of the silver, which when known bring about the end of the illusion. But the attributeless Brahman of the Advaitins can have no such qualities, and hence cannot be the substratum of the cosmic illusion. Hence no substratum of superimposition being possible, the superimposition itself is not possible and hence the world cannot be a vivarta or illusory superimposition of Brahman.²

Further to say that the world is neither real—for then it could not have been set aside by knowledge,—nor unreal—for then it could not have been perceived,—but is anirvacanīya and mithyā, does not stand to reason. For in the first place no definition and no proof of mithyātva and anirvacanīyatva are possible.³ Further, it is not a fact that it is an unreal thing only which can be set aside; e.g. the real anterior ignorance⁴ regarding an object by the knowledge of that object; the real knowledge of a pot by that of a piece of cloth; real past impressions by recognition; real affection, etc. for a person by his faults; the real sin of murdering a Brāhmaṇa by a visit to the Setubandha,⁵ etc.

Moreover, it is found in the world that the denial of an object and the object denied (nivarttīya) belong to the same category, and hence ajñāna, too, must be real like the denial of ajñāna; knowledge and the object known, the doṣa and the adhiṣṭhāna belong to the same category, and hence ajñāna, too, must be real like Brahman.⁶

According to the Advaitins, the world is false, but the question arises here—whether this falsity itself is false or not. If it be false, then evidently the world becomes real, if it is not false, then the doctrine of Non-dualism falls to the ground—there being at least two realities—Brahman and falsity.⁷

¹ V.K.P., 1.4.23, pp. 350ff. See below under Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava for further criticisms.

² V.K.P., 1.1.1, p. 30.

³ Here the author refers back to “former teachers”, p. 405. But he himself also elaborately discusses the definition, etc. of mithyātva on pp. 412ff. For these, see below under Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava.

⁴ Prāgabdhāva.

⁵ V.K.P., 2.1.14, pp. 405ff.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 407.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 412; 2.1.19, p. 446.

It may be urged that the notion of difference is not a logical category and does not stand to reason. Is it the very nature of a thing, or its attribute? It cannot be the nature of a thing, for in that case it becomes the synonym for that thing (which evidently it is not), just as the word "hasta" is a synonym of the word "kara". It cannot be also the attribute of a thing, for in that case, it must be different from the nature of the thing, that difference again must be different and so on to infinity. Moreover—there can be the apprehension of different objects only on the apprehension of the difference between them, and the apprehension of difference only on the apprehension of different objects,—this will lead to the logical fallacy of mutual dependence.¹

To this we reply that the same difficulties confront the notion of non-difference too. Thus, is non-difference the nature of an object or its attribute? It cannot be the nature of an object, because in that case such perceptions as "This is a pot", "This is a piece of cloth" (instead of "This is non-different") come to be false. Also, if every perception had pure, non-differenced consciousness as its object, then a mere perception of a pot would have brought about the knowledge of identity (non-difference being the very nature of the pot must be perceived when the pot is perceived), and in that case, the Vedānta-discussions would be futile. Nor can non-difference be the quality of an object,—for that too will lead to the same difficulties as above,—to dualism and self-contradiction. The fact is that like class, non-difference is a special quality of an object, and is apprehended as soon as the object itself is.²

Thus, the Advaita view is wholly untenable.

(iv) *Criticism of the Advaita view of mokṣa.*

A. *General criticism.*

The Advaita view that the one Īśvara is reflected on many limiting adjuncts or internal organs, just as the one face is reflected on many mirrors around it, and that when the limiting adjunct is no more, the individual soul becomes Īśvara, just as when a mirror is broken or removed, the face reflected on it is no more, is not tenable.

¹ That is, to know a cow, we must know it to be different from a horse, etc., all perception being assimilation and discrimination, yet to know the difference of the cow from the horse, we must know the cow first.

² V.K.P., 2.3.42, pp. 302-3. Cf. Śrī. B., 1.1.1.

Here two alternatives are possible: either the individual soul becomes Īśvara in nature or comes to possess Īśvara's attributes like omniscience and the rest. On the first alternative, the question is whether becoming Īśvara in nature means becoming non-separate from it (without losing one's individuality), or losing one's own nature. If the first, then there is nothing to object, this being our own view,—but it will go against the Advaita view itself. If the second, then mukti will imply the very destruction of the nature of the soul, while the fact is that Scripture explicitly states that the freed soul is manifested in its own form.¹ Further, the question is whether Īśvara, the object reflected, and the soul, the reflection, are real entities, or mithyā and anirvacanīya or tuccha like the hare's horn. They cannot evidently be real entities, for that will be giving up the Advaita view; nor can they be mithyā, etc., for then the very question of bondage and release will be meaningless, seeing that the non-differenced Reality is never subject to bondage and the bound soul is but an unreality. For that very reason, they cannot be tuccha.

On the second alternative also the question is—Do the souls come to possess qualities *similar* to omniscience, etc., i.e. become *similar* to Īśvara, or do they come to possess those very qualities, i.e. become equal to Īśvara? The first goes against the Advaita view itself, and the second is impossible and has no proof, and will lead to the view that there are many Īśvaras.²

B. Criticism of Jīvan-mukti-vāda.

The rule is that on the destruction of the cause, the effect must be invariably destroyed, e.g. when the threads are destroyed, the cloth is also destroyed simultaneously. But the Advaita view is that even when the pure and intuitive knowledge of Brahman arises, the works which have already begun to bear fruit continue to function, i.e. in spite of the destruction of avidyā (which is the cause), by knowledge, the mundane existence (which is the effect) continues. The question is whether knowledge destroys avidyā or not. If it does not, then it will lose its essential nature, the very nature of knowledge being to remove ignorance, and no salvation will ever be possible; and if it does, there can be no jīvan-mukti. It cannot be said that just as the strong smell of garlic persists, even when the garlic-pot

¹ Vide Chānd., 8.3.4. "Svena rūpeṇ abhiniṣpadyate."

² V.K.P., 4.4.7, pp. 1322ff.

has been thoroughly washed, so even when avidyā is destroyed by vidyā, the impressions or saṃskāras of avidyā still persist and cause the continuance of mundane existence,—for this too is open to the same objection as before. None but a fool will say that when the sun arises there can still be some trace of darkness. In the very same manner, there cannot be even the faintest trace of avidyā when vidyā arises. Nor can it be said that the jīvan-mukta is like a piece of burnt cloth (the texture of which is destroyed, but the shape persists),—for the burnt cloth crumbles off to ashes, at the slightest touch, and serves no practical purposes of covering, etc. as a real piece of cloth does, but a jīvan-mukta acts like any other man, and just as he himself did before. Further, what exactly is this cessation of avidyā or avidyā-nivṛtti which, according to the Advaitins, is salvation? Is it the very nature of the self or something else? If the first, then the self being eternal, the cessation of avidyā too must be so, and in that case knowledge (which has to bring it about) becomes futile. If the second, then the question is: Is it real, or unreal, or both or anirvacanīya? Not the first, for then the doctrine of Non-dualism falls to the ground; nor the second, for then it cannot be set aside by knowledge (what is *not*, cannot be set at naught, only an existent object can be set aside), and in that case knowledge would become futile like a lamp during the day; nor the third, reality and unreality being mutually opposed, a thing cannot be both real and unreal; nor finally, the fourth, for what is anirvacanīya is set aside by knowledge. Thus, we conclude that the Advaita doctrine of Jīvan-mukti does not stand to reason in any way, and to say that an embodied being, still under the control of (prārabdha) karmas and subject, as a consequence, to all the human frailties and passions, is freed, is just as absurd as to call a man born blind “lotus-eyed”, or a street beggar the “lord of the goddess of fortune”.¹

VII. Śrībhṭṭa.

He was the immediate disciple of Keśavakāśmīrin, and the thirtieth teacher after Nimbārka. We know of only one work by him, not of any philosophical interest, viz. “Śrī-Kṛṣṇa-saraṇāpattistotram”,²—a collection of twenty-five hymns in praise of Kṛṣṇa, where he describes the Lord, the Moon of Vṛndāvana, of the clan of

¹ V.K.P., 4.4.7, pp. 1328–1330.

² Given in S.R., pp. 69-70.

Brajas and of the Rādhā-lotus (śloka 2), the Lord of the young cow-herdresses, beautiful like thousand cupids, enjoying sports with Rādhā (śloka 3), the delighter of the world, with eyes like lotus and dark blue in colour (śloka 4), dressed in yellow robes (śloka 5) and playing on the flute (śloka 6), etc.,—as his sole resort.

VIII. Harivyāsadeva.

(1) LIFE AND DATE.

Harivyāsadeva was the immediate disciple of Śrībhaṭṭa and thirty-first after Nimbārka. Nothing is known about his life or date. He was a great Vaiṣṇava and a staunch supporter of the doctrine of non-violence.¹

(2) WORKS.

He wrote a commentary, styled "Siddhānta-kusumāñjali", on Nimbārka's "Daśa-śloki", and a commentary, styled "Prema-bhakti-vivardhinī", on Sadānandabhaṭṭa's "Śrī-Nimbārka-śata-nāma-stotram". Other works by him, preserved in manuscript forms, are "Artha-pañcaka",² and "Vedānta-siddhānta-ratnāñjali".³

(3) DOCTRINE.

Harivyāsadeva's doctrine has much in common with that of Baladeva.⁴ It is probable that he was influenced by the school of Baladeva. In any case, in his doctrine we find many points of departure from the usually accepted tenets of the school of Nimbārka.

Like Baladeva, he admits five categories or tattvas, viz. Īśvara or the Lord; Jīva or the individual soul; Prakṛti or matter; Kāla or time; and Karma or work.⁵ Of these, the first two are sentient,—different from each other by the fact that the former is all-pervasive, while the latter is atomic, and similar to each other by the possession of the eight-fold qualities, freedom from sins, etc.⁶—the last three are

¹ B.M.G., pp. 310-311. The tradition is that he was so very pained at seeing the Goddess Mahāmāyā accept animal-sacrifice, that he induced the Goddess herself to be initiated in the Vaiṣṇava-mantra and to discourage animal-sacrifice among her devotees.

² Rep. Bh., 1894, p. 76. Vide also Rep. Katha., p. 29, where the name given is "Tattvārtha-pañcaka".

³ Rep. Bh., 1894, p. 76.

⁴ For Baladeva's doctrine see below in *loco*.

⁵ Ś.K., pp. 4, 22.

⁶ Vide Chānd., 8.7.1.

non-sentient. Again, the first four are eternal,—without beginning as well as without end, while the last, viz. karma, is without beginning, but has an end.¹

Īśvara is the Controller, while the last four, viz. the soul, etc., are the controlled. Among these latter again, the soul is the enjoyer, matter is the object enjoyed, time is the efficient cause of enjoyment (since the soul enjoys material objects in time).²

It is strange that Harivyāsadeva, though belonging to the school of Nimbārka, does not speak of the *aprākṛta* as the fifth category,³ as done by all the followers of Nimbārka, but substitutes karma in its place exactly after Baladeva.

(a) BRAHMAN.

The Highest Reality or Brahman is, as usual, Lord Kṛṣṇa or Hari. He is called Hari because a mere remembrance of Him is enough to wash off all sins.⁴

The Lord is the abode of all auspicious qualities and free from the qualities of matter. But though the Lord appears to be both the attribute (*guṇa*) and the substratum of attributes (*guṇin*)—i.e. as both knowledge and knower, bliss and blissful, etc.—yet really there is no difference between the substratum, the Lord and His attributes. Similarly, though He appears to have a body, yet there is really no difference between the soul, the Lord (*dehin*) and His body (*deha*). Thus, the Lord is one whole with no differences in Him, identical with His attributes and identical with His body. But although there is no real difference between the Lord and His attributes and between the Lord and His body, yet there is a conventional or natural one (*viśeṣa*). The sense is that statements like “Be-ness exists” (*Satā satī*), “Distinction is difference” (*Bhedo bhinnah*), “Time exists always” (*Kālo sarvadā asti*) are not useless tautologous statements, but they are natural and conventional, conveying a very good sense

¹ Ś.K., p. 2. Cf. Baladeva, below.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 22.

³ In śloka 3 of D.S. Nimbārka speaks of the “*aprākṛta*” which is taken by all, except Harivyāsadeva, to mean “what is not derived from *prakṛti*”, but from a luminous stuff, different from *prakṛti*. Harivyāsadeva takes it to mean the *mūla-prakṛti*, with the attributes of *sattva* and the rest non-manifest, as contrasted from *prakṛti* (“*prākṛta-rūpam*”) with the attributes of *sattva*, etc. manifest. Ś.K., pp. 14-15.

⁴ Ś.K., p. 19. See above.

just like the statements "A jar exists", etc. Here the distinction between "Be-ness" and "existence", "Distinction" and "difference", etc. is due to "viśeṣa" or conventional distinction and not to "bheda" or real distinction. In the very same manner, statements like "Knowledge (Brahman) is knower", etc. are very natural and yield a perfect sense and the difference between the Lord and His attributes, or between the Lord and His body, is a case of convention (viśeṣa) and not of real difference (bheda). Viśeṣa is not bheda, but rather a representative of bheda, so to speak, accomplishing the task of bheda, viz. differentiation, without bringing about real difference.¹

This is a new point, not brought out by the previous writers of the sect, so far known. Here also Harivyāsadeva is in perfect concordance with Baladeva.²

Like Baladeva again, Harivyāsadeva emphasises the inconceivable powers (acintya-śakti) of the Lord. He points out that the Lord, though all-pervading, can yet abide within the heart of men, etc. through His inconceivable powers.³

(b) THE CIT.

(i) *Its nature, etc.*

The soul, he points out like others, is of the nature of knowledge and a knower, an Ego, an active agent, an enjoyer, a slave of the Lord, i.e. ever under His control, eternal, subject to bondage and release, atomic in size, and infinite in number.⁴

Unlike Baladeva, Harivyāsadeva extends his above doctrine of viśeṣa to the case of the soul as well, in order to show that there is no distinction between the soul and its qualities, as in the case of the Lord and His qualities. The distinction between the soul and its qualities is due to conventional difference or viśeṣa and not to real difference or bheda. Hence it is that the soul is both knowledge and a knower.⁵

Like others, he holds that there are broadly two kinds of souls—those in bondage and those that are free—with various sub-divisions.⁶

¹ Ś.K., pp. 9, 20 and 21. "Viśeṣaśa bhedopratidinidhiḥ na bhedah", etc.

² Cf. Baladeva's doctrine of Viśeṣa and his consequent doctrine of the identity of the Lord and His attributes and body. See below.

³ Ś.K., p. 7. Vide Baladeva, below.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 5-8.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 1.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 14. Cf. V.R.M. See above.

(ii) *Criticism of the Advaita doctrine of the jīva.*A. *Criticism of Pratibimba-vāda.*

He criticises the Pratibimba-vāda exactly after Puruṣottama. He points out that the statement that the soul is a reflection of Brahman is to be understood as denoting figuratively that it is dependent on Brahman just as the reflection is dependent on the object reflected.¹

B. *Criticism of Avaccheda-vāda.*

He here follows Devācārya exactly.²

(c) THE ACIT.

(i) *Its nature, etc.*

The acit, as pointed out above, is of three kinds, prakṛti or matter, kāla or time and karma or action.³ He accepts the usual Sāṃkhya theory of creation.⁴

(ii) *Criticism of the Advaita view of the jagat.*A. *Criticism of Adhyāsa-vāda.*

The doctrine that the world of plurality is falsely superimposed on Pure Consciousness or Brahman, just as blue colour is falsely superimposed on the sky and is set aside by knowledge—is not tenable. Nothing can be superimposed on what is not an object of knowledge. The blue colour can be attributed to the sky because the sky is an object of knowledge—but Brahman is never so, according to the Advaitins. Further, what kind of knowledge effects the negation here—pure knowledge (śuddha) or knowledge of particular objects (vṛtti-rūpa)? Not the first, because it being eternal, there will be an eternal negation of adhyāsa, i.e. there will be no cosmic illusion at all. Not the second, because if it be real, then Dualism must be admitted; if it be unreal, then it cannot effect the negation. Moreover, it can by no means be said that the cosmic illusion is due to ajñāna. Does this ajñāna inhere in Brahman or in the individual soul? Brahman, who is pure and eternal consciousness, cannot evidently be the substratum of ajñāna. Nor can the soul be the

¹ Ś.K., pp. 5-6. Cf. V.R.M. See above.

³ Ś.K., p. 221.

² See above.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 144ff.

substratum of ajñāna, since it itself is due to the ajñāna.¹ Further, is ajñāna real or unreal? It cannot be real, for then it cannot be set aside, and it cannot be unreal, because that will contradict such feelings "I am ignorant", etc., which prove the existence of ajñāna. If it be said that ajñāna is neither real nor unreal, then we point out that there is no proof of such an object which is neither real nor unreal. A pot is real, a sky-flower is unreal, but we never know something which is both. Further, on the doctrine of strict dualism, there can be no teacher of that doctrine, for the teacher must either be aware of this truth or not. If he is aware of the truth that everything is Brahman, then evidently he cannot instruct his disciple who is identical with himself, and if he is not aware of this truth, he cannot evidently be a teacher.²

(d) RELATION BETWEEN BRAHMAN, THE CIT AND THE ACIT.

Harivyāsadeva criticises, firstly, the Advaita view, as shown above. Secondly, he criticises also the Viśiṣṭādvaita view, viz. that the sentient and the non-sentient constitute the attributes and the body of the Lord, yet are different from Him, otherwise the defects of the latter will pertain to the former. He points out against this view that there can be no real difference between the Lord and His qualities and body—as shown above—and that it is after all unnecessary to take the sentient and the non-sentient to be the body of the Lord, since everything, being under His control and pervaded by Him, is of the form of Him.³ Thirdly, he criticises the view that the Lord and the sentient and the non-sentient are non-different, yet different. He points out that if there be non-difference between Brahman and the universe, the former will be contaminated by all the faults and defects of the latter, and the latter will be endowed with all the supreme excellences of the former.⁴ He concludes, therefore, that the real fact is that there is an essential difference between them, and takes Nimbārka as the representative of pure Dualism.⁵ This, of course, is a strange assertion on the part

¹ Cf. Śrī. B., 1.1.1. See below under Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava for further details.

² Ś.K., pp. 24ff.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 27ff.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 22ff. "Nimbārkasya śuddham dvaitam evābhimatam", p. 22. Vide also Śānti-pāṭha at the end of Ś.K., p. 39:—

"Brahma satyaṃ jagat satyaṃ satyaṃ bhedaṃ api bruvan.
Nimbārko Bhagavān vidbhiḥ satyavādi nigadyate."

of a follower of Nimbārka, seeing that Nimbārka himself never supported *pure* Dualism, but a doctrine of natural difference-non-difference.¹

This goes to show that Harivyāsadeva was deeply influenced by the Madhva and Caitanya schools of thought, as noted above also.

(e) MOKṢA.

Bondage consists in turning one's face away from the Lord (Bhagavad-bahir-mukha), while release consists in turning one's face towards the Lord (Bhagavat-sanmukha).² So long as the soul is averse to the Lord, it remains connected with matter, i.e. with two kinds of bodies—subtle and gross. The subtle body accompanies the soul from birth to birth, while the gross body is created anew at the beginning of each creation and destroyed again. But when the soul comes to have a real devotion for the Lord, it gets rid of both these kinds of bodies.³

There are two kinds of salvation—*aisvaryyānanda-pradhānā* and *sevānanda-pradhānā*. The former consists in enjoying the lordship, etc. given to the freed by the Lord, the latter consists in abiding in eternal bliss by serving the Lord alone. The former is desired by the devotees who desire to enjoy objects given by the Lord, the latter by those who desire the Lord and the Lord alone. To them the service of the Lord is the source of the most supreme bliss and not a source of pain, etc. as ordinary servitude is.⁴

Salvation may be, again, either gradual (*krama-mukti*) or immediate (*sadyomukti*). This also is a new point brought out. Harivyāsadeva points out that some devotees who perform actions in a pure and unselfish spirit, first attain heaven, the Svarga-loka, and successively higher and higher regions, till they reach the highest, viz. the Satya-loka, the world of Brahmā. There, when their fetters are completely broken, they, on the dissolution of that world, attain the Brahma-loka. This is *krama-mukti*. Some devotees, on the other hand, have their fetters broken at once through devotion, and the practice of hearing and the rest, and their subtle bodies are at once destroyed as a result and they go straight to the world of Brahman. This is *sadyomukti*. Both these kinds of devotees have to travel through the path of gods (*Deva-yāna-panthā*)⁵ to reach the region of Brahman.⁶

¹ See above.

² Ś.K., pp. 7, 11.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 13.

⁵ See pp. 60-61 of the thesis, Part 1.

⁶ Ś.K., p. 12. Cf. Baladeva, below.

(f) THE SĀDHANAS.

1. The first essential prerequisite of salvation is sat-saṅga or company of the good. By resorting to good and holy men, one desirous of salvation comes to realise the real nature of the human body and the soul.

2. This knowledge gives rise to a feeling of humbleness (dainya) in him and destroys his pride of knowledge, riches, etc.

3. Then there arises in him an intense reverence (śraddhā) for the Lord Kṛṣṇa, and he desires to dedicate himself completely to Him (prapatti).

4. This reverence for the Lord leads him to the śravaṇa, manana, etc.

5. Thereupon, the Lord being pleased with his humbleness and reverence, takes pity on him and generates the spirit of self-surrender in him.

6. Finally, the grace of the Lord generates a supreme devotion in him (bhakti), consisting in a special love for the Lord¹ and it leads to salvation.

Thus: Sat-saṅga→Dainya and Garva-hāni→Śraddhā and Prapatti-pravṛtti→Śravaṇa, etc.→Bhagavad-anugraha→Prapatti→Bhakti→Mukti.²

Self-surrender has six parts.³ Devotion, too, is of two kinds—viz. prema-viśeṣa-lakṣaṇā,—which, as pointed out above, arises from the grace of the Lord, and is the best kind of devotion and the best means, and sādhana-rūpikā, which arises through resorting to the Good and the Holy, and through the practice of Śravaṇa and the rest. This second kind of devotion leads to the first and is of two kinds—viz. vidhi-bhakti and ruci-bhakti.⁴ The first kind of devotion (viz. prema-viśeṣa-lakṣaṇā) has five different modes, viz. śānta, dāsyā, sakhyā, vātsalyā and aujvalyā or mādhyuryā, typical examples of which are, respectively, the devotions of Vāmadeva and others; Uddhava and others; Śrīdāma, Sudāma and Arjuna, etc.; Devakī, Vāsudeva, etc.; Rādhā and others.⁵ This conception of the five-fold rasas or sentiments is a new point brought out, and distinctly borrowed from the Caitanya school of thought.

¹ Cf. the meaning of the word "bhakti" in Nimbārka and Puruṣottama. See above.

² Ś.K., p. 37.

⁴ Cf. Baladeva. See below.

³ Cf. V.R.M. See above.

⁵ Ś.K., p. 37.

There are certain things which prevent the attainment of the Lord, viz. the ten kinds of sins against the Name (nāmāparādha) and the thirty-two kinds of sins of Service (sevāparādha),¹ and all these are to be avoided with care by one who desires salvation.²

We conclude, therefore, Harivyāsadeva was deeply influenced by the Caitanya movement³ and introduced many new ideas to his sect from that school of thought.

IX. Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava I.

(1) LIFE AND DATE.

Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava is reputed to be Svabhūdevācārya, the immediate disciple of Harivyāsadeva and thirty-second after Nimbārka.⁴ This seems to be supported by one of the opening verses in his work, where he says that he is making a collection of all scriptural truths in that work by means of the knowledge which he has gained through the grace of Harivyāsadeva.⁵ This suggests that he was the immediate disciple of Harivyāsadeva and directly instructed by him.

Nothing, unfortunately, is known of his life and date. His work supplies evidence of his great scholarship.

(2) WORKS.

He wrote a copious commentary, styled “Śruty-anta-kalpa-vallī”, on Nimbārka’s “Saviśeṣa-nirviśeṣa-Śrī-Kṛṣṇa-stava-rāja”.

(3) DOCTRINE.

The chief merit of Puruṣottamaprasāda is his very elaborate and scholarly criticism of the Advaita view, with which he seems to be concerned chiefly. One cannot but be amazed at his wonderful power of subtle argumentation. As regards his general doctrine, he

¹ Cf. Baladeva. See below.

² Ś.K., p. 39.

³ In our list of preceptors, Harivyāsadeva is second after Keśavakāśmīrin and hence must have flourished after Caitanya.

⁴ Preface to Ś.K., p. 6.

⁵ Ś.K., Maṅgala-pāṭha, Śloka 5, p. 1:—

“Śrī-Harivyāsadevācārya-karuṇā-labdha-buddhinā.

Viduṣāṃ kautukārthaṃ vai kriyate śāstra-saṃgrahaḥ.”

accepts the usual tenets of the sect and often refers us back to Puruṣottama,¹ Devācārya,² and Sundarabhaṭṭa.³

(a) *Brahman.*

The Highest Reality—Brahman, Kṛṣṇa and Hari—is an abode of all auspicious qualities and free from all inauspicious and material ones.⁴ The attributes and powers of the Lord are natural—parts and parcels of His very nature, and their denial, therefore, amounts to a denial of the very nature of the Lord. Qualities and powers may be of two kinds, natural and adventitious, e.g. the natural qualities of fire and water are heat and cold respectively, while their adventitious qualities are smoke and foam respectively. Now, we can say that fire is without smoke, or that water is without foam, but we can never say that fire is not hot, or water is not cold. The same is the case here.⁵

As for the rest of the characteristics of the Lord, Puruṣottama follows others exactly. He points out, exactly like Puruṣottama and others, that the Lord embodies Himself as various incarnations, yet Himself remains full.⁶ The birth, work, quality, form and youth of the Lord are non-earthly.⁷ His birth means His voluntary appearance on earth as the various incarnations throughout the various ages—viz. as Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, Nṛsiṃha, etc. His works consist in His creation, maintenance and destruction of the Universe, the protection of the good and the annihilation of the bad—the killing of Rāvaṇa, Śiśupāla, etc., the playful devices in Vṛndāvana, the stealing of cream, etc. His qualities are knowledge, etc. on the one hand and affection, etc. on the other. His forms are the various forms assumed by Him and His youth is His beauty, grace and charm.⁸

(b) *The cit and the acit.*

There is no special section regarding the nature, etc. of the soul and the universe in “Śruty-anta-kalpa-vallī”. The main topic being the Lord—the soul and the universe are discussed here and there only in connection with the discussions of the Lord’s nature, qualities, etc. He brings out no new point here, but exactly follows Puruṣottama.⁹

¹ E.g., Ś.K., pp. 4, 16, 34, 128.

² E.g., *op. cit.*, p. 44.

³ E.g., *op. cit.*, pp. 32, 42. ⁴ Ś.K., pp. 13-14.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 15.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁷ Vide Gītā, 4.9; 11.5.

⁸ Ś.K., p. 34.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 31, 37-38, 41, etc. Cf. V.R.M. See above.

(c) *Relation between Brahman, the cit and the acit.*

Here, also, he follows Puruṣottama exactly.¹

(d) *Mokṣa.*

Here, also, no new point is brought out.

(e) *The sādhanas.*

Like Puruṣottama he speaks of five sādhanas, work, knowledge, etc. and defines them exactly after him.² Like others he emphasises the grace of the Lord as the direct cause of salvation.³ He points out that the manifestation of the Lord's grace is of two kinds—viz. sopādhika and nirupādhika. The first is the grace which descends on those who pray to the Lord for the sake of attaining relief from pain, etc. It is due to particular sādhanas resorted to by particular devotees wishing for particular ends, e.g. the manifestation of the Lord's grace to Draupadī, Dhruva, etc. The second kind of manifestation happens in the case of those devotees who do not pray to the Lord for any particular end. It is due to the will of the Lord, as in the case of Prahlāda, Uddhava and the rest. Hence it is that although a great many people see the Lord when He descends on earth as an incarnation, yet all of them do not become free, since they are not favoured by Him.⁴

(f) *The destiny of man.*

Here Puruṣottama follows Nimbārka exactly, viz.:—

1. The knowers go to the world of Brahman through the path of Gods, not to return.
2. The pious workers go to heaven, the world of the moon, through the path of Fathers, to return once more.
3. The sinners go to hell to suffer terrible sufferings.⁵

(g) *Epistemology.*

Here, also, he follows Puruṣottama exactly.⁶

¹ Ś.K., pp. 27, 30–32, etc. Vide V.R.M. See above.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 119. Cf. V.R.M. See above.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 142.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 38.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 132, 141ff. See above.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 91–94. Vide V.R.M. See above.

(h) *Criticism of rival theories.*(i) *Criticism of rival theories regarding Brahman.*(A) *Criticism of Nirviśeṣa-vāda.*

Brahman cannot be pure distinctionless knowledge, for there are numerous passages in Scripture which designate Brahman as possessed of attributes. It cannot be said that the texts which designate Him as attributes are of a greater force than those which do not, for then we have to admit that the text "Non-existence alone was in the beginning" (Tait., 2.7) is of a greater force than the text "Existence alone was in the beginning" (Chānd., 6.2.1). Moreover, the nirguṇa-texts do not conduce to salvation, e.g. the text "When the seer sees the Golden Person", etc. (Muṇḍ., 3.1.3) shows that the saguṇa-texts lead to salvation. The text "Sākṣī ceta kevala nirguṇa" (Śvet., 6.11) does not deny any and every quality to the Lord, but particular qualities only, viz. material and earthly qualities. If it be objected that the above text denies all qualities in general and not particular qualities only, then we point out that general statements are often modified by particular statements, e.g. the general statement "One should sacrifice animals" really means "One should sacrifice goats". So is the case here. And, if the text does really deny any and every quality to the Lord, then how are you to explain the term "sākṣī", for "sākṣī" means one who sees, i.e. one who is the substratum of the *quality* of knowledge and according to the Advaitins, Brahman is not so.¹

Also why should Scripture first ascribe various qualities to Brahman with great care, and then deny any and every quality to Him, thereby contradicting itself and behaving like a mad man? Further, if Brahman be absolutely free from distinctions, He cannot be the object of Vedāntic discussions even, and this being so, Scripture becomes meaningless.²

Also, if the qualities of the not-self are to be falsely superimposed on the self, then the latter must of necessity be possessed of some qualities which leads it to be mistaken for the non-self, and some again which leads it to be recognised in its real character.³

¹ Ś.K., pp. 53-54.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 54. See above for further details.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 55. See Keśavakāsmirīn above.

Finally, what is the proof of such a Brahman, devoid of all distinctions? Neither perception, nor inference, nor even word which expresses a quality or an action or a universal. So we conclude that Brahman cannot be devoid of distinctions.¹

(B) *Criticism of Aprameya-vāda.*

Here he repeats the argument of Puruṣottama, viz.:—

Whatever is outside the sphere of all knowledge is tuccha, like
the sky-flower,
Brahman is outside the sphere of all knowledge,
Therefore Brahman is tuccha.²

(C) *Criticism of Adhyāsa-vāda.*

The view that ajñāna is illusorily superimposed on Brahman is absolutely untenable, for the very existence of ajñāna is untenable.

Thus, first, what is the āśraya or substratum of ajñāna,—pure consciousness, i.e. Brahman; the omniscient, i.e. Īśvara; or the individual soul? It cannot be said that pure consciousness is the substratum of ajñāna, because just as light and darkness cannot co-exist, so knowledge and nescience, being mutually exclusive, cannot co-exist. Ajñāna is that which is put to an end by knowledge, but if the two may co-exist, then it cannot be said that knowledge contradicts ajñāna and this amounts to a denial of the very nature of knowledge. This difficulty is not removed if it be pointed out that ajñāna, though not contradicted by pure knowledge, is negated by vṛtti-jñāna or knowledge of particular objects,—for according to the Advaitins, vṛtti-jñāna, because of being due to the antaḥkāraṇa, or the internal organ, is not real knowledge, but figurative, and what is aupacārika can never accomplish what the real object does, e.g. if we say “The sacrificial post is the sun”, then evidently the sacrificial post, the figurative sun, can never remove darkness as the real sun can do. Also, if knowledge be not opposed to ajñāna, then it must cease to be jñāna and be non-sentient like pots, etc. The fact is that jñāna and ajñāna are mutually opposed and hence the latter can never inhere in the former.³

¹ Ś.K., p. 55. See under Puruṣottama above for details.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 55. See V.R.M. See above.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 111.

It may be urged here that just as the owl is in complete darkness in spite of the sun's bright rays all around, there being no opposition between the sunlight which is real and the darkness experienced by the owl, which is unreal, so there is no opposition between the real jñāna and the unreal ajñāna so that the one may be the substratum of the other. To this we reply: Although the sunlight is not opposed to unreal darkness, yet there is *real* darkness too besides this unreal darkness and it is opposed to this real darkness. Hence although the sunlight may be the substratum of one kind of darkness, viz. unreal darkness, yet it is actually opposed to real darkness, and so its being the substratum of unreal darkness does not contradict its real nature as opposed to darkness. But in the case under hand there is no other real ajñāna, opposed to jñāna, and hence if jñāna be not opposed to this ajñāna, we have to say that jñāna is not opposed to ajñāna at all. Further, the Advaitins cannot say that ajñāna is unreal, for in that case the individual soul, which is really of the form of bliss, must be said to be subject to unreal miseries only, while the fact is that pains, miseries, etc. of the soul are very real, so long as its bondage continues. Further, perceptions like "I am ignorant"—which prove the existence of real ajñāna—must be regarded as false on this view. If it be urged that no harm is done if the perception "I am ignorant" be taken as false, since this perception, like other perceptions: "I am fat", etc. is after all nothing but a false perception, brought about by the false superimposition of the body on the soul or of the ahaṃkāra on the consciousness, the substratum of ajñāna,—then we point out that the very allegation of the falsity of the perception "I am ignorant" presupposes consciousness as the *substratum of ajñāna*,—the point we are disputing about. Also the perception "I am ignorant" cannot be false, being not due to doṣas (as any illusory perception is).¹

Finally, is the ajñāna of the pure consciousness natural or due to limiting adjuncts? If the former, then like its other natural qualities of bliss, etc. it can never be negated. If the latter, then what is the limiting adjunct here? If the ajñāna be such an adjunct, then there will arise a logical fallacy, since ajñāna cannot itself be its own adjunct. If, again, something else be the limiting adjunct, then there will arise another logical fallacy or arguing in a circle, for this something else is due to ajñāna (all duality being due to ajñāna) and ajñāna itself is due to that something else (which is its limiting adjunct).²

¹ Ś.K., p. 112.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 114.

Hence, the view that pure consciousness is the substratum of ajñāna cannot be maintained in any way.

The omniscient Īśvara too cannot be the substratum of ajñāna. To say that the omniscient is the substratum of ajñāna is just as absurd as to say that the sun is the substratum of darkness. It may be argued that omniscience itself is due to avidyā, whether it means being a knower (pramāṛtva), since the self is never a knower, but pure knowledge; or it means knowing one's own nature (svarūpa-jñapti), since the real nature of the self which is absolutely unassociated can become an object of knowledge, only through avidyā. In answer, we point out that to say that the Omniscient Being is a product of ajñāna is to talk like a man without sense, since only one who is devoid of all avidyā can ever be an Omniscient Being. Also, the qualities of being a knower (pramāṛtva) and self-knowledge (savrūpa-jñapti) are never based on avidyā. To say that the self is unassociated simply means that it is not touched by any faults and not that it is never an object of knowledge.¹

If it be said that even if there can be no connection of Īśvara with avidyā, yet there may very well be connection between Īśvara and Māyā, the latter being the lilopakarana or an implement of sport of the former,—then we ask: What exactly is meant by the term 'māyā' here? Does it mean a particular kind of ajñāna, or a particular kind of power belonging to gods and the rest of creating fire, water and other real objects, without the aid of external implements, or the power of a magician to show non-existing objects? Not the first, because as ajñāna in general is not possible in Īśvara—as shown above,—no particular kind of ajñāna can be possible in Him, and ajñāna is never seen to be an implement of sport. Nor the second, for that goes against the Advaita view and supports ours. Nor the third, because there being no souls to be deluded, no deluding is possible. Further, if this power be true, then there will be no Non-dualism; if imagined by the soul, then it will cease to delude it; if imagined by Īśvara, then Īśvara will be subject to ajñāna.²

Finally, the soul cannot be the substratum of ajñāna, because it itself is due to ajñāna.³

Hence, ajñāna has no āśraya or substratum.

¹ Ś.K., p. 144.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 114.

³ *Op. cit.*

Secondly, there is no viṣaya or object of ajñāna. It may be said that pure consciousness alone can be the object of ajñāna, since everything else is itself due to ajñāna and is non-sentient and as such non-manifest, so that it cannot again be veiled up by ajñāna, i.e. be its object. Here we ask: What exactly is meant by this veiling up of the pure consciousness? Does it mean the disappearance or lopa of the self-manifested nature of Brahman, or its non-origin or anutpatti? Neither,—because what is ever-existent can never have lopa or anutpatti. Also, if there be no manifestation of Brahman, there can be no manifestation of anything else. It cannot be said that this veiling up of Brahman means that Brahman, though having manifestation, is not connected with any object, for (according to the Advaitins) pure consciousness does not refer to any object. It cannot be said that this veiling up of Brahman means any hindrance to the act of manifestation, because (according to the Advaitins) there is nothing besides pure consciousness, so that there can be no obstacle. It cannot be said that the veiling up of Brahman means having such perceptions like “Brahman is not”, “Brahman does not manifest Himself”, because whether such perceptions be recognitions or mere affirmations, in either case, such percepts are the *result* of the veiling up of Brahman and cannot, therefore, be the *cause* of the veiling up of Brahman. On this view, since there is no perceptions, etc. during deep sleep, there must be absence of veiling during that period. It cannot be said that the veiling up of Brahman means the absence of such perceptions: “Brahman is”, “Brahman manifests itself”, etc., for if such perceptions be recognitions, then at present the individual soul has the recognition of its own nature and therefore the recognition of Brahman (the soul being identical with Brahman), and as such there can be no veiling up of Brahman during the state of mundane existence. On the other hand, there is no recognition of Brahman during the state of salvation (the soul being not a perceiver during salvation according to the Advaitins), and no withdrawal of the veil. If, again, such perceptions be simple affirmations, then also, the freed soul not being a perceiver, Brahman must continue to be veiled during salvation as well. It cannot be said that the veiling up of Brahman means such perceptions like “Brahman exists” and absence of such perceptions like “Brahman does not exist”, for these perceptions themselves are the result of the veiling up of Brahman (since according to the Advaitins the soul is not really a perceiver, but appears to be so through illusory superimposition). It cannot be said that the manifestation of

Brahman is real, while His non-manifestation is non-real, being brought about by ajñāna which is mithyā and hence both manifestation and non-manifestation of Brahman are possible, there being no opposition between the true manifestation and the false non-manifestation,—for evidently the two are opposed, or the one (viz. manifestation) cannot negate the other (viz. non-manifestation). It cannot be said also that the self-manifested Being is one who, though not knowable, is yet perceived to be free from all contradictions, and that the veiling up of this self-manifested being means the prāgabdhāva¹ of that freedom from contradiction,—for Brahman is free from all contradictions right from the very beginning and cannot therefore become so *after* the removal of any veil or ajñāna. Also, during the state of mundane existence there is only prāgabdhāva of this manifestation or perception of Brahman as free from all contradictions, but during the state of salvation, there is an absolute destruction of it, since the freed soul is never a perceiver according to the Advaitins. But is it not absolutely absurd to say that there is no non-veiling of Brahman during salvation even? Also, the pot, inside which a lamp has been put, does not really destroy the light of the lamp, but simply covers it up *from some one else*. Similarly, the Advaita doctrine is that ajñāna does not *really* destroy the manifestation of Brahman, but simply veils it up for the time being. But to veil it up means to veil it up from some one else, and who is that some one from whom ajñāna veils Brahman? It cannot be the individual soul, for it itself is due to the veiling up of Brahman by ajñāna.

Thus we conclude that the notion of the veiling up of Brahman by ajñāna cannot be logically defined and hence that pure consciousness cannot be the object or viśaya of ajñāna.²

Nor can the soul's distinction from the body, etc., the soul's not being an enjoyer, etc., and non-distinction of Brahman, absence of a second, or the soul which is one without a second, can be the viśaya or object of ajñāna,—for if these be merely of the nature of the soul, then, as shown above, they can never be the object of ajñāna; if they be different from the soul, then there will be no Non-dualism, as held by the Advaitins; and if they be due to ajñāna, then there will arise the logical fallacy of mutual dependence. It cannot be said that although they are identical with the soul, the self-manifested, yet they

¹ The prāgabdhāva of an object is its non-existence prior to its actual existence.

² Ś.K., pp. 116-118.

can remain veiled, due to their imaginary difference from it,—for as shown above, this imaginary difference itself is not possible without the prior veiling up of Brahman.¹

Hence we conclude that ajñāna has no viṣaya or object.

Thirdly, it cannot be said that ajñāna is something imagined, for there is no one to imagine it. Thus, Brahman cannot be the imaginer here, because Brahman, according to the Advaitins, is inactive and therefore cannot do anything. Further, in that case, Brahman, the imaginer, being permanent, the imagination itself must be so, i.e. ajñāna must be permanent, so that no salvation would be ever possible. Nor can ajñāna itself be the imaginer here, for one cannot imagine one's own self. Further, ajñāna too is inactive like Brahman and therefore cannot be an imaginer. Nor can Brahman and ajñāna together be the imaginer here, because that will lead to the logical fallacy of mutual dependence. Nor can someone else be the imaginer here, for there is nothing else, according to the Advaitins, besides these two. And, if the existence of another ajñāna be admitted as the imaginer of ajñāna, then that ajñāna will need another ajñāna as its imaginer, and that another and so on to infinity. Thus, there can be no imagination of ajñāna and hence no existence of ajñāna.²

Fourthly, ajñāna cannot be said to be mithyā, for no logical definition of 'mithyātva' is possible. It cannot be said that the mithyā is what is separated from the real or the sat,—for a real object itself is separated from a different real object and must become mithyā on this definition. It cannot be said that the mithyā is what is not the locus of the quality of existence or sattvā,—for then, Brahman who, according to the Advaitins, is not the substratum of any quality, must become mithyā. It cannot be said that mithyā is what is not the object of any pramāṇa, or means of knowledge, for the mithyā silver is an object of knowledge, viz. "This is a nacre and *not a silver*". It cannot be said that the mithyā is what is never the direct object of any positive knowledge (and not of the negative roundabout knowledge as quoted above),—for the world, which is mithyā according to the Advaitins, is the object of positive knowledge. It cannot be said the mithyā is what is without existence, for what is without existence can never be perceived, as the mithyā world is. It cannot be said that the mithyā is what is an object of error, for Brahman, as the locus of error, is the object of error. It cannot be said that the mithyā is what is the

¹ Ś.K., p. 118.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 55-56.

object of that knowledge which corrects an illusion (bādhaka-jñāna, viz. "This is a nacre and not a silver"),—for Brahman is the object of such a knowledge. It cannot be said that the mithyā is what is capable of being negated by knowledge,—for a prior piece of knowledge may very well be set aside by a later piece of knowledge, but that does not mean that the former is mithyā. It cannot be said that the mithyā is what is absolutely absent from the substratum to which it is (falsely) attributed,—for the absolute absence of an attributed, i.e. unreal, connection is different from that of a non-attributed, i.e. real one. Finally, it cannot be said that the mithyā is avidyā or an effect of avidyā, for the distinction between Brahman and the individual soul, for example, is mithyā, according to the Advaitins, yet is not an effect of avidyā, being beginningless or anādi.

Hence we conclude that no definition of mithyātva is possible.¹

Also, what is the proof of mithyātva? Not perception, for one can perceive only what is present and near at hand and not what is negated in the past, present and future (as avidyā is according to the Advaitins). Nor inference, because inference is based on perception; nor, finally, Scripture, because none would admit that Scripture is concerned with establishing ajñāna.²

Thus, there is neither any definition nor any proof of mithyātva. Hence, ajñāna cannot be said to be mithyā.

Fifthly, what exactly is meant by the term "ajñāna"? What is the meaning of the prefix "nañ" here? There are six possible meanings of the prefix "nañ",—viz. tat-sādrśya or similarity; tad-abhāva or absence; tadanyatva or otherness; tad-alpatā or littleness; aprāśastya or worthlessness; and virodha or contradiction. Now, it cannot be said that ajñāna is what is similar to knowledge. Two things are said to be similar, when though different, they possess many similar qualities, e.g. "Abrāhmaṇa Kṣatriya" means a Kṣatriya who is similar to a Brāhmaṇa in many qualities. But ajñāna does not possess any quality or property of jñāna. It cannot be said that ajñāna is the absence of jñāna, for if ajñāna be something non-existence then evidently, it cannot be a cause. It cannot be said that ajñāna is other than jñāna, for that implies difference, just as the expression "Abrāhmaṇa Śudra" implies a Śudra who is different from a Brāhmaṇa, and in that case there will be two realities—jñāna and ajñāna and no Non-dualism. It cannot be said that ajñāna is little knowledge, for

¹ Ś.K., p. 56.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 56.

then it will fall under the category of jñāna, a little knowledge being knowledge all the same, just as the word "Anudari kanyā" means a girl who has a belly, though a small one. It cannot be said that ajñāna means worthless knowledge, for then too it will fall under the category of jñāna, just as the word "apaṇḍita" means one who is a paṇḍita, though not a good one. Finally, it cannot be said that ajñāna is opposed to jñāna, for just as the word "asura" means one who is opposed to the Suras (or gods), so here too, jñāna and ajñāna must be on a par with each other and co-exist,—which is not admitted.

Thus we conclude that no etymological meaning of the term "ajñāna" is possible.¹

Thus we find that no substratum, object, imaginer and etymological meaning of ajñāna are possible. Hence the very existence of ajñāna is not tenable.²

And if there can be an ajñāna, there can be no adhyāsa or superimposition of ajñāna on Brahman.³

Further, is that on which ajñāna is superimposed (i.e. the adhiṣṭhāna) of the nature of knowledge and opposed to ajñāna and not opposed to it? It cannot be opposed to ajñāna, for there can be no mutual superimposition or adhyāsa between two opposed things, e.g. a silver is falsely superimposed on a nacre, to which it is similar, and not on a rope to which it is opposed.⁴ It also cannot be non-opposed to ajñāna, for then there can evidently be no cessation of ajñāna. Also to say that jñāna is not opposed to ajñāna is, as pointed out above, simply ridiculous. It cannot be said that although svarūpa-jñāna or knowledge of the self, is not opposed to ajñāna, yet pramāṇa-janyaajñāna, i.e. vṛtti-jñāna or knowledge gained through perception, etc., is opposed to ajñāna and negates it, for then jñāna and ajñāna will come to be concerned with different objects. Thus, what is the object of this vṛtti-jñāna? Is it pure Brahman or qualified Brahman? Not the first, for the Advaitins do not admit that Brahman is ever the object of vṛtti-jñāna. Nor the second, for then, as pointed out above, jñāna and ajñāna will be concerned with different objects, and therefore the former will not be able to negate the latter. Thus, the ajñāna regarding a pillar cannot be removed by jñāna regarding a pot,

¹ Ś.K., pp. 4-5.

² See below "Criticism of Pratibimba-vāda" for further criticisms, viz. that no definition and proof of ajñāna too are possible.

³ Ś.K., p. 56.

⁴ See above.

but only by jñāna regarding the pillar. Similarly, the jñāna regarding qualified Brahman cannot negate the ajñāna regarding pure Brahman. Thus we conclude that Brahman cannot be the substratum of the superimposition.¹

Further, if ajñāna be superimposed on Brahman, then does it veil the very nature of Brahman or His qualities? Not the first, for then the entire universe will be dark; nor the second, because Brahman has no qualities according to the Advaitins. It cannot be said that although Brahman is devoid of qualities, yet ajñāna may very well veil the bliss-portion of Brahman, while the knowledge- and the existence-portions remain unveiled so that the world does not become dark,—for the Advaitins do not admit of any qualities, like bliss, etc. Nor can it be said that bliss, etc. are not qualities of Brahman, but portions of His very nature,—for Brahman, the formless, can have no parts. If He does, then He will be mithyā like pots and the rest who possess parts. Thus we conclude that there can be no superimposition of ajñāna on Brahman, i.e. Brahman cannot be the substratum of adhyāsa.²

Further, Brahman being absolutely devoid of qualities and distinctions cannot be the substratum of adhyāsa, for such a substratum, as shown above,³ must have certain qualities which leads, on the one hand, to the superimposition and on the other, negates it, and Brahman, according to the Advaitins, is absolutely devoid of qualities.⁴

Further, is the nature of pure Brahman veiled by ajñāna or not? Not the first, for then Brahman cannot be the substratum; nor the second, for then there being the manifestation of the very nature of Brahman, there can be no adhyāsa.⁵

Thus we conclude that Brahman cannot be the substratum of adhyāsa. And hence there can be no substratum of adhyāsa at all, because, according to the Advaitins, there is nothing besides Brahman. Hence, there being no substratum of adhyāsa, the adhyāsa itself is not possible.

Finally, there is no one who can superimpose or falsely attribute ajñāna on Brahman. Attribution always implies one who attributes, but neither Brahman, nor ajñāna, nor someone else can do so. Hence there being no one to effect the adhyāsa, adhyāsa itself is not possible.⁶

¹ Ś.K., p. 57.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 57.

³ See above.

⁴ Ś.K., pp. 57-58.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 58.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 57.

Thus, we find that there can be no adhyāsa—or superimposition—of ajñāna on Brahman, because the very existence of ajñāna, which is superimposed, is not possible, because no substratum of the superimposition is possible, and because no effector of the superimposition is possible.

(D) *Criticism of the Advaita view that Brahman is the
Upādāna-kāraṇa of the world.*

Our view is of course that Brahman is both the material and nimitta, efficient, cause of the world. But consistently with their views, the Advaitins cannot hold that Brahman is the material cause of the world,—for what exactly do they mean when they call Brahman the material cause? It may be said that just as two threads, twisted together, are the cause of a rope, so Brahman is the material cause of the world as qualified by māyā, or as possessed of the power of māyā, or as the substratum of māyā.¹ On the first view, just as two threads are the cause of the rope, so Brahman and māyā together are the material cause of the world, while Brahman Himself, not associated with māyā, is changeless. On the second view, Brahman is the cause through the contamination of māyā, while Brahman, not so contaminated, is changeless. On the third view, just as the fibre is the material cause of a piece of cloth through the thread, so Brahman is the material cause of the world through māyā, while Brahman without māyā is changeless.

To this we reply: The first view is untenable, for just as both the threads have to undergo transformation in order to produce the rope, so both Brahman and māyā must be transformed into the form of the world, so that Brahman cannot be said to be changeless. Also, if Brahman, the real, be the material cause of the world, the world too must be real, just as a piece of cloth, made of white and not white threads, is white. It cannot be said that the world may be argued to be real, only if its material cause is *solely* real, and not a mixture of the real (Brahman) and the unreal (māyā),—for in that case, the world which is anirvacanīya, according to the Advaitins, must have a solely anirvacanīya cause, but there is no such thing as an anirvacanīya material cause.

The second view also is untenable. If Brahman be the cause, when in contact with māyā, then He must be like clay, etc., which

¹ Māyā-viśiṣṭha, or māyā-śakti-vat, or māyāśraya.

are also causes. Also, if it be held that Brahman, as contaminated by māyā, undergoes a real transformation, then evidently the world cannot be said to be a vivarta or illusory transformation. If it be said that the world is a real transformation of Brahman, contaminated by māyā, while it is an illusory transformation of the pure Brahman, then we point out that in that case there must be attributed changes in the pure Brahman, and what is really changeless can have no attributed changes even.

The third view also is untenable. We find that the fibre is the material cause of the thread and the thread again is the material cause of the cloth, and in this way alone the fibre is the material cause of the cloth through the thread. But this does not evidently hold good in the case of Brahman and māyā, for Brahman is not the material cause of māyā, as the fibre is of the thread, so that it cannot be said that Brahman is the material cause of the world through māyā. It cannot be said that Brahman is the material cause of māyā in the sense of being the substratum of the cosmic illusion, for that Brahman cannot be such a substratum has already been shown,¹ and further, it is not possible to define a material cause as being the substratum of error, for clay, etc., which are material causes, are not so, while nacre, etc., which are so, are not material causes.²

The same arguments go to refute the view that vivarta means assuming another unreal form, parināma means assuming another real form, while upādānatva (or being the material cause) means assuming another form (real or unreal) and hence Brahman can be the material cause in the sense of having illusory transformation, while ajñāna too is the material cause as having real transformation. The Advaitins themselves hold that what is mithyā must have a mithyā material cause, for if the cause be real, the effect must also be so, and hence the Advaitins themselves deny that the real can have any unreal form, since this would imply the discarding of the very nature of the real. Hence the conclusion cannot but be that the real Brahman can have no vivarta, or unreal form. Also, if Brahman were to assume an unreal form, then Brahman, as pointed out many times before,³ must possess certain qualities which leads Him to assume (i.e. be mistaken as) that particular unreal form, instead of any other. But Brahman has no qualities according to the Advaitins. Hence the world cannot be an illusory transformation of Brahman. Nor is the world a real

¹ See above.

² Ś.K., pp. 58-59.

³ See above.

transformation of ajñāna. Parīṇāma means a *real* transformation into a *real* object, as the parīṇāma of a lump of clay into a pot. But an unreal object (which the world is according to the Advaitins) does not imply any parīṇāma, e.g. an illusory silver does not.¹

Thus we find that Brahman cannot be the material cause of the world on the Advaita doctrine. The Advaitins cannot get out of the difficulty by pointing out that māyā is the material cause, Īśvara is the efficient cause and Brahman is the substratum, because according to the Advaitins also, the material cause and the efficient causes of the world are identical.² Here our author follows Keśavakāśmīrin.³

(E) *Criticism of the Advaita doctrine of Īśvara.*

It cannot be said that Īśvara is Brahman, limited by māyā,⁴ for then Īśvara, being subject to ignorance and illusion, cannot be said to be omniscient. To say that one who is associated with māyā is omniscient is as absurd as to say that the blind is 'lotus-eyed'.⁵

Also, according to the Advaitins, Īśvara or māyā-limited consciousness is the creator of the world and not Brahman or pure consciousness. Now, in what exactly does Īśvara's creatorship consist? Is Īśvara a creator in the sense of being a locus, like a nacre; or in the sense of being the perceiver of the adhyāsa or false superimposition like a mistaken person; or in the sense of being a deluder, like a magician; or in the sense of acting with a definite intention to produce a definite effect by means of perceivable implements like a potter? Not the first, for evidently creatorship does not mean passively being a locus only, but the creator must essentially be active. Scripture bears testimony to the fact that the creator of names and forms resolves to be many⁶; but can one resolve to be something false? Hence, why should Īśvara voluntarily wish to be something false? Hence not the second, for why should Īśvara voluntarily wish to see an illusion? A person under an illusion does not *voluntarily* see the illusory object, because for the time being he is perfectly certain that what he is perceiving is true. Not the third, since there being at that time no individual soul to be deluded, Īśvara cannot be a deluder. Also, Scripture tells us, as pointed out above, that the creator, prior to creating the world, formed the resolve: "Let me evolve (i.e. *create*) names and forms" (Chānd., 6.3.2), but a magician never resolves

¹ Ś.K., p. 59.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 60.

³ See above.

⁴ Māyāvachchinnā.

⁵ Ś.K., p. 60.

⁶ Vide Chānd., 6.2.1.

"Let me *create*", but only that "Let me *show* kings, etc.". Nor, finally, the fourth, for in that case the world cannot be false. A potter never creates an imaginary pot, but always a real one. An imaginary object can never be created, whether by a non-mistaken person, or by a mistaken.¹

Thus, we conclude that the Advaita view of Īśvara is absolutely untenable.

(F) *Criticism of the Advaita interpretation of the text*
"Ekamevādvitīyam".

In the celebrated text "Ekamevādvitīyam" (Chānd., 6.2.1), the word "eka" (= one) means that the Lord is absolutely independent, while the term "advitīya" (= without a second) means that the Lord has nothing equal to or superior to Himself, i.e. whatever there is besides the Lord is absolutely dependent on the Lord. Thus, even the qualities and powers, etc. of the Lord are not independent, but depend on the Lord, Who is their very essence.²

Or, an alternative explanation may be offered, viz.: The term "eka" denies that sentient beings (i.e. the souls) are independent; the term "advitīya" denies that non-sentient objects (i.e. the world, etc.) are independent; while the term "eva" denies that the own qualities of the Lord are independent. Thus, the text means that the cit, the acit and the svagata-dharmas of the Lord, being of the essence of the Lord, are non-distinct from Him. In this sense alone the Lord is one and without a second.³

According to the Advaitins, however, the above text denies three kinds of differences to Brahman, viz. sajātiya or difference from the sentient; vijātiya or difference from the non-sentient; and svagata or difference from His own qualities and powers. But this view is absolutely untenable. Here the term "eva" does not imply any discrimination from something else, e.g. the expression "Śaṅkhaṃ-pāṇḍu eva" means that the conch-shell is white and does not deny the connection of the conch-shell with anything else. Similarly the expression "Pārtha eva dhanurdharaḥ" means that Pārtha is a warrior with bow in hands, but does not deny his connection with something else. Hence, the expression "Ekam *eva* advitīyam"⁴

¹ Ś.K., pp. 60-61.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 16.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 17.

⁴ The whole passage is: "Sadeva saumya idamagra āsīt ekamevādvitīyam" (Chānd., 6.2.1).

means simply that the Sat is eka and advitiya and not that the Sat has no connection with anything else. Further, if the term "advitiya" implies the absence of a second, then the term "eka" becomes a mere superfluity. Hence it cannot be said that the term "agre" implies time and the term "dvitiya" implies an object, as according to the Advaitins nothing besides Brahman ever exists in the present, never did so in the past and will never do so in the future. That is, if Brahman be *always* without a second, then there is no sense in saying that He was so *in the beginning* (agre). Further, if the term "advitiya" does not deny the absence of a second, then there will be no Non-dualism (for then, there will be at least two realities—Brahman and this absence of a second), and if it does not, then too, there will be no Non-dualism.¹ Further, what exactly is meant by the term "sat" in the above text? It cannot mean the pure Brahman, for according to the Advaitins the pure Brahman cannot be expressed by any word or sentence. It cannot mean Brahman with the limiting adjunct of māyā, for then the Advaitins themselves have to admit difference, i.e. if māyā be different from Brahman whom it limits, then there can be no Non-dualism; if non-different, then Brahman Himself will become of the form of avidyā. Finally, it cannot mean the substratum of the adhyāsa of ajñāna, for, as shown above,² Brahman cannot be the substratum of ajñāna.³

(ii) *Criticism of rival theories regarding the jīva.*

(A) *Criticism of Pratibimba-vāda.*

It cannot be said that the individual soul is a reflection of Brahman on avidyā, for, in the first place, the very existence of avidyā is not possible, no definition and proof of avidyā being possible.⁴ Thus, it cannot be said that avidyā is that which is without beginning and a positive entity, yet is negated by knowledge,⁵ for the ajñāna regarding the illusory silver is by no means without a beginning, so that the above definition is too narrow. Again ajñāna cannot be a positive entity, for if ajñāna, a positive entity, were to give rise to an illusion which is not a positive entity, then we have to admit that a false something may arise from a real something. But this cannot be, for the cause and the effect must be of the same nature. Yet if the

¹ See above.

² See above.

³ Ś.K., pp. 17-18.

⁴ Vide above for other criticisms of this point.

⁵ Anādi, bhāvarūpa and jñāna-nivartya.

illusion be not due to ajñāna, it cannot be put to an end by jñāna. Also, according to the Advaitins themselves, ajñāna is different from both existence and non-existence, so how can they hold again that it is a positive entity? Again, ajñāna cannot be always negated by knowledge, e.g. ajñāna persists in the jīvan-muktas in spite of their knowledge; also in spite of knowing perfectly well that the trees on the banks of a river are standing upright, we cannot help seeing them upside down on the surface of the river. Further, if ajñāna be negated by knowledge, then it cannot be without a beginning, for that which is simply due to the false imagination of one thing as another, that which is due to some or other defects, and that which has no existence beyond perception, can never be beginningless, e.g. the illusory silver which is due to the false imagination by a man of a nacre as a silver to some defects of eyesight, want of proper light, etc. and persists so long as the error persists, is not beginningless. Further, if ajñāna be a positive entity, then it cannot be negated by knowledge. Thus, the first part of the above definition of ajñāna (viz. that it is beginningless and a positive entity) comes into conflict with the last part (viz. that it is negated by knowledge). It may be said that the specific vyāpti, viz. "Ajñāna is negated by jñāna", is of a greater force than the general vyāpti "What is beginningless and a positive entity is not negated by knowledge" and ajñāna (according to us) is different not only from existence but also from non-existence, so that although being different from non-existence, it cannot be negated, as the self cannot be, yet being different from existence, it can nevertheless be negated like prāgabdhāva.¹ To this we reply that in that case, i.e. if a specific vyāpti be taken to be of a greater force than a general vyāpti, we may very well infer any and every thing, e.g. we may very well hold that the specific vyāpti "Whatever is a hill is without fire" contradicts the general vyāpti "Whatever smokes is on fire". Further, a specific vyāpti regarding ajñāna, as held by the Advaitins, is not possible, since vyāpti is a *general* statement regarding a *class* of things, but ajñāna, as held by the Advaitins—i.e. ajñāna which is beginningless, a positive entity and negated by knowledge, is without any parallel, as other kinds of ajñāna, viz. the ajñāna regarding a nacre, are neither beginningless nor positive entities, and hence ajñāna as held by the Advaitins, being the only one of its kind, cannot be the subject of any vyāpti. Further, if it be said that what is different from existence

¹ For explanation, see footnote above.

may be negated, then we have to say that atyantābhāva¹ too, which is different from existence, may be negated. Thus we find that the definition of avidyā as that which is beginningless, a positive entity and negated by knowledge, is not tenable.²

Avidyā cannot be defined also as the material cause of error, for, as shown above,³ illusion being not a positive entity cannot have ajñāna, a positive entity, as its material cause. If again an illusion be taken to be a positive entity (for the sake of argument), still then it cannot have ajñāna, which is different from existence, for its material cause, since the cause and the effect must be of the same nature. An illusion is the *knowledge* of an object. Now, according to us, both the object of an illusion and the illusory knowledge are real,⁴ and hence they can have a material cause. Of course, ajñāna is not their material cause, but the illusory object, viz. "silver", has real ingredients as its material cause, while the illusory knowledge, viz. "This is a piece of silver", has the mind as its material cause. But according to the Advaitins neither the illusory object nor the illusory knowledge is real, so how can they have material cause? Hence, it cannot be said that ajñāna is the material cause of illusion. Also, ajñāna cannot be a material cause, because it is not an existent something, according to the Advaitins. Otherwise we have to admit that prāgabhāva⁵ too can be a material cause. Hence if ajñāna were to be a material cause, it must be an existent something. Further, the effect appears to be of the nature of the cause,—an earthen pot looks like clay, but neither

¹ Atyantābhāva is the absolute and eternal non-existence of one thing from another, e.g. heat from water.

² Ś.K., pp. 61-62.

³ See above.

⁴ This is the doctrine of Sat-khyāti, viz. that all percepts are true, even the so-called illusory ones. Thus the doctrine is that because of the original process of Pañcikarāṇa (see above), everything contains the element and ingredient of everything else. A nacre e.g. contains some subtle and ordinarily imperceptible elements of silver, and when owing to some defects in the eyesight, want of proper light, distance, etc., we perceive the silver-element only in the nacre, we mistake the nacre for the silver, although the silver we are perceiving is *real* silver contained in the nacre. This is the so-called false perception of silver in place of nacre and it is called *false*, because it fails to lead to *successful* practical reaction as a *real* silver does; e.g. when we stoop to pick it up under the impression that it is a piece of silver, we find that it is not so and cannot be sold as such. Thus, the distinction between *true* and *false* perception is really a question of practical utility (artha-kriyā). Vide Śrī B., 1.1.1.

⁵ See footnote above.

the illusory silver nor its knowledge appears to be ajñāna,—the illusory silver appears to be real silver and the illusory knowledge as real knowledge for the time being. Finally, the definition of ajñāna as the material cause of illusion is both too narrow, because the ajñāna of the jīvan-muktas is not the material cause of error, they, according to the Advaitins, being not subject to any more error, though leading an earthly existence; and too wide, because clay, etc. which are material causes are not ajñāna.¹

Thus, the definition of ajñāna as the material cause of illusion is not tenable, because illusion can have no material cause, because ajñāna cannot be a material cause, and because it is both too narrow and too wide.

Thus, no lakṣaṇa or definition of ajñāna is possible.

Nor is there any pramāṇa or proof of ajñāna. It may be argued: The existence of avidyā is proved directly through such perceptions like "I am ignorant", "I do not know others", etc. Its existence is proved by inference as well. The fact is that knowledge of a particular object is preceded by something which is other than the prāgabhāva² of knowledge, which was so long veiling up the object of knowledge, which is now negated by knowledge and which was so long inhering in knowledge itself, and this something is *ajñāna*; e.g. when a lamp is lit in a dark room, the lamp does three things—it puts its own prāgabhāva to an end; puts darkness to an end; and manifests objects. Now, this darkness is other than the prāgabhāva of the light, was so long veiling the objects of the light, is put to an end by the light, yet was so long inhering in the lamp. The same is the case here. Hence the following inference proves the existence of ajñāna: Whatever, coming into existence, manifests objects so long non-manifest, is preceded by something which other than its own prāgabhāva, which so long veiled its objects, which is now negated by it and which so long inhered in it, like a lamp lighted in a dark room.

Jñāna does so.

Therefore jñāna is preceded by something which is other than its own prāgabhāva, etc., i.e. by ajñāna.

The existence of ajñāna is proved by Scripture as well,—cf. texts like "Then there were neither non-Being nor Being" (Rg. V., 10.129.1), etc.³

¹ Ś.K., pp. 62-63.

³ Ś.K., p. 63. Cf. Śrī. B., 1.1.1.

² See footnote above.

To this, we reply: Perceptions like "I am ignorant", etc. do not establish ajñāna, for, according to the Advaitins, the "I" is not the substratum of ajñāna, which is a positive entity. Such perceptions prove simply the absence of knowledge and not any ajñāna which is a positive entity. Also, what does the "I" stand for in the expression: "I am ignorant"? It cannot mean the pure Brahman, for the Advaitins do not admit that; nor can it mean the ahaṁkāra, which is non-sentient; nor something else, because there is nothing else besides Brahman according to the Advaitins.

The above inference also is not correct, because it cannot be said that jñāna always negates ajñāna; e.g. the knowledge of happiness, etc. does not negate ajñāna, being of the form of a sāksi. Further, the adjective "other than its own prāgabhāva" is futile, since prāgabhāva being that which is put to an end by the object in question, viz. jñāna, it is expressed by the adjective "negated by it".

Finally, the above text does not prove the existence of ajñāna, but it refers simply to prakṛti. The term "non-being" refers to the subtle mahat, etc., while the term "being" refers to the gross elements, while the term "darkness", tamas, refers to the primal prakṛti, the sense of the text being that in the beginning there were neither subtle elements nor gross elements, but only prakṛti, the primal cause.¹

Thus, there is no pramāṇa or proof of avidyā.

Further, there can be no apprehension of avidyā or avidyā-pratīti. Thus, is avidyā perceived by the pure consciousness or by consciousness arising through one or other of the sources of knowledge? ² Not the first, for if avidyā be perceived by the pure consciousness, then such a perception must be real and everlasting, and continue in salvation too. Nor the second, for then avidyā will be sometimes perceived and sometimes not. Also, avidyā cannot be grasped through any source of knowledge, as just shown above, and hence it cannot be said the apprehension of ajñāna is due to some source of knowledge. Further, according to the Advaitins, the knowledge arising from the ordinary sources of knowledge is itself due to avidyā and hence this will lead to arguing in a circle. Thus, there can be no apprehension of avidyā.³

We conclude, therefore, that there can be no definition, proof, and apprehension of avidyā; hence the very existence of avidyā is impossible.

¹ Ś.K., pp. 63ff.

² Śuddha-caitanya or vṛtti-caitanya.

³ Ś.K., p. 67.

And if there can be no avidyā, then evidently the individual soul can be a reflection of Brahman on avidyā.¹

Next, Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava goes on to point out like Keśavakāśmīrin that if there is to be any reflection of Brahman on avidyā, then the latter must be outside the former²; that the object reflected and the reflection must be of the same status³; and that there can be no reflection of the formless and colourless Brahman.⁴

According to the Advaitins, the upādhi or the limiting adjunct pertains to the reflection and not to the object reflected, and that is why the individual soul is subject to mundane existence and not Brahman. But what does that precisely imply exactly? It cannot imply that the qualities of the upādhi pertain to the reflection, just as dirt on the mirror, the upādhi, makes the image of the face look dirty too,—for agency, etc. do not pertain to ajñāna, the limiting adjunct, yet the individual soul, the reflection, is an agent, etc. It cannot be said also that the upādhi pertains to the reflection in the sense that the functions of the former pertain to the latter, for the functions of the upādhi, such as distinguishing, etc. (i.e. avidyā distinguishes the soul from Brahman) pertain to the ether, which is an object reflected. Also, if the upādhi pertains to the reflection alone, then omniscience, etc., which pertain to Brahman, cannot be said to be due to upādhi, as held by the Advaitins. It cannot be said also that the upādhi pertains to the reflection in the sense that the qualities inhering in the functions of the upādhi pertain to the reflection, or that the upādhi veils its own object from the reflection, for such is never seen in the case of a mirror and a pot. Thus, we find that the upādhi cannot pertain to the reflection⁵.

We conclude, therefore, that the Pratibimba-vāda is absolutely untenable because the very existence of avidyā is not possible; because Brahman cannot be the object reflected; because avidyā cannot be the upādhi; and because the upādhi cannot pertain to the reflection.

(B) *Criticism of Avaccheda-vāda or Upādhi-vāda.*

Here, the author exactly follows Devācārya.⁶

¹ Ś.K.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 67. See above.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 67. See above.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 11, 112. See above.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 113.

⁶ See above.

(C) *Criticism of Adhyāsa-vāda.*

The theory that the course of mundane existence, is due to the illusory superimposition of the body, etc. on the soul is not tenable, for the fact is that it is really due to the want of discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal, between the self and the not-self. In fact, the superimposition of the body, the sense-organs, etc. on the soul,—which is directly opposed to them, is quite impossible. It cannot be said that the perception 'I am a Brāhmaṇa' falsely attributes the qualities of a Brāhmaṇa to the self, for according to the Advaitins the 'I', the aham,—is not the self, the ātman, but is not-self, so what fault can the Advaitins possibly find with this identity between two things, both of which are not-selves? The fact is that the identity between the body and the soul is established by direct perception, and cannot be dismissed summarily as false. Of course, to say that the body and the soul are identified, is not to say that they are one and the same; they are different, yet are identified in all practical experiences, just as heat and iron, though different, are identified in a red-hot iron ball.

The Advaita view is full of contradictions from the very beginning to the end. Thus, according to the Advaitins, the *identification* of the body and the soul is due to adhyāsa or illusory superimposition, but in the same breath they declare that the *differentiation* between the body and the soul also is due to illusory superimposition,—there being the soul alone in reality. But how can possibly the difference and the non-difference between the body and the soul be both falsely superimposed? The unreal (mithyā) is absolutely different from the real (satya) and difference (bheda) is absolutely different from non-difference (abheda). Hence if the difference between the body and the soul be mithyā, the non-difference between them must of necessity be satya. It cannot be said that as the body itself is due to adhyāsa, there is neither difference nor non-difference between the body and the soul,—for the illusory silver, though due to adhyāsa, is yet *different* from the nacre.

The perception "I am a dehin" is just like the perception "I am a gehin"; i.e. just as the latter means "I *have* a house" and never "I *am* a house", so exactly the former means "I *have* a body" and never "I *am* a body". So how can it be said that the latter perception implies an *identity* between the body and the soul? In fact, our perceptions are always to the effect "*My* house", "*My* eyes", "*My*

hands", etc. so that there is always a difference between the "I", the soul, the possessor and the body, etc. the things possessed. Thus, the perceptions "I am a Brāhmaṇa", "I am a man" are true perceptions. The word "Brāhmaṇa" means a conscious *individual soul endowed with a particular body*, and not a *mere body*. If the word "Brāhmaṇa" were to mean a body only, then such injunctions as "A Brāhmaṇa should perform a sacrifice" become absurd, for a body, a non-sentient object, can never possibly perform a sacrifice, etc. In the very same manner, perceptions like "I am blind", etc. are true perceptions, for the blind is a conscious individual soul devoid of eyesight and so on. The perceptions "I am thin", "I am black" etc. are secondary ones like the perceptions "My son being thin, I am thin as well", "I, besmeared with mud, am black", etc. but there is no adhyāsa or illusory identity here, since "I" am clearly conscious of my *distinction* from my son and from the mud here. Moreover, perceptions like "(The same) I who made obeisance to my father in my childhood am now playing with my grandchildren in my old age", "I, who was a tiger in a dream, am now a man", etc. clearly prove that we *distinguish* between our *body* and our *soul*, and that we realise very well that the body may change and assume different forms, but the soul remains unchanged in the midst of all changes. So, the Advaitins cannot say that we mistakenly identify the body and the soul. Hence we conclude that there is no such thing as adhyāsa and that the individual souls are not due to adhyāsa, but to the beginning-less karmas.¹

Further, the Advaita view that the "I" is not the soul, because it does not persist under all states, viz. during deep sleep and release—is not at all tenable, for the "I" does persist during these states. That the "I" persists during the state of deep sleep is clear from the perception "So long I slept happily", etc.² Also, according to the Advaitins themselves, the ahaṁkāra is the vital-breath through its power of action, and mind through its power of understanding.³ Now, if there be no ahaṁkāra during deep sleep, then why is there breathing which is the function of the vital-breath? It may be said that if the ahaṁkāra and the vital-breath be different, then there is no harm if the former disappears during deep sleep; if they be non-different, then

¹ Ś.K., pp. 69-71.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 100-102. See V.R.M., above.

³ Kriyā-śakti and vijñāna-śakti.

we hold that the portion of the ahaṃkāra which, devoid of the vital-breath, disappears, while the vital-breath portion persists; to this we reply: This cannot be, for if the vital-breath only persists in deep sleep, then we cannot have perceptions to the effect "*I slept happily*", as the prāṇa never constitutes the "I".¹ Thus, we conclude that the "I" persists during deep sleep.

The "I" persists during release as well. We do not deny that the Lord is ever-free, but what we insist on is that the Lord is a knower, an "I". So the "I" persists always. This may be established by inferences as well, thus: The "I" persists in salvation, being the performer of the sādhanās which lead to salvation, like consciousness.

The "I" is non-different from the very nature of the soul, because it persists in salvation, like omniscience.²

Further, the Advaita view that the "I" is non-sentient, i.e. the internal organ and not the soul, is not tenable, for in that case, perceptions like "My mind" would mean "My mind's mind"—which is absurd; and also we should not have, in that case, felt any difference between the "I"—ourselves and our minds, which we undoubtedly do, e.g. the "I" persists even in the absence of the mind (attention). We never *feel* that the "I" is non-sentient, and if it be said to be *imagined*, then the soul too may very well be imagined to be non-sentient, as we can, of course, imagine any and every thing to be any and every thing. So we conclude that the "I" is not non-sentient.³

(D) Criticism of Eka-jīva-vāda.

There is absolutely no proof that there is only one soul. On the contrary, this view leads to absurd results. Thus, if there be only one soul, then there could not, evidently, be any preceptor-disciple relation and the Scriptures would become meaningless. If the preceptor be possessed of the knowledge of Non-dualism, then he cannot teach the disciple who is different from him, and if he be not possessed of the knowledge of Non-dualism, then he is nothing but an impostor and a cheat.⁴

¹ Ś.K., pp. 100-102.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 102-103.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 103-104.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 68.

(iii) *Criticism of rival theories regarding the jagat.*(A) *Criticism of Māyā-vāda.*

The Advaitins argue that the world is false or mithyā, as established by the following inference:—

The world is mithyā, because it is capable of being perceived (dṛśyatvāt), because it is non-sentient (jaḍatvāt) and because it is limited (paricchinnavāt), like the nacre-silver.

To this we reply that the above inference is not correct, because the pakṣa or the minor term, the sādhyā or the major term, the hetu or the reason, the middle term, and the udāharaṇa or the example, are all untenable.¹

The pakṣa or the minor term is “the world” here. Now, is the world established by one or other of the sources of knowledge or not? Not the first, because what is so established cannot be negated. If it be said that the universe, though perceived, can yet be negated, since it is not the locus of existence, then we point out in reply that in that case, the pure Brahman too, not being the locus of existence, must be mithyā. The second alternative also is not possible, for in that case, the world must become tuccha or absolutely unreal, like the sky-flower, which too cannot be established by any source of knowledge.

The sādhyā or the major term, viz. “falsity” or “mithyātva” too cannot be established. If this “mithyātva” be real, then Brahman cannot be said to be the sole reality, if it be unreal, then the world must be true.²

The three hetus or reasons quoted also are untenable. Thus, the first reason “dṛśyatva” does not prove the case. It cannot be said the world is false, because it is perceived, for then Brahman too, being directly intuited by the knowers, must be false. It cannot be said that Brahman so intuited is not pure Brahman, but māyā-limited Brahman, who is, of course, mithyā,— for unless the knower perceives the pure Brahman, his ajñāna regarding pure Brahman cannot be put to an end, and the pure Brahman, being in that case outside all sources of knowledge, must be non-established like the sky-flower, which too is outside all sources of knowledge. Also, texts which distinctly declare Brahman to be an object of direct intuition,³ will come to be contradicted. Also, if Brahman who is to be enquired after be only māyā-limited Brahman and not pure Brahman, then

¹ Ś.K., pp. 4–10.

² See above.

³ Vide e.g., Muṇḍ., 3.1.8.

evidently, the very enquiry becomes valueless and the scriptures concerned with such an enquiry become useless. Further, no attributes can either be attributed or denied to something which is unknown, so that this very denial of *dṛśyatva* to the Supreme Brahman implies that the Supreme Brahman is known.

The second reason "*jaḍatva*" also does not prove the case. Now what is "*jaḍatva*"? It cannot be said that the non-sentient is what is not a knower, for in the "I", which according to the Advaitins is a knower, must be sentient, while the pure Brahman, not a knower according to the Advaitins, must be non-sentient. Hence the inference: The pure Brahman is *mithyā*, because He is not a knower, like the Universe. The Advaitins cannot get out of the difficulty by saying that although pure Brahman is not really a knower, yet He is imagined to be so and hence Brahman is sentient,—for an imagined something cannot be the reason for anything—i.e. imagined knowership of Brahman cannot be a reason for His not being non-sentient; also, according to the Advaitins themselves, the internal organ is imagined to be a knower, and hence it must too be sentient like Brahman. It cannot be said that the non-sentient is what is not knowledge, for then the knowledge of particular objects through one or other of the sources of knowledge, being knowledge, must be sentient, while the soul, not being knowledge, must be non-sentient. Thus, has the knowledge of the real nature of the self an object or not? On the first alternative, the question arises: Is the soul itself the object here, or not. It cannot be itself its own object, for according to the Advaitins the self is never an object of the ordinary sources of knowledge. But, on the other hand, nothing else can be the object here, since in salvation there is no other object, yet there is knowledge about the real nature of the self, and what is present alone can be an object. Thus, the knowledge about the real nature of the self can have no object. But the second alternative also—viz. the knowledge about the real nature of the self, has no object—is not tenable, for knowledge cannot be without an object, i.e. it must manifest an object, otherwise the pot, etc. might very well be called knowledge. Further, is the knowledge about the real nature of the self-right knowledge or erroneous knowledge? It cannot be the first, because according to the Advaitins it is not generated through any source of knowledge; nor can it be the second, because it is not due to any defects. If it be said that it is neither, then we point out that in that case it cannot be knowledge at all. Thus we find that there can be

no knowledge of the real nature of the self, and hence the soul, not being knowledge, must be non-sentient. It cannot be said finally that *jaḍatva* is being the not-self, because that is not a Universal, there being only one soul and what is not a Universal cannot be the predicate of a definition, e.g. when we define a man as "A man is mortal", "Mortality" is a universal.

Thus, we conclude that the second *hetu* "*jaḍatva*" is not itself established.

The third and the final *hetu*, viz. "*paricchinnatva*" too does not prove the case. There are three kinds of limit—limit of space, limit of time, and limit by an object. Now, limitedness of space and time cannot be a cause of falsity, because the ether, though unlimited, is *mithyā* according to the Advaitins, while the illusory silver has no limitation of time (i.e. it never was, never is, never will be—no distinctions of time), yet it is *mithyā*. *Avidyā*, too, being the material cause of all space and time and connected with the all-pervading Brahman, is without any limitation of space and time, yet it is *mithyā*. Hence, it cannot be said that limitation of space and time is a criterion of falsity. Nor can it be said that limitation by an object is a criterion of falsity, because, according to the Advaitins, there is no object besides Brahman.

Thus, the three reasons adduced do not prove that the world is false.

Finally, the *udāharana* or the example too is not possible, for according to the Advaitins there is no *nacre* at all, there being nothing besides Brahman. If it be said that Brahman may very well be cited as an example here (if we put the argument in the negative form: What is non-perceivable, non-sentient and non-limited is not false, like Brahman)—then we ask: Is the pure Brahman to be cited as an example here or the qualified Brahman? Not the first, for the pure Brahman is outside all sources of knowledge and can never be cited as an example; nor the second, for that does not prove the case and is opposed to the Advaita theory itself.

Thus we conclude that the above inference does not prove that the world is *mithyā* or false.

(B) *Criticism of Sattvā-traividhya-vāda.*

According to the Advaitins, there are three kinds of existence, *pāramārthika* or real, such as Brahman, *vyavahārika* or empirical such as the world, and *prātibhāsika* or illusory; such as the illusory

silver. But this distinction is absolutely untenable. First, on the Advaita maxim itself, there must be more than these three grades. Thus, according to the Advaitins, a dream is *prātibhāsika* and the illusory silver too is so, and hence the dreamt silver-nacre illusion must be one degree lower than the *prātibhāsika*, and put to an end by the *prātibhāsika*; while the dream of a dreamt silver-nacre illusion must be still another degree lower. On the other hand, there are objects higher than the *vyavahārika*. Hence, once the Advaitins begin to divide objects into grades of reality, they cannot stop at three only.¹

Further, this division into three grades can neither be real, since Brahman is the sole reality, nor be unreal, since then the Advaitins contradict themselves. In the very same way the falsity of the world,² the distinctionlessness of Brahman, etc. inevitably lead to the horns of a dilemma.³

Further, how to distinguish between the *pāramārthika* and the *apāramārthika*? It cannot be said that the *pāramārthika* is the *sat* or the existent, and the *apāramārthika* is what is other than the *sat*, for what is not existent can never be perceived,⁴ while the world, etc., are perceived. It cannot be said also that the *pāramārthika* is what is never negated while the *apāramārthika* is what is negated—because the real nature of a superimposed object may not be negated,⁵ while Brahman may sometimes be an object of negation, as e.g. we say "This is the world and not Brahman". That is, if Brahman be possessed of attributes, etc. then those very attributes, etc. will be negated, but if He be attributeless, then He cannot be the remover of illusion, as shown above.⁶ Thus, no valid distinction is possible between the *pāramārthika* and the *apāramārthika*.⁷

Further, how can we distinguish between the *vyavahārika* and the *prātibhāsika* too? It cannot be said that the *vyavahārika* is due to *māyā*, or cosmic nescience, while the *prātibhāsika* is due to *avidyā* or individual nescience,—for no hard and fast distinction can be made between *māyā* and *avidyā*, e.g. the magic of a juggler, who is *māyika*, is *prātibhāsika*, while the pains, etc. of the individual souls are

¹ Ś.K., p. 82.

² See above.

³ Ś.K., pp. 82-83.

⁴ Cf. the *sat-khyāti-vāda*, according to which even objects of illusory perceptions are real and existent. See footnote (1) above.

⁵ The real nature of the silver is not negated, but only its existence then and there in the nacre.

⁶ See above.

⁷ Ś.K., p. 83.

āvidyaka yet vyavahārika. It cannot be said also that the vyavahārika is what leads to successful practical reaction¹ while the prātibhāsika is what does not,—for in dreams, a dream-pitcher may serve the purpose of fetching dream-water, but none would say the dream-pitcher is vyavahārika. It cannot be said also that the vyavahārika is what is negated by the knowledge of Brahman, while the prātibhāsika is what is negated by the knowledge of something else,—for according to the Advaitins themselves, the prātibhāsika silver too is negated by the knowledge of Brahman, and also the knowledge of Brahman alone is correct knowledge according to them. It cannot be said also that the vyavahārika is what is negated by correct knowledge, while the prātibhāsika is what is negated by illusory knowledge, for as shown above the knowledge of Brahman negates that also which is negated by illusory knowledge, (i.e. the prātibhāsika negated by the vyavahārika). It cannot be said also that the vyavahārika is what is negated by the knowledge of pure Brahman while the prātibhāsika is what is negated by the knowledge of something else, for what is meant by the term “pure” here? It cannot stand for the substratum of the erroneous knowledge, for if there be a knowledge of pure Brahman there can be no error. As shown above again and again, the pure Brahman being essentially self-luminous, there can be no ajñāna veiling Him, i.e. jñāna and ajñāna being mutually contradictory and exclusive cannot possibly co-exist. Again, the term “pure” cannot stand for Brahman—without a second—yet not *known* as such, i.e. the upalakṣita Brahman, for if the knowledge of the śuddha Brahman is to stand for that of the upalakṣita Brahman, then the Vedānta-texts, concerned with the one, without any distinction, must be taken to be concerned with distinctions. The same argument goes to refute the view that the vyavahārika is what is negated by the knowledge of the great texts like “Thou art that” while the prātibhāsika is what is negated by the knowledge of something else,—for the great texts, being due to the Vedānta, concerned with a distinctionless object, must be free from distinctions, and as such cannot be negatory of the vyavahārika,² and if they refer to distinctions, then those distinctions must be real. Hence it cannot be said also that the vyavahārika is what is negated by knowledge which does not designate distinction, while the prātibhāsika is what is negated by knowledge which does so. Finally, it cannot be said that

¹ Artha-kriyā-kārin.

² See above.

the vyavahārika is what is negated by the pāramārthika, while the prātibhāsika is what is negated by the vyavahārika, for that is to assume the very thing to be explained.¹

We conclude, therefore, that there is no way of distinguishing between the pāramārthika and the apāramārthika, and between the vyavahārika and the prātibhāsika, and hence the sattvā-traividhya-vāda falls to the ground.

(C) *Criticism of Drṣṭi-srṣṭi-vāda.*

According to the doctrine of Drṣṭi-srṣṭi-vāda, the entire universe is generated by perception only, i.e. a thing is so long as it is *perceived*, e.g. the body of Devadatta, who is sleeping, does not exist for him, though it exists for Yajñadatta who is awake and is perceiving it. According to this view recognition is simply an error, like the perception "This is that lamp", the fact being that the real lamp never persists for two consecutive moments.

This view is evidently absurd. According to the Advaitins themselves, there are six things which are beginningless—viz. Jīva, Īśvara, pure cit, the distinction between the jīva and Īśvara, avidyā, and the connection between the cit and avidyā. Hence, the universe being beginningless, must be permanent.²

Further, if the entire universe be due to perception, then the effect, being of the form of perception only, cannot be said to be due to its own particular cause, e.g. we have to say that a pot is due to the perception of one who is perceiving it at that moment, and not to clay. But if an effect be not due to its cause, then the scriptural injunctions regarding the performance of sacrifices, etc. leading to heaven, or of śravaṇa, etc. leading to salvation, are simply meaningless. And the Advaitins themselves ought not to take food for allaying hunger, or utter words for making others understand their thoughts.³

On this view, objects like pots, etc. have no existence beyond the particular perceptions of particular individuals, and this makes ordinary activity impossible. Further, on this view, illusion itself becomes impossible. Thus, if the nacre does not exist prior to being perceived, then when a man perceives "This is a piece of silver", there is generated only silver, and no nacre, and hence the perception cannot be said to be a false perception due to the super-imposition of the silver on the nacre. Also, the knowledge "This is a piece of

¹ Ś.K., pp. 83–84.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 105.

³ *Op. cit.*

silver" and the knowledge "This is not a piece of silver" are concerned with different objects (i.e. the object of the first piece of knowledge is "silver", because thing = perception, while the object of the second piece of knowledge is "not-silver"), and hence the latter cannot negate the former. Also, this very negation of the illusory silver being itself *dr̥ṣṭi-sr̥ṣṭa*, the illusory silver must be true.¹

Further, during deep sleep, universal dissolution, etc., the distinction between the soul and Brahman must be non-existent, there being no perceiver of it. Every day (i.e. after deep sleep) and after every dissolution, even the freed souls will be again involved in mundane existence. Also, there being no impressions of past karmas (these being not perceived), the same man who went to sleep may not arise again. Salvation itself being *dr̥ṣṭi-sr̥ṣṭa*, must be false.²

Further, if a mere perception gives rise to a pot etc., that very perception, being *dr̥ṣṭi-sr̥ṣṭa*, like everything else, must be itself due to another perception, that to another perception and so on to infinity. The very doctrine of *dr̥ṣṭi-sr̥ṣṭi-vāda* being itself *dr̥ṣṭi-sr̥ṣṭa*, must be false and hence things cannot be *dr̥ṣṭi-sr̥ṣṭa*.³

This doctrine also fails to explain the fact of recognition, such as "This is that pot". The example of a candle is not to the point, for a candle is being consumed, i.e. changed, every moment, but not pots etc. Pots etc. are permanent, and so too the perceiving self and this makes recognition and memory possible. If everything be *dr̥ṣṭi-sr̥ṣṭa*, then the knowledge of non-dualism must also be so, and hence it cannot be negatory of the knowledge of plurality.⁴

If it be said that the following inference proves that the entire universe is *dr̥ṣṭi-sr̥ṣṭa*, viz.—The Universe is *dr̥ṣṭi-sr̥ṣṭa*, because it is *mithyā* like dream-objects—then we reply that the example quoted is not correct, because dream-objects are not *mithyā*, being created by the Supreme Lord Himself.⁵

In the very same manner, the Universe too is real, being created by the Supreme Lord. The Universe also leads to successful practical reaction and hence it must be real. It cannot be objected that mere leading to successful practical reactions is not a sure criterion of reality, seeing that often what is merely superimposed—viz. the

¹ Ś.K., p. 105.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 105.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 105-106.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 106.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 107-9. The arguments that the *jīva* is not the creator of dream-objects, are exactly similar to those of Nimbārka. See above.

illusory snake etc.—lead to successful practical reactions—for the very superimposition of a non-existent thing is not possible.¹

The Universe is real because it is protected by the Lord. Thus, has the Lord a direct knowledge of the falsity of the world or not? If He has such a knowledge, then why should He have any inclination to protect it, and if He has not, then He cannot be held to be omniscient. If it be said that a magician protects false objects, why not the Lord? Then, we point out that the magician never does so—he simply shows *real* objects, which are past or in some other places, through the power of gems, mantras etc., but never knows them directly nor protects them. But the Lord being omniscient cannot wish to protect what is mithyā. Hence we conclude that the world is real, because it is created and protected by the Lord and leads to successful practical reactions, but is never *dr̥ṣṭi-sṛṣṭa*, or generated by perception.²

(iv) *Criticism of rival theories regarding the relation between Brahman, the cit and the acit.*

(A) *Criticism of Abheda-vāda.*

The view that the cit and the acit are absolutely identical with Brahman is absolutely untenable, and has already been criticised above. The fact is that the distinction between Brahman and the cit and the acit is a natural one and persists throughout.³

(B) *Criticism of Atyanta-bheda-vāda.*

The opposite extreme view too is not tenable, for this makes the abheda-texts false, while the fact is that Scripture as a whole is true, and no texts may be taken to be false.⁴

(C) *Criticism of Viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda.*

Here the author follows Devācārya exactly.⁵

¹ Ś.K., pp. 109–110. The arguments are exactly similar to Purusottama. See above.

² Ś.K., p. 110.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 29–30.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 97, 99.

⁵ See above.

X. Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava II.

(1) HIS LIFE AND DATE.

Puruṣottamaprasāda is said to have been born in the city of Jagādhari in Kurukṣetra in the Vikrama era 1680, i.e. 1623 A.D. He was the only son of Nārāyaṇaprasāda, a Gauḍīya Brahmin, who was a follower of the creed of Svabhūdeva of the sect of Nimbārka. Being an only child, Puruṣottamaprasāda was spoilt by his father, and spent his time in idle pastimes, instead of in study, till he was nine years of age. Thereupon his father took him to his preceptor, Dharmadeva, and left him in his care. Dharmadeva initiated and instructed him with great care and taught him the holy mantra of the Lord Hayagrīva (= horse-necked).¹ He composed an elaborate commentary, styled "Śrutyanta-sura-druma", on Nimbārka's "Saviśeṣa-nirviśeṣa-Śrī-Kṛṣṇa-stava-rāja". He is said to have composed it in compliance with the request of his preceptor Dharmadeva.² He wrote also a commentary, styled "Adhyātma-sudhā-taraṅgiṇī",³ on Śrīnivāsa's

¹ Within a year, so the tradition goes, the Lord, being pleased with the boy, appeared to him in a dream and asked him to ask for a boon. The boy prayed that he might soon be well-versed in all the vedas and thereby fulfil the heart's desire of his father and teacher. He was granted the boon. He sent the information to his father who wanted him to stay on with his preceptor and continue his studies. He engaged himself to studies with whole-hearted devotion and learned everything within three years. At the age of thirteen he returned home, and is said to have defeated all the heretics and preached the Vaiṣṇava religion all around.

² Preface to Ś.S., p. 2.

The tradition is that the Lord appeared before him on his request and wrote on the book with His own hand.

³ That this Puruṣottamaprasāda is not identical with Puruṣottamaprasāda I is evident from the following:

(a) The colophon to the 1st taraṅga of the "Adhyātma-sudhā-taraṅgiṇī" is as follows: "Iti Śrī-Hayagrīvānugrahāśritena Puruṣottamaprasādākhyena Vaiṣṇavena Viracitāyām Adhyātma-sudhā-taraṅgiṇyām pratyāgātmanirṇayo nāma prathama-taraṅgaḥ", p. 15. (The colophons to other six taraṅgas mention no name). The exactly similar colophon is found at the end of "Śrutyanta-sura-druma" thus: Iti Śrī-Hayagrīvānugrahaikasevakena Śrī-Niyamānandānuyāyinā Śrī-Puruṣottamaprasādākhyena Vaiṣṇavena viracite Saviśeṣa-nirviśeṣa-Śrī-Kṛṣṇa-stava-vyākhyāne Śrutyanta-sura-drume caramā śākhā", p. 246. (The same colophon is repeated at the end of each śākhā). This proves that these two works must be composed by the same Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava.

"Laghu-stava-rāja-stotram". A third work by him is "Mukunda-mahimā-stava", a collection of a hundred and one hymns in praise of Lord Kṛṣṇa.

He is said to have composed also a very learned book, called "Para-tattva-nirṇaya", but it has not yet been found as a whole.¹

(3) HIS DOCTRINE.

He accepts the usual tenets of the sect. His main concern is, like Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava I, to criticise the Advaita doctrine and in most places he repeats his arguments.² We notice here*one original criticism by him.

(i) *Criticism of the Advaita view of Anirvacanīya-vāda.*

There is neither any lakṣaṇa or definition, nor any pramāṇa or proof, of anirvacanīyatva. It cannot be said that the anirvacanīya is what is different from the sat or the existent, for a hare's horn e.g. is different from the sat, but is taken to be not anirvacanīya, but tuccha. It cannot be said that it is what is different from the asat or the non-existent, because Brahman is different from the non-existent, yet He is not taken to be anirvacanīya. It cannot be said that it is what is different from both sat and the asat, for a thing must be either sat or asat. It cannot be said that the anirvacanīya is what is not the locus of either existence or non-existence, for in that case Brahman, who is not the locus of any quality, must be taken to be anirvacanīya. It cannot be said that the anirvacanīya is what cannot be depicted, for whatever cannot be depicted must be simply non-existent, also Brahman, who, according to the Advaitins cannot be

(b) The author of "Adhyātma-sudhā-taraṅgiṇī" was a worshipper of the Lord Hayagrīva, as is evident from the colophon "Śrī-Hayagrīvanugrahāśritena". And Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava II was also a worshipper of Hayagrīva.

(c) The author of "Adhyātma-sudhā-taraṅgiṇī" was a disciple of Dharmadeva, a descendent of Svabhūdeva, as is evident from the opening verse: "Śrī-Dharmadevapādābjaṃ Svabhū-vaṃśābdhi-sambhavam" etc., p. 1. And Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava II also was a disciple of Dharmadeva.

¹ Preface to Ś.S., p. 2.

² E.g., his criticism of the Advaita view that Brahman cannot be the cause of the world (pp. 11ff.), of Adhyāsa-vāda and dialectic on ajñāna (pp. 13ff.), etc.

depicted, must be anirvacanīya. It cannot be said that it is what is different from the existent, different from the non-existent and different from both the existent and the non-existent, for as shown above, the existent and the non-existent being mutually opposed cannot be denied simultaneously. For the same reason, it cannot be said that the anirvacanīya is what is devoid of existence, devoid of non-existence and devoid of both existence and non-existence. Also, what is meant by the terms "existence" and "non-existence" here? Firstly, it cannot be said that existence means a class and non-existence the absence of that, for in that case, Brahman who has no class becomes anirvacanīya, i.e. unreal, while the world which has a class becomes real. Secondly, it cannot be said that existence is what leads to successful practical reaction, while non-existence is what does not, for the very same reason, seeing that Brahman does not lead to any practical reaction, not being the basis of action at all, while the world does so. Thirdly, it cannot be said that existence is what is incapable of being negated, while non-existence is what is so capable, for according to the Advaitins, the anirvacanīya is capable of being negated, yet it is not the same as the non-existent. Fourthly, it cannot be said that existence is what is established by the sources of knowledge, while non-existence is what is not so established, for the anirvacanīya cannot be established by any source of knowledge, yet it is not non-existent. The pure Brahman too is not capable of being established by any source of knowledge yet He is sat. Fifthly, it cannot be said that existence is what is outside all sources of knowledge, for then the existent can have no specific marks of its own, like the sky-flower. Sixthly, it cannot be said that existence is what is free from nothingness, i.e. what is not a non-entity, for then the anirvacanīya, which is not a mere non-entity, like the sky-flower, according to the Advaitins, must be existent. Seventhly, it cannot be said that existence is what is free from Brahmanhood, i.e. what is not Brahman, for then the world must be existent. Eighthly, it cannot be said that existence is what exists at all times and in all places, while non-existence is what does not. Now, we accept this definition, but the Advaita theory itself contradicts it, for according to it, the world etc. which are capable of being depicted (i.e. is nirvacanīya), must be existent. Thus, as it is not clear what exactly is meant by the terms "existence" and "non-existence" here, it cannot be said that the anirvacanīya is what is devoid of existence and non-existence and different from both of these two.

Further, does the anirvacaniya exist (i.e. asti), or not (i.e. nāsti), or is it altogether false (i.e. asat)?¹ It cannot be said to exist, for whatever exists must have some mark by which it can be distinguished from others and depicted, e.g. when we say "The pot exists", the very existence of the pot means that it is something which is capable of being depicted by some mark or other. But the anirvacaniya cannot be depicted and hence cannot be distinguished from anything else and therefore cannot be known, as all knowledge implies assimilation and discrimination. But if the anirvacaniya cannot be known, it cannot be *denied* too, for just as knowledge (or affirmation) must be of a *definite* thing so denial too must be so. In fact, nothing at all can possibly be said of the anirvacaniya, as it is absolutely indefinite, indeterminable and indescribable. It can neither be affirmed, nor denied.

Thus, we conclude that no definition of the anirvacaniya is ever possible.²

It has also no pramāṇa or proof. It is not an object of direct perception, as alleged by the Advaitins, for when we mistake a nacre for a silver, what we see for the time being, is not any anirvacaniya silver, but the *real* silver-elements in the nacre.³ Thus, the anirvacaniya is outside the sphere of all pramāṇas.⁴

XI. Mādhava Mukunda.

(1) LIFE AND DATE.

Nothing is known definitely about his life and date. Keśava Kāśmīrī Bhaṭṭa, as we have seen, refers to one Mukunda as his guru. But we have no means of ascertaining whether he means Mādhava Mukunda or not.

(2) WORKS.

His only known treatise is Para-pakṣagiri-vajra, or Hārda-saṅcāya, in which he severely criticises the various Advaita Vedānta tenets of Śaṅkara and his followers. His arguments are similar to

¹ The difference between "nāstitva" and "asattvā" is that while the former applies to things which *are*, though are not here and now, as "the pot is not", the latter applies to what is never existent at all, as the sky-flower.

² Ś.S., pp. 18ff.

³ Cf. the doctrine of Sat-khyāti. See footnote (1) below.

⁴ Ś.S., pp. 20ff.

those of Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava I (in his Śrutyanta-kalpavalli) which have already been set forth in details.

XII. Vanamāli Mīśra.

(1) LIFE AND DATE.

He lived in a village called Triyaga, near Brindavan, and belonged to the Bharadvāja clan.

(2) WORKS.

He composed a treatise, called Vedānta-siddhānta-saṃgraha or Śruti-siddhānta-saṃgraha. It consists of seven chapters and is written in verse with a commentary in prose. It discusses the tenets of the Nimbārka School.

XIII. Anantarāma.

(1) LIFE AND DATE.

Anantarāma was one of the later followers of Nimbārka. He was the son of Nārāyaṇaprasāda, a Gauḍīya Brāhmaṇa and was born in the village of Jagādharī in the Punjab in the 17th century A.D. He was a disciple of Dharmadāsa.¹ According to this view he must have been a brother of Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava II.

(2) WORKS.

He composed a number of treatises, developing the Svābhāvika-bhēdābheda-vāda of Nimbārka and subjecting the Advaita view to a thorough criticism. But he makes no original contributions and his criticisms of the Advaita view too are borrowed mostly from previous writers.²

His works are the following:—

- (a) Vedānta-tattva-bodha. (Prose.)
- (b) Vedānta-ratna-mālā. (A fairly elaborate treatise in verse, dealing with the three tattvas or categories and their relation.)

¹ Preface to Vedānta-ratna-mālā.

² Cf. his criticism of Nirviśeṣa-vāda. Vedānta-tattva-bodha, pp. 5ff.—which is exactly similar to the arguments of Puruṣottama. Vide V.R.M. See above. Adhyāsa-vāda and dialectic on ajñāna—Vedānta-tattva-bodha, pp. 9ff.—exactly similar to the arguments of Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava I. See Ś.K. See above.

- (c) Tattva-siddhānta-bindu. (Twenty-five verses.)
- (d) Śruti-siddhānta-ratna-mālā.¹
- (e) Vedānta-sāra-padya-mālā.² (Twenty-five verses.).
- (f) Śrī-Kṛṣṇa-carana-bhūṣaṇa-stotram.³ (Seventy-two verses.)
- (g) Śrī-Mukunda-śaraṇāpatti-stotram.⁴ (Seventeen verses.)
- (h) Ācārya-carita.⁵

¹ Preface to Vedāntaratna-mālā.

² Given in S.R., pp. 91-96.

³ S.R., pp. 38-51.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 65-67.

⁵ Preface to Ś.S., p. 2.

COMPARISON OF THE DOCTRINE OF NIMBĀRKA WITH SOME OTHER BHEDĀBHEDA DOCTRINES.

I. Nimbārka and Rāmānuja.

SVĀBHĀVIKA-BHEDĀBHEDA-VĀDA AND VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA-VĀDA.

Rāmānuja's theory is too well-known to be recounted at length. The Highest Reality, or Brahman, according to him, is Viṣṇu or Vāsu-deva, a Personal God, endowed with every auspicious quality and free from all defects.¹ His conception is exactly similar to that of Nimbārka, except that, as we have seen, Nimbārka identifies Brahman with Kṛṣṇa. There is not a single mention of Rādhā or Kṛṣṇa in Rāmānuja's works.

Like Nimbārka, Rāmānuja holds that the individual soul is knowledge, yet a knower, an agent, and an enjoyer, atomic in size, and so on.² Here also, the two are in perfect agreement. But while according to Nimbārka, the individual souls are parts of the Lord in the sense of being His powers or śaktis, according to Rāmānuja they are so in the sense of being His attributes or modes or viśeṣaṇas.³ The same remarks apply to the non-sentient substance too. Like Nimbārka, again, Rāmānuja speaks of three kinds of the non-sentient, viz. prakṛti or matter, kāla or time, and suddha-tattva or pure matter,⁴ this last corresponding to Nimbārka's aprākṛta.

Rāmānuja explains the relation between Brahman, the sentient and the non-sentient on the analogy of the soul-body, or substance-attribute relation, i.e. as a relation of non-separation (aprthaktva). The soul and body, the substance and attribute are different from one another, yet they are inseparably connected, and form a whole. Exactly similar is the case with Brahman, and the sentient and non-

¹ Śrī. B., 1.1.1, pp. 2, 63, chap. 1. Madras ed., etc.

² *Op. cit.*, 2.3.19, pp. 139-141; 2.3.20ff., pp. 141ff.; 2.3.33ff., pp. 151ff. etc. Cf. also V.D. and V.S. on the same sūtras. Vide also Y.M.D., pp. 31ff.

³ Śrī. B., 1.1.1, pp. 61, 96, 101, chap. 1, etc.; 1.2.15, p. 42, chap. 2, etc. V.D., intro. pp. 3-4; etc. V.S., 1.1.1, p. 4, etc.

⁴ Y.M.D., pp. 15ff.

sentient.¹ But Nimbārka takes his stand, as we have seen, on the cause-effect relation. With Rāmānuja the stress is more on the principle of non-difference than on that of difference, but not so with Nimbārka.²

Rāmānuja's view of salvation too is in perfect accord with that of Nimbārka.³

According to Rāmānuja, bhakti is the means to salvation. By bhakti he does not understand devotion or love, as Nimbārka does, but upāsana or meditation.⁴ This bhakti is based on knowledge, and arises from six essential pre-requisites, viz. discrimination of food (viveka), complete disregard for worldly objects (vimoka), continued practice (abhyāsa), performance of sacrifices (kriyā), virtuous conduct, like truthfulness and the rest (kalyāṇa) and freedom from dejection (anavasāda). Bhakti, thus, comprises all ethical virtues. Nimbārka too holds, as we have seen, that meditation, based on knowledge, is a means to salvation, and that mental purity, generated by the external performance of sacrifices and internal practice of self-control and the rest, is its essential pre-requisite.

Thus, from the point of view of philosophy, the main difference between Nimbārka and Rāmānuja consists in their views with regard to the relation between difference and non-difference, God on the one hand, men and the world on the other.

From the point of view of religion, too, there is a difference of spirit between their systems. While Rāmānuja's system, though admitting a personal relation between God and man, is more intellectual, Nimbārka's system is less so, and decidedly more devotional and religious. That is, in Rāmānuja's system, devotion is based on an intellectual apprehension of and the consequent reverence for the supreme majesty of the Lord, keeping the devotee somewhat apart from the Lord,⁵ while in Nimbārka's system, the superseding element is a sweet relation of love and ecstasy, drawing the two nearer in a relation of utmost intimacy.⁶

¹ Śrī. B., 1.1.1, pp. 96, 101, etc., chap. 1; 2.1.15, p. 43, chap. 2, etc. V.D., intro. pp. 1-4. V.S., 1.1.1, p. 4, etc. Vide also S.A.M., pp. 5ff.

² See below under Śrīkaṇṭha.

³ Śrī. B., 1.1.1, pp. 36, 39-72, etc., chap. 1.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, pp. 9ff., chap. 1. "Evam-rūpā dhruvānusmṛtir eva bhaktiśabdenābhidhiyate, upāsana-para-paryāyatvāt bhakti-śabdasya". See above.

⁵ Aīśvarya-pradhānābhakti.

⁶ Mādhurya-pradhānābhakti.

II. Nimbārka and Bhāskara.

SVĀBHĀVIKA-BHEDĀBHEDA-VĀDA AND AUPĀDHKA-BHEDĀBHEDA-VĀDA.

(1) *Introduction.*

Bhāskara is said to have flourished during the reign of King Bhoja about 918-973 Śakābda, i.e. 996-1061 A.D.¹ He wrote a commentary on the Brahma-sūtras, developing a Bhedābheda view and criticising Advaita-vāda or Māyā-vāda.

Eggeling thought that Bhāskara was identical with Nimbārka.² But this view is absolutely untenable. It is clear beyond doubt from Nimbārka's Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha and other works and Bhāskara's commentary that Nimbārka and Bhāskara were two different persons, representing two different schools of thought.

(2) *Brahman.*

The first distinction which is at once evident from a cursory glance through the commentary of Bhāskara is that Bhāskara, unlike Nimbārka, throughout refers to the Highest Reality as Brahman,³ and sometimes as Īśvara,⁴ but not even once calls Him Puruṣottama or Kṛṣṇa, as is done by Nimbārka repeatedly. Bhāskara speaks of no consort of Brahman, as Nimbārka does of Rādhā, as ever accompanying Brahman, i.e. Kṛṣṇa.

Like Nimbārka, Bhāskara holds that Brahman is the Supreme Cause of the entire Universe, its creator, maintainer and destroyer,⁵ its material and efficient cause.⁶ He holds, like all the rest, that Brahman can be known through Scripture alone,⁷ and that Scripture and not reasoning is our guide with regard to super-sensible objects.⁸

¹ Preface to Bh. B., p. 7.

² I.O.C. (Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS., Part IV, 1894, pp. 802, 803). The MSS. referred to by Eggeling are not Nimbārka's commentaries at all, but Bhāskara's, now published in the C.S.S. See Bibliography.

³ Bh. B., 1.1.1, pp. 6, 7; 1.1.2, p. 8; 1.1.3, p. 9, etc. etc. from the beginning to the end.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.2, p. 8; 1.1.12, p. 24; 1.2.6, p. 39; 1.2.9, p. 40, etc.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.2, p. 8; 1.1.11, p. 24, etc.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.2, p. 8; 1.4.22, p. 84; 1.4.26, p. 86, etc.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, p. 8; 1.1.3, p. 9, etc.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.4, pp. 16, 19; 2.2.2, p. 110.

Reasoning, to be of any avail, must follow revelation and never supersede or transcend it.¹

Brahman, according to Bhāskara, has two aspects (*dvi-rūpa*), viz. the *kāraṇa-rūpa* or the causal state and the *kārya-rūpa* or the effected state.² Brahman is one as cause and many as effects, just as gold is one as gold, but many as bracelets, ear-rings etc.³ In other words, Brahman is *bhinnā-bhinna-rūpa*.⁴

But the *abhinna* and *kāraṇa-rūpa* is the real, original and natural form of Brahman, while the *bhinna* and *kārya-rūpa* is due to *upādhi* or limiting adjunct and is, as such, something adventitious,⁵ though real.⁶ By Himself, Brahman is originally without distinction, without form, one and without a second, a pure unity and a pure cause. Then, *afterwards*, He comes to manifest Himself voluntarily in various effects or forms, i.e. comes to have a form, through *upādhi* and plurality, i.e. the universe of souls and matter, follows.⁷

Bhāskara emphasizes this distinction between the transcendent and the immanent⁸ aspects of Brahman again and again.⁹ He points out that the universe has Brahman for its essence, but Brahman has not the universe for His essence.¹⁰ That is the universe has no existence beyond Brahman but Brahman is never exhausted wholly in the universe, but has other aspects too beyond it. Bhāskara is, of course, careful to point out that the *prapañca-rūpa* and the *bhinna-kārya-rūpa* of Brahman is not less real simply because it is something adventitious, and not original, being due to limiting adjunct.¹¹ He, in fact, does not use the term "*upādhi*" in the Śaṅkarite sense, as we shall see later.¹²

¹ Bh. B., 1.1.11, p. 24; 1.3.6, p. 90; 1.1.11, p. 92, etc.

² *Op. cit.*, 1.1.4, p. 19; 1.1.11, p. 24, "Tat kāraṇātmanā kāryātmanā *dvi-rūpeṇa* avasthitam"; 1.2.23, p. 46.

³ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.4, p. 18.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.4, p. 18, "Ato *bhinnābhinna-svarūpaṃ* Brahmeti sthitam".

⁵ Āgantuka.

⁶ Bh. B., 2.3.43, p. 141, "Sa ca *bhinnābhinna-svarūpo* 'abhinna-svābhāvikam *aupādhikam* tu *bhinna-rūpaṃ*"; cf. also 3.2.27 (written as 3.2.26 in order to be in conformity with the numbering of sūtras by Śaṅkara), p. 170; 4.1.3, p. 221; 4.4.4, p. 243. See below.

⁷ Bh. B., 3.2.11, p. 165.

⁸ *Prapañca-vilakṣaṇa* and *prapañca-lakṣaṇa*.

⁹ Bh. B., 1.1.20, p. 29; 1.2.23, p. 46.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, 3.2.11, p. 165; 3.2.13, p. 166; 3.2.23, p. 169; 3.4.8, p. 202.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, 3.2.11, p. 165; 3.2.23, p. 168; etc. See below.

¹² See below.

Bhāskara points out that even when Brahman manifests Himself as effects, He never Himself actually *becomes* the Universe, but remains unchanged and unmodified in nature, as a spider remains unchanged, though weaving its web out of itself.¹ Creation means the manifestation of Brahman's power,² and Brahman's immanence in the created effects is not His actual transformation in the form of those effects, but is simply His abiding within the universe and within the hearts of men as their Inner Controller and Inner Soul,³ Himself remaining in His pristine exalted condition, absolutely unaffected by their defects and miseries.⁴

Now, Nimbārka agrees with Bhāskara in holding that Brahman is both transcendent and immanent, i.e. both the transcendent creator and the immanent ruler; that He is never actually transformed into the form of the Universe and that transformation means nothing but projection of His power.⁵

But in Nimbārka we do not find any such sharp and emphatic distinction between the two forms of Brahman, His *kāraṇa-rūpa* and His *kārya-rūpa*. According to Nimbārka, Brahman, of course, has a *kāraṇa-rūpa* when He is a pure cause, without producing any effects, e.g. during the time of universal dissolution; but even in His causal state, Brahman is not absolutely non-differenced, or *nirviśeṣa*, a pure unity or a bare identity as Bhāskara holds. According to Bhāskara in His causal state, Brahman is free from all distinctions whatsoever, i.e. He has then no internal differences⁶ even, i.e. His powers and qualities involve no difference in Him. During His causal state the sentient and the non-sentient — His two powers, remain completely merged in Him, like a grain of salt in the sea,⁷ and His qualities, such as knowledge and the rest, are non-different from Him, just as heat, the quality of fire, is non-different from fire, and do not imply any difference of nature on His part.⁸ In short, according to Bhāskara, Brahman is an *abstract Unity* in His causal state, with no internal

¹ Bh. B., 2.1.14, p. 96.

² *Op. cit.*, 1.4.25, p. 85; 2.1.14, pp. 96, 97; 2.1.27, p. 105.

³ *Op. cit.*, 1.2.5-6, p. 39; 1.2.18, p. 44.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.17, p. 26; 1.2.8, p. 40; 1.3.7, pp. 52, 53; 1.4.21, p. 82; 2.1.22, p. 103.

⁵ Śakti-vikṣepa.

⁶ Cp. the three kinds of *bhedas*, *sajātiya*, *vijātiya* and *svagata*.

⁷ See below.

⁸ Bh. B., 3.2.23, p. 169; 4.4.7, p. 244.

differences, but becomes a concrete unity in His effected state, with the internal differences of the sentient and the non-sentient. But for Nimbārka, Brahman is always differenced or *saviśeṣa*, in the sense that He has always internal differences, i.e. is always a *concrete-Unity* even during His causal state. The sentient and the non-sentient are *never* absolutely identical with Brahman, *never* absolutely merged and absorbed in Him like a grain of salt thrown into the sea, but always retain their own individuality and separateness even during salvation and dissolution, and as such, they always constitute the internal differences of Brahman. Thus, a pure, non-differenced unity is a thing unknown to Nimbārka. Nimbārka, in fact, does not think it necessary to note the *kāraṇa-rūpa* of Brahman separately from His *kārya-rūpa* for the evident reason that he thinks that there is no fundamental distinction between them to require special mention.

According to Bhāskara, as according to Nimbārka, Brahman is a qualified Being although, as noted above, the qualities of Brahman involve no difference in His own nature.¹ Brahman is pure existence and pure knowledge,² yet He is a knower or possesses knowledge as His quality.³ He is omniscient and omnipotent.⁴ He has many other qualities too, such as freedom from sins, freedom from fear, etc.⁵

It is curious that Bhāskara never directly refers to Brahman as possessed of innumerable qualities,⁶ as Nimbārka repeatedly does.⁷ He throughout emphasizes only one quality of Brahman, viz. Omniscience. Everywhere he refers to Brahman as Omniscient and Omnipotent.⁸ Again and again, these two adjectives are coupled together and prefixed before the word "Brahman", whenever the word is mentioned⁹. In many other places, again, he speaks of Brahman

¹ Bh. B., 3.2.23, p. 169 ("Na dharmadharmibhedena svarūpabhedahy"), 4.4.7 (p. 244).

² *Op. cit.*, 3.2.15, 16, p. 166; 3.2.17, p. 166; 3.2.19, p. 167; 3.2.23, pp. 168-169. Brahman is *sal-lakṣaṇa* and *bodha-lakṣaṇa*.

³ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.2, etc.

⁴ See below.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.20, p. 29; 1.2.8, p. 40; 1.2.18, p. 44, etc.

⁶ *Ananta-guṇa*.

⁷ Vide V.P.S., 1.1.1, p. 1 (page references are to the K.S.S. ed., throughout); 3.2.11, p. 279, etc. etc.; Ś.N.K.S., Śloka 1, etc.

⁸ *Sarvajña* and *sarva-śakti*.

⁹ Bh. B., 1.1.2, p. 8; 1.1.11, p. 24; 1.2.6, p. 39; 1.4.26, p. 83; 2.1.14, pp. 96, 97; 2.1.24, p. 104; 2.1.33, p. 107; 2.2.37 (printed as 2.2.40 in conformity with the numbering of Śaṅkara), p. 128, etc. etc.

as possessed of infinite and inconceivable powers.¹ With him, thus, the stress is throughout on the wonderful and innumerable *powers* (śakti), of Brahman, rather than on His wonderful and innumerable *qualities* (guṇa), as with Nimbārka. In fact, not once does he take the trouble of describing Brahman as an abode of all auspicious qualities etc., but rather takes it for granted that Brahman is possessed of various qualities, and speaks of some of them incidentally in connection with discussing the import of certain scriptural texts.² More particularly, he never refers to those softer qualities of the Lord which play so prominent a part in the system of Nimbārka and especially in that of his followers. He, of course, like all the rest, describes Brahman as blissful,³ but not once does he speak of Brahman's beauty, loveliness or grace.

Bhāskara, in fact, does not regard Brahman as a personal and embodied being as Nimbārka does. According to Nimbārka, as we have seen, the Lord is the Highest Person or Puruṣottama, possessed of a celestial body, full of divine beauty and grace. But Bhāskara does not speak of the body of Brahman. He also makes no mention of incarnations as Nimbārka does and in his criticism of the Pāñcarātra system⁴ he definitely rejects the theory of four vyūhas,—which is accepted by Nimbārka and his followers.

There is not a single mention of the grace of the Lord in Bhāskara's commentary,⁵ and never does he call Brahman "bhaktavatsala", etc. which Nimbārka does so often. According to Bhāskara, Brahman is to be worshipped indeed, but not as a Personal God of love and grace, but as a formless and distinctionless entity, in whatever way that might be possible.⁶ Thus, while according to Nimbārka, the Lord is to be known, *loved* and worshipped, according to Bhāskara, Brahman is to be known and worshipped, and not loved.

Bhāskara holds, in opposition to Śaṅkara, that Brahman, though not something to be produced, modified and purified, is yet something

¹ Bh. B., 1.4.25, p. 85; 2.1.14, pp. 97, 98; 2.1.30, p. 106; 2.2.2, p. 110; 2.4.4, p. 146; etc. Ananta-acintya-śakti.

² *Op. cit.*, 1.1.20; 1.2.8; etc.

³ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.12-19, pp. 24-29.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 2.2.38-40 (printed as 2.2.41-44 in the book in conformity with Śaṅkara's numbering of the sūtras), pp. 128-129.

⁵ See below under "sādhana".

⁶ I.e. as nirākāra and nirviśeṣa. See below.

to be obtained.¹ He is to be approached by freed souls and to be obtained by them.²

Here Nimbārka agrees with Bhāskara.³ This question is connected with the question whether salvation is a positive acquisition, or a mere negative removal of nescience (as held by Śaṅkara), which will be considered below.⁴

Thus, we conclude that although there is a general agreement between Nimbārka and Bhāskara with regard to the nature and qualities of Brahman, as the Universal Cause etc., yet there is a vital point of divergence between the two in that Nimbārka does not countenance the purely formless and distinctionless aspect of Brahman on which Bhāskara lays so great a stress.

(3) *The cit.*

Like Nimbārka, Bhāskara holds that the soul is knowledge by nature and a knower,⁵ and an enjoyer,⁶ and an active agent;⁷ that in size, it is atomic⁸ and that in number it is infinite.⁹

But the fundamental difference between Nimbārka and Bhāskara is that Bhāskara holds that although the soul is an enjoyer, etc. yet its state of being an enjoyer, an agent, atomic and innumerable¹⁰ is neither original and natural, nor eternal, but due to limiting adjuncts and adventitious, lasting so long only as the limiting adjunct itself does.¹¹

This follows from the peculiar doctrine of Bhāskara, that the individual soul is different-nondifferent from Brahman¹² during the

¹ Bh. B., 1.1.4, p. 20. Contrast Ś.B., 1.1.4, pp. 161ff., i.e. according to Bhāskara, Brahman, though not upādya, vikārya and saṃskārya, is yet āpya.

² *Op. cit.*, 1.2.4, p. 38; 1.2.13, p. 41; 1.3.1, p. 52.

³ See above Nimbārka's doctrine of salvation.

⁴ See below under "Mokṣa".

⁵ Bh. B., 2.3.18, p. 135.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.17, p. 26; 1.2.8, p. 40; 1.3.7, pp. 52-53; 2.1.22, p. 103.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.33-39, pp. 138-139.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.19-28, pp. 135-137.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, 1.4.21, p. 52; 2.2.37 (printed as 2.2.40 in the book in conformity with Śaṅkara's numbering), p. 128.

¹⁰ Bhokṭṛtva, kartṛtva, apūtva and anantatva.

¹¹ I.e. not svābhāvika and nitya, but aupādhika, āgantuka and anitya.

¹² Bh. B., 1.1.17, p. 26; 1.2.6, p. 39; 1.2.20, p. 45; 1.4.21, p. 81; 2.1.22, p. 103; 2.3.43, p. 141; 3.2.6, p. 162; 3.2.28-29 (printed as 3.2.27-28 in conformity with Śaṅkara's numbering), p. 170. See below.

state of mundane existence only, but originally, i.e. during the causal state of Brahman, it was non-different from Brahman and ultimately, i.e. during the states of dissolution and salvation, it will be non-different from Brahman.¹

Thus, during the state of mundane existence, i.e. during the effected state of Brahman, the individual soul, as a part and an effect of Brahman and as abiding in and resting on Him, is non-different from Him, because the part is non-different from the whole, the effect from the cause, the support from the supported.² Yet at the same time, it is different from Brahman because of the upādhi or limiting adjunct which separates it from Brahman. Curiously enough, Bhāskara illustrates his theory by the examples used by both Parīṇāma-vādins and Vivarta-vādins. He says that the individual soul is a part of the Supreme Being, a part due to the limiting adjunct of beginningless avidyā and karma, just as a spark is of fire, or the ether within the ear (limited by the upādhi 'ear') is of the universal ether or the vital air within everybody (limited by the upādhi 'body') is of the universal air.³ Thus, whenever Bhāskara speaks of the individual soul as a part of Brahman, he cites the example of spark and fire, but says at the same time that the individual soul is a part of Brahman *due to upādhis*.⁴

It is clear, therefore, that by the term "upādhi" Bhāskara does not understand something false or illusory, as Śaṅkara does, otherwise he would not have quoted the example of spark and fire, a spark being a *real* part of fire. As we have seen above, he says that the upādhis are beginningless avidyā and karma.⁵ Again, in another place, he says that the upādhis are buddhi, the internal organ etc., and their qualities, viz. attachment etc., based on the sense of egoity.⁶ What he means is that so long as the individual soul is under the clutches of avidyā⁷ and regards itself as absolutely different from

¹ See below under "Relation between Brahman, cit and acit.

² Bh. B., 1.4.2, p. 72; 2.1.14, p. 93; 2.1.18, p. 101; 2.4.4, p. 145; 2.1.19, p. 102.

³ *Op. cit.*, 1.4.21, p. 81.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.43, p. 140; 3.2.30 (printed as 3.2.29 in conformity with Śaṅkara's numbering), p. 170. Vide also 3.2.19, p. 167 and 3.2.29, pp. 167-168.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 1.4.21, p. 81.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.29-30, p. 137.

⁷ Avidyā is defined thus: "Śarīrāday-anātma-buddhiḥ". Bh. B., 1.1.4, p. 21; vide also p. 19.

Brahman¹, it is led on to perform kāmya-karmas etc.— i.e. act in a selfish spirit, and this leads it to be connected with matter, i.e. with the body, the senses, buddhi, internal organ etc., and matter serves as a limiting adjunct to differentiate it from Brahman.

Bhāskara admits, therefore, the *reality* of upādhis. He explicitly says that what is aupādhika is *not* apāramārthika.² The difference between what is svābhāvika or natural and what is aupādhika or unnatural is not a difference between what is real and what is unreal, but only a difference between what is original and *real for ever* (nitya) and what is adventitious and not real for ever, but *for a time being only* (anitya). Bhāskara points out that what is adventitious and not original is not necessarily false, e.g. a thing which has no heat within it, may become hot when in contact with fire (as an iron pot placed over fire), but this heat which is something adventitious is not something unreal.³ Thus, according to Bhāskara, what is aupādhika is real, *very real*, so far as it goes, i.e. so long as the upādhi lasts, but ceases to be so as soon as the upādhi ceases. This sense of the 'aupādhika' is exactly opposed to the Śaṅkarite sense of it. According to Śaṅkara, what is aupādhika is *never* real, for if it be real, it could not be ever-negated. Śaṅkara thus identifies reality with *permanence*. According to him, what is existent or sat is true for all times. But according to Bhāskara, reality and permanence are not necessarily identical. A real thing may be non-permanent, i.e. be real *for a time only* and not all throughout. According to Bhāskara, therefore, the non-difference of the soul from Brahman is SVĀBHĀVIKA, i.e. REAL AND LASTING, being real always,— during the state of mundane existence as well as during the states of dissolution and salvation; while its difference from Brahman is *aupādhika*, i.e. *real, though not lasting*, being real during the state of mundane existence only.⁴

¹ Bh. B., 2.3.20, p. 137. "Yāvadāyam ātmā kevalena dvaitadarśanena saṃsaratī tāvat-kālabhāvi buddhyādyupādhi-yogaḥ."

² *Op. cit.*, 2.3.40, p. 139. "Na caupādhikam kartṛtvam apāramārthikam."

³ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.40, p. 139.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.43, pp. 140-141; 3.2.6, p. 162; 3.2.26 (printed as 3.2.25 in conformity with the numbering of Śaṅkara), pp. 161-162; 4.1.3, p. 221; 4.4.4, p. 243. See below under "Relation between Brahman, cit and acit". It is interesting to compare the view of Bhāskara with that of Auḍulomi (as given by Bhāskara himself). According to Auḍulomi (Bhāskara points out) the soul is absolutely different, or atyanta-bhinna from Brahman during its state of bondage, but becomes different from Him during its state of release. (Bh. B., 1.4.20, p. 81). Bhāskara criticises this view in the next sūtra (*op. cit.*, 1.4.21,

When the upādhi is removed, then the soul becomes one with Brahman, just as when the pot is broken, the ether within the pot becomes one with the universal ether,¹ or just as a grain of salt when thrown into the sea becomes one with the salt water.² It attains the pure form of the Supreme Self³ and becomes omniscient and omnipotent⁴ and all-pervading⁵ like Brahman, it becomes the Universal soul like Him.⁶

After having thus considered what exactly is the significance of the term "upādhi" in Bhāskara, we can now understand clearly why and in what sense Bhāskara calls the soul's state of being an agent, an enjoyer and atomic of the soul, *aupādhika* merely and not natural. He points out that if the soul were a natural agent, it would have continued to act *always*, but since where there is action there is enjoyment and where there is enjoyment there is mundane existence, the soul would have been subject to the mundane existence always and would have never been free.⁷ The fact is that the soul is an agent so long as it has a body, senses, etc., so long as it is connected with the upādhis of matter, but it is no longer an agent when the upādhi is no more, just as a carpenter is an agent when he has his tools with him and not otherwise,⁸ or just as fire produces smoke when it is in contact with fuel and not otherwise.⁹ And this agency of the soul, though *aupādhika*, is not unreal,¹⁰ i.e. the soul though not always an agent is a *real* one, so long as it remains as such, i.e. during its state of bondage. The (*aupādhika*) agency of the soul is dependent upon Brahman¹¹—a point common with Nimbārka, according to whom also its agency is dependent on Him.

p. 81) and points out that the soul can never be *absolutely different* from Brahman, for even during the state of mundane existence it is the Supreme Soul Himself who abides as the individual soul. Even the upādhi or matter cannot make the soul *absolutely different* from Brahman, just as the spark is not absolutely different from fire, or the ether within the ear-hole from the universal ether. Hence, even during the state of mundane existence the souls are not *atyanta-bhinna* from Brahman, but *bhinnābhinna* from Him.

¹ Bh. B., 4.4.4, p. 243.

² *Op. cit.*, 4.2.15, p. 231.

³ *Op. cit.*, 4.4.2, p. 242.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 4.4.7, p. 244.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 4.4.15, p. 247.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 4.4.7, p. 244.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.4, p. 139. "Na svābhāvikaṃ kartṛtvam, anirmokṣa-prasaṅgāt".

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.40, p. 139.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, 3.4.25, (printed as 3.4.26 in conformity with the numbering of Śaṅkara), p. 210.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.40, p. 139.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.41, p. 140.

The soul's state of being an agent too is similarly *aupādhika*, lasting so long only as karmas and their results, viz. the body etc., do.¹

The atomicity of the soul too is *aupādhika* only, for it, as non-different from Brahman, is all-pervading by nature.²

Bhāskara does not say explicitly whether the soul's state of being innumerable too is *aupādhika* only; but in view of the fact that the freed souls merge absolutely into Brahman, as salt in the sea,³ it is evident that it too is *aupādhika*, seeing that a grain of salt thrown into the sea and immediately dissolved in it cannot, of course, be distinguished from a thousand other grains so thrown.

Only the soul's state of being a knower is not *aupādhika*, but is natural, for the soul being Brahman Himself,—who is a knower—is always knowledge and a knower.⁴

Now, if we compare this view of Bhāskara with that of Nimbārka, we find how divergent are their opinions on some very fundamental points. Firstly, according to Nimbārka, the soul is a knower, an agent an enjoyer, atomic in size and infinite in number, all *throughout*, in bondage as in release, secondly, the soul is *always* different-non-different from Brahman, but can never become absolutely identical with Him. Hence while according to Nimbārka, the soul's state of being an agent, an enjoyer, atomic, innumerable and different-nondifferent from Brahman are *svābhāvika*, i.e. real and ever-lasting, according to Bhāskara they are *aupādhika*, i.e. real but temporary.

Like Nimbārka, Bhāskara holds that the souls and the world are powers of Brahman. Brahman has two powers—*bhogyā-śakti* and *bhoktr-śakti*. The first is transformed into the non-sentient world, the second into sentient souls.

As regards the different states of the soul, viz. dream, deep sleep, etc. Bhāskara agrees generally with Nimbārka, only unlike Nimbārka, he holds that the dream-creations are not real and that they are created by the individual soul and not by the Lord.⁵

As regards the different destinies and paths of the soul, Bhāskara is in complete agreement with Nimbārka.

¹ Bh. B., 3.4.25, (printed as 26 in conformity with the numbering of Śaṅkara), p. 210.

² *Op. cit.*, 3.3.29-32, pp. 137-138; 4.4.15, p. 247.

³ See below.

⁴ Bh. B. 2.3.18, p. 135. "Svābhāvikaṁ cāśya brahma-rūpam, *aupādhikam* itarat".

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 2.1.27, p. 105.

(4) *The acit.*

Bhāskara agrees with Nimbārka generally as regards the process of creation and dissolution, etc.,¹ but he differs from him in holding that the universe, like the individual souls, is different-nondifferent from Brahman during His effected state, but non-different from Him during His causal state. It is different-nondifferent from Brahman during the state of mundane existence for the very same reasons the souls are so, as noted above²—i.e. non-different as a part and effect of Brahman³ and different as matter. But during dissolution it becomes merged in Brahman and absolutely one with it, just as a lump of salt, thrown into the sea, becomes absolutely one with and non-distinguishable from it. And, just as everything thrown into a salt-lake becomes salt, so the non-sentient merged in the sentient becomes sentient indeed.⁴

But according to Nimbārka, as we have seen, the non-sentient matter can never discard its own nature and become sentient Brahman, and therefore the Universe is *always* different-nondifferent from Brahman, during creation as well as dissolution.

Bhāskara also does not speak of the three kinds of the non-sentient, aprākṛta, kāla, etc., but of the universe alone, which he points out—in opposition to Śaṅkara and in agreement with Nimbārka—is real⁵ and eternal.⁶

(5) *The relation between Brahman, the cit and the acit.*

Like Nimbārka, Bhāskara recognises three eternal realities, Brahman, the sentient and the non-sentient.⁷ The relation between

¹ Bh. B., 2.3.1–15, pp. 130ff.

² See above.

³ Bh. B., 2.4.4, pp. 145–146.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 3.2.17, pp. 166–167. “Cetane acetanaṃ kṣiptam abhedāt cetano bhavet.

Rūmāyāṃ vastu vinyastaṃ tat sarvaṃ lavaṇibhavet”. Cf. also 2.1.9, p. 91.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.4, pp. 18, 20; 2.1.4, p. 93; 3.2.11, p. 165; 3.2.23, p. 168.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 2.4.4, p. 146.

When the universe disappears, i.e. is discovered into Brahman in dissolution, it does not become unreal, but only *indistinguishable from* Brahman, just as a grain of salt does not become unreal when dissolved in the sea. Hence the world is eternally true. The same is the case with the soul too.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.16, p. 134:—The jīva is nitya. *Op. cit.*, 2.4.4, p. 146:—The jagat is nitya.

them has already been noted. It is a relation of different-non-difference during the effected state of Brahman,—during creation and mundane existence, and a relation of non-difference (absolute identity) during the causal state of Brahman—during dissolution and salvation, and here, as we have seen, Bhāskara fundamentally differs from Nimbārka.

It will be interesting and instructive to consider the Bhedābheda-vāda of Bhāskara a little more in detail in order to find out wherein does it exactly differ from the Bhedābheda-vāda of Nimbārka.

Bhāskara begins with a severe criticism of the view of those who hold non-difference to be the only reality. No doubt he has here Śaṅkara in mind. He points out that difference is an indisputable fact of direct experience and hence can by no means be summarily rejected on the ground of mere logical subtleties, e.g. we find that a cow is different from a horse, a pot from a piece of cloth and so on.¹ All things thus, are mutually different and so how can we disbelieve this fact of direct experience? Knowledge of difference too is knowledge no less than knowledge of non-difference.² So, if we do not regard the one—viz. the latter, as false, what right have we to regard the former to be so?

Nor can it be objected that difference and non-difference are mutually contradictory and cannot, therefore, co-exist,—for this too is a fact of direct experience that the two *do* co-exist. In fact nothing is seen to be pure non-difference or pure difference in the world of experience. Everything is, really, different-non-different, different as effects and individuals, and non-different as springing from the same cause and belonging to the same genus, e.g., a cow is different from another cow as an individual cow, but non-different from it as belonging to the same genus 'cow'. Again, a cow is different from a horse as a cow, but non-different from it being an existent substance like it and so on.³ Similarly, a gold ear-ring is different from a gold bracelet, but non-different from it as gold. Everything must be decided to be true or false on the basis of direct experience alone and direct experience guarantees us in believing that difference and non-difference do co-exist.⁴

¹ Bh. B., 2.1.14, p. 99.

² *Op. cit.*, 1.1.4, p. 19. "Bheda-jñānam api jñānam eva" 2.1.14, p. 94, line 13, 98.

³ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.4, pp. 16-17.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.4, pp. 16-17.

Hence it is that there is no contradiction or mutual opposition between Brahman, the Unity, and Universe, the plurality, as between heat and cold. If there were any such contradiction, the Universe of souls and matter could not have arisen from Brahman, abode in Him, and been merged in him,—as declared by Scripture.¹ Hence, unity and plurality are both real and co-existent.²

After thus establishing the reality of difference and its co-existence with non-difference, Bhāskara goes on to declare that the former, though real, is not ever-lasting,—i.e. is not *svābhāvika* or original and ultimate but is *aupādhika* or adventitious and non-permanent. He emphasizes this point again and again.³ We have seen above the peculiar sense in which Bhāskara uses the term 'aupādhika'—viz. what is real *so long as it lasts*, only it does not *last for ever* like what is *svābhāvika* does. Hence, according to Bhāskara, difference is *not less real* than non-difference, but only *less permanent*. It lasts, *as a reality*, so long as the upādhis—viz. *avidyā*, karma, matter, do but disappears when the upādhis are removed, just as the ether within the pot disappears when the pot is smashed,⁴ or just as the stain on a piece of gold disappears when in contact with fire.⁵

Herein we find a definite point of divergence between Nimbārka and Bhāskara. According to Nimbārka, as we have seen, difference and non-difference are not only *equally real* but *also equally permanent*. Just as there can be no pure difference, so exactly there can be no pure non-difference *at any time*. According to Bhāskara, however, as we have seen, although there can be no pure difference and pure non-difference in the world of experience (i.e. during the effected state of Brahman), still there can be pure non-difference beyond the world of experience (i.e. during the causal state of Brahman).

However much Bhāskara may try to prove by his peculiar theory of upādhi that difference, though not ever-lasting like non-difference, is nevertheless equally real with it, yet we cannot but feel that the two do not hold exactly an equal place in his system, as they do in that of Nimbārka. If difference be neither original, nor ultimate, but only an intermediate passing phase, destined to come to an end, however real it may be during that period, it must of necessity be less

¹ Vide e.g. Tait. 3.1.

² Bh. B., 1.1.4, p. 17.

³ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.43, p. 141; 3.2.6, p. 162; 3.2.12, p. 165; 3.2.27, (printed as 3.2.26 in conformity with Śaṅkara's numbering), p. 170; 4.1.12, p. 221; 4.4.4, p. 243.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 4.4.4, p. 246.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 4.1.3, p. 221.

important and less real than non-difference, which is there for ever and from all eternity. But in Nimbārka's system, as we have seen, difference and non-difference are precisely on the same level and of the same importance.

Bhāskara's theory may appropriately be called "Aupādhika-bhedābheda-vāda",¹ as distinguished from the "Svābhāvika-bhedābheda-vāda" of Nimbārka.

(6) *Mokṣa.*

Bhāskara holds, like Nimbārka, that salvation is a state of supreme bliss, and not a state of pure consciousness only, which he points out, is no better than a state of unconsciousness.² Salvation is a positive state, a positive new acquisition, i.e. something new to be obtained, and not a mere negative removal of the veil of nescience.³ The soul is ever free.⁴ If salvation were ever-obtained, everyone would have been free.⁵

Like Nimbārka again, Bhāskara holds that salvation can be obtained only after the destruction of the earthly body. When the works, which have already begun to bear fruits, are all fully exhausted by retributive experience, and when the earthly body, as a consequence, comes to be dissolved, then and then alone can one attain final emancipation.⁶ He severely criticises the Śaṅkarite conception of Jīvan-mukti.⁷

But the fundamental difference between Nimbārka and Bhāskara, as we have already seen, is that Bhāskara holds, unlike Nimbārka, that in salvation the individual soul becomes absolutely identical with Brahman.⁸ This Nimbārka never maintains.

Another fundamental difference between the two is that while Bhāskara admits of two kinds of salvation—viz. sadyomukti or

¹ Sundarabhaṭṭa, one of the followers of Nimbārka, does actually refer to Bhāskara as the upholder of the 'Aupādhika-bhedābheda-vāda'. Vide SJS., p. 30.

² Bh. B., 1.1.5, p. 21. He holds that it is better to be a jackal in the forest than to be a mukta in the Śaṅkarite sense. 1.3.9, p. 54; 4.4.7, p. 244.

³ See above.

⁴ Bh. B., 1.4.21, p. 18.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.5, p. 20.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 3.4.25, (printed as 3.4.26 in conformity with Śaṅkara's numbering), p. 210; 4.1.14, p. 224; 4.1.18, p. 226.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 3.4.25, (printed as 3.4.26 in conformity with Śaṅkara's numbering), p. 210.

⁸ See above.

immediate release and krama-mukti or gradual release, Nimbārka does not. Bhāskara points out that in accordance with the rule 'As you meditate, so you become' (Chānd. 3. 14. 1), those who meditate on the Para Brahman or the Supreme Brahman, attain the Supreme Brahman and become free *at once*, i.e. they at once become identical with Brahman and as such, omniscient, omnipotent and all-pervading like Him. This is immediate release. But those who meditate on the Kārya Brahman or the effected Brahman, viz. Hiranyagarbha only, attain *at first* the effected Brahman only, and not the Supreme Brahman at once. Then, after having acquired supreme knowledge there in the world of Hiranyagarbha, they, on the dissolution of that world, attain the Supreme Brahman by and by, together with Hiranyagarbha.¹ This is gradual release. These latter kind of freed souls remain distinct from Brahman, so long as they have not attained the Supreme Brahman, and are as such not so long omnipotent like Him, but lack the power of creating, maintaining and destroying the Universe.² But when they at last attain the Supreme Brahman, they become omnipotent like the immediately freed souls.

But according to Nimbārka there is only one kind of salvation, viz. sadyo-mukti, and the freed souls *ever* lack the power of creation, etc. and are *ever* atomic in size.

(7) *The sādhanas.*

Bhāskara lays a very great stress on karma or action as a *direct* means to salvation. He begins by pointing out that the enquiry into Brahman is to be undertaken only after an enquiry into karma, for knowledge must essentially be combined with action in order to lead to salvation, and unless we first know the nature of actions, we cannot possibly decide which actions are to be so combined and which not.³ Bhāskara insists on this 'combination of knowledge and action' (jñāna-karma-samuccaya) again and again all throughout.⁴ He

¹ Bh. B., 3.1.17, p. 157; 4.3.14, p. 240. See below.

² *Op. cit.*, 4.4.17-22, pp. 247-249. The sadyo-muktas are 'niravadhikaishvarya', while the krama-muktas are "sāvadhikaishvarya".

³ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, p. 2.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, p. 2. 'Atra hi jñāna-karma-samuccayāt mokṣa-prāptiḥ sūtrakāraśya abhipretā'; 1.1.1, p. 4; 1.1.4, p. 16; 1.1.5, pp. 20, 21; 3.4.1, p. 201; 3.4.25 (printed as 3.4.26 in conformity with the numbering of Śaṅkara), pp. 207, 209, 210; 4.1.6, p. 225.

points out that one who has studied the Vedas can claim only to have a knowledge of the meaning of the scriptural texts, but the real knowledge of Brahman depends on some other factors—viz. the proper and disinterested performance of the daily and occasional (nitya and naimittika) duties, and of sacrifices, etc., the practice of charity and penance, the cultivation of self-control and tranquillity, etc. and so on, as declared by Scripture.¹

Mere action is of course of no avail, for the fruits of mere action are transitory and therefore worthless. But when combined with knowledge, it yields permanent results.²

On the other hand, mere knowledge is of no avail. Knowledge by itself does not lead to salvation unless combined with action and meditation.³

The next question is: In what relation do these two—viz. action and knowledge, stand to each other? Bhāskara points out that the former is *not* the cause of the origin of the latter, since knowledge arises from śravaṇa or hearing of scriptural texts etc.,⁴ — but is an essential ingredient of it,⁵ an essential ingredient that must accompany knowledge, already obtained from other sources, till the end, helping it to lead to final release. Thus, each of these two has its peculiar function:—the knowledge of identity removes all traces of avidyā and passion, attachment etc., while the proper performance of daily and occasional karmas removes all traces of past karmas.⁶

Then Bhāskara goes on to point out that this jñāna-karma-samuccaya is nothing but upāsanā-karma-samuccaya,⁷ for knowledge cannot stop at itself, but must lead to meditation. Thus, first we acquire a knowledge of the Self and then after having thus determined what the Self is, we then afterwards meditate on it, just as we first *know* the king or the preceptor, and then worship him.⁸ So long

¹ Bh. B., 1.1.1, pp. 2–5. The passage referred to is Brh. 4.4.22.

² *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, p. 4 “Svataḥ kṣaṇikasyāpi karmaṇo jñāna-rasa-viddhasya akṣayaphalatvāt na kṣiyata iti ucyate”.

³ *Op. cit.*, 3.4.1, p. 201; 3.4.25, (printed as 3.4.26 in conformity with Śaṅkara's numbering), p. 209.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 3.4.25, (printed as 3.4.26), p. 209; 4.4.1, p. 219.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 3.4.25, (printed as 3.4.26), p. 209.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, p. 3; 3.4.25, (printed as 3.4.26), p. 209.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, p. 3.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.1, p. 174.

as we do not practise meditation, we do not get rid of mundane existence.¹

Thus, knowledge, leading to meditation, plus action is the cause of salvation.

Now, there are various kinds of meditations, viz. Parabrahma-upāsanā, Kāryabrahma-upāsanā and Pratika-upāsanā. Of these, the Parabrahma-upāsanā or meditation on the Supreme Brahman is the best. Now, as we have seen,² the Supreme Brahman has two forms—viz. kāraṇa-rūpa or the causal form and kārya-rūpa or the effected form. The question is: Is He to be meditated on in both these forms? Bhāskara strongly repudiates this suggestion. The Supreme Brahman, he points out, is to be meditated on in His kāraṇa-rūpa alone, and never in His kārya-rūpa. Thus Brahman is to be meditated on in His pure causal form, as a pure Unity, devoid of all differences whatsoever, as formless, as different from the universe of souls and matter, as pure existence, as pure knowledge, and as one and without a second.³ Such a Brahman is to be meditated on as identical with the self of the meditating devotee himself thus: "I am Brahman,"⁴ or in the reciprocal form: "I am Brahman, Brahman is I".⁵ This meditation on the identity between Brahman and the soul, removes all ajñāna,⁶ and all differences which are but aupādhika, just as the stain on a lump of gold is removed when it is put to fire,⁷ and the devotee attains identity with Brahman at once, i.e. immediate release.⁸

Beside this kind of meditation on the formless and attributeless Supreme Brahman, there are certain saguṇa upāsanās of Him—i.e. the upāsanās of Brahman under various aspects, and possessing various qualities, as designated in the Upaniṣads—viz. the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā,

¹ Bh. B., 3.4.25 (printed as 3.3.26 in conformity with Śaṅkara's numbering), p. 209; cf. also 3.2.25-26 (printed as 3.2.24-25 in conformity with Śaṅkara's numbering), pp. 169-170.

² See above.

³ Bh. B., 3.2.11, pp. 164-165; 3.2.12, p. 165. That is, Brahman is to be meditated on in His śuddha-kāraṇa-rūpa, as abheda, nirākāra, prapañca-vilakṣaṇa, sal-lakṣaṇa, bodha-lokṣaṇa ekamevādvitīyam.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 3.2.15, p. 166.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.36, (printed as 3.3.37 in conformity with Śaṅkara's numbering), p. 181.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, p. 3.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 4.1.3, p. 221.


⁸ *Op. cit.*, 4.3.14, p. 240.

the Madhu-vidyā and the rest.¹ These, too, lead to the Supreme Brahman, i.e. to salvation—any one of them.²

Secondly, there is upāsanā of the Kārya-brahma or Hiranyagarbha. Those who practise this sort of meditation, first attain Hiranyagarbha and then the Supreme Brahman, i.e. gradual release.³

Thirdly, there are meditations on symbols, such as names and the rest. Those who practise this sort of meditations do not attain Brahman, but only limited results.⁴

The following is a chart of the various kinds of Upāsanās:—



Thus, according to Bhāskara, knowledge of Brahman→Meditation on Brahman→salvation. Karma accompanies all these throughout and nowhere is there any giving up of karma.⁵

Now, if we compare this view of Bhāskara with Nimbārka's view of sādhanas, then we find that they differ in the following points:—

- (a) According to Nimbārka also, karma has an important part to play in the attainment of salvation, but he does not give it so great an importance as Bhāskara does. According to Nimbārka, the function of karma is simply to purify the mind and thereby help the rise of knowledge, but here it ends. Karma thus is not a permanent accompaniment of jñāna, according to Nimbārka, nor a direct means to salvation, but only an indirect means. But this Bhāskara definitely denies. According to him, karma is *not* the cause of the rise of knowledge, but its essential

¹ These are considered throughout the 3rd pāda of the 3rd chap.

² Bh. B. 3.3.58, (printed as 3.3.59 in conformity with Śaṅkara's numbering), p. 198.

³ *Op. cit.*, 4.3.14, p. 240.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 4.3.15, p. 241.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 3.4.25, (printed as 3.4.26 in conformity with Śaṅkara's numbering), pp. 208-209.

and *permanent* accompaniment and as such, a *direct* means to salvation.

- (b) Nimbārka also recommends the meditation on the true self of the individual soul as identical with Brahman, but he does not speak of the nirguṇa-upāsanā of Brahman, but of the saguṇa-upāsanā only. According to him, the conjoint worship of Rādhā-Kṛṣṇa is the best form of worship, but not a mention of this is found in Bhāskara.
- (c) Nimbārka emphasises, all along, the grace of the Lord as the first essential pre-requisite of salvation, but in Bhāskara, there is not a single mention of grace.
- (d) According to Nimbārka, prapatti and gurūpasatti, i.e. self-surrender to the Lord and to the preceptor, are independent means to salvation, but Bhāskara makes no mention of them at all.
- (e) In Bhāskara there is no place for a sweet and personal relationship of love and living companionship between the Lord and his devotee as in Nimbārka.¹

(8) *Conclusion.*

We conclude therefore, that Nimbārka and Bhāskara differ in many essential points with regard to their theories of Brahman, the sentient, the non-sentient, salvation and the means thereto. Hence we are justified in taking Nimbārka and Bhāskara to be two different persons, representing two different schools of thought, viz. Svābhāvika-bhedābheda-vāda and Aupādhika-bhedābheda-vāda respectively.

Bhāskara, in fact, while so severely criticising Śaṅkara, could not be altogether free from Śaṅkara's influence. That is why he insists so much on the pure, non-different and attributeless form of Brahman and upon the fact that difference is due to upādhis, so also the soul's state of being an agent, and so on. He, in fact, tries to work out a sort of reconciliation between the Kevalādvaita-vāda and the Dvaitādvaita-vāda, standing, as it were, midway between Śaṅkara and Nimbārka.

From the point of view of religion, too, Nimbārka and Bhāskara are poles asunder. While Nimbārka's system is intensely religious, devotional and emotional, there is properly speaking no place of a

¹ Mādhurya-pradhānā bhakti.

personal, emotional religion in the system of Bhāskara, though he speaks of meditation.

III. Nimbārka and Śrikanṭha.

SVĀBHĀVIKA-BHEDĀBHEDA-VĀDA AND VIŚIṢṬA-ŚIVĀDVAITA-VĀDA.

(1) *Introduction.*

Śrikanṭha Śaivācārya belonged to the Śaiva sect, headed by Śvetācārya,¹ and flourished after Śaṅkara.² He wrote a commentary on the Brahma-sūtras, establishing the supremacy of Śiva and developing a theory of Viśiṣṭādvaita, similar to that of Rāmānuja.

(2) *Brahman.*

The Highest Reality or Brahman, according to Śrikanṭha, is Śiva, otherwise called Bhava, Śarva, Paśupati, Mahādeva, Śambhu, Rudra,³ Nilakanṭha,⁴ Trilocana,⁵ Umāpati,⁶ etc. He is called "Bhava" because He exists everywhere at all times;⁷ "Śarva" because He is the destroyer of everything;⁸ "Paśupati" because He is the ruler of the jivas (= paśus);⁹ "Mahādeva" because He enjoys supreme bliss;¹⁰ "Rudra" because He removes the miseries of the world,¹¹ and so on, and He is called "Śiva", because He is free from all taints, and is supremely auspicious.¹²

¹ ŚK.B., Maṅgala-pāṭha, verse 4, p. 5, Part 1.

² Vide the sub-commentary called "Śivārkamaṇi-dīpikā"—on ŚK.B., p. 9, Part 1. That Śrikanṭha flourished after Śaṅkara is evident from the fact that he, in his commentary, makes many references to the doctrine of Śaṅkara. Vide e.g. 2.3.19, p. 142, Parts 7 and 8; 2.3.42, p. 158, Parts 7 and 8; 2.3.49, p. 161, Parts 7 and 8; etc. The editor, Hālāsyānātha Śāstrin, however takes him to be prior to Śaṅkara vide his Sūtrārtha-candrikā-ṭīkā" on ŚK.B. Maṅgala-pāṭha, p. 99, Part 1.

³ ŚK.B., 1.1.1, p. 71, Part 1.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.21, p. 257, Part 3; 1.4.29, p. 579, Part 6; 2.1.1., p. 1, Parts 7 and 8; 3.3.39, p. 353, Parts 10 and 11, etc.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.21, p. 255, Part 3; 3.2.31, p. 265, Part 9; 3.3.52, p. 371, parts 10 and 11, etc.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.22, p. 260, Part 2; 1.1.25, intro., p. 272, Part 2, etc.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.2, p. 125, Part 2.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 126, Part 2.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 127, Part 2.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 128, Part 2.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 127, Part 2.

¹² *Op. cit.*, 1.1.4, p. 189, Part 2.

Śiva is the supreme cause from which everything arises.¹ He is both the material and the efficient causes of the Universe.² He is the material cause of the Universe through His māyā or icchā-śakti,³ when He is called Nārāyaṇa or Viṣṇu.⁴ Nārāyaṇa thus is Śiva in the state or form of the upādāna or the material cause,⁵ and is as such inferior to Śiva, though non-different from Him.⁶ And inferior to Nārāyaṇa is Hiranyagarbha, or the aggregate of souls or effects.⁷

Śiva is essentially possessed of an infinite number of attributes and infinite inconceivable powers,⁸ i.e. is possessed of distinctions and never without them.⁹ On the one hand, He is an abode of all auspicious qualities and powers, and on the other, free from all defects and faults.¹⁰ He has two aspects,—stern and soft. On the one hand, He is a mighty ruler, striking terror in the heart of all,¹¹ but on the other, He is an abode of infinite bliss,¹² and the cause of the

¹ ŚK.B., 1.1.12, pp. 203, 206, Part 3; 1.1.16, p. 230, Part 3; 1.1.17, pp. 236-7, Part 3, etc. etc.

² *Op. cit.*, 1.1.2, p. 129, part 1; 1.1.5, p. 195, Part 1; 1.1.20, p. 246, Part 3; 1.2.9, pp. 340-41, Part 4; 1.4.23-28, pp. 558-572, Part 6.

Śrīkaṇṭha criticises the view of those Śaiva sects which take the Lord to be the efficient cause merely and not its material cause, vide ŚK.B. 2.2.35-38, pp. 106-113, Parts 7 and 8.

³ ŚK.B., 1.2.9, pp. 341, 345, Part 4; 1.4.27, p. 570, Part 6.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 1.2.2, p. 318, Part 4; 1.3.12, p. 430, Part 5; 3.2.36, pp. 269-70, Part 9; 4.3.11, p. 476, Parts 10 and 11.

⁵ *Op. cit.* 1.2.3, p. 318, Part 4; 1.3.4, p. 430, Part 5; 3.2.35, p. 269, Part 9; 4.3.11, p. 476; Parts 10 and 11.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 1.3.12, p. 430, Part 5. "Yato Viṣṇu-Śivayor upādāna-nimittayor avasthā-bhedam antareṇa svarūpa-bhedo nāsti".

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 4.3.14, p. 478, Parts 10 and 11.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, pp. 71, 89, Part 1; 1.1.2, p. 121, Part 2; 1.1.24, p. 272, Part 3; 1.2.1, p. 302, Part 4; 1.2.9, p. 338, Part 4; 1.2.19, p. 371, Part 4; 1.3.22, p. 445, Part 5; 2.1.1, p. 1, Parts 7 and 8; 2.1.25, p. 37, Parts 7 and 8; 2.1.28, p. 39, Parts 7 and 8; 2.1.30, p. 40, Parts 7 and 8; 3.2.11, p. 245, Part 9; 3.2.13, p. 248, Part 9; 3.2.17, p. 248, Part 9; 3.2.29, p. 363, Part 9; 3.3.17, p. 310, Part 9; 4.4.22, p. 506, Parts 10 and 11.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.2, p. 124, Part 2.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, p. 89, Part 1; 1.1.2, pp. 121, 128, Part 2; 1.1.24, p. 272, Part 3; 1.2.9, p. 338, Part 4; 3.2.11, p. 245, Part 9; 3.2.17, p. 248, Part 9; 3.3.17, p. 310, Part 9; 4.4.22, p. 506, Parts 10 and 11.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, 1.3.40, p. 496, Part 5.

¹² *Op. cit.*, 1.1.13-16, pp. 206-230, Part 3.

bliss of individual souls,¹ supremely merciful and gracious towards His devotees² and the giver of salvation³ and other fruits.⁴

The sentient and the non-sentient are the powers of the Lord.⁵ The cit-śakti consists in three factors, viz. knowledge, volition and action,⁶ while the acit śakti consists in the five great elements, viz. earth, water, fire, air and ether.⁷ Brahmā, Janārdana, Rudra, Īśvara, and Sadāśiva are the presiding deities of these five elements respectively.⁸

The sentient and the non-sentient, consisting of these eight forms, constitute the body of the Lord.⁹ Or, they are the attributes of the Lord,¹⁰ qualifying Him, as the body qualifies the soul, or as blueness qualifies lotus.¹¹ The Lord is thus qualified by the universe¹² and has the universe for His form or body.¹³

The Lord, qualified by the universe, has two forms,—viz. causal state and effected state.¹⁴ During His causal state, the attributes

¹ ŚK.B., 1.1.15, pp. 217-18, Part 3.

² *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, pp. 71, 91-92, Part 1; 1.2.1, p. 302, Part 4; 1.2.9, p. 337, Part 4; 1.3.24, p. 452, Part 5; 2.1.1, p. 1, Parts 7 and 8; 2.1.35, pp. 49, 50, Parts 7 and 8; 4.3.1, p. 468, Parts 10 and 11; 4.1.1, p. 482, Parts 10 and 11; 4.4.22, p. 506, Parts 10 and 11.

³ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, pp. 71, 91-92, Part 1; 1.1.17, p. 235, Part 3; 1.1.20, p. 246, Part 3; 2.1.35, pp. 49-50, Parts 7 and 8; 3.3.39, p. 355, Parts 10 and 11.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 3.2.40, p. 276, Part 9.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 1.2.9, p. 340, Part 4; 1.4.27, p. 566, Part 6; 2.1.18, p. 29, Parts 7 and 8.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 1.2.9, p. 345, Part 4. See also sub-commentary on the same page.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.14, p. 133, Parts 7 and 8.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.16, p. 228, Part 3. See also sub-commentary on the same page. 2.3.14, p. 133, Parts 7 and 8.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, 1.2.1, pp. 303, 307, Part 4; 1.2.12, p. 352, Part 4; 1.3.8, p. 417, Part 5; 1.4.22, p. 551, Part 6; 1.4.27, p. 567, Part 6; 2.1.9, p. 14, Parts 7 and 8, 2.3.14, p. 133, Parts 7 and 8; 2.1.22, p. 31, Parts 7 and 8; 3.2.28, p. 259, Part 9.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, 2.1.22, p. 31, Parts 7 and 8; 2.3.52, p. 162, Parts 7 and 8; 3.2.27, p. 259, Part 9.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, 2.1.22, p. 31, Parts 7 and 8.

¹² *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, pp. 71, 89, Part 1; 1.1.20, p. 246, Part 3; 1.2.1, p. 303, Part 4; 1.4.27, p. 571, Part 6; 2.1.14, p. 19, Parts 7 and 8; 3.2.29, p. 259, Part 9. The Lord is prapañca-viśiṣṭa.

¹³ *Op. cit.*, 1.2.9, p. 345, Part 4; 3.2.29, p. 263, Part 9. The Lord is prapañca-rūpa.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.2, p. 135, Part 1; 1.4.27, pp. 567, 571, Part 6; 2.1.9, p. 14, Parts 7 and 8; 2.1.27, p. 39, Parts 7 and 8.

and powers of the Lord, viz. the sentient and the non-sentient, exist in Him in a subtle form, while during His effected state, they are manifested in various names and forms. The Lord is thus, both the cause and the effect. The universe is nothing but the Lord Himself.¹

The Lord is not pure knowledge, but a knower.² He is an enjoyer as well, though not of the fruits of karma like the soul, but of His own infinite bliss,³ and finally He is an agent. His five actions are:—creation, maintenance and dissolution of the universe, favour, i.e. emancipating the soul, and concealment or concealing the essential nature of the soul i.e. causing its bondage.⁴

Finally, the Lord is possessed of a celestial, non-material body, which does not entitle Him to any karma.⁵

If we compare this view of Śrīkaṇṭha with that of Nimbārka, we find that there is not much difference between the two doctrines, so far as the philosophical part goes, except that while Nimbārka identifies Brahman with Kṛṣṇa, Śrīkaṇṭha identifies Him with Śiva, and in his system Umā takes the place of Nimbārka's Rādhā. As a Śaiva teacher, Śrīkaṇṭha makes Viṣṇu subordinate to Śiva, which, of course, Nimbārka as a Vaiṣṇava teacher will not tolerate.

But as we have seen, Nimbārka too holds, like Śrīkaṇṭha, that Brahman is the sole supreme cause of the universe, both its material and efficient cause, that He is essentially possessed of attributes and powers, that He is an abode of supreme might and majesty on the one hand and infinite beauty, bliss and tenderness on the other, that the cit and the acit are śaktis of the Lord, that the Lord is a knower as omniscient, an enjoyer as enjoying celestial pleasures and a doer, as the creator, controller and giver of fruits, and possesses a celestial body.

The most important point of difference worth noticing is that Nimbārka does not admit that the sentient and the non-sentient are the viśeṣaṇas, attributes, of the Lord. This view has been severely criticised by the followers of Nimbārka.⁶ They point out that they

¹ ŚK.B. See below under "Relation between Brahman, cit and acit".

² *Op. cit.*, 2.3.29, p. 147, Parts 7 and 8; 3.2.16, pp. 247-8, Part 9.

³ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.2, pp. 122, 124, Part 2; 1.2.11, p. 350, Part 4; 4.4.21, p. 500, Parts 10 and 11.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.2, pp. 109-115, Part 2. The kṛtya-pañcaka or the five actions are (1) Janma, (2) Sthiti, (3) Pralaya, (4) Anugraha, (5) Tirobhāva.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.21, pp. 251-252, Part 3; 1.2.8, p. 328, Part 4.

⁶ S.J., pp. 43-44; S.S., p. 45. See above. Cf. also Anantarāma's "Vedāntatattva-bodha", pp. 27-32.

are powers and parts of the Lord, and do constitute His body, but are not His attributes by any means.

Another point of difference is that Śrīkaṇṭha rejects the vyūhas¹ accepted by Nimbārka and does not speak of avatāras or incarnations.

(3) *The cit.*

Śrīkaṇṭha's doctrine of the individual soul too is similar to that of Nimbārka. Like Nimbārka, he holds that the soul is an eternal and real substance,² a knower,³ an enjoyer,⁴ and an active agent,⁵ and atomic in size,⁶ and that its state of being a knower, an enjoyer, an agent and atomic are natural, pertaining to its very nature and are, as such, ever-lasting, in bondage as in release.

He is also in perfect agreement with Nimbārka with regard to the different states of the soul, viz. dream, deep sleep and the rest,—viz. that the dream-objects are created by the Lord,⁷ that the Lord is the place of deep sleep and not the vein or the pericardium,⁸ that the state of swoon is a distinct and peculiar state,⁹ and so on, and also with regard to the various destinies and paths of the soul, viz. the path of Gods etc., and the way of the soul's going through them.¹⁰

There are, however, two points of difference:—

- (a) First, as we have already seen, according to Śrīkaṇṭha the soul is an attribute of the Lord, which Nimbārka does not hold.
- (b) Secondly, according to Nimbārka the very nature of the soul is to be controlled, while the very nature of the Lord is to control, and hence the soul is *ever* under the control of the Lord, in release too as in bondage. But according to Śrīkaṇṭha, although the soul is under the control of the Lord during the state of mundane

¹ ŚK.B., 2.2.39-42, pp. 115-119, Parts 7 and 8.

² *Op. cit.*, 2.3.18, p. 140, Parts 7 and 8.

³ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.19, p. 142, Parts 7 and 8; 2.3.27-29, pp. 146-7, Parts 7 and 8.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 1.3.6, pp. 407-8, Part 4; 3.2.13, p. 246, Part 9; 4.4.19, pp. 497-98, parts 10 and 11.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.33-39, pp. 152-154, Parts 7 and 8.

⁶ *Op. cit.*

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 3.2.1-6, pp. 224-233, Part 9.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 3.2.7-8, pp. 235-239, Part 9.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, 3.2.10, p. 242, Part 9.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, 4.3.1-25, pp. 468-479, Parts 10 and 11.

existence,¹ yet when it becomes free and attains similarity with the Lord, it is no more under His control in the sense that it is no longer subject to scriptural injunctions and prohibitions which embody the very commands of the Lord Himself,² but becomes independent.³

(4) *The acit.*

Here too, Śrīkanṭha agrees with Nimbārka in holding that the world is real and eternal,⁴ and a power of the Lord.⁵ Śrīkanṭha, like Nimbārka, admits real transformation. According to him, the entire universe, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient, is an effect or real transformation of the Lord, just as the curd is of the milk.⁶ The process of creation is as follows: During universal dissolution, there is nothing—no sun or moon, no day or night, no names or forms, no sentient or non-sentient objects, but everything is enveloped in deep darkness, and the Lord, with His sentient and non-sentient powers drawn forth, i.e. non-manifest, abides as a cause, absolute, one and without a second, self-luminous, a solitary perceiver. Then there arises in Him the supreme power of knowledge, removing the darkness around, and the Lord wishes to be 'many'. Thereupon He develops His own subtle powers of the sentient and the non-sentient, so long blended with Him, and the universe of names and forms arises. The Lord is thus both the cause and the effect.⁷ But although the Lord is transformed into the universe, yet He Himself remains untransformed and full, just as the genus, though present in each species, is yet itself non-divided.⁸

¹ ŚK.B., 2.3.40, p. 156, Parts 7 and 8; 2.4.14, p. 173, Parts 7 and 8.

² *Op. cit.*, 4.4.9, p. 487, Parts 10 and 11.

³ *Op. cit.*

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 1.4.9-10, pp. 522-24, Part 6. Śrīkanṭha points out like Nimbārka, that no contradiction is involved in holding the world to be both unborn and an effect of the Lord. It is unborn in the sense it *ever* abides as a subtle power of the Lord, and it is an effect in the sense that during creation, it is developed in gross forms possessing various names and forms. Vide ŚK.B., 1.4.10, pp. 524, Part 6.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 1.2.9, p. 340, Part 4; 1.4.27, p. 566, Part 6; 2.1.18, p. 29, Parts 7 and 8.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 1.4.27, p. 565, Part 6.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 1.2.9, pp. 340-41, Part 4; 1.4.27, pp. 566-67, Part 6; 2.1.10, p. 29, Parts 7 and 8.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 2.1.27, p. 39, Parts 7 and 8.

Śrīkaṇṭha also agrees with Nimbārka with regard to the successive stages of creation, viz. the ether, the air, etc.¹

But he differs from Nimbārka in two points, viz. :—

- (a) First, he takes the world, as we have seen, to be an attribute of the Lord, which Nimbārka does not.
- (b) Secondly, he does not speak of the aprākṛta and kāla as species of the non-sentient, as Nimbārka does.

(5) *Relation between Brahman, the cit and the acit.*

Thus, according to Śrīkaṇṭha, there are three real and eternal entities—viz. Śiva, the sentient and the non-sentient, just as according to Nimbārka, there are three real and eternal entities, viz. Kṛṣṇa, the sentient and the non-sentient. Now, what, according to Śrīkaṇṭha, is the exact relation between these three?

Śrīkaṇṭha points out, exactly like Nimbārka, that on the one hand there is an essential difference between Brahman, and the sentient-nonsentient. The Lord is by nature an abode of all auspiciousness, purity and perfection, and absolutely free from all faults and defects, but the souls and the universe are not so. The universe is non-intelligent and impure. The soul is intelligent, no doubt, yet it is never omniscient like the Lord, but possessed of but little and limited knowledge,² and is impure eternally subject to stains and defects.³ Further, the Lord is the director, the souls and the world the directed.⁴ The Lord is the Lord of the entire universe, but the soul is not.⁵ The Lord is the object to be worshipped,⁶ the end to be attained,⁷ and independent,⁸ while the soul is the worshipper, the attainer and dependent. Thus the Lord is by nature different from the sentient and the non-sentient.⁹

But the sentient and the non-sentient, though different from the Lord, are not yet absolutely different from Him, but are at the same time non-different from Him, for the Lord is the cause, and the cit and

¹ ŚK.B., 2.3.1–14, pp. 122–133, Parts 7 and 8.

² *Op. cit.*, 1.2.11, p. 35, Part 4; 1.3.43, p. 505, Part 6; 2.1.23, p. 32, Parts 7 and 8.

³ *Op. cit.*, 1.2.11, p. 351, Part 4.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 1.2.12, p. 352, Part 4.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 1.3.44, p. 506, Part 6.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 1.2.2, pp. 316–317, Part 4.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 1.3.21–22, pp. 444–445, Part 5.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 2.1.14, p. 21, Parts 7 and 8.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.45, pp. 159–60, Parts 7 and 8.

the acit His effects;¹ the Lord is one who pervades, the sentient and the non-sentient, the pervaded,² and the cause and the effect, what pervades and the pervaded are non-different.³ Here also Śrīkaṇṭha perfectly agrees with Nimbārka.

But, next the vital question arises: Are we then to believe that there is both difference and non-difference between Brahman and the universe? This suggestion Śrīkaṇṭha repudiates at once. He points out that we must guard against three views, viz.:—

- (a) Atyantabheda-vāda or the view that there is an absolute difference between Brahman and the universe, as between a pot and a piece of cloth, because that will be in conflict with scriptural texts designating difference between the two.
- (b) Atyantābheda-vāda or the view that there is an absolute non-difference between them, as between the nacre and the illusory silver, because that too will go against the scriptural texts which designate a difference between them.
- (c) Bhedābheda-vāda or the view that there is both difference and non-difference between them, because that will go against facts of direct experience, as difference and non-difference, being mutually contradictory, are never found to co-exist.

The correct view, Śrīkaṇṭha continues, is that the relation between Brahman and the universe is exactly analogous to that between the soul and the body, and between the substance and its attribute, and between the cause and its effect. The soul (śarīrī) and the body (śarīra) are non-different in the sense that the soul cannot exist without the body and vice-versa; the substance (guṇī or viśeṣya) and its attribute (guṇa or viśeṣaṇa) are non-different in the sense that the substance cannot exist with the attribute and *vice versa*; the cause (kāraṇa) and its effect (kārya) are non-different in the sense that the cause cannot exist without the effect, because the cause *always* possesses the power of producing the effect, i.e. the effect, even when not actually existent in that particular form, is *ever* existent in the cause

¹ ŚK.B., 2.3.42, p. 158, Parts 7 and 8; 2.3.45, p. 159, Parts 7 and 8; 2.3.52, p. 162, Parts 7 and 8; 3.2.28, p. 259, Part 9.

² *Op. cit.*, 2.3.42, p. 159, Parts 7 and 8.

³ *Op. cit.*, 2.1.15–21, pp. 21–30, Parts 7 and 8; 2.3.42, p. 159, Parts 7 and 8.

in the form of its power,—and *vice versa*. Brahman and the universe are non-different in exactly the same sense, because Brahman cannot exist without the universe, which ever exists in Him as His power,—just as fire cannot exist without heat or a blue lotus without blueness, and the universe cannot exist without Brahman, just as an earthen pot cannot exist without clay. Thus, *non-difference* here means *essential and mutual interdependence*, i.e. the relation between two things none of which can exist without the other,¹ and not *actual* identity. And difference means *difference of nature*. Just as the soul, though non-different from the body, in the above sense, is yet different from it in nature and superior to it; just as the substance, though non-different from the attribute, in the above sense, is yet different from it in nature and superior to it; and just as the cause, though non-different from the effect in the above sense, is yet different from—so exactly Brahman, though non-different from the universe in the above sense, is yet different from it in nature and superior to it.²

It is this peculiar relation between Brahman and the universe which makes it possible for them to form *one whole* in spite of their difference. The soul and the body, though different, form one integral whole, because none can exist without the other. Similarly, Brahman and the universe, though different, form one *concrete whole*, because none can exist without the other.

Hence, Śrīkaṇṭha calls his doctrine “Viśiṣṭa-śivādvaita-vāda”,³ or the doctrine that Śiva, the Unity, is *qualified* by the sentient-non-sentient, the plurality, just as the soul is qualified by the body.

It will be interesting to note wherein exactly Śrīkaṇṭha's doctrine of Viśiṣṭādvaita differs from Nimbārka's doctrine of Svābhāvika-bhedābheda. According to Nimbārka also, when we say that the universe is *non-different* from Brahman, we do not mean thereby that it is *actually* identical with Him, but simply that it is *absolutely dependent* on Brahman and cannot exist without Him. Non-difference thus means *essential dependence* according to Nimbārka as well; and difference also means *difference of nature* according to him. Hence Nimbārka's doctrine is not open to the objection raised by Śrīkaṇṭha

¹ “Prapañca-Brahmaṇor ananyatvaṃ nāma . . . vinā-bhāva-rahitatvaṃ” ŚK.B., 2.1.22, p. 31, Parts 7 and 8.

² *Op. cit.*, 2.1.22, p. 31, Parts 7 and 8.

³ *Op. cit.*, 2.1.14, p. 19, Parts 7 and 8. Vide also 2.1.14, p. 20, Parts 7 and 8; 2.1.22, p. 31, Parts 7 and 8.

against Bhedābheda-vāda, viz. that non-difference and difference being mutually exclusive, cannot co-exist.

Thus, according to both Nimbārka and Śrīkaṇṭha, *non-difference and difference* are both true, and

Non-difference = essential dependence,

Difference = difference of nature.

But with Nimbārka, non-difference and difference are precisely on the same level, they co-exist and have the same importance. But according to Śrīkaṇṭha, non-difference and difference are both real and co-existent, no doubt, but non-difference is the principal, which is *qualified* by difference and in this sense difference is *subordinate* to non-difference, just as the body is subordinate to the soul which it qualifies. Thus, with Śrīkaṇṭha (as with Rāmānuja), the stress is more on the *principle of identity* than on that of difference.

(6) Mokṣa.

Salvation, according to Śrīkaṇṭha, consists in the severance of the bondage of the mundane existence,¹ and the consequent attaining of the state of Śiva.² It means becoming *similar* to Śiva in nature and qualities, i.e. becoming omniscient and independent like Him, possessed of all His infinite auspicious qualities and freed from all stains and defects.³

Thus, the released soul becomes only *similar* to the Lord, and never *identical* with Him.⁴ Salvation means the full development of the self of the soul and not its absolute absorption in the Lord.⁵ The freed soul is distinct from the Lord in this that it is atomic, while the Lord is all-pervasive,⁶ and that it lacks the power of creating, main-

¹ ŚK.B., 1.1.1, pp. 91-92, 98, Part 1; 3.4.48, p. 414, Parts 10 and 11; 4.1.2, p. 428, Parts 10 and 11. That is, salvation means pāśa-viccheda and paśutva-nivṛtti.

² *Op. cit.*, 4.1.3, p. 428, Parts 10 and 11; 4.4.9, p. 487, Parts 10 and 11.

³ *Op. cit.*, 4.4.9, p. 487, Parts 10 and 11.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 1.3.8, p. 417, Part 5; 3.2.24, p. 257, Part 9; 3.3.40, p. 356, Parts 10 and 11; 4.4.1, pp. 481-2, Parts 10 and 11; 4.4.4, pp. 483-4, Parts 10 and 11; 4.4.9, p. 487, Parts 10 and 11.

⁵ "Paripūrṇam ahaṁbhāvaṁ prakāṣaṁ anubhavati." This ahaṁkāra or egoity of the freed soul, Śrīkaṇṭha points out, is not like the sāṁsārika or prākṛta ahaṁkāra, since it is not narrow (paricchinna), but universal (prapañcā-vagāhin). Vide 4.4.19, p. 498, Parts 10 and 11.

⁶ See above.

taining and destroying the universe—which power belongs exclusively to the Lord alone.¹

The freed soul shares all the divine pleasures with the Lord.² It possesses pure, independent and non-material sense-organs and mind, by means of which it enjoys pleasures.³ It is united with the Lord in blissful experience (*samarasya*)⁴ and perceives always the ever-blissful form of the Lord.⁵

Salvation, thus, is a positive state of supreme and unsurpassed bliss,⁶ and knowledge,⁷ and not a state of mere unconsciousness, and it can be attained only after the destruction of the earthly body (*videhan-mukti*).⁸

Thus, we find that Śrīkaṇṭha's conception of salvation too tallies with that of Nimbārka, with the difference (which runs throughout between the two)—

- (a) that while according to Nimbārka, salvation means attaining *Kṛṣṇatva* or the nature of Kṛṣṇa, according to Śrīkaṇṭha it means attaining *Śivatva* or the nature of Śiva; although, as we have seen, the natures of Kṛṣṇa and Śiva, as held by the two, are the same.
- (b) There is another difference, viz. while according to Nimbārka, the freed soul is under the absolute control of the Lord, equally with the soul in bondage, according to Śrīkaṇṭha it is not so, as already noted above.⁹
- (c) A third point of difference is that Śrīkaṇṭha, like Bhāskara, admits of two kinds of salvation, viz. immediate or *sadyas*, and gradual or *krama*. He points out that those who meditate on the Lord in His own nature go directly to the Lord and become free at once, but those who meditate on the Lord as sentient souls and as non-sentient objects, or on Nārāyaṇa,—who is but the

¹ ŚK.B., 4.4.17-18, pp. 495-97, Parts 10 and 11.

² *Op. cit.*, 4.4.21, pp. 499-500, Parts 10 and 11.

³ *Op. cit.*, 1.3.1, p. 417, Part 5; 4.4.14, p. 49, Parts 10, 11.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 4.4.19, p. 498, Parts 10 and 11.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 1.3.1, p. 417, Part 5; 4.4.14, p. 491, Parts 10 and 11.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 2.1.35, p. 49, Parts 7 and 8; 4.4.9, p. 488, Parts 10 and 11; 4.4.14, p. 492, Parts 10 and 11.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, p. 92, Part 1.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 4.2.8, p. 456, Parts 10 and 11; 4.2.18, p. 465, Parts 10 and 11.

⁹ See above.

Lord in the form of the material cause of the Universe,¹—first go to Nārāyaṇa, and thence to Śiva afterwards.² But Nimbārka, as we have seen, admits of one kind of salvation only, viz. immediate.

In other points, however, they are in perfect agreement.

(7) *The sādhanas.*

According to Śrīkaṇṭha, the study of Brahman must essentially be preceded by the study of religious duties, for Dharma is the sādhyā, Brahman the sādaka.³ Dharma, i.e. the proper and disinterested performance of the daily and occasional duties, such as the performance of sacrifices, etc., and the practice of charity, penance, self-control and so on, purify the mind and thus help the rise of knowledge in it.⁴ Thus, karma is a necessary element of knowledge.⁵

But the function of karma extends no further. Karma fulfils its task by helping the rise of knowledge, but does not itself lead to salvation. It is, therefore, only an *indirect* means to salvation, salvation being directly brought forth by knowledge alone.⁶

Now this knowledge is nothing but meditation.⁷ Knowledge leads to meditation and meditation to salvation. One desirous of salvation should first *know* the Lord from Scripture, and then *meditate* on Him.⁸

There are various kinds of meditation leading to different results. There is, first, meditation of the Lord in His own nature (svarūpeṇa), which leads to Him directly and immediately. The Lord is to be meditated on in His own supreme nature as identical with the self

¹ See above.

² ŚK.B., 1.1.32, p. 292, Part 3; 4.3.15, p. 479, Parts 10 and 11. See below.

³ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1.

⁴ ŚK. 1.1.1, pp. 37, 39, 42, 43, 68, 84, Part 1; 3.4.26-27, pp. 397-99, Parts 10 and 11; 4.1.16, p. 447, Parts 10 and 11; 4.1.17, p. 447, Parts 10 and 11.

⁵ I.e. Karma is vidyāṅga and vidyā-sahakārin. *Op. cit.*, 3.4.1, p. 384, Parts 10 and 11; 3.4.9, p. 387, Parts 10 and 11; 3.4.26, pp. 397-98, Parts 10 and 11.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 3.4.26, p. 395, Parts 10 and 11. "Sākṣāt jñānaphalam eva mokṣaḥ."

⁷ ŚK.B., 1.1.4, p. 187, Part 2. "Ata upāsanārūpa-jñāna-mokṣaphalam vidhīyate."

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.4, p. 189, Part 2; 3.4.51, p. 419, Parts 10 and 11; 4.1.1, pp. 422-25, Parts 10 and 11.

of the meditating devotee, which helps the removal of the *paśutva* of the soul and the consequent attainment of *Śivatva*.¹ There are also various *parā-vidyās* or meditations on the Supreme Being, depicted in the *upaniṣads*, which also lead to the Lord directly.²

There is, further, meditation on the Lord as *Nārāyaṇa* or the material cause, which leads to the attainment of *Nārāyaṇa* first, then to that of the Lord.³ Then there is meditation on the Lord as sentient souls (*bhoktr-rūpeṇa*) and as non-sentient objects (*bhogyarūpeṇa*), which also does not lead to the Lord directly but by and by.⁴ Finally, there are certain symbolic meditations which do not lead to the Lord at all.⁵

The following is a chart of the various kinds of *Upāsanās*:—⁶

Upāsanā.				
(1) Meditation on the Lord as He is in Himself. (Svarūpa-upāsanā or Kāraṇa-upāsanā.)	(2) Meditation on the Lord under various aspects. (Parā-vidyās of the <i>upaniṣads</i> .)	(3) Meditation on the Lord as <i>Nārāyaṇa</i> . (Upādāna-upāsanā.)	(4) Meditation on the Lord as souls and matter. (Bhoktr-bhogyā-upāsanā or Kārya-upāsanā.)	(5) Meditation on symbols. (Pratīka-upāsanā.)
(Leads to the Lord.)	(Leads to the Lord.)	(Leads to <i>Nārāyaṇa</i> and thence to the Lord.)	(Leads to the Lord by and by.)	(Does not lead to the Lord.)

Śrīkaṇṭha points out that the grace of the Lord is an essential pre-requisite of salvation. The Lord is the giver of salvation, and unless He is pleased to favour us, we can never attain salvation.⁷

Thus, according to Śrīkaṇṭha: Karma→jñāna→upāsanā→Bhagavat-prasāda→mukti.

It will be clear from the above that here too Śrīkaṇṭha is in perfect agreement with Nimbārka. Nimbārka also holds like Śrī-

¹ ŚK.B., 4.1.3, pp. 427-8, Parts 10 and 11.

² *Op. cit.*, 3.3.57, p. 380, Parts 10 and 11.

³ *Op. cit.*, 4.3.15, p. 479, Parts 10 and 11.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.32, p. 292, Part 3.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.58, p. 38, Parts 10 and 11.

⁶ See above.

⁷ ŚK.B., 1.1.1, pp. 71, 92, Part 1; 1.1.17, p. 235, Part 3; 4.2.16, p. 464. Parts 10 and 11; 4.4.1, p. 482, Parts 10 and 11.

kaṇṭha (and against Bhāskara) that karma, through generating mental purity, helps the rise of knowledge, and is as such only an *indirect* means to salvation; that knowledge and meditation are both direct means to salvation; and that the grace of the Lord plays an important part in the attainment of salvation. He, however, does not speak of the meditation on Nārāyaṇa as the material cause, although he recommends the Ahaṁgraha-upāsana or the meditation on the Self of the devotee as identical with that of the Lord.¹ And Śrīkaṇṭha does not speak of prapatti and gurūpasatti, or self-surrender to the Lord and preceptor respectively, as independent means to salvation, as Nimbārka does. Further, Śrīkaṇṭha does not emphasise a sweet and intimate relation of love, as Nimbārka does, between the Lord and His devotee, but rather a more distant relationship of awe and reverence, like Rāmānuja.²

(8) Conclusion.

Thus, we find that from the point of view of philosophy, the main difference between the Svābhāvika-bhedābheda-vāda of Nimbārka and the Viśiṣṭa-Śivādvaita-vāda of Śrīkaṇṭha lies in their conceptions of the relation between the one and the many, non-difference and difference. On other points, however, they agree on the whole.

From the point of view of religion, of course, there are sectarian differences between them, as natural. Śrīkaṇṭha, as a Śaiva teacher rejects the vyūhas, takes the Dahara-vidyā as the best of all the meditations³ and so on, which Nimbārka, as a Vaiṣṇava teacher, does not. Further, there is a distinct difference of spirit too as noted above.⁴

From the point of view of ethics, Nimbārka is more liberal, and makes provisions even for those who are unable to reach salvation by their unaided efforts—which Śrīkaṇṭha does not.

¹ See above.

² Aiśvarya-pradhānā bhakti and not mādhyura-pradhānā bhakti.

³ ŚK.B., 3.3.38, p. 351, Parts 10 and 11. Vide also the sub-commentary Śivārka-maṇi-dīpikā, p. 2, Part 1, "Daharavidyā-niṣṭhaḥ ayam ācārya" etc.

⁴ Cf. Rāmānuja above.

IV. Nimbārka and Baladeva

SVĀBHĀVIKA-BHEDĀBHEDA-VĀDA AND ĀCINTYA-BHEDĀBHEDA-VĀDA.

(1) *Introduction.*

Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa was a follower of the school of Caitanya, and a disciple of Viśvanātha Cakravartin.¹ He wrote a commentary on the Brahma-sūtras, viz. "Govinda bhāṣya", so called because it was composed, so the tradition goes, under the command of Lord Govinda or Kṛṣṇa.²

Baladeva composed another treatise, called "Prameyaratnāvalī", which summarises the teachings of the school of Caitanya and is based on the doctrine of Madhva. It lays down nine prameyas or propositions, established by proper proofs, viz.:—

- (a) The Lord is the Highest Reality.
- (b) The Lord is known from Scripture alone.
- (c) The Universe is real.
- (d) The difference between the Lord and the individual souls is real.
- (e) The individual souls are real and are servants of the Lord.
- (f) The individual souls are different from one another, and there are various grades of souls.
- (g) Release consists in the attainment of the Lord.
- (h) Worship of the Lord is the sole cause of release.
- (i) There are three sources of knowledge, viz.: perception, inference and Scripture, the last being the most reliable and authoritative.³

¹ Preface to SD.R., p. 1; preface to P.R., p. 9.

² "Bhāṣyam etad viracitaṃ Baladevena dhīmatā, Śrī-Govinda-nideśena Govindākhyam agāt tataḥ."

Gloss on G.B., p. 1, chap. 1.

Preface to G.B., p. 2; preface to P.R., pp. 16-17.

The tradition is that when Baladeva was living in Vṇḍāvana, once he entered into a great philosophical controversy with a very learned scholar of the Advaita school. The latter, being unable to meet Baladeva's arguments, asked him on what particular commentary his arguments were based. Baladeva replied that they were based on the commentary of the sect of Caitanya. Then the Advaita scholar wanted to see it. Thereupon, Baladeva in compliance with the command of Lord Kṛṣṇa composed the commentary in a month.

³ P.R., introduc. verse 5, p. 11; and end verses 1 and 2, pp. 135-136, where Baladeva cites Madhva as authority. He makes obeisance to Ānandatīrtha (i.e. Madhva) in P.R., verse 3, introduc., p. 5.

A third philosophical work of Baladeva is "Siddhānta-ratna", elucidating his general doctrine.¹

Baladeva admits of five tattvas or categories which are exactly similar to those admitted by Harivyāsadeva.²

(2) *Brahman.*

(a) *His essential nature, attributes and powers.*

According to Baladeva, the Highest Reality or Brahman is Kṛṣṇa,³ Viṣṇu⁴ or Hari,⁵ a Personal God, possessed of infinite auspicious qualities⁶ and inconceivable powers.⁷ He is 'Nirguṇa' in the sense of being free from certain qualities which are included under the generic term "guṇa", viz. the three guṇas of prakṛti—sattva, rajas and tamas and He is 'saguṇa' in the sense of being a storehouse of all auspicious qualities.⁸ His attributes are of two kinds—majestic and sweet. The former consists in His indomitable might and lordliness, the latter in His infinite bliss and loveliness.⁹ One of the greatest and at the same time, sweetest attributes of the Lord is His

¹ For other alleged works of Baladeva, see preface to P.R., pp. 9-10.

² G.B., introduc., p. 12, chap. 1. "Tathā hi Īśvara-jīva-prakṛti-Kāla-karmāṇi pañca-tattvāni śrūyante."

³ P.R., 1st prameya, p. 14; 7th prameya, verse 1, p. 106; 8th prameya, verse 4, p. 121; verse p. 9, 127.

⁴ G.B., introduc.; 1.1.4; 1.2.25; 1.2.27; 1.3.8; 1.3.14; 1.3.16; 1.3.24; 1.4.1; etc. etc.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.3; 1.1.18; 1.1.19; 1.3.23; 1.3.30; 2.3.14; 3.2.32; 3.3.29; 3.3.38; 3.3.51; 3.4.1; 4.1.7; etc. etc.

P.R., 5th prameya, p. 86; 8th prameya, p. 116, verse 1, p. 117.

⁶ G.B., 1.1.2; where he points out that the very word "Brahman" denotes the possession of unlimited and unsurpassed attributes, for the word means 'in whom all the attributes reach to infinity'; 1.1.3; 1.4., introduc.; 3.1, introduc.; 3.2.22; 3.3, introduc.; 3.3.12, etc.

P.R., 1st prameya, pp. 32-36, where the attributes of the Lord are enumerated as omniscience, bliss, lordliness, friendliness, teachership, saviourhood and beauty.

⁷ G.B., 1.1.2; 1.2.7; 1.2.32; 1.4., introduc.; 2.1.37; 2.3.6; 2.3.18; 3.2.13; 3.2.27.

⁸ G.B., 1.1.11, pp. 55-56, chap. 1.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.29, introduc. p. 157, chap. 3.

essential love and solicitude for His devotees. He is verily, a slave of His devotees and even gives His own Self to them.¹

The attributes and powers of the Lord are by nature inconceivable (acintya) and mysterious.² Baladeva emphasises this point again and again. The Lord is all pervading yet atomic, or of the size of a span, dwelling actually within the heart of His devotees;³ He is one, yet appears as many;⁴ all-knowledge, yet appears as having a body;⁵ essentially formless and colourless, yet possesses the most attractive form;⁶ unmanifest, yet manifests Himself to His devotees;⁷ He is just and impartial, yet shows special grace to His devotees;⁸ He is the creator of all, their material cause, yet unmodified Himself;⁹ without any parts, yet possessed of parts;¹⁰ immeasurable, yet measured.¹¹

All such paradoxical or apparently contradictory qualities co-exist in the Lord since everything is possible in His case.¹² We, of course, fail to conceive this, but we must believe it on the authority of Scripture, for in transcendental matters, Scripture, and not reasoning, is our only guide.¹³

The attributes of the Lord are not different or separate from the Lord, but are nothing except the Lord Himself. And, although there is no real distinction between the Lord and His attributes, yet for conventional purposes, a distinction is recognised and spoken of. Baladeva bases his theory of the identity of substance and attribute

¹ G.B., 3.3.31, p. 162, chap. 3. 3.3.51, p. 208, chap. 3; 3.4.1, p. 235, chap. 3: "vidyayā parituṣṭo Haris sva-bhaktāya ātmānam dadāti"; 3.4.43, pp. 287-88, chap. 3.

² Vide footnote 3 below.

³ G.B., 1.2.7; p. 115, chap. 1, "Vibhutve sati aṇutvādikam acintya-śakti-yogāt"; 1.2.32, p. 142, chap. 1.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 1.2.32, p. 142, chap. 1; 2.1.27, p. 60, chap. 2.

⁵ *Op. cit.*

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 2.1.37, p. 78, chap. 2.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 3.2.27, p. 82, chap. 3.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 2.1.37, see below under "The Sādhanaś".

⁹ *Op. cit.*, 2.1.27, p. 60, chap. 2.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*

¹¹ *Op. cit.*

¹² *Op. cit.*, 1.2.32, 2.1.27, 2.1.37, p. 78, chap. 2; 3.2.13, p. 58, chap. 3.

¹³ *Op. cit.*, 2.1.11, p. 32, chap. 2; 2.1.27, p. 62, chap. 3; 2.3.17, p. 186, chap. 2; 3.2.17, p. 63, chap. 3; SD.R., 1st pāda, pp. 37, 42.

on the doctrine of *viśeṣa*, already explained.¹ Thus, just as the coil constitutes the serpent and is not separate from it, but is yet the attribute of the serpent, so the Lord, Who is essentially intelligence and bliss, possesses intelligent bliss as His attributes too;² or just as the sun is essentially light, yet the substratum of light, so the Lord, though essentially of the nature of knowledge, is yet the substratum of knowledge as well;³ or just as time is one incessant duration and has neither priority, nor posteriority, so the Lord is both knowledge and knower, bliss and blissful, substance and attribute.⁴

The fact is that the Lord has no internal differences,⁵ i.e. is not a concrete whole of different kinds of attributes, just as a tree is a concrete whole of roots, leaves, and flowers, etc.⁶ But He is one essence throughout like a diamond, and every one of His attributes is identical with Him, and not a part, separate from Him, and as such every one of them is full, perfect and unchangeable.⁷

The Lord has three powers—viz., *parā-śakti*, *aparā-śakti*, and *avidyā-śakti*.⁸ The first is called *Viṣṇu-śakti* or *Svarūpa-śakti*, the second *kṣetrajña* and the third *karma*,⁹ and also *māyā* or *tamas*.¹⁰ The *parā-śakti* is three-fold—viz. *saṃvit* or *jñāna-śakti*, i.e. the power of consciousness; *sannidhi* or *bala-śakti*, i.e. the existence-giving power, viz. that which brings about the union of atoms, etc.; and *hlādinī* or *kriyā-śakti*, i.e. the bliss-giving power.¹¹ Through the

¹ See under *Harivyāsadeva*, *vide* G.B., 3.2.28, introduc., p. 84, chap. 3. "Atha svarūpād guṇānām abhedah pratipadyate"; 3.2.31, see below.

P.R., 1st prameya, verse 11, p. 37.

For the doctrine of *Viśeṣa*, *vide* G.B., 3.2.31, pp. 87-89, chap. 3, "Viśeṣaśca bheda-pratinidhiḥ bhedābhāve api bhedakāryasya dharma-dharmi-bhāvāder vyavahārasya nivarttakah", etc.—exactly like *Harivyāsadeva*.

² G.B., 3.2.28, p. 85, chap. 3.

³ G.B., 3.2.29, p. 86, chap. 3.

⁴ G.B., 3.2.30, p. 86, chap. 3.

⁵ G.B., 3.2.28, p. 85, chap. 3; 3.3.13, p. 136, chap. 3: "Svagata-bhedasyāp pratyākhyānāt", SD.R., 1st pāda, pp. 43-44.

⁶ Cf. the three kinds of *bheda*, *sajātiya*, *vijātiya* and *svagata*.

⁷ G.B., 3.3.13, p. 136, chap. 3.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 1.4.26, p. 266, chap. 1; 3.3.39, pp. 177-78, chap. 3.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, 1.4.26, p. 266, chap. 1.

P.R., 1st prameya, p. 42:—

"Viṣṇu śaktiḥ parā proktā kṣetrajñākhyā tathāparā;
Avidyā-karma-saṃjñānyā tṛtīyā śaktirīṣyate."

¹⁰ G.B., 1.4.10, pp. 224-25, chap. 1.

¹¹ P.R., 1st prameya, p. 44.

first the Lord, knowledge by nature, Himself knows,¹ and gives knowledge to the souls. Through the second the Lord, existent by nature, Himself exists,² and gives existence to space, time, matter, souls and karma. Through the third, the Lord, bliss by nature, Himself enjoys, and gives bliss to the souls.³

The aparā-śakti and the avidyā-śakti of the Lord consist respectively in the souls and matter.⁴

The Lord is thus both the efficient and material cause of the universe.⁵ He is the efficient cause through His parā-śakti, and He is the material cause through His aparā and avidyā-śaktis.⁶ When these latter two powers are manifested in gross forms, the Universe of souls and matter arises. As the operative cause, the Lord is Unchangeable or kūṭastha, as the material cause, He is subject to modification or pariṇāmin.⁷ But though subject to modification, He remains modified in His own essential nature, which fact, though apparently contradictory, must be accepted on the authority of Scripture.⁸

Like the attributes, the powers of the Lord too are identical with the Lord, since the Lord has no internal differences.⁹

The parā-śakti of the Lord is identical with Śrī, the constant companion of the Lord, and as the parā-śakti of the Lord is identical with the Lord Himself, Śrī is identical with the Lord.¹⁰ But though identical with the Lord, she cannot but love and be devoted to the Lord, Who is her very existence, just as the branch cannot but love the tree, or the moon-beam the moon,¹¹ and an erotic sentiment is possible between the Lord and Śrī.¹² The Lord is, thus, an enjoyer of objects of desire (viz. Śrī), not through lust, but through love. The intense bliss which the Lord enjoys from His contact with Śrī does

¹ That is, jñāna becomes jñātā.

² That is, sattvā becomes sat.

³ SD.R., 1st pāda, p. 64. Ānanda becomes ānanda-maya.

⁴ G.B., 2.1.14, p. 38, chap. 2.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 1.4.23-27, pp. 262-271, chap. 1.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 1.4.26, p. 266, chap. 1. "Tasya nimittatvam upādānatvañ cābhidhiyate. Tatrādyam parākyā śaktimadrūpeṇa, dvitīyaṇ tu tad-anyā-śakti-dvayādvāraiva."

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 1.4.26, p. 267, chap. 1.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 2.1.10, pp. 50-51, chap. 2.

⁹ See above.

¹⁰ G.B., 2.3.40, p. 182, chap. 3.

P.R., 1st prameya, verse 12, p. 40.

¹¹ G.B., 3.3.41.

¹² *Op. cit.*, 3.3.42, p. 186, chap. 3.

not imply any want of perfect bliss, fulness and self-enjoyment on His own part, but it is like the joy which one feels on seeing one's own beauty in a mirror.¹

The Lord is, of course, not an enjoyer in the sense the individual soul is, i.e. is never subject to actions and their results.²

The Lord is a knower too and not merely pure knowledge³ and an agent, i.e. the creator, maintainer and destroyer,⁴ the cause of bondage and release⁵ the dispenser of justice, i.e. fruits of karmas.⁶ Those acts which the Lord performs through His cit-śakti and svarūpa, viz. His acts as incarnations, viz. suckling the breasts of Yaśodā, playing with cowherds and cowherdesses, etc. are eternal, while those acts which the Lord performs through matter and time, viz. creating the world, etc.—are non-eternal.⁷

(b) *His form (vigraha) and manifestations (avatāras).*

The Lord is possessed of a celestial, non-material form or body.⁸ The body of the Lord possesses the positive attributes of existence, intelligence and bliss, all-pervasiveness and the rest, as well as the negative attributes of not being coarse, nor fine, neither short, nor long, neither red, nor fluid, etc.⁹

The form of the Lord is unmanifest to the external senses.¹⁰ But though the Lord is ordinarily imperceptible to the senses, yet in absorbed devotion, He becomes perceptible even to the senses of the devotee. A devotee who is full of love for Him and repeatedly practises meditation and the rest, has his senses saturated, as it were, with His essence through His grace. He then becomes fit for seeing Him and sees Him with his purified mind, just as he sees external objects.¹¹

¹ G.B.

SD.R., 1st pāda, pp. 76-83.

² *Op. cit.*, 1.2.8, pp. 115-16, chap. 1.

³ See above.

⁴ See above.

⁵ G.B., 3.2.5, p. 45, chap. 3.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 3.2.29-42, pp. 100-104, chap. 3.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.11, pp. 128-133, chap. 3.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 2.1.31, pp. 68-69, chap. 2.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, 3.2.32, introduc., pp. 76-77, chap. 3; 3.3.34, p. 169, chap. 3.

Vide Brh., 3.8.8.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, 3.2.23, p. 177, chap. 3.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, 3.2.24-27, pp. 78-79, chap. 3.

The form or body of the Lord is not different from the Lord, but identical with Him,¹ just as the attributes and powers of the Lord are not different from, but identical with Him.² Hence the Lord is called formless, i.e. He *does not possess* the form or the body, but *is* the form or the body.³ The body of the Lord being His very self⁴ possesses all the attributes of the Lord, viz. all-pervasiveness, knowledge, etc.⁵

The Lord has a multitude of forms through which He manifests Himself as avatāras or incarnations. That is to say, the Lord is one indeed, so is His eternal consort Śrī, yet they become many, since they assume various forms through their essential power.⁶

Thus, just as in a crystalline gem there exist many hues and colours, though the gem is one, so in the own form of the Lord there exists an infinite number of forms, each eternal and perfect and mysterious, and the Lord, though one and not limited by them, is yet fully manifest through every one of them.⁷

The Lord incarnates Himself variously as Fish, Tortoise, etc. and again as Kṛṣṇa the Sweet, Rāma the Brave, Nṛsiṃha the Terrible, etc. These incarnations, viz. Fish and the rest, are not to be confused with the souls, in spite of the fact that they too, like the souls, are called parts of the Lord. Just as both the sun and the firefly are called light, yet are not the same, or just as both nectar and wine are called liquids, yet are not the same, so the incarnation and the soul, though both parts of the Lord, are not the same.⁸ The soul is under the control of the Lord, and subject to injunctions and prohibitions, but not so the incarnation⁹; the soul is atomic and non-full, but the incarnation is not so.¹⁰ In fact the term "part", applied to the incarnation means the Lord in His entirety.

¹ G.B., 3.2.14, introduc., p. 58, chap. 3.

² See above.

³ G.B., 3.2.14, p. 59, chap. 3. "Rūpam vigrahas tad-viśiṣṭam Brahma na bhavātīti arūpavad ity ucyate vigrahas tad ity arthaḥ."

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 3.2.16, p. 61, chap. 3. "Atra dehād bhinno dehīty evam bidheśvara-vastuni nāsti, kintu deha eva dehīti labdham."

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 3.2.14, p. 59, chap. 3.

⁶ P.R., 1st prameya, verse 13, p. 45.

⁷ G.B., 3.3, introduc., p. 106, chap. 3.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.44, pp. 223-24, chap. 2.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.46, p. 226, chap. 2.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.47, p. 227, chap. 2.

The fact is that the Lord may manifest all His powers in an incarnation, who is then called a full incarnation, or He may manifest only a portion of His powers, when the incarnation is called partial. But these partial incarnations are not parts of the Lord in the same sense the souls are. On the contrary, they represent various aspects of the same Lord, manifesting His different powers, just as the crystal shows different attributes or colours at different times. Or, to give another example, just as a learned teacher, though perfectly well-versed in all the scriptures, may not expound all of them, while addressing a lower class, but only some portions of them and may be called a partial teacher only in that sense, so the so-called partial manifestations of the Lord, though really identical with the Lord Himself, manifest only a portion of His attributes and powers and are hence called partial incarnations.¹

Thus, in the Kṛṣṇa incarnation only, i.e. in the infant Kṛṣṇa, suckling the breasts of Yaśodā, all the six attributes of the Lord, viz. supreme love for all humanity, being an object of supreme love for all humanity, being the composer of supremely sweet heavenly music, possessing a most beautiful form and immeasurable compassion,—are fully manifested, while in other incarnations, fewer attributes and powers are manifested.²

The essential form of the Lord is, thus the form of Kṛṣṇa, the cowherd, with eyes like full-blown lotus, and body blue like cloud, wearing raiments like sparkling lightning, with two arms adorned with the symbol of silence, surrounded by cows, cowherds and cowherdesses and standing under the Heavenly Tree.³

Besides this essential form of blissful Kṛṣṇa (svayaṁrūpa) the Lord has His power or energy forms (or vilāsa-rūpa)—such as Nārāyaṇa, Vāsudeva, Saṁkarṣaṇa and Aniruddha.⁴

¹ G.B., 2.3.45, pp. 224-25, chap. 2.

² *Op. cit.*, 2.3.45, pp. 224-25, chap. 2.
SD.R., 2nd pāda, p. 117.

³ G.B., 3.2.16, p. 61, chap. 3; 3.3.6 (introduc.), 3.3.20; introduc., p. 117, chap. 3; 3.3.29, introduc., p. 156, chap. 3; 3.3.38, p. 176, chap. 3.

Cf. Gopāla-pūrva-tāpanī:—

“Sapundarika-nayanam meghābham vaidyutāmbaram,
Dyibhujam mauna-mudrādhyam vanamālinam Īśvaram”, etc.

⁴ G.B., 3.3.15, p. 138, chap. 3.

Just as the Lord manifests Himself in different incarnations so Śrī too, the eternal consort of the Lord, manifests herself in corresponding incarnations. Thus, when the Lord assumes the form Āditya, she becomes Kamalā; when He becomes Bhārgava, she becomes Dharanī; when He becomes Rāma, she becomes Sitā; when He becomes Kṛṣṇa, she becomes Rukmiṇī and so on. Thus, when He becomes a God, she becomes a goddess, when He becomes a man, she becomes a woman, and so on.¹

Besides the full and partial incarnations, who are the Lord Himself, there are certain exalted souls like Sanatkumāra, Nārada, etc., through whom the Lord shines forth temporarily. These God-possessed souls are called 'āveśāvatāras'.² They too are to be venerated highly, but not to be worshipped like the Lord or His incarnations, for they do not possess all the attributes of the Lord.³

(c) *The City (or loka) of the Lord.*

The city of Brahman, called Vaikuṇṭha, Gokula, Saṁvyoma or Mahiman, is identical with the Lord Himself, and not different from Him,⁴ just as the attributes and powers of the Lord and His body are identical with Him.⁵

Hence, like the Lord Himself, the city of the Lord too is possessed of the six celestial attributes⁶ and free from the three attributes of matter, viz. sattva, rajas and tamas. It cannot be attained by the ungodly, but only by those who perform the five-fold duties⁷ and are eternally perfect and devoted to the Lord. The divine city is full of marvellous palaces and courtyards, gardens and pools, and is refulgent with the light of myriads of suns.⁸

It is not to be wondered how the Lord can be both the dweller (the Lord) and the place dwelt in (the City), for everything is possible

¹ P.R., 1st prameya, p. 51.

² G.B., 3.3.21, introduc., p. 146, chap. 3.

³ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.23, p. 148, chap. 3.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.37-38, pp. 176-178, chap. 3.

⁵ See above.

⁶ Viz. supreme love for humanity, etc. See above.

⁷ Viz. abhigamana, upādāna, ijjā, adhyāna and samādhi. *Vide* 'Prabhā-tīkā' on P.R., p. 60. See below under "The Ritualistic Doctrine of the School of Nimbārka". Cf. also S.B., 2.2.42.

⁸ P.R., 1st prameya, pp. 59-60.

in His case, possessed as He is of inconceivable powers.¹ But though the City of the Lord is nothing but the Lord Himself, yet it appears as a *material* city to the devotee, through the grace of the Lord.²

The Lord brings down on earth His City—which is His own self, and manifests Himself there. Hence, just as Kṛṣṇa is not to be regarded as an ordinary man, but as the Lord Himself, so Mathurā is not to be regarded as an ordinary earthly city, but as the Divine Abode.³

It will be seen now that Baladeva's doctrine of Brahman is similar to that of Nimbārka, so far as general philosophical principles go apart from sectarian details. According to both, Brahman or the Highest Reality is Kṛṣṇa, accompanied by Rādhā. Baladeva makes Śrī the constant consort of the Lord, but Śrī is nothing but Rādhā since, he points out, when Śrī or the parā-śakti of the Lord manifests herself as the giver of gladness, joy and expansion of consciousness, she is called Rādhā, the highest of all women.⁴ Hence Rādhā is the parā-śakti or the hlādinī-śakti of the Lord and non-different from Him.⁵ Again, according to both, the Lord is possessed of attributes and His attributes are majestic and awe-inspiring on the one hand, and sweet and lovable on the other, the Lord is both the material and efficient cause of the world, the Lord is possessed of a celestial body, dwells in a celestial city and manifests Himself in different incarnations and vyūhas, the Lord is both transcendent and immanent and so on. According to Baladeva, as we have seen, the aparā and avidyā śaktis of the Lord represent His immanent aspects, and the parā or svarūpa śakti is transcendent aspect.

Thus, there is on the whole perfect agreement between Nimbārka and Baladeva, although the peculiar view of Baladeva, viz. that there is identity between the Lord and His attributes, powers, body and city, is not found in Nimbārka. According to Baladeva, as we have seen, there is no internal difference in the Lord, in the sense that the Lord

¹ G.B., 3.3.37, p. 175, chap. 3.

² *Op. cit.*, 3.3.36, p. 174, chap. 3.

³ P.R., 1st prameya, verse 17, p. 162.

⁴ G.B., 3.3.42, p. 187, chap. 3. "Hlādinī-sāra-samaveta-saṃ-vid-ātmaka-yuvatī-ratnatvena tu Rādhādi-Śrī-rūpā ca."

Vide also P.R., 1st prameya, p. 55.

⁵ S.D.R., 2nd pāda, pp. 118-19. "Yā bhagabad-abhinnābhihitā yā ca hlādinīty-ādinā viśeṣitā sā paraiva Rādhikeśvaritī."

is not a concrete whole of various attributes, but *is* each of these attributes. But according to Nimbārka, there is internal difference in the Lord in the sense that the sentient and the non-sentient which are parts and powers of the Lord are ever different from Him, though not outside or independent of Him. And Baladeva too should admit that there is internal difference in the Lord in this sense, for according to him also, the sentient and the non-sentient, though powers of the Lord, are different from Him.¹

(3) *The Cit.*

Baladeva's doctrine of the individual soul too is similar to that of Nimbārka.

(a) Like Nimbārka, he holds that the individual soul is, by nature, eternal—without beginning and without end,² self luminous.³ The soul is not knowledge merely, and though its form is that of knowledge, its nature is that of a knower.⁴ It is also an enjoyer⁵ and an active agent.⁶ It is an agent in a two-fold sense, viz. it acts on the external world *indirectly* through the instrumentality of its sense-organs—e.g. it sees colour by means of its eyes, lifts objects by means of its hands and so on—, and it is also an agent in the act of *directly* controlling those sense-organs, just as a carpenter is an agent in the act of carpentry through the medium of his instruments, viz. axe, etc., i.e. constructs various objects by means of these tools, and he is also an agent in the act of directly holding and using those tools.⁷

But though the individual soul is an agent, it is not an independent agent like the Lord. In fact, every act of the soul involves five factors—viz. the soul, the body, the different sense-organs, various kinds of energies and the Lord, and he who thinks himself to be the sole agent is a mistaken fool.⁸ The fact that the activity of the soul depends

¹ See below under "Relation between Brahman, the cit and the acit".

² G.B., 2.3.16, pp. 183-185, chap. 2.

³ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.43, pp. 221-222, chap. 2.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.17, p. 186, chap. 2. "Jñā evātmā jñāna-rūpatve sati jñātr-svarūpa eva."

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.27, p. 198, chap. 2.

Op. cit., 1.2.8, pp. 115-116, chap. 1.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.31-38, pp. 203-212, chap. 2.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.38, p. 210, chap. 2.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.38, pp. 210-211, chap. 2. *Vide* Gītā, 18.14. *Vide* also G.B., 2.1.14, where it is said that the soul is an agent in the same sense that the cow

upon the Lord—which fact is declared by Scripture itself¹—does not however, imply that the individual soul is a mere automaton, moved by the Lord, so that the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions, which presuppose free will on the part of the agent are useless, for the Lord causes the individual soul to act in a particular way, not arbitrarily, but out of regard for its tendencies, generated by its own past works. Thus, as the acts of the soul in the present life are determined by its acts in former lives, it itself is really responsible for its acts, though impelled by the Lord, just as the rain is the common cause of the growth of various kinds of plants, while the seed is the particular cause of the particular plant. Hence, the soul is an agent, though a secondary agent, while the Lord is the causative agent, because without His permission, the soul cannot act. But still, as the responsibility of the soul does not cease, the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions are not meaningless.²

The soul's state of being a knower, an enjoyer and an agent of the soul, Baladeva points out like Nimbārka, are natural, pertaining to it in bondage and in release.³

Like Nimbārka, again, Baladeva insists on the soul's eternal dependence on and servitude to the Lord.⁴ The soul is ever under the control of the Lord in bondage,⁵ as in release.⁶

Like Nimbārka, again, Baladeva holds that the soul is a part,⁷

is an agent in the act of producing milk. The cow has no power of her own to produce milk, but it is the vital energy (prāṇa-śakti) of the cow which is the primary agent in the production of the milk. Similarly, though the soul is observed to produce an effect, it is not independent in its acts, but the Lord is really the primary agent here.

¹ G.B., 2.3.39, p. 213, chap. 2; 2.3.46, pp. 226-227, chap. 2.

² *Op. cit.*, 2.3.40, pp. 214-215, chap. 2.

³ See below under "Mokṣa".

⁴ P.R., 5th prameya, pp. 65-66. "Jivānām bhagavad-dāsatvam."

⁵ G.B., 2.3.46, pp. 226-227, chap. 2.

⁶ See below under "Mokṣa".

⁷ G.B., 2.3.41-43, pp. 217-222. Baladeva points out the soul is not a part of the Lord as a piece of stone cut off from the rock is of the rock, for Brahman is by nature indivisible. Hence the soul is said to be a part of Brahman in the sense of being a *subordinate* to Him, separate from Him, yet related to Him, as the created, the ruled, the supported, etc.

G.B., 2.3.41.

an effect¹ and a power² of the Lord, and is both different and non-different from Him.³ So much for the nature of the soul.

(b) Next, the size of the soul. Here also, Baladeva agrees with Nimbārka in holding that it is atomic in size,⁴ and that this atomicity of the soul, like its agency and the rest, is natural, i.e. the freed soul also remains atomic and does not become all-pervading like the Lord.

(c) Next, the number of souls. Here too Baladeva agrees with Nimbārka in holding that there is a plurality of souls.⁵ He points out that the souls are not absolutely equal and similar. Although their essential nature is the same, i.e. although they have no distinctions among themselves, in so far as they are all intelligent by nature, all cognising subjects and agents and atomic in size, yet there are differences and gradations owing to their karmas and sādhanas.⁶ Even the freed souls are different from one another on account of the difference of their devotion.⁷

(d) Finally, the kinds of souls. Like Nimbārka, Baladeva holds that there are broadly, three kinds of souls, viz. baddhas or the freed souls, i.e. the souls who were in bondage, but are free now, and nitya-

¹ 1.4.26, pp. 265-66, chap. 1; 2.1.14, pp 38-44, chap. 2; 2.3.16, pp. 184-185, chap. 2.

Baladeva points out exactly like Nimbārka that no contradiction is involved by holding the soul and the universe to be both eternal and products of the Lord. When the sentient and the non-sentient, the two powers of the Lord, lie latent in Him, they are said to be non-existent, but when they are manifested, the universe of souls and matter is said to *originate*. The difference between the souls and the pradhāna is, however, this: when the non-sentient objects like the pradhāna and the rest, originate from Brahman (i.e. are manifested), they undergo a change of essential nature—i.e. so long they were energy of Brahman, the sentient, but now they become non-sentient. But the souls do not undergo any such change of essential nature when they originate from Brahman. The only change in their case consists in the contraction and expansion of intelligence—i.e. during dissolution their intelligence is in a state of contraction, during creation it is in a state of expansion,—in either case, however, the soul does not undergo any essential change of a nature. (G.B., 2.3.16.)

² *Op. cit.*, 2.3.16, pp. 184-185, chap. 2; 2.3.41, p. 219, chap. 2.

³ See below under "Relation between Brahman, cit and acit".

⁴ G.B., 2.3.18-30, pp. 187-202, chap. 3.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.42, p. 220, chap. 2.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.49-51, pp. 229-230, chap. 2.

"Svarūpa-sāmye api tad-adṛṣṭānām aniyamāt nānā-vidhatvāt", 2.3.49.

⁷ P.R., verses 2-3, pp. 103-105. See above.

muktas, or the ever-free souls, who are the eternal companions of the Lord.¹

The souls in bondage, according to Baladeva, are again of two kinds, those who desire for salvation, and those who desire for heaven or other worldly objects. The first kind of devotees are again of two kinds—viz. *svaniṣṭhas* and the *ekāntins*. These latter, again are of two kinds—viz. *pariniṣṭhas* and *nirapekṣas*.²

Baladeva is also in perfect agreement with Nimbārka regarding the different states of the soul, viz. dream,³ deep sleep, swoon, etc. and also regarding the destiny of the soul and its journey through the path of gods, etc.⁴ There is only one slight point of difference. According to Nimbārka, the general rule is that the presiding deities of light, day, etc. (the successive stages in the path of gods) or the agents of the Lord lead the souls of knowers to the Lord.⁵ But according to Baladevā, though this is the general rule, yet the Lord makes an exception in the case of the *nirapekṣa* devotees, who are His special favourites, and Himself comes down to fetch them to Him, being impatient of delay.⁶

(4) *The Acit.*

Baladeva's theory of the world too is very similar to that of Nimbārka. Like Nimbārka, he holds that the world is an effect, a development of *prakṛti*, which is a part, an effect and a power of the Lord.⁷ *Prakṛti* is also called *tamas*, *māyā* or *avidyā*.⁸ It is originally the equilibrium of the three *guṇas*, but it is fertilised, i.e. set to motion, by a glance of the Lord and gives rise to the Universe.⁹

Baladeva emphasises the reality of the world, and criticises the Śaṅkarite doctrine of *Vivarta-vāda*.¹⁰ He points out that the omniscient Lord has created the world with His own power, thence the

¹ G.B., introduc., 3.3.11, p. 131, chap. 3.

² For the peculiar duties, etc. and status of these three classes of devotees, see below under "kinds of Bhaktas".

³ G.B., 3.2.1-3, pp. 40-43, chap. 3.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 4th chap., 3-4 pādas.

⁵ See above.

⁶ G.B., 4.3.16, pp. 80-81, chap. 4.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 1.4.26, p. 266, chap. 1; 2.1.14, p. 38, chap. 2; 2.3.16, p. 184, chap.

2. See above footnote 1.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, introduc., pp. 13-14, chap. 1.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, introduc., pp. 13-14.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, 1.4.26, pp. 267-269, chap. 1.

world is bound to be real, for the real cannot produce what is unreal.¹ The statements that the soul alone existed in the beginning, etc., simply mean that during dissolution souls and matter remain merged indistinguishably from the Lord, like birds in a dark forest.²

Like Nimbārka, Baladeva admits *kāla* to be an eternal, non-intelligent substance. Time, according to him, consists in three states—viz., past, present and future and is conventionally denoted by such terms as “simultaneous”, “slow”, “quick”, etc. It is measured by seconds, minutes, hours, days, etc.—up to *parārdha*. It is in constant motion, like a wheel and is involved in the creation and destruction of objects. It is a power of the Lord, and as such without beginning and end.³

But Baladeva does not speak of the *aprākṛta* as Nimbārka does. He speaks instead of *karma* as the fifth category, a non-intelligent substance, without beginning, but having an end.⁴ Karma, too like matter and time, is an important factor in creation. The Lord, though omnipotent and independent, is not capricious, and hence He creates the world strictly in accordance with the *karman* of the souls. These three substances, viz. matter, time and karma, are co-eternal with the Lord and subordinate to Him, though the Lord never disregards them in His act of creation.⁵

(5) *Relation between Brahman, the cit and the acit.*

Like Nimbārka, Baladeva holds that there are three eternal substances. Brahman, the sentient and the non-sentient. The vital question is—what is the relation between them?

Firstly, Baladeva points out, exactly like Nimbārka, that there is an essential difference of nature between Brahman, on the one hand, and the sentient and the non-sentient, on the other. The Lord is supremely pure and perfect, free from all sins and all *karman*, while the soul is tainted by sins and fettered by *karman*,⁶ and the universe is impure and non-intelligent. The Lord is the ruler,⁷ the creator

¹ P.R., 3rd *prameya*, verse 1, p. 75, etc.

² *Op. cit.*, verse 2, p. 80.

³ G.B., introduc., p. 14, chap. 1.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, introduc., p. 15, chap. 1.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 2.1.35, pp. 74-75, chap. 2.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.20, pp. 83-84, chap. 1, 1.2.2, p. 111, chap. 1; 2.1.22, pp. 53-55, chap. 2.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.21, pp. 84-85, chap. 1.

and the supporter,¹ while the souls and the world are the ruled, created and supported. The Lord is the object to be attained,² the master and the beloved³ and the worshipped⁴ while the souls are the attainers, servants, lovers and the worshippers. Even the freed soul is different from the⁵ Lord.

But on the other hand, the soul and the universe are non-different from the Lord, for they are effects of Brahman and the cause and the effect are non-different.⁶ Further, the Lord is all-pervading and pervades the soul and the universe and in this sense too, the soul and the universe are said to be non-different from Him.⁷ Hence we have two kinds of texts, declaring both the difference and non-difference of the Lord from the sentient and the non-sentient.

But how are we to reconcile both difference and non-difference? Baladeva frankly gives up the problem as incomprehensible. An incomprehensible difference—non-difference is the truth of things, and although we cannot conceive it by reason, we must accept it on the authority of revelation, for scripture is our sole guide in transcendental matters.⁸ Baladeva emphasises, as we have seen, the inconceivable and mysterious powers of the Lord.⁹ According to him, the problems *how* unity (Brahman) can become plurality (prapañca) without losing its unity and integrity,¹⁰ *how* one can appear as many without being limited by its manifold forms¹¹ are beyond our grasp, although the facts that unity does become plurality, the one, many cannot but be believed and accepted. Similarly, the relation between unity and plurality, one and many is an insoluble and incomprehensible mystery, but as scripture teaches both difference and non-difference, we must accept both to be true.

Thus, like Nimbārka. Baladeva too accepts both difference and non-difference to be true. As a follower of Madhva, however, and

¹ G.B., 1.1.17, pp. 173-174, chap. 1; 1.2.4, p. 112, chap. 1.

² *Op. cit.*

³ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.41, pp. 217-218, chap. 2.

Baladeva points out that the phrase "Thou art that" (chānd. 6.8.7, etc.) means simply that "All thy functions are dependent on the Lord" (p. 219, chap. 2).

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 3.2.18 (introduc.) (p. 65, chap. 3).

⁵ See below under "Mokṣa".

⁶ G.B., 2.1.14-20 (pp. 38-51, chap. 2).

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 2.1.14 (p. 38, chap. 2).

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.17. See above, p. 63, chap. 3.

¹⁰ See above.

⁹ See above.

¹¹ See above.

also as mainly a religious teacher (religion requires difference between the Lord and His devotee), he lays a greater stress on difference than on non-difference between the Lord and the soul.¹ But he is also reluctant to admit an absolute difference between them as Madhva does, since the effect cannot be absolutely different from its cause—which would lead to Asat-kārya-vāda—or the pervaded from one who pervades. Hence he ends by accepting both difference and non-difference and regarding them as incompatible and incomprehensible, though true.

Nimbārka, however, as we have seen—accepts both difference and non-difference to be equally true and compatible as well. The doctrine of Baladeva may, therefore, be called “Acintya-bhedā-bheda-vāda” as distinguished from the “Svābhāvika-bhedābheda-vāda” of Nimbārka.

(6) *Mokṣa*.

Bondage, according to Baladeva, consists in turning one's face away from the Lord and the consequent obscuration of its own real nature and attributes, while salvation consists in turning one's face towards the Lord, when bondage falls off and the soul attains the form and attributes of the Lord.²

Thus, like Nimbārka, Baladeva too holds that the state of salvation involves two factors. On the one hand, it means the manifestation of the real nature of the self—the full development of its eight-fold superior attributes,³ and on the other it means becoming similar to the Lord.⁴ The difference between the Lord and the individual soul being eternal, this difference persists in the state of salvation too and the freed soul never becomes identical with the Lord. The freed soul is different from the Lord in two points as usual, viz. it is atomic,⁵ while the Lord is all-pervading, and it lacks the power of creation

¹ *Vide* P.R., where he devotes one entire prameya (4th prameya, pp. 81–94) in demonstrating the difference between Brahman and the souls, but it contains not a word about non-difference between them. And he makes obeisance to Madhva and quotes him as authority in the beginning and in the end. See footnote (1) above.

² G.B., introduc., p.13, chap. 1; 1.3.19, p. 167, chap. 1; 3.4.43, p. 288, chap. 3.

³ *Op. cit.*, 4.4.1-2, pp. 84–88, chap. 4. The eight qualities are freedom from sins, etc., *vide* chānd, 8.7.1.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.16-17, pp. 71–74, chap. 1; 1.3.22-23, pp. 169-170, chap. 1; 1.3.43, p. 207, chap. 1.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 4.4.20, p. 116, chap. 4.

etc.—which power belongs exclusively to the Lord.¹ The freed soul is equal to the Lord in point of enjoyment, and not essentially and absolutely.²

In all these points, Baladeva is in perfect agreement with Nimbārka. Like Nimbārka, he emphasises the individuality and separate existence of the freed soul and holds that the freed soul too is a knower, an agent and an enjoyer like the soul in bondage. It is a knower in the sense that it directly knows or intuits Brahman and is omniscient like Him.³ It is an agent in the sense that it roams and sports about in the world of Brahman,⁴ possesses divine creative powers (*satya-saṃkalpatva*)⁵ and creates the world of Fathers, etc. at will.⁶ It is an enjoyer in the sense, that it shares, as noted above, the enjoyments of the Lord⁷ and subsists in infinite and eternal bliss.⁸

According to Baladeva, therefore, as according to Nimbārka, salvation is a positive state and not a mere negative state of absence of pain.⁹

Baladeva, further, agrees with Nimbārka in holding that the freed soul is ever under the control of the Lord, but of none else.¹⁰

Baladeva points out that although the freed soul is under the control of the Lord, yet it is not obligatory for it to carry on meditation on the Lord any longer,¹¹ yet it is irresistibly drawn towards worshipping the Lord, who is so ravishingly beautiful, just as a person suffering from billiousness, though cured by eating sugar, continues to eat sugar, even after his complete cure, simply because sugar is so sweet.¹² But this worship of the Lord by the freed soul, is considered to be no action in the ordinary sense of the word, because it worships without any taint of the *guṇas*.¹³

¹ G.B., 4.4.17-18, pp. 111-113, chap. 4.

² *Op. cit.*, 1.1.16, pp. 71-72, chap. 1; 4.4.21, pp. 117-118, chap. 4.

³ *Op. cit.*, 4.4.15, introduc. and *sūtra*, pp. 108-109, chap. 4.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.32, p. 205, chap. 2.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 3.2.1, p. 41, chap. 3.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 4.4.8, p. 98, chap. 4.

⁷ See footnote (2).

⁸ G.B., 4.4.20, p. 116, chap. 4.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, 4.4.1, p. 85, chap. 4.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, 4.4.9, p. 100, chap. 4.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.27-28, pp. 153-158, chap. 3.

¹² *Op. cit.*, 4.1.12, p. 15, chap. 4. "Pittadagdhasya sitayā pittanāśe api sati, bhūyas tadāsvāda-vat."

¹³ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.38, p. 211, chap. 2.

According to Baladeva, just as there are mutual differences among the souls in bondage, so there are mutual differences among the freed souls as well, owing to their difference of devotion.¹

The freed souls, Baladeva points out, are colleagues of the Lord and hence possess the power of appearing in many forms,² e.g. when the Lord manifests Himself as Kṛṣṇa, the freed souls become His companions and so on.

The freed soul, Baladeva points out, is in threefold union with the Lord—viz. first, it is in the city of the Lord which is the Lord Himself;³ secondly, the Lord is in it, so that it ever feels the presence of the Lord; and thirdly, it is in union with the external form of the Lord.⁴ It is this separation from the external form of the Lord which generates the sentiment of viraha or separation in the freed soul, which sentiment it is said to undergo sometimes in spite of its intimate union with the Lord.⁵

Baladeva, like Nimbārka, accepts Videhan-mukti only and not Jīvan-mukti.⁶

Baladeva points out that Scripture speaks of four kinds of salvation, viz. sālokyā, or residence in the same world with the Lord; sārṣṭi or possessing the same power and rank as the Lord; and sāmīpya or proximity to the Lord and sāyujya or intimate union with the Lord. But of these, sāyujya-mukti is the main and involves all the rest, because, when the soul is in union with the Lord, it resides in the same world as the Lord, attains His nature and attributes and is in proximity to Him.⁷

(7) *The Sādhana.*

(a) *Bhakti, its nature and pre-requisites (viz. karma and jñāna).*

According to Baladeva, bhakti or devotion is the sole and direct cause of salvation.⁸ He uses the term “bhakti” in the sense used

¹ P.R., 6th prameya, verses 2-3, pp. 103, 105. See below under “Kinds of Upāsana”.

² G.B., 3.3.11, p. 131, chap. 3.

³ See above.

⁴ G.B., 4.4.4, pp. 91-92, chap. 4.

⁵ *Op. cit.*

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.33, p. 116, chap. 3; 3.3.53, pp. 211-12, chap. 3; 3.4.52, pp. 303-304; chap. 3, 4.1.15, pp. 21-23, chap. 4.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 4.4.4, pp. 91-92, chap. 4.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 3.2, introduc., p. 38, chap. 3; 3.3.48, p. 202, chap. 3; 3.3.54, pp. 214-217, chap. 3.

by Nimbārka, viz. 'prema' or intense love,¹ and not in the Rāmānujist sense of upāsanā or meditation.²

Bhakti, he points out, really involves two factors—viz., vairāgya or a strong disgust for any and every object other than Brahman, and prema or an equally strong yearning and love for Brahman. These two, vairāgya and prema, are the principal of all sādhanas. The former is generated by the knowledge of the imperfection and transitoriness of all worldly objects, as well as by the knowledge that attachment to worldly objects leads to endless rebirths; while the latter is generated by the knowledge of the Lord and His glorious attributes, omniscience, omnipotence, loveliness and the rest.³

It is clear, therefore, that devotion is not blind, irrational, but is rational and essentially based on knowledge. It is based on a two-fold knowledge, viz. knowledge of the individual self and the world and knowledge of the Lord.⁴

Baladeva distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge: vijñāna and prajñā. Vijñāna means intellectual knowledge, which is obtained from the study of scripture, while prajñā means intuitive knowledge which is nothing but devotion and meditation. The former is indirect, since it is only textual conception; the latter is direct, since it is intimate realisation. The former is the gateway to the latter and is of no avail by itself, for by merely mastering the meaning of words by merely studying the Vedas, one does not become a Brahma-vid or a real knower of Brahman. A real knower of Brahman is he who not only *knows* Brahman, but *intuits* or realises and feels Him directly. Just as the mere utterance of the words "Honey is sweet" will never give a man the taste of the sweetness of honey, but he must actually taste honey to realise how sweet is honey, so exactly is the case here.⁵ In this way, knowledge leads to devotion and meditation and thereby to salvation.

¹ For the definition of bhakti, see under Nimbārka.

² See in loco for Rāmānuja's definition. According to Baladeva, dhyāna is only one form of bhakti; the main characteristic of which is intense joy and love. See below under "Modes and kinds of Bhakti".

³ G.B., 3.2, introduc., pp. 38-39, chap. 3; 3.2.42, p. 104, chap. 3.

For the knowledge which specially help the rise and growth of bhakti—see below.

⁴ G.B., 1.1.2, p. 3P, chap. 1; 3.3.54, p. 217, chap. 3; S.D.R., 1st pāda, p. 54. "Bhaktir api jñāna-viśeṣo bhavati", and p. 67 "jñāna-bhakti-rūpāyāḥ vidyāyāḥ tu sāksāt tat-prāptau iti na kācit kṣatīḥ".

⁵ Op. cit., 1.1.2, p. 30, chap. 1; 3.3.52, p. 209, chap. 3; 3.4.12, pp. 244-247.

Karma or action too, Baladeva points out like Nimbārka, has an important part to play in the attainment of salvation. The proper performance of the duties incumbent on one's own stage of life goes to refine and purify the mind and thereby help the rise of knowledge and devotion in it.¹ Like Nimbārka, again, he points out that the function of karma extends thus far only and no farther. Karma is a means to the rise of knowledge and devotion, but not a means to their fruit, viz. salvation. And, when once knowledge and devotion have arisen, karma is no longer necessary and hence is abandoned, just as a horse is necessary for accomplishing a journey, but no longer necessary when the journey is accomplished.²

Hence Baladeva definitely rejects the Vidyā-karma-samuccaya-vāda, or the doctrine that the combination of vidyā and karma leads to salvation. He points out that vidyā and vidyā alone (by which term he understands "devotion preceded by knowledge")³ is the cause of salvation.⁴

Like Nimbārka, Baladeva emphasises the grace of the Lord as an essential pre-requisite of the attainment of salvation. A man's unaided effort, he points out, can be of no avail unless the Lord is pleased to choose and help him. Thus, choice by the Lord is the most important cause of salvation.⁵

This fact, however, does not contradict the statement, made above, that devotion is the *sole* cause of salvation, for the grace of the Lord and the consequent choice by Him are not arbitrary, but depends on the devotion of the souls themselves. The Lord does not choose any and every one, but only those who are whole-heartedly devoted to Him. Hence, ultimately devotion is the cause of salvation.⁶

¹ G.B., 1.1.1, p. 25, chap. 1; 3.4.8, pp. 236-37, chap. 3; 3.4.26, pp. 263-64, chap. 3; 3.4.33, pp. 271-273, chap. 3.

² *Op. cit.*, 3.4.8, pp. 236-37, chap. 3; 3.4.36, pp. 263-64, chap. 3; 3.4.33 pp. 271-273, chap. 3.

For the place of karma in the life of the three kinds of bhaktas, see below in loco.

³ G.B., 3.3.48, p. 202, chap. 3. "Vidyā-śabdena jñānapūrvikā bhaktir ucyate."

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.48, p. 202, chap. 3; 3.3.50, p. 204, chap. 3; 3.4.35, p. 262, chap. 3.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.54, pp. 214-216, chap. 3.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 2.3.40, pp. 214-215, chap. 2; 3.3.54, pp. 214-217, chap. 3.

SD.R., 1st pāda, p. 57.

The grace of the Lord leads to the direct intuition or vision of the Lord. Though the Lord is infinite and unmanifest, yet when He is pleased with His devotees, He manifests His own essential form to them through His mysterious power of grace.¹ This direct vision of the Lord means the perception of the Lord as an *external object*, i.e. perceiving the Lord in the very same way as one perceives an external object,² and this external vision of the Lord is absolutely necessary for unless there be such a vision, there can be no salvation.³

This direct vision of the Lord Himself is different from the vision of Him as an incarnation, when e.g. he descends on earth as Rāma or Kṛṣṇa and so on. The former is the vision of Him as free from māyā or contact with matter, the latter is the vision of Him as enveloped in māyā. The former can be gained only when the gross and the subtle bodies are destroyed through Brahma-vidyā, the latter can be gained in the present life through great merit. Hence, the former alone leads to final emancipation, the latter only to heavenly joys.⁴

Thus, we conclude that the successive sādhanas are as follows:—The first thing is to keep company with good and righteous men and to serve them and to perform one's own duties in a purely disinterested spirit.⁵ By such company and serving, there arises the knowledge of one's own self and of the supreme self. This two-fold knowledge produces vairāgya on the one hand, prema or bhakti on the other.

When bhakti becomes strong, the devotee becomes the beloved of the Lord and comes to be chosen by Him, and then finally, comes the direct vision of the Lord which is salvation.⁶

Thus:—Sat-saṅga and niṣkāma-karmas → jñāna → vairāgya and prema or bhakti → bhagavat-prasāda and varāṇa → sakṣātkāra and mukti.

There are certain auxiliaries which help the attainment of salvation, viz.:—

1. Guru-bhakti or worshipping the spiritual teacher as a God and Guru-prasāda or the consequent grace of the spiritual teacher. The Lord cannot be reached by the mere study of the Veda, but the kindly

¹ G.B., 3.2.27.

² *Op. cit.*, 3.3.49, introduc., p. 203, chap. 3.

³ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.48-49, pp. 202-203, chap. 3.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.53, pp. 211-212, chap. 3.

⁵ See the exception in the case of the nirapekṣa bhaktas, under "Kinds of Bhaktas".

⁶ G.B., 3.3.54, p. 217, chap. 3.

glance of the preceptor is absolutely necessary, for salvation depends upon the favour of the preceptor in imparting the means of reaching Brahman to the disciple.¹

But although the grace of guru is absolutely necessary, yet one must not fall into the mistake of supposing that it is all-sufficient, for supreme devotion to the Lord, śravana, manana and the rest too are no less necessary.²

Thus, Baladeva definitely rejects gurūpasatti—which consists in relying on the preceptor and preceptor alone—as an independent and self-sufficient sādhana.

2. Worship of good and holy men as gods and the consequent grace of these Holy ones. If a man has the good fortune to obtain the grace of good and holy men, he obtains the grace of the Lord too.³

3. Visiting sacred places and not abusing the worshippers of the Lord and so on.⁴

Devotion, as we have seen, is generated by the knowledge of the supremely glorious attributes of the Lord.⁵ The following kinds of knowledge more specially help the rise and growth of devotion :—

1. The knowledge that the Lord is possessed of inconceivable powers and is the substratum of all paradoxical and contradictory attributes,⁶ instead of detracting from His greatness, strengthens the love of the devotee towards Him, and the devotion for the Lord is increased by such contemplation on His contradictory attributes.⁷

2. The knowledge of the great contrast and difference between the Lord and the individual soul helps the rise of devotion. Devotion for the Lord becomes natural and easy when we contemplate the greatness of His nature and attributes and our own insignificance.⁸

3. The knowledge that the Lord is the Inner self of all and not an external object, generates devotion for Him, for if He were as easily attainable as an external object like a jar and the rest, then there could have been no devotion for Him.⁹

¹ G.B., 3.3.44, p. 192, chap. 3.

² *Op. cit.*, 2.2.45, p. 193, chap. 3.

³ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.51, pp. 206–208, chap. 3. P.R., 8th prameya, verse 1, p. 113.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.51, pp. 206–207, chap. 3.

⁵ See above.

⁶ See above.

⁷ G.B., 3.2.13, p. 58, chap. 3.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 3.2.22, p. 76, chap. 3.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, 3.2.23, introduc., p. 76, chap. 3.

4. The knowledge that the bliss of the Lord is the highest, naturally generates devotion for Him, for there could be no devotion, for one who is possessed of only limited and transitory bliss.¹

5. The knowledge that the Lord is the Highest Being is an essential cause of devotion for Him, for there can be no devotion for a Lord from whom there is a still higher.²

6. The knowledge that the Lord, as all-pervading, is near the devotee, encourages devotion for Him, for if the Lord were not near, but a far-off Deity, the devotee would have naturally become discouraged and would have despaired of reaching Him, which would have resulted in a decrease of his devotion for Him.³

7. The knowledge that the Lord is the giver of fruits softens and encourages the devotee and helps the rise of devotion, for if the Lord did not give rewards of action, or gave inadequate rewards, He would have been considered as a cold, callous and unjust person, so that no devotion would have arisen for Him.⁴

(b) *Modes and kinds of bhakti.*

There are mainly nine modes of devotion:—

1. Listening to the recitation of the name of the Lord.
(śravaṇa.)
2. Singing it to himself. (kīrtana.)
3. Remembering it always. (smaraṇa.)
4. Serving the Lord humbly. (pāda-sevana.)
5. Worshipping Him. (arcana.)
6. Saluting Him. (vandana.)
7. Treating Him as a Master. (dāśya.)
8. Treating Him as a Friend. (sakhyā.)
9. Self-surrender. (ātma-nivedana.)

Every one of these nine modes has full efficacy and leads to salvation.⁵

¹ G.B., 3.2.32, introduc., p. 90, chap. 3.

² *Op. cit.*, 3.2.37, introduc., p. 95, chap. 3.

³ *Op. cit.*, 3.2.38, introduc., 97, chap. 3.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.39, introduc., p. 100, chap. 3.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.32, pp. 164-165, chap. 3.

Cf. Bhāgavata-purāṇa, 7.5.23:—

“Śravaṇaṃ kīrtanaṃ Viṣṇoḥ smaraṇaṃ pāda-sevanam,
Arcanaṃ dāśyaṃ vandanaṃ sakhyam ātma-nivedanam.”

An objection may be raised here:—

Devotion has been defined as immediate intuition or realisation.¹ But only one form of devotion—viz. meditation, may be said to be such an immediate intuition, while the other forms, viz. worship, muttering of prayers, etc., cannot be said to be so, because they involve activities of the body, speech and so on.

The reply to this objection is as follows:—

Devotion is the consciousness of the bliss-giving power of the Lord (hlādinī-śakti),² i.e. it is the consciousness of intense joy. It leads the devotee to be united with the Lord through love. This being the case, even the physical activities of the devotee (who is united with the Lord), viz. his worship, etc., become sources of intense joy to Him, thence they also become immediate realisation of the Lord. That is, just as the body of the Lord, whose essence consists of pure bliss and intelligence is all-joy throughout, and every one of His limbs—His nails, His hair, etc.—is made up of bliss, so every activity of the devotee—physical or otherwise—is a direct perception of the Lord. And, we must not question how physical activities can be direct realisations, but we must accept it on the authority of Scripture.³

The attributes of the Lord, as we have seen, are of two kinds—viz. majestic and sweet. Now, corresponding to these two kinds, there are two different kinds of devotion, viz. vidhi-bhakti or devotion of fear and ruci-bhakti or devotion of love. The former is generated by the knowledge of His supreme might and majesty, the latter by that of His infinite beauty and sweetness and either of these leads to salvation.⁴

The nine modes of devotion, mentioned above, may be brought under either of these two kinds, i.e. there may be śravaṇa of the Lord as majestic or as sweet and so on.⁵

¹ See above.

² G.B., 3.4.12, p. 247, chap. 3. "Hlādinī-sāra-samavetasamvid-rūpā bhaktih." SD.R., 1st pāda, p. 60.

³ *Op. cit.*, 3.4.12, p. 247, chap. 3.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 3.2.9, introduc., pp. 156–158, chap. 3.

For further accounts—see below for a detailed exposition, see SD.R., 2nd pāda, pp. 88–107.

⁵ P.R., 8th prameya, verse 4, p. 121.

"Navadhā bhaktir vidhi-ruci-pūrvā dvividhā bhavet", etc.

(c) *Kinds of upāsana.*

The Lord, as we have seen, has an infinite number of forms, thence there is an infinite number of ways of meditating on Him, and these meditations are different from one another.¹ Thus, the Lord may be meditated on as Kṛṣṇa, Rāma, Nṛsiṃha, Naranārāyaṇa, Fish, Tortoise and so on.²

The Svaniṣṭha devotees as we shall see,³ try to meditate on *all* the forms of the Lord. But such a procedure is not to be encouraged for three main reasons, viz. first, because it is impossible, for none can possibly meditate on *all* the forms of the Lord, possessed as He is of infinite inconceivable forms;⁴ secondly, because it involves an unnecessary distraction of thought and results in a general devotion for all form, but a deep devotion for none;⁵ thirdly, because it is unnecessary, since meditation on any *one* form is sufficient to lead to salvation.⁶

Hence the correct procedure is the procedure of the ekāntin devotees, i.e. to choose one particular form only, and *stick to that form* throughout. And, this choice of one particular form is determined by one's preceptor and the order of good men with whom one is brought up.⁷

These nitya-pūjās, the sole object of which is the realisation of Brahman, differ from the kāmya-pūjās which aim at gaining, not Brahman, but some other particular fruit like fame or fortune, etc. With regard to these latter kinds of pūjās, one is at liberty to worship any form and change from one form to another as suits the case; e.g. the worshipper of the Nṛsiṃha-form may worship other forms for obtaining particular ends. But the nitya-pūjās must never be changed, as pointed out above but must remain the same and uniform throughout. Even when one who practices nitya-pūjā is in need of some lower kāmya objects, he must ask his own God for it, but never have recourse to the worship of any other form.⁸

There are two eternally perfect paths of meditation on the attributes of the Lord, viz. the path of vidhi-bhakti and the path of

¹ G.B., 3.3.60, p. 225, chap. 3.

² *Op. cit.*, 3.3, introduc., pp. 106-108, chap. 3.

³ See below under "Kinds of Bhaktas".

⁴ G.B., 3.3.9, p. 124, chap. 3.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.8, p. 123, chap. 3. See below under "Kinds of Bhaktas".

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.61, p. 266, chap. 3.

⁷ *Op. cit.*

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.62, pp. 227-230, chap. 3.

ruçi-bhakti. From the highest companions of the Lord—viz. the eternally freed souls, down to the lowest mortal on earth, everyone must follow either of these two paths, i.e. meditate on either God, the Majestic, or on God, the Sweet. And as either of these leads to salvation, the devotee is at perfect liberty to follow any of them.¹

But although both these ways of meditation lead to salvation, yet ruçi-bhakti is superior to vidhi-bhakti, for the simple reason that the Lord being all love and all sweetness Himself, the devotion of love and sweetness is more pleasing to Him than the devotion of fear and majesty. Hence, the devotee following the path of ruçi-bhakti by his steady and selfless devotion brings the Lord under his control, as it were; for when he, out of his infinite love for the Lord, surrenders and offers himself to Him, He in His turn, being pleased with him, gives Himself to him, manifests His own infinite sweetness to Him, and makes it possible for him to experience His sweetness fully. The Lord is, of course, conquered by any kind of devotion, yet devotees following the path of ruçi-bhakti, conquer Him more easily and fully than the other kind. Hence ruçi-bhakti is the highest of all kinds of devotion.²

The Lord is to be meditated on as accompanied by Śrī, His eternal consort.³

Besides meditating on the various attributes of the Lord, the devotee should meditate on the various limbs of the Lord, accompanied by appropriate gestures, i.e. on His smiling face, compassionate eyes, etc.⁴

The different forms of meditation lead to different forms of realisation. The universal rule is that as one meditates on the Lord, so he obtains or realises Him.⁵ Hence the devotee sees or realises the Lord as possessed of those attributes only, with which he has so long invested Him in his meditations, and not as possessed of other qualities. Thus, he who meditates on the Lord as Sweet and Beautiful sees Him as such in salvation; while he who meditates on Him as Mighty and Majestic sees Him as such.⁶ Hence, the visions of the Lord differ in accordance with the attitudes of the devotees, and the

¹ G.B., 3.3.29-30, pp. 158-160, chap. 3.

² *Op. cit.*, 3.3.31, pp. 161-162, chap. 3.

SDR., 2nd pāda, pp. 104-42.

³ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.42, p. 188, chap. 3.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.63-68, pp. 230-232, chap. 3.

⁵ Cf. Chānd., 3.14.1.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 3.2.35-36, pp. 94-95, chap. 3; 3.3.56, p. 221, chap. 3.

same Lord appears in different aspects to different devotees, just as the same light of a lamp appears different when it falls on different parts of a temple, viz. on a crystalline surface, or on a wall embedded with rubies, etc.; or just as the same air passing through different musical instruments, viz. flute, conch-shell, etc. produce different sounds.¹ There is thus a difference in the state of salvation owing to the difference of devotion,² i.e. a difference among the freed themselves owing to their different sentiments.³

(d) *Kinds of bhaktas.*

There are, broadly, two kinds of devotees, viz. *svaṇiṣṭha* and *ekāntin*. The latter are, again of two kinds—viz. *pari-niṣṭha* and *nirapekṣa*. The *svaṇiṣṭhas* are Universalists, i.e. they meditate on *all* forms of the Lord and always coalesce in their meditations all the attributes of the Lord, found in every form. But the *ekāntins*, viz. the *pari-niṣṭhas* and the *nirapekṣas*, are exclusionists, i.e. they do not meditate on all forms of the Lord, although they know very well that the Lord has innumerable forms; but they choose *one* particular form only, and meditate on that alone. Thus, their love is not universal⁴ but limited, e.g. the exclusive worshipper of the *Kṛṣṇa*-form does not combine, in his meditation, the form sacred to the worshipper of the *Nṛsiṃha*-form, viz. the flowing mane, the gaping jaw, the terrible teeth and so on; just as the exclusive worshipper of the *Nṛsiṃha*-form does not meditate on the lute and cane of *Kṛṣṇa*, nor on His beauty and sweetness, so dear to the devotee of *Kṛṣṇa*.⁵ But the *svaṇiṣṭhas* meditate on these different attributes of the different forms,

¹ G.B., 3.3.52, p. 209, chap. 3; 3.2.35, p. 94, chap. 3.

² *Op. cit.*, 3.3.52, p. 209, chap. 3.

³ P.R., 6th prameya, verse 3, p. 105.

“Śāntādyā rati-paryyantā ye bhāvāḥ pañca kīrtitāḥ
Tair devaṃ smaratāṃ pumsāṃ tārātamyam mitho matam.”

The five sentiments are the five degrees of devotion, each a little higher than the preceding one: (1) *Śānta* or tranquil meditation on the Lord (*Śrīkṛṣṇa-niṣṭha-buddhivṛttitā*); (2) *Dāsyā*, or active service of the Lord (*sevā*); (3) *Sakhyā*, or a feeling of personal friendship with the Lord (*niḥsambhramatā*); (4) *Vātsalyā*, or filial affection for the Lord (*sneha*); and (5) *Mādhuryā* or feeling of sweetness the highest stage of emotional development (*ruci-bhakti*) (*asaṅga-saṅga-dāneṇa sukhotpādanam*). *Vide* “*Prabhā*” *ṭīkā* on P.R., p. 105.

Cf. *Harivyāsadeva* above.

⁴ G.B., 3.3, introduc., pp. 108-109, chap. 3.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 3.3.8, p. 122, chap. 3.

in a succession of time, just as one sees different hues in the prism at different times.¹

The ekāntin is superior to the svaniṣṭha, because his devotion, being exclusive, is deeper and more absorbing, and as such higher than that of the Svaniṣṭha. The ekāntin thus has a deep, one-pointed love and devotion for one particular form, while the svaniṣṭha has a general love for all forms, but a deep love for none.²

The respective duties of the three classes of devotees are as follows:—

1. The svaniṣṭhas belong to the order of householders. They faithfully discharge the duties incumbent on their own castes and stages of life with a view to attaining vidyā³ since in their case, the rise of vidyā depends on two sets of qualifications, viz. physical or external, such as, the performance of sacrifices, the practice of charity, penance, etc.; and moral or internal, such as, self-control, dispassion, endurance, etc.⁴

But when the svaniṣṭhas, thus obtain vidyā through the proper performance of the duties incumbent on their castes and stages of life, they do not give up karma, but go on performing them in order to increase the already obtained vidyā.⁵ The second object, which leads them to perform karmas even after the origin of vidyā, is their desire to go to heaven and experience its varieties.⁶ But these karmas of the enlightened svaniṣṭhas are not to be confused with the ordinary kāmya-karmas of ordinary men, for the Svaniṣṭhas do not wish to enjoy heavenly pleasures, etc., but their going to heaven and experiencing its varieties are also to serve the Lord and study the works of the Lord as found there. The Svaniṣṭhas really go to the Lord, and it is only as an incident that they go to heaven, and see its objects. Heaven, thus, is no more than a halting stage in their continuous progress towards the world of Brahman. Just as a man, while going to a village,

¹ G.B., 3.3, introduc., p. 108, chap. 3; 3.3.7, p. 121, chap. 3.

² *Op. cit.*, 3.3.8, 9, pp. 123-124, chap. 3.

"Svaniṣṭha-bhakter ekānti-bhaktir gādhā-veśād valiyasī," 3.3.8, p. 123; 3.3.61.

³ *Op. cit.*, 1.1.1, p. 25, chap. 1; 3.4, introduc., p. 234, chap. 3. For the definition of "vidyā", see above.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 3.4.26-27, pp. 263-267, chap. 3.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 3.4.32-33, p. 271, chap. 3.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 3.4, introduc., p. 234, chap. 3; 3.4.33, pp. 271-272, chap. 3.

may casually touch the grass on the roadside, so the *svaniṣṭhas*, incidentally experience the joys of heaven, while going to the Lord.¹

Thus, two factors co-operate in leading the *svaniṣṭhas* to heaven, viz.: (a) the merit of the works performed by them after the rise of *vidyā*, and (b) the works which have already begun to bear fruits before the rise of *vidyā*. Leaving these two sorts of works, *vidyā* burns up all other *karmas* of the *svaniṣṭhas*.²

The fact is that the power of *vidyā* being supreme, *vidyā* can burn to ashes *all* works whatsoever, even those which have begun to bear fruits, but does not do so in deference to the will of the Lord. The Lord wishes that the enlightened devotee should continue his earthly existence a little longer, so that he may be a living example to mankind, and spread His glory in the world. Hence, the devotee, who has harmonised his will to the will of the Lord, allows his *prārabdha* *karmas* to go on producing effects. That is, he allows *vidyā* to singe his *prārabdha* *karmas*, but not to reduce them to ashes. His *prārabdha* *karmas* are just like a piece of half-burnt cloth, which retains its texture and looks like a piece of cloth, but which falls to pieces at the slightest touch. Dressed in such *prārabdha* *karmas*, the devotee goes on carrying on his duties in accordance with the will of the Lord.³

2. The *pariṇiṣṭhas* too belong to the order of householders and they too perform, with equal faith and zeal all the duties incumbent on their castes and stages of life but not with a view to going to heaven in order to see the wonderful works of the Lord there, but simply for the sake of society and the good of humanity, i.e. for setting examples before others to follow.⁴

Besides the duties mentioned above, the *pariṇiṣṭhas* have to perform the *bhāgavata-dharmas* or duties of meditation, etc., out of love for the Lord.⁵

Of these two classes of duties, the *bhāgavata-dharmas* are by far the more important ones for the *pariṇiṣṭhas*. Their primary duty is to worship the Lord and this they can never omit. The other kinds

¹ G.B., 3.4.33, pp. 272-273, chap. 3.

² *Op. cit.*, 3.4.33, pp. 272-273, chap. 3.

³ *Op. cit.*, 3.4.16, pp. 251-252, chap. 3; 3.4.52, p. 304, chap. 3; 4.1.15, pp. 21-22, chap. 4.

Note the exception in the case of the *nirapekṣas*.

⁴ G.B., 1.1.1, p. 25, chap. 1; 3.4, introduc., p. 234, chap. 3; 3.4.34, introduc., p. 274, chap. 3.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 3.4.34, introduc., p. 274, chap. 3.

of duties, on the other hand, are to be performed by them in their leisure moments after they have duly performed their bhāgavadadharmas, and may even be altogether omitted. And this omission of these duties does not incur any sin on their part, since it is not due to any voluntary neglect of duty, but only to their being absorbed in the worship, etc., of the Lord.¹

3. The nirapekṣas (such as Gārgī) do not belong to the order of householders, or to any order, but are sanyāsins or hermits. These dispassionate sages are ever immersed in meditation, uninfluenced by anything else and totally indifferent to worldly life.² They are not required to perform any duties incumbent on castes, etc., to gain vidyā because owing to their proper performance of all the duties like truth, austerity, prayer and the rest, they are born in this life with their minds already purified and fit for vidyā. The sense is: A man who has duly discharged the prescribed duties in his previous life dies before the actual origin of vidyā. Hence, in his next birth, his mind is already fit for vidyā and he is able to obtain full and perfect vidyā by simply coming into contact with holy men. Thus, the company of the good is all that is required for the rise of vidyā in the case of the nirapekṣas.³

The nirapekṣas, belonging to no stage of life, are superior to the svaṇiṣṭhas and the pariniṣṭhas, belonging to the stage of householders, for the condition of a non-householder is a better means of acquiring vidyā, and the nirapekṣas are devoted to the Lord, heart and soul, with no other distraction.⁴

The nirapekṣas are never in danger of falling off from their state of devotion and meditation, and be attracted by the life of a householder, because their senses are completely devoted to the Lord alone, so much so that they never feel attracted to anything else, and also because all desires are completely destroyed in them, except the desire for the Lord.⁵ They desire only to worship the Lord, and faith is the only enjoyment they crave for just as a hungry man craves for food.⁶

Although the nirapekṣas perform no karmas, as the svaṇiṣṭhas do, yet vidyā by itself carries them to heaven for two purposes—viz. first, for testing whether they have a true vairāgya or disinterested

¹ G.B., 3.4.34-35, pp. 274-276, chap. 3; 3.4.22, pp. 258-259, chap. 3.

² *Op. cit.*, 3.4.38-39, pp. 280-282, chap. 3.

³ *Op. cit.*, 3.4.38-39, pp. 280-282, chap. 3.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 3.4.39, p. 281, chap. 3.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 3.4.40, pp. 283-284, chap. 3.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 3.4.42, p. 286, chap. 3.

spirit, or are fascinated by heavenly delights; and secondly, for proclaiming to all the inhabitants of heaven their unselfish love and devotion.¹ The nirapekṣas never desire for heavenly enjoyments, nor even the offices of world-rulers like Indra and the rest.²

The nirapekṣas are special favourites of the Lord. Through the special grace of the Lord, they obtain vidyā at once simply through sat-saṅga,³ and through the grace of the Lord, they, though in the midst of the distractions of the world are yet outside its entanglements.⁴ Further, they have to undergo no anxieties for their worldly wants, because the Lord Himself supplies their every want.⁵

It has been pointed out above that the prārabdha-karmas of the enlightened devotees continue to produce effects through the wish of the Lord, in order that they may teach mankind. But an exception is made in the case of some Nirapekṣas who become free as soon as they obtain vidyā, without having to undergo the consequences of their prārabdha-karmas.⁶ Through the will of the Lord, who is impatient of their delay in coming to Him, yet wishes to uphold the strict principle of justice that the fruits of karmas must be always experienced, the good and bad prārabdha-karmas of those nirapekṣas go to their friends and foes respectively who experience their consequences.⁷

When the nirapekṣas thus obtain vidyā they discard their gross and subtle bodies and get a divine body called "prasāda-vapuṣ" by means of which they enjoy all pleasures along with the Lord.⁸

As a special concession to the nirapekṣas, the Lord Himself comes down to fetch them to Him, being impatient of delay, and does not leave the task to the troop of conducting divinities of light, day and the rest, as He does in the case of other devotees.⁹

Now, if we compare Baladeva's theory of sādhanas with that of Nimbārka, we find that both agree in holding that karma is but an *indirect* means to salvation, assisting only the rise of knowledge, but not directly bringing about its fruit, viz. salvation. They also agree in holding that knowledge and devotion mutually involve each other:

¹ G.B., 3.4.33, p. 273, chap. 3.

² *Op. cit.*, 3.4.41, p. 285, chap. 3.

³ *Op. cit.*, 3.4.38, p. 280, chap. 3.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 3.4.43, pp. 287-288, chap. 3.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 3.4.44, pp. 289-290, chap. 3.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 4.1.17, introduc., pp. 25-26, chap. 4; 4.1.17, pp. 26-28, chap. 4.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 4.1.17-18, pp. 27-29, chap. 4.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 4.1.19, p. 30, chap. 4.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, 4.3.16, pp. 80-81, chap. 4.

the former leads to the latter, devotion is not blind, but based on knowledge. Further, Baladeva agrees with Nimbārka in taking self-surrender too to be an independent sādhanā, although he does not consider it in details and regards it as a mode of devotion.¹ But unlike Nimbārka, he rejects, as we have seen ² surrender to a preceptor as an *independent* means, for he expressly points out that although devotion to the preceptor and the consequent grace of the guru are *absolutely necessary* elements in salvation, yet they are never the *sole* elements. Devotion to the Lord and one's own efforts consisting in śravaṇa, manana and the rest too are absolutely necessary,—devotion to the preceptor cannot by *itself* lead to salvation.

According to Nimbārka, each of the Upaniṣadic vidyās, viz. Śāṇḍilya-vidyā, Madhu-vidyā, Dahara-vidyā and the rest leads to salvation, but Baladeva does not mention any of these vidyās, but emphasises, instead, meditations on the different forms of the Lord, regarding which Nimbārka is silent.

Further, although Nimbārka holds that the Lord has two different aspects, viz. majestic and sweet, yet he does not speak of the two separate kinds of meditations on the Lord as the majestic and the Lord as the sweet, as Baladeva so emphatically and repeatedly does.

Although Baladeva holds that meditation on any form leads to salvation, yet he thinks that the Kṛṣṇa-form is the best of all, since Kṛṣṇa is the most perfect form of the Lord, and the Lord, he points out, is to be meditated on as accompanied by Śrī (who in her highest manifestation is Rādhā). Here Baladeva agrees with Nimbārka, who also recommends the joint worship of Rādhā-Kṛṣṇa as the best form of worship.

Both Nimbārka and Baladeva emphasise mādhyakṣya-pradhānā bhakti, i.e. a sweet and most intimate relation of love between the Lord and His devotees, and not a mere relation of awe.

While Baladeva takes the order of a non-householder (anāśramin) to be higher than that of householders (āśramins) and takes the non-householders (nirapekṣas) to be special favourites of the Lord, Nimbārka is of a different opinion, viz. that everyone should belong to one or other of the stages of life, otherwise one cannot be entitled to Brahma-vidyā.

¹ See above "Ātma-nivedana" or self-surrender to the Lord is regarded as one of the nine modes of devotion and as leading to release by itself.

² See above.

Another peculiar point in Baladeva's system is that vidyā is taken to be capable of burning up all karmas, even those which have begun to bear fruits. But other commentators agree in holding that vidyā cannot destroy these prārabdha-karmas—which can be destroyed by retributive experience alone. Even the Advaitins are forced to admit it, although it has made their view open to much criticism—viz. how can the effect (viz. the body—the product of karmas) persist even when its cause (viz. ajñāna) is removed.

Nimbārka does not speak of the three kinds of devotees—Svaniṣṭha, etc., as Baladeva does.

(8) *Rituals*.¹

The devotee must be purified by the Pañca-saṃskāras—which are exactly similar to those admitted by the school of Nimbārka.²

The devotee should live in places like Mathurā and the rest. He should fast on the Lord's Day, on the eleventh day of the moon (ekādaśī). If it does not commence on the break of dawn (aruṇodaya), he should observe it on the next day. Similarly, he should observe the birthday festival of the Lord on the eighth day of the moon (Janmāṣṭamī), but if the eighth day of the moon does not commence with sunrise (sūryodaya) he should observe it on the next day.

Finally, the devotee should avoid with care the ten sorts of blasphemy or Nāma-aparādha, viz.:—

1. Censuring holy men.
2. Meditating on other deities like Śiva and the rest as independent deities, i.e. uttering their names in presence of Viṣṇu.
3. Showing contempt for one's preceptor or for other persons fit to be revered.
4. Speaking ill of Scripture and other works which are in conformity with it.
5. Disbelieving the efficacy of the sacred Name of the Lord in removing all sins.
6. Trying to explain the scriptural statements regarding the efficacy of the sacred Name by other methods, i.e. as mere eulogy.

¹ P.R., 8th prameya, verses 1–8, pp. 117–125.

² For details, see "Prabhā" ṭīkā on P.R., p. 122. See below under "Ritualistic Doctrine of the School of Nimbarka".

7. Wilful commission of sins on the idea that the mere utterance of the sacred Name afterwards will be able to wash them off.
8. Thinking that any other good work, such as charity, etc., can be equal to the utterance of the Sacred Name.
9. Teaching the Name to a disbeliever.
10. Not loving the Name, even after hearing its glory.

Now, if we compare this doctrine with the ritualistic doctrine of the school of Nimbārka, we find that there is not much difference between the two. However, so far as the determination of the tithis for the observance of religious vows and festivals goes, Baladeva says, as we have seen if the *ekādaśī-tithi* does not begin with the *break of dawn* (*arunodaya*) one should not observe the *ekādaśī-vrata* on that day, but on the next day. But according to the followers of Nimbārka, if the tithi does not begin with *midnight*, one should observe the vow the next day. Again, according to Baladeva, if the *aṣṭamī-tithi* does not begin with *sunrise*, one should not observe the *Janmāṣṭamī-vrata* on that day, but according to the followers of Nimbārka, if the tithi does not begin with *midnight*, one should, as before, perform the *Janmāṣṭamī* on the next day.¹

(9) Conclusion.

Thus, we find that from the point of view of philosophy, the main difference between Nimbārka and Baladeva lies in their conceptions of the reconcilableness or otherwise of difference and non-difference. While the system of Nimbārka is more philosophical, that of Baladeva is more religious. From the point of view of religion, however, there is not much difference between them, except the sectarian ones, since both are infused with the same spirit of emotion, ecstasy and intimate association between the Lord and the individual soul.

V. RÉSUMÉ.

(i) POINTS OF DISSIMILARITY BETWEEN NIMBĀRKA AND RĀMĀNUJA.

Rāmānuja.

Nimbārka.

- | | |
|---|---|
| (1) The Highest Reality is Viṣṇu.
No mention of Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā. | The Highest Reality is Kṛṣṇa, accompanied by Rādhā. |
|---|---|

¹ See below under "Some of the religious observances and festivals of the sect of Nimbārka".

*Rāmānuja.**Nimbārka.*

- | | |
|---|--|
| (2) The sentient souls are attributes or modes of the Lord. | They are powers of the Lord, and not His attributes. |
| (3) The non-sentient substance is an attribute or mode of the Lord. | The non-sentient substance is a power of the Lord, and not His attribute. |
| (4) Difference qualifies non-difference and is as such subordinate to it. More emphasis on the principle of identity. | Difference and non-difference are precisely on the same level, none being subordinate to the other. Equal emphasis on both the principles. |
| (5) Bhakti means continuous meditation. | It means intense love. |
| (6) The relation between God and man is a distant relation of reverence. | The relation between them is an intimate relation of love. |
| (7) More intellectual. | More religious. |

Points of similarity between Nimbārka and Rāmānuja.

- (1) Brahman is a personal God, endowed with infinite auspicious attributes and powers and free from all defects, the one identical material and efficient cause of the universe.
- (2) The souls are knowledge by nature, knowers, doers, enjoyers, atomic, innumerable, dependent and real in bondage as in release.
- (3) The non-sentient substance is of three kinds, matter, pure matter and time; and is real and dependent on the Lord.
- (4) Difference and non-difference are both real.
- (5) Meditation, based on knowledge and accompanied by proper actions, is the means to salvation.
- (6) Salvation is the full development of the nature of the individual soul, and its attaining similarity with the Lord. There is no jīvan-mukti.
- (7) The grace of the Lord is an essential condition of salvation.

(ii) POINTS OF DISSIMILARITY BETWEEN NIMBĀRKA AND BHĀSKARA.

*Bhāskara.**Nimbārka.*

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|---|---|
| <p>(1) The Highest Reality is Brahman or Īśvara, not a personal God of love and grace. No consort of Brahman mentioned.</p> <p>(2) Emphasises the formless non-different causal state of Brahman,—with no internal differences even,—over and above His effected state as having a form and different-non-different from the universe.</p> <p>(3) Does not speak of incarnations and rejects the vyūhas.</p> <p>(4) The soul is different-non-different from Brahman during mundane state, but non-different from Him during salvation.</p> <p>(5) The soul's state of being an agent, an enjoyer and atomic are not natural and everlasting, but due to limiting adjuncts and temporary.</p> <p>(6) Does not speak of the aprākṛta and time as species of the non-sentient substance.</p> <p>(7) The world is different-non-different from Brahman during creation, but non-different from Him during dissolution.</p> | <p>The Highest Reality is Kṛṣṇa, a personal God of love and grace, accompanied by Rādhā.</p> <p>Does not admit of such a purely non-different form of Brahman, who has <i>always</i> internal differences.</p> <p>Accepts incarnations and vyūhas.</p> <p>The soul is <i>always</i> different-non-different from Brahman, in salvation too.</p> <p>It is natural and everlasting.</p> <p>Does so.</p> <p>The world is <i>always</i> different—non-different from Brahman.</p> |
|---|---|

*Bhāskara.**Nimbārka.*

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|---|---|
| (8) Difference is due to limiting adjunct, non-difference is natural. | Difference and non-difference are equally natural. |
| (9) Action is a direct means to salvation. | It is but an indirect means to salvation. |
| (10) No grace of the Lord is required for salvation. | Grace of the Lord is an essential pre-requisite of salvation. |
| (11) No place for a relation of love and companionship. | Emphasises such a relation. |
| (12) Salvation means the absolute absorption of the soul in Brahman. | The soul retains its individuality even in salvation. |
| (13) Admits two kinds of salvation, viz. immediate and gradual. | Admits one kind of salvation, viz. immediate. |

Points of similarity between Nimbārka and Bhāskara.

- (1) Brahman is endowed with attributes and powers and is the one identical material and efficient cause of the universe.
- (2) The souls and matter are the effects, parts and powers of the Lord, and are real and eternal.
- (3) They are different-non-different from the Lord (during mundane existence).
- (4) Both difference and non-difference are real (during mundane existence).
- (5) Knowledge and meditation are direct means to salvation.
- (6) Salvation is a posite acquisition, a positive state of bliss; and there is no jīvan-mukti.

(iii) POINTS OF DISSIMILARITY BETWEEN NIMBĀRKA AND ŚRĪKAṆṬHA,

*Śrīkaṇṭha.**Nimbārka.*

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|--|---|
| (1) The Highest Reality is Śiva, accompanied by Umā. | The Highest Reality is Kṛṣṇa, accompanied by Rādhā. |
| (2) Viṣṇu is subordinate to Śiva. | Not so. |

*Śrīkaṇṭha.**Nimbārka.*

- | | |
|--|---|
| (3) Does not speak of incarnations and rejects the vyūhas. | Accepts incarnations and vyūhas. |
| (4) The souls and the world are attributes of the Lord. | They are powers and not attributes of the Lord. |
| (5) The freed soul is not under the control of the Lord. | The soul is <i>ever</i> under the control of the Lord, even when freed. |
| (6) Does not speak of the aprākṛta and time as species of the non-sentient substance. | Does so. |
| (7) Non-difference and difference are both real, yet difference qualifies non-difference and is as such subordinate to it. | Difference and non-difference are both real and on the same level. |
| (8) There are two kinds of salvation, viz. immediate and gradual. | There is one kind of salvation, viz. immediate. |
| (9) Emphasises a relation of awe and reverence between God and man. | Emphasises a relation of love and companionship. |
| (10) Does not recognise prapatti and gurūpasatti as independent sādhanas. | Does so. |
| (11) Recommends meditation on Nārāyaṇa as the material cause. | Does not do so. |

Points of similarity between Nimbārka and Śrīkaṇṭha.

- (1) Brahman, a personal God, is endowed with all auspicious attributes and powers, and free from all faults, and is the one identical material and efficient cause of the Universe.
- (2) The souls are knowledge by nature, knowers, agents, enjoyers, atomic and innumerable and real in bondage as in release.

- (3) The non-sentient substance is real and dependent on the Lord.
- (4) Difference and non-difference are both real.
- (5) Salvation implies the full development of the real nature of the soul and its attaining similarity with the Lord. There is no jīvan-mukti.
- (6) Action is an indirect means to salvation, while meditation based on knowledge is the direct means.
- (7) The grace of the Lord is an essential pre-requisite of salvation.

(iv) POINTS OF DISSIMILARITY BETWEEN NIMBĀRKA AND BALADEVA.

<i>Baladeva.</i>	<i>Nimbārka.</i>
(1) The Lord is identical with His attributes, body and city.	Not so.
(2) The Lord has no internal differences.	The Lord has always internal differences.
(3) Does not speak of the aprākṛta as a species of the non-sentient, but substitutes karma.	Admits the aprākṛta and not karma to be a species of the non-sentient.
(4) Difference and non-difference are real yet irreconcilable.	They are both real and reconcilable.
(5) Gurūpasatti is not an independent sādhana.	It is so.
(6) The order of an anāśramin is higher than that of an āśramin.	The order of an āśramin is the best of all.
(7) Vidyā can destroy even prārabdha-karmas.	It cannot do so.
(8) Does not speak of the meditations mentioned in the Upaniṣads as means to salvation.	Does so.
(9) Speaks of two distinct kinds of meditations—viz. meditation on God, the Sweet and God, the Majestic.	Does not do so.

*Baladeva.**Nimbārka.*

- (10) Speaks of three classes of disciples, viz. *svanīṣṭha*, *parinīṣṭha* and *nirapekṣa*. Does not do so.
- (11) More religious. More intellectual.

Points of similarity between Nimbārka and Baladeva.

- (1) Brahman is Kṛṣṇa, accompanied by Rādhā, and endowed with all auspicious qualities and free from all defects. He is the one identical material and efficient cause of the Universe and manifests Himself in incarnations and *vyūhas*.
- (2) The souls are knowledge by nature, knowers, agents, innumerable, atomic, dependent and real in bondage and release.
- (3) The world is real and dependent on the Lord.
- (4) Time is an eternal non-sentient substance.
- (5) Salvation means the full development of the real nature of the soul and its attaining similarity with the Lord. There is no *jīvan-mukti*.
- (6) Action is an indirect means to salvation, while meditation, based on knowledge, is the direct means.
- (7) Self-surrender to the Lord is a direct means to salvation.
- (8) A most intimate relation of love and companionship between God and man is emphasised.
- (9) The grace of the Lord is an essential factor in salvation.
- (10) Ritualistic doctrine similar on the whole.

VI. RITUALISTIC DOCTRINE OF THE SCHOOL OF NIMBĀRKA.

(1) INITIATION TO THE MANTRA OF THE LORD (DIKṢĀ), ETC.

A Vaiṣṇava¹ must be initiated by his preceptor to the mantra of his sect. There are two kinds of Vaiṣṇavas, viz. *sāṃpradāyikas* and *aśāṃpradāyikas*. The former learn the great truth, taught by the Lord Himself, directly from a pious and learned preceptor, who in his

¹ For the marks of a Vaiṣṇava, see Sv.S., 11th taraṅga, pp. 117ff. See below.

turn, has learnt it from a previous preceptor and so on. The latter do not have recourse to a preceptor and therefore, do not learn the truth direct but simply imitate the manners and customs of the former kinds of Vaiṣṇavas. Evidently, the former are far superior to the latter, and they alone get the fruit, viz. salvation. Hence, everyone who desires to attain salvation should approach a preceptor and be properly initiated by him.¹

He must be initiated to the Viṣṇu-mantra, and not to the mantra of Brahmā, Śiva, or any other deity, for Viṣṇu-mantra is the best and the only efficacious one.²

Now, there are various kinds of Viṣṇu-mantras, of which the Gopāla-mantra of eighteen syllables³ is the best.⁴ Hence the devotee should be first initiated by Mukundaśaraṇa-mantra and then by the Gopāla-mantra of eighteen syllables.⁵

Men of four castes are to be initiated to the Gopāla-mantra without distinction, although a Śūdra and a woman are entitled only to a curtailed mantra of the Lord consisting of ten syllables.⁶

The devotee should approach his preceptor for initiation in the following manner:—

Having first properly performed his daily duties, such as saṁdhyā,⁷ meditation and so on, he should prepare the pañca-gavyas or a mixture of the five products of the cow, viz. milk, sour milk, butter, the liquid and the solid excreta. He should first of all put some liquid excreta of the cow in a pot, reciting the Gāyatrī-mantra; with the recitation of prescribed mantras successively put in it some solid excreta of the cow, milk, sour milk and butter and finally the washings of the kuśa-grass; mix them all and drink the mixture with the utterance of 'Om'. This will purify him and destroy his sins.⁸

Next, he is to put on a new sacred thread.⁹ He should first wash the threads in clean water, then rinse his mouth, practise breath-exercises and make the resolve to wear a new thread in order that he may be entitled to the performance of works enjoined in Scripture. After that he should take the threads in his hands, recite the Gāyatrī-

¹ D.P., pp. 7-8.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 7.

³ Viz. "Kṛīm Kṛṣṇāya Govindāya Gopījana-vallabhāya svāhā". See K.D., 2nd paṭala, pp. 32-55.

⁴ K.D., 2nd paṭala, pp. 32ff.; D.P., pp. 14-15; Sv.S., 3rd taraṅga, pp. 14ff.

⁵ D.P., pp. 15, 27.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, K.D., 1st paṭala, p. 3.

⁷ See below under "Practical mode of worshipping the Lord the idol".

⁸ D.P., pp. 16-18.

⁹ Of course, excluding a śūdra or a woman.

mantra over them ten times, hold them separately in his right hand with the utterance of two mantras and put them on one by one, rinsing his mouth each time and reciting the Gāyatrī-mantra as best as he can. The old threads are to be taken out with the recitation of mantras, placed on a clean spot for the-time being and thrown into a river afterwards.¹

Purified thus by the proper performance of the daily duties, by the drinking of the Pañca-gavyas and by the putting on of a new sacred thread, the devotee should now approach a preceptor, and be initiated by him to the holy mantra of the Lord. The successive stages of the process of initiation, viz. goptr̥tva-varaṇa, ātmasāṭ-karaṇa, etc., have already been considered in details.²

A Vaiṣṇava has two-fold marks, viz. internal and external. His internal marks are dhyāna or meditation, bhakti or devotion and yajña or performance of sacrifices, preceded by his initiation to the Gopāla-mantra,³ as pointed out above. Meditation and devotion have been already considered.⁴ So only the third remains to be considered.

There are five kinds of yajñas or sacrifices, viz. ātma-yajña, japa-yajña, dravya-yajña, jñāna-yajña and yoga-yajña.⁵

1. The method of performing the ātma-yajña is as follows: Having risen early in the morning, washed his hands and feet, rinsed his mouth and bowed down to his preceptors, the devotee should eulogise the Lord and recite appropriate mantras, and afterwards renounce his own self and everything belonging to himself to the Lord, choosing Him as His Master, Father, Husband, Friend and All, and asking Him to make him His own absolutely. The rule is that one belonging to the first three classes should renounce and dedicate one's self to the Lord with the utterance of the three mantras, viz. "Om. I am he", the Mukunda-mantras stated in the Pañca-rātra and the mantra taught by Śrīnivāsa, viz. "All is yours, nothing is mine. Svāhā"; while one belonging to the fourth caste is to renounce one's self by reciting two mantras only.⁶

¹ D.P., pp. 21-22.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 22ff. See above under Gurūpasatti. For the month suitable of the dīkṣā, see Sv.S., 3rd taraṅga, pp. 8ff.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 1.

⁴ See above in Loco.

⁵ S.R., pp. 111-114. Also, D.P., pp. 2-3.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 112. We are not told which two mantras.

(2) The japa-yajña is prescribed thus: The devotee should bathe in the river, offer oblations of water to the Lord; on his return, wash his hands and feet, place a seat as enjoined and sit down on it. Then he should make obeisance to the successive spiritual teachers; meditate on the Lord the Mantra-mūrti Śabda-Brahman, who though one, yet appears as having parts through sound, just as the one air assumes five-fold forms in every man; and pray to Him as his Saviour. Next he should worship the Lord mentally with five Upacāras, or ingredients¹ and externally place the Idol on the throne and worship it with pādya,² arghya³ and so on; practice breath-exercises; recite the mantra of eighteen syllables; and perform japa or mutter mantras as best as he can. After the japa, he should once more make obeisance to the previous teachers of the sect, rinse his mouth, bow down to the Mantra-mūrti, place Him in his heart, place the external Idol in the basket and finish.

(3) Dravya-yajña means worshipping the Lord by means of various kinds of dravyas or upacāras, i.e. ingredients such as flower, sandal-paste, lamp perfume, ornaments and so on, in accordance with Scripture and the practice of the sect.⁴

(4) Jñāna-yajña means discussing the meaning of texts like "Thou art that", etc. as stated by the teachers of the sect, and studying and teaching the Upaniṣads, the Brahma-sūtras, the Bhagavad-gītā and the rest.

(5) Yoga-yajña means controlling the mind by means of breath-exercises meditating on the Lord and His qualities.

The proper performance of any one of these five kinds of yajñas leads one to release. Hence the followers of the sect should daily perform one or two or three or all of them, just as they perform samdhya⁵ and the rest. Although those who perform the Ātma-yajña, have no more duties to perform, since they have had complete resort to the Lord, yet they should perform other kinds of yajñas too in order to teach mankind and obey the mandates of their sect.

So far for the internal marks of a Vaiṣṇava. The external marks of a Vaiṣṇava consist in putting on a garland of tulasi-beads, stamping

¹ Viz. sandal-paste, flowers, incense, lamp and offering of food, etc. D.P., introduc., p. 2.

² i.e. water for the washing of feet.

³ i.e. offering of food, etc.

⁴ See below under "Practical mode of worshipping the Lord: the idol".

⁵ *Op. cit.*, for details.

the marks of conch-shell, disc, etc. on the body and putting on the caste-mark or tilak on the forehead. No vaiṣṇava should omit to put on a garland of tulasī-beads which purifies his whole being and destroys all his sins. It should be put on over the sacred thread at all times and under every circumstance.¹ It should not be taken out even when one is answering the call of nature, or bathing or eating. He who bathes with the garland of tulsī-beads on his neck gets all the fruits of bathing in holy rivers, even though he may be bathing in an ordinary pond; and he who eats with this garland hanging on his neck gets all the fruits of an Aśva-medha sacrifice.²

The garland of tulasī-beads is to be first consecrated by the pañca-gavyas,³ and offered to the Lord with flowers and perfume, and then worn on the neck.⁴ The process of purifying the garland⁵ is as follows: First the garland is to be thoroughly washed with the pañca-gavyas, mixed with the washings of the kuśa-grass. After that it is to be placed on an Aśvattha-leaf, and fifty letters, beginning with om, hrīm, am, ām, etc. are to be mentally appropriated⁶ to it; and is to be besmeared with sandal-paste, and perfumed with incense together with the recitation of proper mantras. Further every bead of the garland too is to be consecrated with mantras. Finally the garland should be worshipped with five ingredients⁷ and the devotee is to meditate on the Lord, mutter the mantra learnt from his preceptor, perform breath-exercise and place the garland on his head.⁸

The last two, viz. putting the signs of conch-shell, etc. and putting the tilaka are considered below in connection with the pañca-saṃskāras.

The pañca-saṃskāras or the five-fold purificatory ceremonies which make one fit for the service, etc. of the Lord are—tāpa, puṇḍra, nāma, mantra, and yāga.⁹

(1) Tāpa means putting on the marks of Viṣṇu's conch-shell, disc, club, and lotus on the body, either branding them on the skin with red-hot iron, or stamping them with gopī-candana or white clay.¹⁰ The

¹ D.P., pp. 46ff.; Sv.S., 3rd taraṅga, pp. 40ff.

² Sv.S., 3rd taraṅga, pp. 40-43.

³ See above.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 3rd taraṅga, p. 43.

⁵ Mālā-saṃskāra-vidhi.

⁶ Nyāsa.

⁷ Viz. sandal-paste, etc. See above, footnote 1, p. 258.

⁸ D.P., pp. 18-19.

⁹ Sv.S., 3rd taraṅga, p. 24; S.R., p. 140; G.M., p. 34.

¹⁰ Gopī-candana is a species of white clay said to be brought from Dvārakā. *Vide* Svadhar. MS., Fol. 1; Sv.S., 3rd taraṅga, pp. 31-32; S.R., p. 141; G.M., p. 35.

former is called 'tapta-mudrā', the latter 'śītala-mudrā'. The former is to be adopted in four places, viz. Naimiṣa, Mathurā, Dvāravatī and Sudarśanaśrama, the latter in other places.¹

(2) Puṇḍra or ūrdhva puṇḍra means putting the tilaka or caste-mark, i.e. drawing two perpendicular lines on the forehead, with a spot in the middle. The lines must be drawn from the tip of the nose right to the end of the forehead. They are said to represent the temple of Hari, and the spot the place of Hari accompanied by Lakṣmī. Hence one should never omit to put on the spot in the middle of the two lines, since just as a temple is worthless, unless the Lord be in it, so the lines are of no value unless there be the spot between them.²

The puṇḍra is to be drawn with gopī-candana. But if it be not available, then it may be drawn with the clay from the shores of the Ganges, or with the clay from the tulasī-pot.³

The puṇḍra may be drawn by any of the four fingers, except the little one, but with different results. If it be drawn by the forefinger, then one attains salvation; if by the middle finger, long life; if by the third finger, objects of desire; and if by the thumb, prosperity.⁴

The puṇḍra is to be worn during the period of worship and oblation, and daily during morning and evening prayers.⁵ If a man performs sacrifices, oblations to gods and forefathers, daily prayers, etc., or practises charity and the rest or studies Scripture without putting on the puṇḍra not only does he fail to obtain any fruit from these, but goes to hell as well.⁶

A Brahmin should put on twelve puṇḍras, a Kṣatriya, four, a vaiśya two, and a śūdra and a woman, one.⁷

The method of putting on the twelve puṇḍras is as follows: The first puṇḍra is to be put on the forehead with the mantra "Om, obeisance to Keśava", the second on the belly with the mantra "Om, obeisance to Nārāyaṇa", and in this manner the puṇḍra is to be put successively, on the breast, cavity of the throat, right side of the

¹ Sv.S., 3rd taraṅga, pp. 32-40; D.P., pp. 47-49; S.R., p. 140; G.M., p. 34.

It is claimed by the disciples of Nimbārka that he was the first to institute the ceremony of 'tapta-mudrā' in Dvārakā in the Kali-yuga. See S.R., p. 124; A.C., p. 84.

² Svadhar. MS., Fol. 1; Sv.S., 3rd taraṅga, pp. 25-28; cf. also D.P., pp. 48-49; S.R., pp. 141-142; G.M., p. 35.

³ Sv.S., 3rd taraṅga, pp. 30-31; S.R., p. 142; G.M., p. 35.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 3rd taraṅga, p. 29.

⁵ *Op. cit.*

⁶ *Op. cit.*

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 29.

belly, right arm, right neck, left side of the belly, left arm, left neck, back and throat, with the mantras "Om, obeisance to Mādhava, Govinda, Viṣṇu, Madhusūdana, Trivikrama, Vāmana, Śrīdhara, Hṛṣikeśa, Padmanābha, and Dāmodara" respectively.¹

One should not put on a puṇḍra which is circular, horizontal or curved, or without any spot in the middle,² and should never use sandal-paste or ash for drawing it.³

(3) Nāma consists in giving the names of the Lord such as "Haridāsa" (servant of Hari) and so on to one's self, to one's children and disciples.⁴

(4) Mantra means learning and teaching the Viṣṇu-mantra handed down by the teachers of the sect.

(5) Yāga means worshipping and teaching the worship of the Lord and His idols and the rest.⁵ The idols of the Lord may be made of stone, wood, metals, such as gold or copper, clay, mind, i.e. mentally conjured by deep and earnest meditation, or be of the form of Śālagrāma or the black sacred stone.⁶

Every true Vaiṣṇava should be consecrated by these five saṃskāras.

He should also perform the five-fold duties, viz. cleaning the temple of the Lord; collecting flowers, offerings and the like for Him; worshipping Him by scent and so on; and studying the hymns, etc. of the sect as taught by the preceptor.⁷

The following are some of the further duties of a Vaiṣṇava.⁸

He should guard the Gopāla-mantra and keep it secret with the same care as he keeps his body covered; revere his preceptor and other Vaiṣṇavas and obey their commands; honour the garlands and the rest which he may find in the temple of the Lord, put them on with the greatest respect and afterwards throw them into a river; at once leave the place where the preceptor is being spoken ill of; and remember the mantra, taught by his preceptor more specially in the morning,

¹ Sv.S., 3rd taraṅga, pp. 28-29; D.P., p. 24; G.P., given in S.R., p. 8.

² Svadhar. M.S., Fol. 1; Sv.S., 3rd taraṅga, p. 28.

³ *Op. cit.*

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 28; S.R., p. 142; G.M., p. 35.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 3rd taraṅga, p. 24; G.M., p. 38.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 7th taraṅga, pp. 82ff.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 10th taraṅga, p. 108; Ā.C., footnote 1, p. 108. The five duties are: abhigamana, upādāna, ijjā, yoga and svādhyāya.

⁸ D.P., pp. 35ff. See further details there.

and when he is in a foreign country, or is about to begin a journey or is making a donation. Further, he should wear new and clean clothes offered to the Lord; besmear his body with sandal-paste, keep a tuft of hair on his head; eat the food and betel-leaves supposed to be eaten by the Lord and drink the washings of His feet; worship the tulasi-plant and eat its leaves; finally if he should happen to see some wonderful workings of the Lord in dreams, he is to reveal them to his preceptor only and to none else.

The following are some of the prohibitions to which a Vaiṣṇava must adhere.¹

He should not sleep in the evening; rinse his mouth standing; seat on the seat of his preceptor; precede, but follow him; touch even his shadow with his feet or cross it; omit to take the daily bath and perform the daily worship of the Lord; forget to stand in presence of the Lord and the preceptor; attempt to show off his learning to his preceptor; rinse his mouth or put on the caste-mark without uttering suitable mantras; and wear a blue dress. Further, he should not take intoxicating liquors, fish, meat, lentil, spinach and gourd,² and should not eat from a brass plate or from the leaf of a banyan tree³; spit in the temple of the Lord and enter there with shoes⁴; practise magical rites like hypnotism and so on; worship the Lord from a wooden seat; conduct the ceremony frivolously; talk indecently while engaged in the ceremony; offer scentless flowers, unconsecrated objects and stale food to the Lord; make obeisance with one hand; see Him at a time not prescribed; let the proper time of worship pass and mutter mantras without counting, and so on.

He should also avoid with care thirty-two kinds of sins.⁵

*The practical mode of worshipping the Lord : the Idol.*⁶

I. (1) The devotee should rise very early in the morning, remember the name of his preceptor, and the names of the Swan, the Four Kumāras, Nārada, Nimbārka, and twelve preceptors like Śrīnivāsa and the rest, and after that Lord Kṛṣṇa, reciting prescribed verses. He should bow down to the earth goddess and ask her to forgive the touch of his feet on her, and get down from the bed.⁷

¹ D.P., pp. 39-41. See further details there.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 39.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 36.

⁴ *Op. cit.*

⁵ Sv. S., 10th tārāṅga, p. 109.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 9th tārāṅga, pp. 97ff.

⁷ This is utthāpana-vidhi.

(2) Then he should go out to answer the call of nature, uttering suitable mantras, as enjoined by Scripture.¹

(3) Next, he should brush his teeth, with a stick of khādira, karañja, kadamba, vaṭa (i.e. banyan), āmra (i.e. mango) or nimba tree. He should take up the stick, praying to the tree to give him long life, strength, fame, energy and so on; first rinse his mouth sixteen times; then brush his teeth with the stick; and finally, rinse his mouth sixteen times once more.²

(4) Next, he should go to the river for bath; first wash his hands and feet and rinse his mouth; then besmear himself with mud from head to feet and plunge into the water. He should look at the sun and pray to it to make the water holy for him; make the amkuṣa-mudrā,³ and pray to the seven holy rivers⁴ to meet together in the water of that particular river; utter the principal mantra⁵; make kumbha-mudrā; and sprinkle himself with water eleven times. Then he should put on the caste-mark with water; rinse his mouth; offer libations of water thrice to the Lord; and get up.⁶

(5) On reaching the shore, he should consecrate his clothes by uttering the principal mantra, make dhenu-mudrā⁷ and put them on.⁸

(6) After that, he should put on twelve tilaks,⁹ and perform the saṃdhyā ceremony as follows: He should take some water in his right palm, cover it over with his left, consecrate it by uttering principal mantra and drink it. Then he should rinse his mouth three times, and again take some water in his right palm, cover it over with the left, consecrate it as before, put that water in his left palm and sprinkle his head with it. For the third time, he should take some water as before in his right palm, cover it with the left and consecrate it as before, and smell it with his right nostril. He should imagine that by his act of smelling the water has gone down into his body through the right nostril, has washed off all sins therein, and has again come

¹ This is śauca-vidhi. Vide also Sv. S., 6th taraṅga, pp. 70ff.

² This is danta-prakṣāṇa-vidhi.

³ A mudrā is the name of a particular position or intertwining of the fingers, commonly practised in religious worship and supposed to possess an occult meaning and religious efficacy.

For amkuṣa-mudrā, see K.D., appendix, p. 1.

⁴ Viz. Gaṅgā, Yamunā, Godāvarī, Sarasvatī, Narmadā, Sindhu, Kāverī.

⁵ I.e. the Gopāla-mantra.

⁶ This is snāna-vidhi.

⁷ Vide K.D., appendix, p. 1.

⁸ This is vastra-paridhāna-vidhi.

⁹ Of course if he be a Brahmin and not otherwise. See above.

out in his hand through the left nostril in a blackened form. Imagining this, he should shake it with the astra-mantra and throw it off. Thereby, he should think himself thoroughly washed off and cleaned. This is the first part of the saṁdhyā-ceremony.

The second part consists in offering libations of water to the Lord three times with the recitation of the Gāyatrī-mantra as modified by the school¹; making the kara-nyāsa, i.e. assigning the different parts of the palm, viz. the forefinger, etc. to the different parts of the Gāyatrī-mantra²; and finally, reciting the mantra twenty-eight or hundred and eight times. This is the Vaiṣṇavite process of performing the saṁdhyā ceremony, whether in the morning, midday or evening.³

(7) Next, he should draw a lotus with eight petals in water; offer libations of water to his preceptor, to other great preceptors, to Nārada and other divine sages, to previous holy ones and to the Bhāgavatas; meditate the Lord Kṛṣṇa in the seed-vessel of the lotus; utter the principal mantra; and offer libations of water to Kṛṣṇa twenty-eight times.⁴

(8) After that, he should return home, reciting verses or in silence.

So far his preliminary consecratory ceremonies. Next his duties in the temple of the Lord.

II. (1) Before entering the temple of the Lord, he should wash his hands and feet and rinse his mouth once more. Having entered there, he should spread a seat; make dhenu-mudrā⁵; pray to the earth goddess to purify his seat; touch the ground with the forefinger with the utterance of the prescribed mantra; strike the ground thrice with the small finger of his left foot; and seat himself facing the east or the north,⁶ in a padmāsana or svastikā posture.⁷

(2) Then he should bow down to his preceptor and other previous teachers; and proceed to consecrate his hands by repeating the astra-

¹ Oṃ. Gopālāya vidmahe Gopīvallabhāya dhīmahi tan naḥ Kṛṣṇaḥ pracodayāt.

² Thus: Oṃ. Gopālāya aṣṭāṅgābhyāṃ namaḥ, vidmahe tarjanībhyāṃ namaḥ, Gopīvallabhāya madhyamābhyāṃ namaḥ, etc.

³ This is saṁdhyā-vidhi.

⁴ This is tarpaṇa-vidhi.

⁵ See K.D., appendix, p. 1.

⁶ The rule is to face the east. But if that be not possible, e.g. during the night, one may face the north. See the commentary on K.D., 1st paṭala, verse 7, p. 6.

⁷ For the explanation of these postures, see the commentary on K.D., 1st paṭala, verse 6, p. 5. This is āsana-vidhi.

mantra¹ eight times, by rubbing sandal-paste and flowers in his palms, by mentally assigning them to the Lord² and, finally, by clapping his hands three times repeating the same astra-mantra. Next, he should bind the ten quarters, as it were, by snapping his thumb and forefinger together and uttering the same astra-mantra, and surround himself, as it were, with a fire-rampart and water, with the same mantra.³ That is, he should hereby regard himself as placed in a safe enclosure, where no harm can befall him, so long as he is engaged in the worship.⁴

(3) After that, he should proceed to purify his elemental, i.e. material, body, for a non-god should not worship God. The process is as follows: He should first connect his soul, situated within the heart-lotus, with the Lord, situated in the lotus with a thousand petals over the head, through the *suṣumnā-nāḍī* with the mantra "I am He", and regard the twenty-five principles—viz. the earth and the rest, as absorbed therein. After that, he should begin the actual process of purifying his body thus: He should first draw in air through his left nostril with the recitation of the black *vāyu-bija* "yam" sixteen times, hold forth his breath, reciting the same sixty-four times, and exhale it out through his right nostril, uttering the same thirty-two times. Thereby he should consider his body dried up. Secondly, he should draw in air through the right nostril along with the utterance of the red *agni-bija* "ram" sixteen times, hold forth his breath by uttering the same sixty-four times and emit it out through the left nostril, uttering the same thirty-two times. Thereby he should consider his earthly body destroyed. Thirdly, he should draw in air through the left nostril with the recitation of the white *candra-bija* "ṭam" sixteen times, thereby taking it to the moon in the head,⁵ and then recite the white *varuṇa-bija* "vam" sixty-four times. Thereby he should consider himself endowed with an immortal body,—fit for conducting the worship of the Lord,—in place of the destroyed earthly one. Finally, he should emit the air through the right nostril, reciting the yellow *prithvī-bija* "lam" thirty-two times. Thereby he should

¹ Viz. 'Astrāya phaṭ'.

² Kara-nyāsa.

³ K.D., 1st paṭala, verse 7, p. 5; Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 97; G.P., given in S.R., pp. 8-9.

⁴ This is *ātma-rakṣaṇa-vidhi*.

⁵ I.e. in the *Brahma-randhrastha-candra*.

regard the immortal body he has just got as easy to be seen as his former earthly one.¹

(4) Thus, on getting a new immortal body, he should next bring down his soul, which he has previously sent up to the Brahma-randhra,² to the heart-lotus of this new body, by placing his hand on the heart and uttering the prescribed mantra,³ and the praṇava sixteen times.⁴

That is, the whole process consists of three steps. First, he should take his soul out of his earthly body, and keep it in the Lord, abiding in the Brahma-randhra. Next, he should destroy his earthly body, and get a new immortal body. Finally, he should install his soul, left intact so long in the Lord in the Brahma-randhra, in this new immortal body. The soul is the same and is not to be destroyed,—but only the body is changed. Of course, as evident, the entire process is only mental, and the earthly body is not really destroyed, but is simply supposed to be so for the time being.

III. After having thus purified his body and made it fit for the worship of the Lord by means of the inhaling and exhaling of air with mantras, he should next proceed to purify it further by means of a series of nyāsa, i.e. should mentally assign the various parts, etc. of his body to deities, etc. with suitable mantras.

(1) Thus he should first perform the kevala-mātrkā-nyāsa, or assign the different parts of the body to different letters, the forehead to the letter “a”, the mouth to the letter “ā”, the right eye to the letter “i”, the left eye to the letter “ī” and so on.⁵

(2) Next, he should perform the Keśavādi-mātrkā-nyāsa, exactly like the first, with the additions of couples of deities.⁶

¹ This is bhūta-suddhi-vidhi. K.D., 1st paṭala, verses 8-10, pp. 6-7; Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, pp. 97-98; G.P., given in S.R., p. 8.

² See above.

³ Thus: “I am He. May my vital-breath, my sense-organs, my speech, mind, eyes, ears and nose come here and stay here for ever for the worship of the Lord. Svāhā.”

⁴ This is prāṇa-pratiṣṭhā. K.D., 1st paṭala, verse 10 and commentary, p. 7; Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 98; G.P., given in S.R., pp. 8-9.

⁵ Thus: Om namaḥ lalāṭe, āṃ namaḥ mukha-vṛtte, and so on. K.D., 1st paṭala, verse 11, p. 8; Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, pp. 98-99; G.P., given in S.R., pp. 10-11.

⁶ Thus: Am namaḥ Keśava-kīrtai; āṃ namaḥ Nārāyaṇāya kāntai, and so on.

K.D., 1st paṭala, verses 14-24, pp. 9-11; Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, pp. 99-100; G.P., given in S.R., pp. 12-13.

(3) Thirdly, he should perform the tattva-nyāsa, or assign his whole body, heart, etc. to the supreme souls of the jīva, prāṇa, etc.¹

(4) Fourthly, he should perform the indriya-nyāsa, or assign his sense-organs to different deities, viz. his ears to the quarters, his eyes to the sun and so on.²

(5) Fifthly, he should perform the pīṭha-nyāsa, i.e. imagine his body to be a pedestal of worship.³

Next, he should perform the Śrī-Gopāla-mantra-nyāsa, i.e. mentally appropriate the mantra of eighteen syllables,⁴ consisting of the following five nyāsas, viz. :—

(6) Ṛṣyādi-nyāsa, i.e. he should assign his head, etc. to the sage Nārada, etc.⁵

(7) Next, he should perform the kara-nyāsa, i.e. assign the fingers and the palm and back of the hand to the different words of the mantra of eighteen syllables.⁶

(8) After that he should perform the aṅga-nyāsa, i.e. assign the various parts of his body to different words of the mantra of eighteen syllables.⁷

(9) Next, he should perform the pada-nyāsa, i.e. assign various parts of his body to the different words of the mantra of eighteen syllables.⁸

(10) Finally, he should perform the varṇa-nyāsa, i.e. assign different parts of the body to different syllables of the mantra of eighteen syllables.⁹

¹ Thus: Maṃ namaḥ parāya jīvātmane namaḥ; bhaṃ namaḥ parāya prāṇātmane namaḥ, iti dvayaṃ sakala-śarīre, etc. K.D., 1st paṭala, verses 28–31, pp. 13–15; Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, pp. 101–102; G.P., given in S.R., pp. 13–14.

² G.P., given in S.R., p. 15.

³ For details, see K.D., 1st paṭala, verse 41, p. 20; Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, pp. 102–103; G.P., given in S.R., p. 15.

⁴ For details, see Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 103; G.P., given in S.R., p. 15; D.P., p. 43.

⁵ Thus: Om Nārada-ṛṣaye namaḥ śirasi, etc. Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 104; G.P., given in S.R., p. 15; D.P., p. 43.

⁶ Thus: Kṛīm aṅguṣṭhābhyāṃ namaḥ, Kṛṣṇāya tarjanībhyāṃ namaḥ, etc. Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 104; G.P., given in S.R., p. 16; D.P., p. 43.

⁷ Thus: Kṛīm hṛdayāya namaḥ, Kṛṣṇāya śīrase svāhā, etc. Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 104; G.P., given in S.R., p. 16; D.P., p. 43.

⁸ Thus: Kṛīm namo mūrdhani, Kṛṣṇāya namo vaktre, etc. Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, pp. 104–105; G.P., given in S.R., p. 16; D.P., p. 43.

⁹ Thus: Kṛīm mūrdhani, kṛm bhāle, ṣṇam bhruvoḥ, etc. Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 105; G.P., given in S.R., p. 16; D.P., p. 43. This is nyāsa-vidhi.

IV. After having thus purified his body, sense-organs, mind, etc. by the series of nyāsas, he should next practise prāṇāyāma or breath-control for finally purifying, adjusting and preparing them for the great task which he is about to commence, viz. the worship of the Lord.

Here is the procedure:

He should mutter klīm sixteen times, draw in air through his left nostril, hold his breath, muttering it sixty-four times, and emit the air muttering it thirty-two times.¹

V. Being thus absolutely purified, he should begin the actual worship of the Lord. He should commence with the internal or mental worship. That is, he should meditate on the Lord as possessed of eyes like full-blown lotus, body blue like cloud, wearing a shining cloth, with two hands adorned with the symbol of silence, standing under the Heavenly Tree² and so on.

After that he should worship the Lord mentally with five objects.³

VI. He should now mutter prayers a thousand times or one hundred and eight times and dedicate them (i.e. the japas) to the Lord.⁴

VII. Next, he should begin the external worship of the Lord, i.e. worship the idol. This should consist of the following successive steps:—

(1) First he should properly arrange the necessary utensils, etc., placing the bowl for washing hands behind him, the pitcher of water on his left, sandal-paste, flowers, cloth and incense, etc. on his right, the pots near his left hand, the lamp of clarified butter on the right side of the Lord, and the lamp of oil on the left of the Lord.⁵

(2) Next, he should place and worship the conch-shell thus: He should draw round, triangular and quadrangular diagrams in his front on the left, worship these diagrams with sandal-paste and flowers; place a washed tripādikā flower there; and worship it with

¹ This is prāṇāyāma-vidhi. G.P., given in S.R., p. 16; D.P., pp. 43-44.

² Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 105. Cf. Baladeva above.

There are many other modes of dhyāna. A long account is given in K.D., 3rd paṭala, verses 1ff., pp. 50ff. Cf. also G.P., given in S.R., p. 16; D.P., p. 44.

³ See above, foot note 1, p. 258.

⁴ This is japa-vidhi. Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 105; G.P., given in S.R., p. 16; D.P., p. 44.

⁵ This is pātra-saṁsthāpana-vidhi. Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 105; G.P., given in S.R., p. 17.

sandal-paste, flowers and unhusked barley-corns; then he should proceed to worship the conch-shell with the prescribed mantra; fill it with pure water, uttering the principal mantra; and worship the water. He should next worship all the holy rivers, the Ganges and the rest; make dhenu-mudrā,¹ repeat the nectar-mantra thrice; and make the gadā, padma, garuḍa, and matsya mudrās² successively. After that, he should hold the conch-shell on both sides with his thumb and third finger, touch the water within it with a japā flower or a petal of the tulasi-flower by his forefinger and middle finger, and utter the mantra eight times. He should dip a flower in the water and put it into the pitcher, sprinkle it over himself and on all the articles of worship.

Next, he should meditate on the conch-shell—as springing from the ocean, supported by the navel of Viṣṇu, worshipped by all the gods, and so on.³

(3) After that, he should place the basin for washing the feet of the Lord⁴ to the south of the conch-shell, and put śyāmaka grass, durvā grass and a lotus⁵ in it. The vessel for the offering of flowers and grass⁶ to the north of the conch-shell and put sandal-paste, flowers, unhusked barley-corns, the sharp point of the blade of kuśa-grass, sesamum, mustard and durvā grass⁷ in it; the basin for rinsing the mouth⁸ to the east of the conch-shell and put nutmeg, cloves and kaṅkola-plant⁹ in it and the vessel for the offering of honey and milk¹⁰ to the west of the conch-shell and put curd, honey and clarified butter in it. If the requisite objects be lacking, he should name a fragrant tulasi-flower for each object, and put it there in place of the actual object; he should fill up all the vessels with water from the pitcher; worship them with sandal-paste and flower; utter mantra over each of them; put some water from the conch-shell in them; make dhenu- and mahā-mudrās.¹¹

¹ See K.D., appendix, p. 1.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 2-3.

³ This is śaṅkha-pūjana-vidhi. G.P., given in S.R., p. 18. Cf. also Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, pp. 202-203.

⁴ Pādya-pātra.

⁵ Sv. S. adds Viṣṇukrānta-plant. 9th taraṅga, p. 106.

⁶ Arghya-pātra.

⁷ Sv. S. adds piparī-plant. 9th taraṅga, p. 106.

⁸ Ācamana-pātra.

⁹ Sv. S. adds barley-corn. 9th taraṅga, p. 106.

¹⁰ Madhuparka-pātra.

¹¹ This is pādyaḍi-pūjana-vidhi. Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 106; G.P., given in S.R., p. 19.

(4) Then he should draw a lotus with eight petals on the ground; put the throne of the Lord over it; offer flowers, uttering the Mahā-pīṭha-mantra and meditate the Lord therein.¹

(5) After that he should awaken the Lord with the prescribed mantra "Arise, arise, O Govinda! Arise, O Madhu-sūdāna! Arise, O Lord of Rādhā, the Saviour of the poor".²

(6) Next, he should place the idol of Kṛṣṇa in a copper vessel, offer flowers to Him, and make pañcāṅga-nyāsa, i.e. assign the different parts of his body to the Lord.³

(7) Then he should proceed to offer flowers, etc.,⁴ water for washing the feet,⁵ water for rinsing the mouth⁶ and honey and milk⁷ to the Lord successively, along with the utterance of the principal mantra. Thus, he should offer sandal-paste, flowers, unhusked barley-corn and kuśa grass, placing them over the head of the idol; the pure water of the Ganges for the washing of His feet, putting them at its feet; the same for the rinsing of His mouth, placing them in its mouth; and finally, honey and milk and butter, putting them in the same.⁸

(8) Next, he should once more offer rinsing water of the Ganges scented with camphor to the Lord, and bathe the idol with the water from the conch-shell with the utterance of suitable mantras.⁹

(9) After that he should proceed to dress and adorn the Lord. He should dress the idol in a fine yellow robe and adorn it with sandal-paste, garlands of fragrant flowers, sacred thread, and various costly ornaments like crown, ear-rings, necklace and anklets, reciting appropriate mantras each time.¹⁰

(10) Next, he should offer incense¹¹ and lamp¹² to the Lord, reciting mantras; and offer refreshment, consisting of milk and rice

¹ This is pīṭha-pūjā-vidhi. Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 106; G.P., given in S.R., p. 19.

² This is utthāpana-vidhi. G.P., given in S.R., p. 19.

³ Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 106; G.P., given in S.R., p. 19.

⁴ Argha. ⁵ Pādya. ⁶ Ācamana. ⁷ Madhu-parka.

⁸ This is pādya-ārpana-vidhi. Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, pp. 106-107; G.P., given in S.R., pp. 19-20. See also K.D., 4th paṭala, verse 25, p. 89.

⁹ This is snāna-vidhi. G.P., given in S.R., p. 20. See also Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 107; K.D., 4th paṭala, verse 26, p. 89.

¹⁰ This is vastra-paridhāna-vidhi. G.P., given in S.R., p. 20. See also Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 107; K.D., 4th paṭala, verse 26, p. 89.

¹¹ Dhūpa-dāna. See K.D., 4th paṭala, verse 50, p. 98 for details.

¹² Dīpa-dāna. See K.D., 4th paṭala, verse 51, p. 98 for details.

cooked together with pure white sugar.¹ He should, first, worship the refreshment with sandal-paste and flowers, etc.; then absorb up all its impurities by muttering the vāyu-bīja "yam" eight times, destroy all its impurities by muttering the agni-bīja "ram" eight times and, finally, make it nectar-like by muttering the varuṇa-bīja "vam" eight times. Then he should make dhenu-mudrā and mahā-mudrā, protect the refreshment from harm by making the cakramudrā and uttering the astra-mantra, and utter the mūla-mantra over it. After having thus rendered the refreshment completely free from impurities, etc., he should put a little water from the conch-shell in the plate, make grāsa-mudrā, and make offerings to the five prāṇas. After that he should offer the refreshment to the Lord, muttering prayers, and think that He has partaken of it.²

(11) Next, he should make the Lord rinse His mouth and offer betel-leaves to Him.³

(12) He should now wave the lamps around the Lord, four times round His feet, twice round His navel, once round His face, and seven times round His whole body.⁴

(13) Next, he should wave the water-filled conch-shell over the idol, and sprinkle everyone present and himself with that water.

(14) He should then ask the forgiveness of the Lord for his unintentional mistakes in serving Him.⁵

(15) Finally, he should worship the washings of the feet of Kṛṣṇa with sandal-paste and flowers, etc., uttering mantras; place the vessel containing the washings on his head; and put it on a prop and not on the ground. Then he should offer the washings of the feet of the Lord first to the stalwart Vaiṣṇava of ancient days like Vāli, Vibhīṣaṇa, Bhīṣma, Kapila, Nārada, Arjuna, Prahlaḍa and so on, and then to the Vaiṣṇavas present there. He should distribute among them also the sandal, flowers, etc. of the Lord and the remains of the refreshment offered to the Lord. Then, last of all, he himself should partake of the

¹ Dīpa-dāna, verse 52, p. 98.

² This is naivedya-pradāna-vidhi. Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 107; G.P., given in S.R., p. 21; K.D., 4th paṭala, verses 53ff., pp. 99ff.

³ This is tāmbūla-pradāna-vidhi. G.P., given in S.R., p. 22. See also Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 107.

⁴ This is nīrājana-vidhi. G.P., collected in S.R., p. 22. See also Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, p. 107.

⁵ This is aparādha-kṣamāpāna-vidhi. Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, pp. 107-108; G.P., given in S.R., p. 22.

food taken by the Lord and drink the washings of his feet. Finally, he should mutter suitable prayers, recite verses, walk round the Lord and bow down to Him, with the final prayer to Him to accept out of compassion the leaves and flowers, fruits which have been offered to Him through devotion alone.¹

Thus, the devotee has broadly seven-fold duties to perform, viz.:—

- I. First, his daily duties—rising from the bed, brushing his teeth, bathing, performing oblations, and so on.
- II. Next, purifying his earthly body and making it fit for the worship of the Lord, consisting in seating himself, protecting himself from harm and interruption, destroying his present earthly body and assuming a new heavenly one.
- III. Next, purifying his body further by a series of nyāsas, like Kevala-mātrkā-nyāsa and the rest.
- IV. Next, purifying his body still further by prāṇāyāma.
- V. Next, performing the internal worship of the Lord, viz. meditation.
- VI. Next, performing japas.
- VII. And finally, performing the external worship of the idol, consisting in arranging the necessary utensils and objects properly, worshipping the conch-shell and so on, awakening the Lord, bathing and feeding Him and so on.

(3) SOME OF THE RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCES AND FESTIVALS OF THE SECT OF NIMBĀRKA.

(1) Ekādaśī-vrata. Every Vaiṣṇava should observe this vow, i.e. fast on the eleventh day of the moon, called the Lord's day (Hari-vāsara) during both the waning half and the waxing half.² This vrata is the best of all and the most favoured by the Lord and hence its proper and regular performance conduces to both worldly well-being and salvation.³

Now, the ekādaśī is to be observed in accordance with the kapāla-vedha method. The kapāla-vedha or ardha-rātrodaya doctrine is that every tithi or lunar day really commences with *midnight*. Hence if the

¹ G.P. (collected in S.R.), pp. 22-23. Cf. also Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, pp. 107-108.

² Sv. S., 13th taraṅga, pp. 148ff.; D.P., p. 10; Ś.N.V.N., pp. 1ff.

³ *Op. cit.*, 13th taraṅga, pp. 150ff.

ekādaśī does not commence with the midnight, but after that moment, this vow is not to be observed on that day, but on the following.¹

This method of determining the actual tithi holds good not only in the case of the ekādaśī vow, but is a general rule to be followed in the case of all religious observances and festivals.²

The kapāla-vedha or ardha-rātrodaya system is a peculiar tenet of the school of Nimbārka. There are generally three methods of determining tithis—viz. sūryodaya, aruṇodaya and ardha-rātrodaya (or kapāla-vedha). According to the first, a tithi begins with *sunrise*. It is followed by non-Vaiṣṇavas. According to the second, a tithi begins with the *break of dawn* (a few hours before sunrise). It is followed by Vaiṣṇavas of other sects.³ And, according to the third, as pointed out above, a tithi commences with *midnight*.⁴

The following are the duties of a Vaiṣṇava on the ekādaśī tithi: He should get up early in the morning and brush his teeth. The prohibition with regard to the brushing of teeth when one is fasting does not apply to a Vaiṣṇava, since, in his case, the brushing of teeth is a daily obligatory duty and unless he does so, he is not fit to worship the Lord.

He should then take some water, consecrate it by uttering the Śrī-Gopāla-mantra of eighteen syllables thrice and drink it; resolve to fast on that day⁵; and make offerings of flowers to the Lord. He should fast the whole day and night; avoid chewing betel-leaves, sleeping by day, having sensual enjoyment, and doing forbidden deeds; and spend his time in muttering prayers, singing the name of the Lord, listening to His name, worshipping and meditating on Him. He should, further, keep awake the whole night, worshipping the Lord, and reading holy books and so on.⁶

Throughout the year, a number of ceremonies and festivals are to be observed every month. Thus, in the month of Vaiśākha, the first month of the year, a Vaiṣṇava

¹ Sv. S., 13th taraṅga, pp. 156ff.; D.P., pp. 50ff.; preface to Ś.N.V.N., pp. 1ff.

² *Op. cit.*, 13th taraṅga, p. 161; preface to Ś.N.V.N., p. 3.

³ E.g. the sect of Baladeva. See p. 422 of the thesis, Part I.

⁴ Sv. S., 13th taraṅga, pp. 151ff.; D.P., pp. 50ff.; preface to Ś.N.V.N., pp. 1ff.

⁵ Saṃkalpa-karaṇa.

⁶ Sv. S., 13th taraṅga, pp. 203ff. For his duties on the Daśamī and Dvādaśī, see *op. cit.*, pp. 201–203, 218–221.

(2) should perform the Akṣaya-tṛtīyā-vrata, on the third day of the bright half of the moon.¹

(3) He should further celebrate the birthday of Jāhnavī, the river Ganges, on the seventh day of the bright half of the moon,² and

(4) perform the Nṛsiṃha-jayanti-vrata on the fourteenth day of the bright half of the moon.³

(5) In the month of Jyeṣṭha, the second month, he should first perform the Jala-pūjā, i.e. worship the lord in water.⁴

(6) Then he should observe the ceremony of Daśaharā on the tenth day of the bright half of the moon. He should bathe Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa with cold water mingled with sandal-paste, camphor and saffron and offer them specially cold refreshment. This Vrata is called "Daśaharā" because it removes ten kinds of sins, viz. three physical sins: theft, injuring others and violating the wife of another; four sins relating to speech: uttering harsh words, untruthfulness, backbiting and rambling; and three kinds of mental sins, viz.: hankering after the property of others, wishing them ill and attention towards improper objects.⁵

(7) In the month of Āṣāḍha, he should perform first the Kadamba-puṣpa-pūjā, i.e. worship the Lord with the kadamba-flower.⁶

(8) He should observe the festival of Rathotsava or the ceremony of putting the Lord on a chariot on the second day of the bright half of the moon⁷; and

(9) perform the festival of Śayanotsava or worship the Lord as lying on a snake on the ocean of milk⁸ and so on.

(10) One of the chief festivals of the Vaiṣṇavas is the festival of Janmāṣṭamī or the birthday celebration of the Lord. It is held in the month of Bhādra, on the eighth day of the dark half of the moon. There are two kinds of Janmāṣṭamī, kevala and jayanti. The former is to be performed every year, the latter only when the aṣṭamī-tithi

¹ For details, see Sv. S., 9th taraṅga, pp. 263ff.

² For details, see Sv. S., 19th taraṅga, p. 265.

³ For details, see Sv. S., 19th taraṅga, pp. 265ff.

⁴ For details, see Sv. S., 20th taraṅga, pp. 272ff.

⁵ Sv. S., 20th taraṅga, p. 275.

⁶ For details, see Sv. S., 21st taraṅga, pp. 277ff.

⁷ For details, see Sv. S., 21st taraṅga, p. 278.

⁸ For details, see Sv. S., 21st taraṅga, pp. 279ff.

For other religious observances and festivals, see Sv. S., 22nd taraṅgas ff., pp. 293ff; Ś.N.V.N., pp. 1ff.

comes to be connected with the star Rohiṇī, which does not happen every year.¹ In accordance with the general rule, it is to be observed on the aṣṭamī-tithi provided the tithi commences with midnight and not later than that.² The process of performing the celebration is as follows: The devotee should rise early in the morning, brush his teeth, and resolve to fast throughout the day. Then in the midday having bathed in pure water of a river, he should set up a lying-in chamber (sūtikā-gṛha) and strive to make it, as best as he can, like the original lying-in chamber of Devakī where Kṛṣṇa was born. Within that chamber, he should place the eight kinds of idols of Kṛṣṇa, viz. made of wood, metals, stone, gold, etc. and so on. The image of Devakī should be placed on the bed, and the new-born child Kṛṣṇa should be represented as suckling her breasts. The images of Yaśodā and Vāsudeva too should be placed there. Then Nanda, the cowherd, the cowherdess Yaśodā and Devakī should be worshipped with sandal, flowers, unhusked barley-corns, fruits and so on; after that the incarnations should be meditated on, and Aditi, the Mother of gods, should be worshipped, and so on.³

CONCLUSION.

We have considered four Bhedābheda schools, viz.:—

- (1) Svābhāvika bhedābheda-vāda of Nimbārka.
- (2) Viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda of Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha.
- (3) Aupādhika-bhedābheda-vāda of Bhāskara.
- (4) Acintya-bhedābheda-vāda of Baladeva.

There is a general agreement among these philosophers with regard to the nature and qualities of Brahman, the sentient and the non-sentient. But the difference among them consists in their views regarding the *relation* between these three entities. All of them admit both difference and non-difference to be equally real, but the vital question is here: How are we to *reconcile* difference and non-difference, plurality and Unity? Nimbārka accepts them both to be equally natural (svābhāvika) and perfectly compatible. Rāmānuja and

¹ Sv. S., 23rd taraṅga, p. 303.

² Op. cit., 23rd taraṅga, pp. 307ff.

³ Op. cit., 23rd taraṅga, pp. 319–321.

Śrīkaṇṭha try to reconcile them on the analogy of soul and body, which, though different, yet form an integral whole. Bhāskara regards them to be equally real, but he takes difference to be non-lasting though real (aupādhika) and non-difference to be both lasting and real. Baladeva frankly gives up the problem as inconceivable (acintya) and engages himself with religion rather than philosophy. He seems to suggest that instead of wasting our time and energy in trying to think out problems which are really unthinkable, it will be far better for us to *accept* what Revelation tells us, and engage ourselves with what lies within our own powers—viz. devotion and worship.

The problem of the relation between the One and the many, God and the world, is an eternal one, and hundreds of views have been advanced on this point. On the one hand, we have strict Non-dualistic doctrines of the type of Śaṅkara's Advaita-vāda, which completely identify the One and the many (i.e. assert that the One denies the many), and on the other hand, we have strict Dualistic doctrines of the type of Madhva's Dvaita-vāda which completely differentiate the One from the many. And between these two extreme types, there are various kinds of grades of doctrines which try to reconcile the One with the many.

The questions how and why the One becomes many and in what relation does it precisely stand to the many, are questions which will perhaps be never satisfactorily answered. But considering all things, the explanation given by Nimbārka seems to be very reasonable. Nimbārka elucidates his point, as we have seen, by the analogy of the cause-effect relation. The effect (or the part) is *different from* the cause (or the whole), since it has a peculiar nature and some peculiar functions of its own. The earthen pot, for example, is different from a mere lump of clay, in the sense that it has a peculiar shape of its own which the lump lacks, it has some peculiar functions of its own, viz. fetching water and so on, which the mere lump cannot perform. But, on the other hand, the effect is *non-different* from the cause, since it, as a modification of the cause, is nothing but the cause; for example, the earthen pot is non-different from the lump of clay, because after all it is nothing but clay, and depends for its very existence upon it.

The cause, on its side, is *different* from the effect, because the effect is not the whole of it, i.e. because it has a peculiar nature of its own which is not exhausted in the effect, but is something over and above it. The lump of clay e.g. is different from the pot, because it is

not *only* the pot, but hundred other things, cups, pitchers and so on. But, again, the cause is *non-different* from the effect, because it *is* the effect, so far as it goes. The lump of clay e.g. is *non-different* from the pot, because it is clay like the pot.

Thus, the cause-effect (or whole-part) relation is a relation of difference-non-difference, both of which are equally true.

The very same is the case with Brahman and the universe. The universe is *different* from Brahman, because it has a peculiar nature of its own, possessing as it does certain qualities which Brahman lacks (like non-intelligence, grossness and so on), and not possessing certain qualities which Brahman possesses (like all-pervasiveness and so on); while it is *non-different* from Brahman, because it is after all nothing but Brahman, arising from, sustained by, and reabsorbed in Brahman. Brahman, on His side, is *different* from the universe, because He is not exhausted in it, but possesses a transcendental nature of His own; while He is *non-different* from the universe because He is immanent in it, which, as His effect, is nothing but Brahman. Thus, Brahman is different from the universe as *transcendent*, non-different from it as *immanent*.

If we understand difference and non-difference in this sense of transcendency and immanency, no contradiction will be involved in taking difference and non-difference to be equally real and compatible. Non-difference does not mean here "absolute identity", like that between one pea and another, but it simply means "essential dependence of the universe on Brahman and the immanence of Brahman in the universe", while difference means "difference of nature between the universe and Brahman and the transcendence of Brahman over the universe". Hence everything is reconciled.

The second question: *Why* the One should become the many, is not a less puzzling one. Nimbārka points out that the creation of the world is but a mere sport (*līlā*) on the part of Brahman, and does not arise from any want on His part, since He is ever-satisfied and has His desires eternally fulfilled. But this cosmic sport is not absolutely purposeless or arbitrary, but it serves the purpose of justice, although it serves no purpose of Brahman Himself. It is regulated by moral demands, and the universe which is created by Brahman in mere sport is really created in strict accordance with the karmas of individuals themselves.

This seems to be the only possible explanation, if the Creator be admitted to be both self-sufficient and just. Of course, this solution,

too, if logically pushed farther lands us in a dilemma: Who is responsible for the first karmas of individuals which are responsible for their varying lots? God cannot be held to be responsible, for then He becomes partial. Nimbārka (in common with others) tries to get out of the difficulty by pointing out that the karmas are beginningless, and so is the creation of the world, in accordance with the maxim of seed and shoot (*viñānkura-nyāya*). The seed gives rise to the shoot, the shoot to the seed, the seed to the shoot and so on to infinity. It cannot be said whether the seed is the prior or the shoot and hence both are taken to be beginningless. In the very same manner, the karmas give rise to the world, the world to the karmas and so on to infinity, hence they must be taken to be beginningless.

Strict logic may demur at this way of solving the question, but it is doubtful whether such questions can be answered on the ground of strict logic alone. In any case, Nimbārka's explanation is a rational and creditable attempt at solving one of the most difficult problems of life, though he might not have the last say on the subject.

The third question is: *How* does the One become the many. Nimbārka points out that the One becomes the many through the projection of its powers, without losing its own Unity, integrity and essential nature, just as the spider weaves its web out of itself, yet itself remains unmodified. This is indeed an ingenious solution.

We find, therefore, that the doctrine of Nimbārka is a valuable contribution to the history of thought from the point of view of philosophy, and honestly tries to answer some of the fundamental questions of human existence.

From the point of view of religion also, the doctrine of Nimbārka scored no small a triumph, as is evident from a large number of followers it has even now in North India and Bengal. Of the four systems considered above, Bhāskara has no place for a personal religion or bhakti, Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha emphasise aiśvarya-pradhānā bhakti, or a distant relation of awe and reverence, while Nimbārka and Baladeva emphasise mādhyurya-pradhānā bhakti or an intimate relation of love and sweet comradeship. Although a man is at first overwhelmed by the grandeur and majesty of the Lord, yet he cannot remain at a distance from Him for long, but is irresistibly drawn nearer by a bond of mutual love and living companionship. Hence it is that the doctrine of Nimbārka has captured the hearts of thousands.

From the ethical point of view also, we find Nimbārka to be very broad-minded and rational. He insists not only on the external per-

formance of sacrifices and ceremonies, but equally on the inner purity and cultivation of the mind, and the ethical virtues of self-control, charity and the rest. He does not insist that in order to attain salvation one must give up society and one's stage of life or āśrama. He lays the greatest emphasis on the *spirit* with which one performs one's duties. A man who performs his duties in a disinterested and unselfish spirit is able to attain salvation, whether he be a householder or an ascetic.

We conclude, therefore, that the doctrine of Nimbārka has much to recommend itself from the points of view of philosophy, religion and ethics, as it tries to tackle the eternal problem of difference and non-difference from a new point of view, and encourages a relation of faith, love and intimacy between God and man.

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2. Śrī-Mukunda-śaraṇāgati-stotra.
3. Vedānta-ratna-mālā.
4. Vedānta-sāra-padya-mālā.
5. Vedānta-tattva-bindu.
6. Tattva-siddhānta-bindu.

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Bābāji, Lāladāsa. See Bhakta-mālā.

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1. Govinda-bhāṣya. See Brahma-sūtras with commentaries.
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4. Yamunā-stotram. See Stotra-ratnāvali, pp. 73-76.
5. Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā. See Brahma-sūtras with commentaries.

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4. Prapanna-kalpa-vallī. See Stotra-ratnāvalī, pp. 108-111.
5. Prātaḥ-smaraṇa-stotra. See Stotra-ratnāvalī, pp. 71-72.
6. Rādhāṣṭaka. See Laghu-stavāvalī, pp. 32-34.
7. Rahasya-mīmāṃsā. See Mantra-rahasya-ṣoḍaśī and Prapanna-kalpa-vallī.
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2. Guru-bhakti-mandākinī. See Laghu-stava-rāja-stotra.
3. Śrī-Mukunda-mahimākhya-stava. See Stotra-ratnāvalī.

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- Śrī-Mukunda-mahimākhya-stava. By Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava II. See ditto, pp. 51-65.
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- Śukadeva. See Svadharmāmṛta-sindhu.
- Sundarabhaṭṭa. See:
1. Dvaitādvaita-siddhānta-setukā. See Brahma-sūtras with commentaries: Siddhānta-jāhnavī.
 2. Mantrārtha-rahasya. See Mantra-rahasya-ṣoḍaśī.
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5. Cūlikā-upaniṣad.
6. Gopāla-pūrva-tāpanī-upaniṣad.
7. Jābāla-upaniṣad.
8. Kālāgni-rudra-upaniṣad.
9. Kaṭṭha-śruti-upaniṣad. See list B.
10. Kaṭṭha-upaniṣad.
11. Kauṣṭhiki-upaniṣad.
12. Kena-upaniṣad.
13. Mahā-upaniṣad.
14. Mahānārāyaṇa-upaniṣad.
15. Maitrī-upaniṣad.
16. Māṇḍūkya-upaniṣad.
17. Mudgala-upaniṣad.
18. Muktika-upaniṣad.
19. Muṇḍaka-upaniṣad.
20. Nārāyaṇa-upaniṣad.
21. Nṛsiṃha-pūrva-tāpanī-upaniṣad.
22. Nṛsiṃha-uttara-tāpanī-upaniṣad.
23. Praśna-upaniṣad.
24. Skanda-upaniṣad.
25. Subāla-upaniṣad.
26. Svetāśvatara-upaniṣad.
27. Taittirīya-upaniṣad.
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4. Śāṃkhāyana-brāhmaṇa. See Kauṣītaki-brāhmaṇa.
5. Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa.
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4. Manu-smṛti.
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Sūtras—Grhya. See Āśvalāyana-grhya-sūtra.

Sūtras—Śrauta. See:

1. Āpastamba-śrauta-sūtra.
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
ABBREVIATIONS USED

A.C.	Ācārya-carita.
A.K.	Amara-koṣa.
A.S.	Audumbara-saṃhitā.
A.S.T.	Adhyātma-sudhā-taraṅgiṇī.
A.Sm.	Atri-smṛti.
Agni.	Agni-purāṇa.
Ait.	Aitareya-upaniṣad.
Ait.Ar.	Aitareya-āraṇyaka.
Air.Br.	Aitareya-brāhmaṇa.
Ap.D.S.	Āpastamba-dharma-sūtra.
Ap.S.S.	Āpastamba-śrauta-sūtra.
As.G.S.	Āśvalāyana-gṛhya-sūtra.
Athar.V.	Atharva-veda-saṃhitā.
B.	Quoted by Baladeva.
B.M.	Bāla-manoramā.
B.M.C.	British Museum Catalogue.
B.M.G.	Bhakta-mālā.
Bh.	Quoted by Bhāskara.
Bh.B.	Bhāskara's Commentary on the Brahma-sūtras.
Bh.P.	Bhaviṣya-purāṇa.
Bha.P.	Bhāgavata-purāṇa.
Br.Su.	Brahma-sūtra.
Br.V.P.	Brahma-vaivarta-purāṇa.
Brahma B.	Brahma-bindu-upaniṣad.
Brh.	Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad.
C.M.B.	Chandoga-mantra-brāhmaṇa.
C.S.S.	Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series.
C.U.	A Concordance to the principal Upaniṣads and Bhagavad-gītā.
Cat.Cat.	Catalogus Catalogorum.
Chand.	Chāndogya-upaniṣad.
Cul.	Cūlikā-upaniṣad.
D.P.	Dikṣā-tattva-prakāśa.
D.S.	Daśa-śloki.
D.Sm.	Dakṣa-smṛti.
G.B.	Govinda-bhāṣya.
G.D.S.	Gautama-dharma-śāstra.
G.K.	Gauḍapāda-kārikā.

G.M.	Guru-bhakti-mandākinī.
G.P.	Gopāla-paddhati.
G.P.T.	Gopāla-pūrva-tāpanī-upaniṣad.
Gita.	Bhagavad-gītā.
Hari V.	Hari-varṣa.
I.O.C.	India Office Catalogue.
I.P.	Indian Philosophy, Vol. 2.
Isa.	Īśa-upaniṣad.
Jabala.	Jābāla-upaniṣad.
K.D.	Krama-dīpikā.
K.F.	Kūrma-purāṇa.
K.R.	Kālāgni-rudra-upaniṣad.
K.S.S.	Kaśi Sanskrit Series.
K.V.S.	Kātyāyana-vārtika-sūtra.
Katha.	Kāṭha-upaniṣad.
Kath. Sam.	Kāṭhaka-saṃhitā.
Kaus.	Kauṣītaki-upaniṣad.
Kena.	Kena-upaniṣad.
L.M.	Laghu-mañjūṣā.
L.N.	Laukika-nyāyāñjali.
L.S.	Laghu-stava-rāja-stotram.
L.S.V.	Laghu-stavāvali.
M.R.	Mantrārtha-rahasya.
M.R.S.	Mantra-rahasya-ṣoḍaśī.
M.Sam.	Maitrāyaṇī-saṃhitā.
M.W.	Sanskrit-English Dictionary.
Maha.	Mahābhārata, Asiatic Society edition.
Maha. Up.	Mahā-upaniṣad.
Mahanar.	Mahānārāyaṇa-upaniṣad.
Maitri.	Maitrī-upaniṣad.
Mand.	Māṇḍūkya-upaniṣad.
Manu.	Manu-saṃhitā.
Mudg.	Mudgala-upaniṣad.
Mukti.	Muktika-upaniṣad.
Mund.	Muṇḍaka-upaniṣad.
Nar.	Nārāyaṇa-upaniṣad.
N.B.	Number of sūtras according to Nimbārka's commentary.
Nr.Pur.	Nṛsiṃha-pūrva-tāpanī-upaniṣad.
Nr.Ut.	Nṛsiṃha-uttara-tāpanī-upaniṣad.

N.W.P.	A Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Private Libraries of the North-West Provinces.
Oudh. Mss.	List of Sanskrit Manuscripts discovered in Oudh.
P.K.	Prapanna-kalpa-valli.
P.R.	Prameya-ratnāvali.
P.S.M.	Prapanna-sura-taru-mañjarī.
Pan.	Pāṇini-sūtra.
Prasna.	Prasna-upaniṣad.
Pu.Mi.Su.	Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra.
R.	Quoted by Rāmānuja.
Rep. Bh.	Report on the Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Bombay Presidency. (Bhandarkar.)
Rep. Kath.	Report on the Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Bombay Presidency. (Kathavate.)
Rg. V.	Rg-veda-saṃhitā.
S.	Quoted by Śaṅkara.
S.A.M.	Śuklācārya-mata-saṃgraha.
S.B.	Śaṅkara's commentary on the Brahma-sūtras. Kasi Sans. Series.
S.J.	Siddhānta-jāhnavī.
S.K.	Śruty-anta-kalpa-valli.
S.N.	Śrī-Nimbārkācāryas tan matañ ca.
S.N.K.S.	Saviśeṣa-nirviśeṣa-Śrī-Kṛṣṇa-stava-rāja.
S.N.K.	Śrī-Nimbārka-mahā-munīndra.
S.N.V.N.	Śrī-Nimbārka-vratotsava-nirṇaya.
S.R.	Stotra-ratnāvali.
S.S.	Śruty-anta-sura-druma.
S.S.	Siddhānta-setukā.
Sab. B.	Śabara's commentary on the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra.
Sam. Ka.	Sāṃkhya-kārikā.
Sam. Su.	Sāṃkhya-sūtras.
Sat. Br.	Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa.
Sat. S. S.	Satyāsādhya-śrāuta-sūtra.
Sd. K.	Siddhānta-kaumudī.
Sd.R.	Siddhānta-ratna. By Baladeva.
SK.	Quoted by Śrīkaṇṭha.
SK. B.	Śrīkaṇṭha's commentary on the Brahma-sūtras.
Skanda.	Skanda-upaniṣad.
Sri. B.	Śrī-bhāṣya. Madras edition.
Sv. S.	Sva-dharmāmṛta-sindhu.
Svadhar. MS.	Sva-dharmādhva-bodha. Manuscript.
Svet.	Svetāśvatara-upaniṣad.
Subala.	Subāla-upaniṣad.

T.P.	Tattva-prakāśikā.
Tait.	Taittiriya-upaniṣad.
Tait. Ar.	Taittiriya-āraṇyaka.
Tait. Br.	Taittiriya-brāhmaṇa.
Tait. Sam.	Taittiriya-saṃhitā.
Tand. Br.	Tāṇḍya-mahā-brāhmaṇa.
V.C.	A Vedic Concordance.
V.D.	Vedānta-dīpa.
V.K.	Vedānta-kaustubha.
V.K.P.	Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā.
V.K.V.	Vedānta-kārikāvali.
V.M.	Vedānta-ratna-mālā.
V.P.	Viṣṇu-purāṇa.
V.P.S.	Vedānta-pārijata-saurabha.
V.R.M.	Vedānta-ratna-mañjūṣā.
V.S.	Vedānta-sāra.
V.Sm.	Vaśiṣṭha-smṛti.
V.Su.	Vaiśeṣika-sūtras.
Vasu.	Vāsudeva-upaniṣad.
Ved. In.	Vedic Index of Names and Subjects.
Ved. Pari.	Vedānta-paribhāṣā.
Vj. S.	Vājasaneyā-saṃhitā.
Y.S.	Yoga-sūtra.
Y.M.D.	Yatindra-mata-dīpikā.
Yaj. Sm.	Yājñavalkya-smṛti.



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